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Abstract
Impact assessment (ia) has attracted considerable attention in the worlds of research and prac-
tice. ia is discussed extensively and promoted widely as a means to enhance the rationalisation,
control and coordination of policy-making. However, at the same time, there has also been
disagreement based on whether ia is seen to reect one single, or multiple rationales.is
has, in turn, led to debates about whether particular ia experiences reect one or a mixture
of motives.is thesis therefore explores whether the dierent ambitions or logics that ia
intends to promote can be seen as complementary, whether one dominates, or whether they
are contradictory. By looking at the European Union’s ia system— through an in-depth study
of ve ias — this thesis nds that while the logic of enhanced control plays a dominant role
throughout the policy-making process — particularly during the later policy-making stages —
the ambitions or logics of enhanced rationalisation and coordination also play distinct roles.
is thesis thereby contributes to the debates about the use of ‘meta-instruments’ to
address the three policy challenges of how to choose the ‘best’ policy option; how to steer
public administrations; and how to coordinate policies across institutional sub-units. In doing
so, the thesis departs from earlier studies on ia two signicant ways. First, it examines ia
as a set of procedural rules, therefore moving away from a focus on the role of the ia report
in advancing (or failing to advance) the ambitions of enhanced control, rationalisation or
coordination. Second, instead of examining each ia ambition or logic in isolation, this thesis
acknowledges a multiplicity of ambitions.is multiplicity is not an aspect of diusion across
jurisdictions or because of policy ‘context’; rather, it is a feature of the motives and ambitions
of actors interacting and changing at dierent stages in the policy-making process.
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I Introduction
Impact assessment (ia) has attracted considerable attention in the worlds of research and prac-
tice. ia is discussed extensively and promoted widely as a means to enhance the rationalisation,
control and coordination of policy-making. However, at the same time, there has also been
disagreement based on whether ia is seen to reect one single, or multiple rationales.is
has, in turn, led to debates about whether particular ia experiences reect one or a mixture
of motives.is thesis therefore explores whether the dierent ambitions or logics that ia
intends to promote can be seen as complementary, whether one dominates, or whether they
are contradictory. By looking at the European Union’s ia system— through an in-depth study
of ve ias — this thesis nds that while the logic of enhanced control plays a dominant role
throughout the policy-making process — particularly during the later policy-making stages —
the ambitions or logics of enhanced rationalisation and coordination also play distinct roles.
is thesis thereby contributes to the debates about the use of ‘meta-instruments’ to address
the three policy challenges of: how to choose the ‘best’ policy option; how to steer public
administrations; and how to coordinate policies across institutional sub-units. In doing so, the
thesis departs from earlier studies on ia in two signicant ways. First, it examines ia as a set of
procedural rules, therefore moving away from a focus on the role of the ia report in advancing
(or failing to advance) the ambitions of enhanced control1, rationalisation2 or coordination.3
Second, instead of examining each ia ambition or logic in isolation, this thesis acknowledges
1See: E. Posner, “Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benet Analysis”, Chicago Law Review, 2001 or G. Rowe,
“Tools for control of political and administrative agents: ia and Governance in the eu”, in H. Hofmann and A. H.
Tuerk (eds.) eu Administrative Governance, 2006.
2See: N. Lee and C. Kirkpatrick, “Integrated impact assessment”, Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal,
March 2006 or C. Cecot, R. Hahn, and A. Renda, “A Statistical Analysis of the Quality of the Impact Assessment
in the European Union”, aei Centre for Regulatory and Market Studies, 2007.
3For example, coordination is referred to in: oecd, Indicators of Regulatory Management System, 2009 or
C. Radaelli, “Diusion without convergence: how political context shapes the adoption of regulatory impact
assessment”, Journal of European Public Policy, 2005 or A. Meuwese, Impact Assessment in eu Lawmaking, Kluwer
Law International,e Hague, 2008.
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a multiplicity of ambitions.is multiplicity is not an aspect of diusion across jurisdictions
or because of policy ‘context’4; rather it is a feature of the motives and ambitions of actors
interacting and changing at dierent stages in the policy-making process. e empirical
evidence for this thesis is derived from the eu’s ia process. As one of the most comprehensive
ia processes in the oecd, the eu ia is an amalgamation of tools and processes developed over
the course of 30 years.5 Furthermore, in seeking to overcome several public policy challenges,
the eu’s consolidated ia process also incorporates the three theoretical ambitions of enhanced
rationalisation, control and coordination, making it an ideal subject for this research.6e
amalgamation of tools and processes to achieve dierent ambitions also provides the basis
to advance the debate between ia proponents and ia sceptics. Based on dierent theoretical
logics, ia sceptics rely on the arguments which oen underpin the logic of enhanced control,
while ia proponents rely on the logics of enhanced rationalisation and coordination. As a
result, ia proponents call for ever-improved ia processes, analytical tools, and the insulation
of ia from political preferences. In doing so, proponents claim ia can and is overcoming long
established policy-making challenges.7 Sceptics on the other hand claim that the ia ambitions
are ‘elusive’8 and will likely always be subservient to ‘political considerations’.9
Making the case for recognising the limitations of ia, while also acknowledging the potential
of ia to contribute to public policy-making, this thesis goes beyond a simple review of ia
reports to examine one single logic.e thesis begins by utilising a policy process perspective
to examine a large sample of ia reports rather than a perspective that focuses on outputs or
outcomes.is provides a number of initial trends ahead of a detailed examination of ve
ias in the form of case studies.e case studies allow each theoretical ambition to be traced
across the policy-making process and answer the question: are ia ambitions complementary,
does one dominate, or are they contradictory?
4See: C. Radaelli, “Better Regulation and the Lisbon Agenda”, paper delivered to European Evaluation Society
Conference, London, 2006.
5As the following section will illustrate, the eu ia system builds on the Simplication of the Legislation on the
Internal Market (slim) project, the work conducted by the Business Environment Simplication Task Force
(best), the Business Impact Test, Consultations and the Environmental Impact Assessment.
6is is a similar to the typology of instrumental usage, political usage and communicative usages developed
in: A. Meuwese, Impact Assessment in eu Lawmaking, Kluwer Law International,e Hague, 2008.
7As do: N. Lee and C. Kirkpatrick, “Integrated impact assessment”, op. cit.
8As stipulated by: C. Radaelli, “Better Regulation and the Lisbon Agenda”, op. cit. or more recently ia ambitions
have been stipulated to be a function of the condition behind the use of ia as outlined in: C. Dunlop, M.Maggetti,
C. Radaelli, D. Russels, “e many uses of regulatory impact assessment: A meta-analysis of eu and uk case
studies”, Regulation and Governance, 2012.
9H. Heclo and A. Wildavsky,e private government of public money, McMillan, 1974.
10
JohannesM.Wolff Introduction
1 Public Policy Problems and Impact Assessment
Public policy is about “anything that government chooses to do or not to do”10, developed
through a “set of interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or group of actors concerning
the selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a specied situation”.11 is
wide-ranging concept of public policy highlights a number of challenges, including: how
to identify the ‘right’ or ‘best’ policy option, how can political actors ensure their ocials
implement their policies (or steer their administrations) and how can policies as well as
actors be coordinated across institutional sub-units. In search of solutions to these challenges,
policymakers around the globe have embraced ia.12
However, while ia holds out the promise that — as a procedural tool to manage information
— it can overcome these three public policy challenges, ia also risks becoming all things
to all people.13 e sceptics argue that procedural tools have been tried before and failed.
e ia proponents, or optimists, argue that ia has both improved the analytical methods
and procedural rules that underpin the policy-making process leading to ‘better decisions’.
In particular, proponents argue that ia sets out a problem-solving model which, if only
implemented properly (e.g. isolated from political preferences and throughmore sophisticated
analytical tools), can yield ‘better’ policy solutions. Sceptics on the other hand argue that
decision and policymakers will always “put community [or cultural / social values] above
policy”14 therefore condemning ex-ante tools, such as ia, to failure.15 With several ambitions
to argue over, sceptics and optimists focus on the ia ambition or logic which in their view has
been successful, or conversely has been a failure. In particular, proponents of ia focus on the
ideal of enhanced rationalisation, whereas sceptics focus on the logic of enhanced control and
how this limits or constrains the logics of rationalisation and coordination. In doing so, both
sceptics and optimists emphasise the extent to which iameets specic objectives or ambitions
10T. Dye, Understanding Public Policy, 7th Edition, Englewood Clis, 1999.
11W. Jenkins, Policy Analysis: A Political and Organizational Perspective, Palgrave MacMillan Press, 1978.
12See: C. Kirkpatrick, D. Parker, and Y. Zhang, “Regulatory impact assessment in developing and transition
economies: a survey of current practice”, Public money and management, op. cit.; and S. Jacobs, Current trends in
regulatory impact analysis: the challenges of mainstreaming ria into policy-making, Jacobs and Associates, 2006.
13For example numerous objectives are identied in: oecd, Indicators of Regulatory Management System, 2009
or C. Radaelli, “Diusion without convergence: how political context shapes the adoption of regulatory impact
assessment”, Journal of European Public Policy, 2005.
14H. Heclo and A. Wildavsky,e private government of public money, op. cit.
15ibid.
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with a focus on the output, in particular the ia report. Sceptics and optimists therefore place
little emphasis on ia as a procedural tool as well as the tensions and synergies of dierent
objectives or ambitions.16
So what are the widely diagnosed public policy challenges that ias are supposed to address?
e literature points to three. First, the problem of identifying the ‘right’ policy option is about
overcoming the challenge of incomplete information.e diculty in making public policy
decisions lies in the “impossibility for a single, isolated individual to reach any high degree of
rationality”.17 Coping strategies tomanage incomplete information have been coined ‘bounded
rationality’ and incorporated into ideas of ‘incrementalism’.18 While proponents of ex-ante
tools— such as ia—seek to go beyond the limits of so called ‘techno-bureaucratic rationality’19,
sceptics point out that attempts to enhance rationalisation — for example through the public
management reform initiatives of the 1980s and 1990s — have had limited success.20 Indeed,
the principles that underpin the ideas of ‘bounded rationality’ and ‘incrementalism’ also
challenge ex-ante tools that assume policies can be designed to address specic problems and
that central decision-makers can use ‘better’ information to make more ‘rational’ policies.21
e lack of a single, unitary, decision-maker and an environment where decision-making is
discontinuous further exacerbates the challenge of more ‘rational’ policies. As a result, policy-
making is marked by a specic type of ‘rationality’ which — according to ia proponents —
limits informational learning.22 Undeterred by the challenge to ‘rationality’, supporters of tools
and processes to make ‘better decisions’ promote ia as the most recent incarnation of tools
16While some studies acknowledge various ambitions or objectives, these overemphasize the ias role and are
framed within the policy context/condition, not by policy-making stage. See: A. Meuwese, Impact Assessment
in eu Lawmaking, Kluwer Law International,e Hague, 2008; and more recently C. Dunlop, M. Maggetti,
C. Radaelli, D. Russels, “e many uses of regulatory impact assessment: A meta-analysis of eu and uk case
studies”, op. cit.
17H. Simon, “A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organisations”, Administrative Behaviour,
1947.
18C. Lindblom, “Still muddling through not there yet”, Public Administration Review, Vol. 39, 1979 or more
recently B. Jones, “Bounded Rationality”, in Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 2, 1999.
19T. O. McGarity, Reinventing Rationality:e Role of Regulatory Analysis in the Federal Bureaucracy, Cambridge
University Press, 1991.
20D. Moynihan, “Managing For Results in Statement Government: Evaluating a Decade of Reform”, Public
Administration Review, Vol. 66 No 1, 2006.
21oecd, Regulatory Impact Analysis: Best Practices in oecd Countries (Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development), Paris/Washington, 1997.
22See: P. Sabatier and H. Jenkins-Smith, Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach, Westview
Press, 1993 and M. Nilsson, A. Jordan, J. Turnpenny, J. Hertin, B. Nykvist, and D. Russel, “e use and non-use
of policy appraisal tools in public policy making: an analysis of three European countries and the European
Union”, in Policy Sciences, Vol. 41, No. 4, 2008.
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which are over time leading to improvements in how governments express “not only what
is, but also what ought to be”.23 Sceptics, however, point out that improvements to spending
procedures have and continue to face the challenge that governments “put community [or
cultural / social values] above policy.”24
e second policy challenge is about how political actors ensure their policy preferences
are implemented and is demonstrated by the principal-agent problem.25e challenge lies
in the information asymmetry between the decision and policymaker (or expert), where the
decision-maker seeks a variety of means to monitor policymakers and ensure his or her policy
preferences are implemented. Solutions designed to limit policy dri include control processes
known as ‘police patrol’ or ‘re-alarms’.26 However, these solutions are not without diculties.
While they provide decision-makers with a monitoring mechanism, control processes depend
on the credibility of decision-makers to punish policymakers for non-compliance.27 Ironically,
sceptics have pointed out that as decision-makers have improved monitoring mechanisms and
the information asymmetry is reduced they also place more trust in policymakers.is in turn
increases their willingness to agree policy proposals, not necessarily because they reect his or
her preference.28e challenge is further exacerbated when there is no single unied decision-
maker and procedural controls become amechanism for dierent decision-makers to inuence
or control each other. Procedural ‘stacking of the deck’29 then becomes a multi-purposed
mechanism, exacerbating the challenge of resolving information asymmetry between dierent
actors. Nevertheless, proponents of ex-ante assessment tools argue that a combination of
procedural rules and increased information requirements does allow decision-makers to
control policy, noting a reduction in the volume of new rules as a success.30 Building on this,
ia is promoted as themost recent tool for helping decision-makers to achieve their objectives,31
23H. Heclo and A. Wildavsky,e private government of public money, op. cit.
24ibid.
25W. Niskanen, “Bureaucrats and politicians”, in Journal of Law and Economics, 1975.
26M. McCubbins and T. Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms”, in
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1984.
27G. Miller, “e Political Evolution of the Principal Agenteory”, in Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 8,
2005.
28E. Posner, “Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benet Analysis”, op. cit.
29G. Miller, “e Political Evolution of the Principal Agenteory”, op. cit.
30G. R. Baldwin & C. G. Veljanovski, “Regulation by Cost-Benet Analysis”, Public Administration, Vol. 62,
1984.
31Note:e oecd is recommending improvements in procedural rules / controls to enhance the ‘quality’ of
analysis. See: oecd, Indicators of Regulatory Management System, 2009.
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with a particular emphasis on the need to establish the right institutional incentives, sanctions
and set-up of processes.32
e third challenge — how to coordinate across institutional sub-units — is about limiting
organised anarchies from making decisions in isolation and therefore forgoing the potential
for mutual benets.33 Formal and informal coordination mechanisms depend on a balance
between self-interest, control of specic action resources — such as budgetary control or
power of initiative — and the potential for ‘mutual benets’.34 Uncoordinated policy-making
therefore diminishes the eectiveness of policy when “designed by specialized sub-units within
ministerial organisation, which [avoid / undermine] the established policies and interests of
other ministerial units”.35 However, while ia processes are the most recent promise of shared
utility when decision and policymakers work with actors outside their individual ministerial
units (or work toward positive coordination), the challenges of increased coordination remain
the same.36 In particular, the level of coordination is limited by the level of benets that can
be achieved, balanced against the cost of taking advantage of “the joint strategy options of
several ministerial portfolios”.37
As suggested in the preceding paragraphs, tools and processes designed to advance policy
decisions are not new. ia represents the most recent incarnation of a long list of methods
and tools intended to solve public policy challenges. ia supporters oen draw parallels to
the processes of budget management, arguing that regulatory ‘spending’ should be subject to
similar rules and scrutiny as do tax and spend.38e argument is that in a world where policy
proposals are developed in a market — “complete with the supply and demand of policy and
regulation”39 — a mix of analytical and procedural rules are needed to advance the ‘public
good’ by kerbing the enthusiasm of “decision-makers to maximise their rent.”40 However,
32ibid.
33M. Cohen, J. March, and J. Olsen, “A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice”, Administrative Science
Quarterly, Vol. 17 1972.
34F. Scharpf, “Games Real Actors Could Play: Positive and Negative Coordination in Embedded Negotiations”,
Journal ofeoretical Politics, 1994.
35ibid.
36T. O. McGarity, Reinventing Rationality:e Role of Regulatory Analysis in the Federal Bureaucracy, op. cit.
37F. Scharpf, “Games Real Actors Could Play: Positive and Negative Coordination in Embedded Negotiations”,
op. cit.
38J. F. Morrall; Controlling Regulatory Costs:e Use of Regulatory Budgeting, Unclassied oecd document, Public
management Occasional Papers, Regulatory Management and Reform Series No. 2, 1992.
39G. Stigler, “eeory of Economic Regulation”,e Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 2. No. 1, 1971.
40S. Peltzman, “Toward A More Generaleory of Regulation”, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 19, No 2,
1976.
14
JohannesM.Wolff Introduction
sceptics point out that this comparison assumes that the challenge of controlling tax and
spend, such as “increased budget decits, can be [and have been] solved through procedural
changes.”41 Indeed, the experience of budget reforms has shown a number of limitations for
both procedural rules and analytical tools.42
e diculty with ‘process solutions’ is that while they can enhance the implementation
of decisions they “cannot in themselves achieve dramatic change, but also because change
at the margin and to revisit past themes is an established characteristic of budget reforms.”43
As a result, reform has oen resulted in tinkering around the edges, as governments “put
community [or cultural / social values] above policy.”44Additionally, the challenge of using
analytical tools, such as cost-benet analysis, to contribute to public policy decisions has been
well documented.45 While the application of so-called ‘economic rationalism’ seeks to apply
a technical (mostly quantitative) assessment, it does so at the expense of less (quantiable)
or even unquantiable values.46 Paradoxically, with the rise of the ‘regulatory state’47 there
has been a mix of ‘decentred’ or ‘poly-centred’ regulatory regimes and a push for increased
centralisation of the ‘regulatory state’ (e.g. through prescriptive processes and tools).48 Against
the backdrop of the diculties with procedural and analytical methods, so-called ‘smart’
regulatory techniques are intended to be pragmatic, exible and pluralistic,49 while there is a
centralisation of regulatory functions50 with an “incessant drive towards synoptic legibility:
installing systems of comprehensive reporting and surveillance over numerous social spheres;
the consequential pressure to standardize and to codify, which is to make explicit what had
hitherto been tacit”.51
41P. Joyce, “e Reiterative Nature of Budget Reform: Is there Anything New in Federal Budgeting?”, in Public
Budgeting & Finance, Fall 1993.
42ibid.
43ibid.
44H. Heclo and A. Wildavsky,e private government of public money, op. cit.
45C. D. Foster & M. E. Beesley “Estimating the Social Benet of Constructing An Underground Railway in
London”, in Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Vol. 126, 1963.
46C. Hood, “Emerging Issues in Public Administrations”, in Public Administration, Vol. 73, 1995.
47G. Majone, “e rise of the regulatory state in Europe”, in West European Politics, 1994.
48J. Black, “Tensions in the regulatory state”, in Public Law, 2007.
49N. Gunningham and P. Grabovsky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy, Clarendon Press,
Oxford 1998.
50oecd, Indicators of Regulatory Management System, 2009.
51M. Moran,e British Regulatory State: High Modernism and Hyper-Innovation, Oxford University Press,
2004.
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Recognising past and current challenges to public policy processes and analytical meth-
ods, this thesis builds on the wider literature. While ia is oen associated with cost-benet
analysis and risk assessments, it is important to note that ia diers from previous methods
and analytical tools, claiming to provide a more ‘comprehensive’ means to enhance the logics
of enhanced rationalisation, control and coordination. In amalgamating processes and an-
alytical tools — such as cost-benet analysis — it is important to note that ia, particularly
in the context of the European Union, is designed to be a mix of procedural and analytical
tools. ia incorporates a number of ex-ante analytical methods, such as cost-benet analysis,
risk assessments, multi-criteria analysis, cost-eectiveness analysis, and value of life years
analysis.52 ese methods form a toolkit to conduct the analytical work over the course of
the ia process. e amalgamation of processes, methods and ambitions has resulted in ia
being promoted as the most recent solution to various policy challenges.erefore, rather
than examining the development (or lack) of specic processes or analytical tools, this thesis
examines ia as a set of amalgamated procedural and analytical methods which incorporates a
number of — oen previously tried — solutions to public policy challenges. Accordingly, this
thesis seeks to go beyond the analysis of one single tool or process and to explore the interface
of various processes and methods to determine whether this ‘muddies the water’ (or ia being
all things to all people) or whether the ambitions can operate individually or jointly.
With the promise of advancing solutions to a number of challenges, jurisdictions around
the world have sought to incorporate the various tools and methods that make up ex-ante
assessment tools such as ia. By mixing information provisions and procedures, policymakers
seek to achieve more than one ambition.e desire to achieve several ambitions is not new.
Going back to 1946, when the United States introduced the Administrative Procedure Act
(apa), the requirement for American policymakers to issue notices explaining the need for
regulatory interventions had numerous objectives.53 In reaction to the expansion of the Federal
Government under the ‘New Deal’, these public notices provided a means to enhance the
analysis of regulation or rationalisation, control of the Federal Government by Congress and
the coordination of agencies. Today, oecd countries have sought to adopt ex-ante assessment
tools and processes such as ia, resulting in a myriad of tools and processes to achieve dierent
52Commission of the European Communities, Communication on Impact Assessment, com (2002) 276.
53C. Radaelli, “Regulating Rule-Making via Impact Assessment”, in Governance: An International Journal of
Policy, Administration, and Institutions, Vol. 23, No. 1, 2010.
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ambitions (oen, but not always branded as ia).54 is variety has made ex-ante tools, in
particular ia, vulnerable to the criticism that its objectives are ‘elusive’ and context specic,
“allowing policymakers to shi their interests and objectives over time”.55
e result is a number of questions, including: are the co-existing ambitions which ia
seeks to achieve complementary, does one dominates others, or are they are contradictory?
Is ia overpromising by seeking to enhance rationalisation, control and coordination of the
policy-making process? Little research has looked at ia as a process, nor at the potential for
its objectives or ambitions to vary over the course of the policy-making process. As indicated
above, while ia is not solely about cost-benet analysis, it is oen associated with it and
therefore opinion is divided between the proponents who believe that a simple application of
its methodology should provide the necessary information for decision and policymakers
to develop policy, and the sceptics who believe that cost-benet analysis is too narrow and
incompatible with the complexities of the policy-making process.56
e purpose of this thesis is therefore to go beyond an examination of individual assess-
ment tools, or describing the assessment procedure or reviewing the quality of ia based on
documentary analyses of the resulting statements.57 Instead, this thesis applies a three-staged
methodological approach to explore ia ambitions across the policy-making process. By seg-
menting ia into a set of procedural and analytical steps with three distinct stages, this thesis
uses a policy stages approach to examine whether the ia ambitions of enhanced rationalisation,
control and coordination interact in a complementary or contradictory manner. Although
a staged methodological approach represents an ideal-type model of the policy process, a
separation of the policy process into identiable steps provides a dynamic, heuristic approach
to focus on the contributions and interaction of dierent actors and institutions at distinctly
dierent stages in the policy process.58is also provides an approach to compare dierent
ias by comparing and contrasting each ia stage within an individual policy-making process
but also against other ia policy-making processes.
54See: oecd, Indicators of Regulatory Management System, op. cit. and C. Radaelli, “Diusion without conver-
gence: how political context shapes the adoption of regulatory impact assessment”, op. cit.
55C. Radaelli, “Better Regulation and the Lisbon Agenda”, op. cit.
56A. Sen, “e Discipline of Cost-benet Analysis”, in Journal of Legal Studies, June 2000.
57For example: N. Lee and C. Kirkpatrick, “Integrated impact assessment”, op. cit.
58W. Jann and K. Wegrich, “eories of the Policy Cycle”, in F. Fischer, G. J. Miller and M. S. Sidney, Handbook
of Public Policy Analysis:eory, Politics and Methods, crc Press, 2007.
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e empirical evidence for this thesis is derived from one of the most comprehensive and
systematic ia processes amongst oecdmembers, the European Union’s ia. Ranked highly by
practitioners in such areas as ‘institutional capacity for managing regulatory reform’, ‘formal
and open consultations’ and ‘due process in rule-making procedures’,59 the European Union’s
ia system is considered one of the most comprehensive ia systems, “paying attention to social
and environmental aspects” as well as “economic analysis”.60 Along with the methodological
approach for this thesis, the European Union’s ia system is presented in more detail in the
fourth section of this chapter — Research Methodology — and in Chapterree.61
e remainder of this chapter is divided into three sections. e rst section provides
an overview of the European Union ia, arguing that ia evolved as a tool to solve a number
of public policy challenges. In particular the eu ia was developed as a response to the rise
of the ‘regulatory state’ — whereby the administration “relies on regulation, rather than
public ownership, planning or centralised administration”62 — and the need to balance two
political goals or ambitions (i.e. sustainable development and economic growth).e second
section provides an overview of the methodology, including the conceptual framework used
to divide the policy process and trace the ia procedure, as well as a brief overview of the
empirical evidence used to test the research question of whether the ambitions of enhanced
rationalisation, control and coordination are complimentary or contradictory. Finally, the
third section provides a brief conclusion to set the scene for the second chapter which provides
the theoretical underpinnings to examine the empirical evidence in this study.
59See: oecd—Regulatory Policy Committee, “Indicators of Regulatory Management Systems”, Paris, 2009.
60O. Fritsch, C. Radaelli, L. Schreer and A. Renda, “Regulatory Quality in the European Commission and the
uk: Old questions and new ndings”, Centre for European Policy Studies, January 2012.
61Based on an assessment of: oecd, Dra oecd Recommendation on Regulatory Policy and Governance,
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/49/43/48087250.pdf (June 2011) and the resources spent on eu ia where on an
average of 50 ias per year, assuming one ia requires about 2.5 months Full Time Equivalent person, and taking
into account a survey of ia support units which indicated roughly 40 es individuals providing support and
training to the ia system across the Commission, provides a total annual gure of roughly 50 full time individuals
working on ias per year. Rough estimates of sta costs put the cost gure at around e6 million annually.is
does not include the cost of external contractors or studies although this is considered to be substantial (see C.
Radaelli and AMeuwese, “Hard Questions, Hard Solutions: Proceduralisation through Impact Assessment in
the eu”, inWestern European Politics, Vol. 33, 2010).
62G. Majone, “e rise of the regulatory state in Europe”, op. cit.
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2 European Union Impact Assessment Process and its
Objectives
is thesis argues that the ia ambitions of enhanced rationalisation, control and coordination
play distinct roles throughout the policy-making process by looking specically at the Euro-
pean Union’s ia system. As noted above, the empirical evidence for this thesis is based on the
European Union’s ia which is ranked highly by practitioners.63 It also incorporates a wide
range of ambitions, making it an ideal case to explore the interaction and variation of actors
and their ambitions over the course of the policy-making process.
is section provides an introduction to the European Union’s ia process and how its
development resulted in an amalgamation of processes, methods and tools. It is divided into
three parts, arguing that while the introduction of a consolidated ia system in 2003 resulted
in the amalgamation of various methods and processes, this amalgamation also meant the
inclusion of a number of objectives and ambitions.e rst part outlines the tools developed
to improve policy and enhance outcomes, followed by the processes to coordinate and improve
legislation, ending with an overview of the various overlapping objectives or ambitions of the
ia system.
Although the objectives outlined in the European Union ia blueprint — the ia Guidelines
— are not explicitly framed within the ambitions or logics of enhanced rationalisation, control
or coordination, they do fall into three broad themes which are reected in the logics outlined
earlier as well as the wider ia and ‘meta-instrument’ literature.64e themes are:
• ia as a tool to improve the regulatory environment — or as a means for enhanced
rationalisation — by promoting greater transparency, balanced choice of legislative
63See: oecd—Regulatory Policy Committee, “Indicators of Regulatory Management Systems”, Paris, 2009.
64Similar to the typology of instrumental usage, political usage and communicative usages in: A. Meuwese,
Impact Assessment in EU Lawmaking, Kluwer Law International,e Hague, 2008, or ideas of control, meta-
regulation and organizational rationality referred to in: H. Rothstein and J. Downer “Renewing dera: Exploring
the emergence of Risk-Based policy-making in UK central Government”, Public Administration, 2012, and C.
Dunlop, M. Maggetti, C. Radaelli, D. Russels, “e many uses of regulatory impact assessment: A meta-analysis
of EU and UK case studies”, op. cit.
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instruments and improved assessment of future impacts as well as improved assessment
of legislative quality;65
• ia as a tool to simplify the regulatory environment and support the Lisbon Agenda66
— or provide a means for enhanced control — by ensuring various actors, including
the Commission, European Parliament and Council work to simplify the Aqcuis,67
removing unneeded proposals and legislation; and
• ia as a means to ensure minimum standards for consultation68 — or enhanced coordi-
nation — of actors during the legislative processes.
ese themes reect the process and policy challenges of the 1980s and 1990s, in particular:
to provide advice to promote economic growth and sustainable development (or achieve an
overall policy objective); to improve the processes and analytical basis of decisions in reaction
to the rise of the regulatory state (or steer the regulatory Commission); and to coordinate
actors in and outside the eu institutions.e following section picks up each of the above
themes, arguing that the eu developed analytical tools to advance the ambition of enhanced
rationalisation and improving the ‘regulatory environment’. However, improved analytical
tools also served as a means to advance the ambition of enhanced control (or inuence) over
policy outcomes, in particular to promote ‘economic growth’ and ‘sustainable development’.
In addition to analytical tools, the eu also developed procedural steps to enhance the coor-
dination of actors and policies. In so doing, the eu institutions, in particular the Commission,
sought to strengthen their control over the policy-making process, which was a reaction to
the perceived challenge of the ‘regulatory state’. As a result, the comprehensive ia system
introduced in 2003 amalgamated overlapping tools and objectives, creating an ia process that
risked being all things to all people.
65European Parliament, Council, Commission, Inter-institutional Agreement of 22 December 1998 on Common
Guidelines for the Quality of Draing of Community legislation, Ocial Journal of the European Communities
(ojec) 1999, 73/1.
66Commission of the European Communities,e Community Lisbon Programme: A Strategy Fore Simpli-
cation of the Regulatory Environment, com (2005) 535.
67Commission of the European Communities,e Implementation of the Framework Action “Updating And
Simplifyinge Community Acquis”, com (2004) 432 nal.
68Commission of the European Communities, Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue —
General principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission, com (2002)
704 nal.
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Analytical Tools to Improve Policy and Enhance Preferred Outcomes
e European Union’s ia system has two origins, a method developed by Directorate General
for Enterprise and Industry (dg entr) and one by dg of Environment (dg env). Each dg
established its own analytical tools and methods going back over 20 years and both tools
were designed to support the policy-making of each dg’s policy domain (i.e. economic
development and environmental protection respectively).e development of both methods
reect the ambitions of enhanced control and rationalisation, in so far that they were designed
to support the drive towards the Single Market and the need to develop tools for thinking
about proposals in a more coherent and structured manner (tools which would support the
political objective of achieving the Single Market). In particular, the methods reected the
need to put forward proposals that would be supported by Member States (mirroring the
idea of enhanced rationalisation). At the same time, dg entr and dg env also sought to
enhance their control over the policy process, developing tools to support the ambition of
some Member States to ensure specic policy objectives (such as economic growth) were
translated into European policy (reecting the idea of seeking a means to justify policy or to
‘stack the deck’ in favour of nding evidence to support specic policy preferences). dg entr’s
Business Impact Assessment procedure and dg env’s Environmental Impact Assessment
Directive respectively were therefore the founding tools of the ia system introduced in 2003,
each specically supporting two dierent political aims: economic growth and sustainable
development.
e Business Impact Assessment procedure was an analytical method developed in the
context of the European economic crisis during the early 1980s. At the time, the view among
Member States was that the “poor competitiveness of European rms relative to those of main
trading partners in the us and, in particular, Japan contributed to large trade decits”,69 and in
turn to economic diculties. At the European level, ideas were developed to help the European
economy which included a focus on helping the market economy by introducing increased
competition. Supported by “new neo-liberal economic governments in the United Kingdom,
Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark, the idea that markets rather than Governments were
better placed to generate economic growth” gave rise to a call for deregulation.70
69A. R. Young, “e Single Market”, in H. Wallace, W. Wallace and M. Pollack (eds.) Policy Making in the
European Union, Oxford University Press 2005.
70ibid.
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With the adoption of the Single European Act in 1986 and the push to create a single market,
the United Kingdom Presidency at the time took the opportunity to lobby for the introduction
of the European Union’s rst impact analysis procedure.e so-called Business ia procedure
echoed the United Kingdom’s own Compliance Cost Assessment and was adopted by dg
entr. As the lead Commission dg on business enterprise, dg entr became the champion
of the new procedure to support economic growth by ensuring Commission proposals took
business impacts into account.is mirrored initiatives to revitalise the single market and a
call for greater market integration throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In the 1990s, dg entr
continued to champion projects to support economic growth through moves to deregulate
and further enhance the consideration of business impacts in the policy-making process. For
example, dg entr introduced the Simplication of the Legislation on the Internal Market
(slim) project, the Business Environment Simplication Task Force (best) and the Business
Test Panel.
However, the methods developed to support economic growth and enhance the consid-
eration of business impacts were in contrast to those designed to advance environmental
protection. Starting in the 1970s, the environmental element of the ia system sought to bal-
ance the eects of economic development on the environment. In response to individual
members of the European Community which started to introduce environmental protection
legislation in the 1950s and 1960s, the European Commission developed the rst European
Action Programme in the 1970s.e Action Programme was intended to address the growing
concern of countries and encouraged a common European environmental policy to counter
the harmful eects of economic development and growth.71 Building on the Environmental
Action Programme, dg env worked throughout the 1980s and 1990s to establish analytical
methods to encourage policymakers to take environmental impacts into account. In 1985
dg env introduced the Environmental Impact Assessment (eia) Directive, responding to
increased Member State concerns about adverse environmental eects. e eia Directive
called upon the rest of the European Commission and Member States to use environmental
ias (i.e. assessments similar to cost-benet analysis) to determine environmental eects before
giving authorisation for proposals. While the Directive provided a strong legislative anchor,
the application of the environmental iamirrored dg entr’s procedures.
71A. Lenshow, “Environmental Policy”, in H. Wallace, W. Wallace and M. Pollack (eds.) Policy Making in the
European Union, op. cit.
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In the early 2000s, the Lisbon Council set out a new European Union objective: to become
the “most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world.”72 To support
the Lisbon objective, the Commission proposed a comprehensive policy-making process to
improve Europe’s regulatory environment.73 e result was the introduction of the European
Commission’s new integrated ia approach, integrating the tools developed by dg entr and dg
env, but also re-iterating the two dgs’ policy objectives i.e. to create an eective and ecient
regulatory environment for economic growth, while taking into account environmental
considerations and working toward the Sustainable Development strategy.
Procedural Steps to Coordinate and Improve Legislative ‘Quality’
Similarly to the drive to improve the analytical tools to achieve specic outcomes outlined
above, procedural steps were developed to improve legislation. In doing so, the initiatives
outlined in the following pages reect the logics which underpin the ambitions of enhanced
rationalisation and coordination. In particular, the initiatives to create the Single Market
in the 1980s and 1990s saw an increase in eu legislation which resulted in a focus on and
realisation of the importance of eu legislation relative to domestic legislation.74 In this context,
policymakers at eu and Member State level sought to improve eu policy-making and in
particular nancial management by establishing new ways of coordinating but also controlling
the quality of policy-making at eu level.
Increased eu legislation led toMember States calling for the codication ofworking practices
for policy development, reecting the recognition of the need for well-draed European
legislation.75 In response, the European Commission introduced tools to improve the policy-
making process and agreed working practices with Member States, the European Parliament
and Council. For example, the 1992 Edinburgh European Council adopted a resolution
calling for the draing of Community legislation to be improved.76 Going further, the United
72Lisbon European Council, Presidency Conclusions, March 2000 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/
cms\T1\textbackslash{}_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00100-r1.en0.htm).
73Commission of the EuropeanCommunities,Action Plan: Simplifying and improving the regulatory environment,
com(2002) 278 nal.
74G. Majone, “e rise of the regulatory state in Europe”, op. cit.
75Council: Resolution of 8 June 1993 on the quality of draing of Community legislation (oj C 166, 17.6.1993).
76e Council of the European Communities, Council Resolution of 8 June 1993 on the quality of draing of
Community legislation, Ocial Journal of the European Communities (ojec). 17.06.1993, No C 166.
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Kingdom, the Netherlands and Denmark called for the increase in administrative cooperation
to ensure ‘better regulation’.
In 1992, the European Commission published the Sutherland Report77 recommending an
administrative partnership between the Commission and public administrations of the Mem-
ber States to improve legislative draing.e Dutch commissioned Koopmans Report78 went
further and called for the specic codication of the Commission’s rulemaking procedures
in particular.e European Commission responded by introducing in-house Commission
guidelines on how the process of legislative policy should be conducted79 and by the late
1990s the Amsterdam Treaty called upon the European Institutions to “establish by common
accord guidelines for improving the quality of the draing of Community legislation”.80e
eu Institutions responded with an Inter-institutional Agreement on common guidelines for
the quality of draing, committing the institutions to technical requirements when developing
and enacting Community legislation.
e end of the 1990s saw a focus on the management of eu nances, particularly when
in January 1999 the Santer Commission was accused of mismanaging the eu budget. A
motion against the Commission was tabled by the European Parliament but vetoed aer
the Commission committed to cooperate with an ocial enquiry. e enquiry’s ndings
resulted in the resignation of the Santer Commission, compounding the need to improve
the Commission’s internal workings, both in terms of nancial management but also the
policy-making processes. Following these events, the new Prodi Commission took oce with
a mandate to reform the Commission,81 focusing in particular on nancial reform which
provided it the opportunity to re-invigorate changes to the Commission’s policy-making
process.
With the start of the new millennium the eu had set out a vision for the coming decade; the
new Lisbon Agenda. To support the vision of becoming the “most competitive and dynamic
77Commission of the European Communities,e Internal Market Aer 1992: Meeting the Challenge, (sec(92)
2044) — Sutherland Report.
78Koopmans Report,e quality of ec Legislation. Points for Consideration and Proposals,e Hague, 1995.
79Commission of the European Communities, General Guidelines for Legislative Policy (seec(1995) 2255/7).
80European Union, Treaty of Amsterdam: Section Two —e Union ande Citizen , Ocial Journal of the
European Communities (ojec) 1997 c340, 139.
81B. Laan and J. Lindner, “e Budget, in Policy Making in the European Union”, in H. Wallace, W. Wallace
and M. Pollack (eds.) Policy Making in the European Union, op. cit.
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knowledge-based economy in the world”82 the Prodi Commission used the need for improved
internal processes to underpin the development of Europe’s future regulatory environment.
As a result, the Commission set out its intention to establish a consolidated regulatory ia
system, in June of 2002,83 subsequently introducing the new ia system in 2003.
Overlapping Objectives and Ambitions
Although the new ia system sought to consolidate the various existing tools and processes,
the dierent motivations or ambitions underpinning the methods remained.e outcome
is an ia system which includes a wide range of objectives, creating sucient scope for the
interpretation of objectives or ambitions to t dierent purposes.
For example, the 2002 Communication on ia sets out the new system’s purpose of generating
policy advice by stating that ia is:
“a tool to improve the quality and coherence of the policy development process,
by contributing to an eective and ecient regulatory environment, and by
providing a mechanism for a more coherent implementation of the European
strategy for Sustainable Development.”84
But it also explains that ia should be:
“an integral part of the process of designing policy proposals andmaking decision-
makers and the public aware of the likely impacts, and that it is an aid to decision-
making ... by informing decision-makers of the consequences of policy choices”.85
A 2004 Commission Sta Working Paper picks up on the two points above and highlights the
coordination theme, stating that:
“the contribution towards developing a more transparent regulatory process, to
assist the eu’s decision-making process in order to improve the quality of its
proposals ... to systematically assess likely economic, environmental and social
82Lisbon European Council, Presidency Conclusions, March 2000 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/
cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00100-r1.en0.htm).
83Commission of the EuropeanCommunities,Action Plan: Simplifying and improving the regulatory environment,
com(2002) 278 nal.
84Commission of the European Communities, Communication on Impact Assessment, com (2002) 276.
85ibid.
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implications, and to identify balanced solutions that are consistent with the policy
objectives pursued by the Community”.86
e blueprint of the ia system, the Commission’s ia Guidelines provides an all-inclusive list of
aims, stating that the ia system is intended to:
“ensure early coordination within the Commission; demonstrate the Commis-
sion’s openness to input from a wide range of external stakeholders, and to show
its commitment to transparency; provide a careful and comprehensive analysis
of likely social, economic and environmental impacts; also contribute to meeting
the specic commitments of the Lisbon and Sustainable Development Strategies;
improve the quality of policy proposals, by keeping eu intervention as simple as
possible.”87
As noted above, the eu ia system is the product of several initiatives developed over the course
of 30 years. Although one unied ia approach was introduced in 2003, various objectives
and ambitions — in particular to enhance the rationalisation, control and coordination of the
policy process — remained.
e new ia system was therefore designed to advance: a solution for how to choose the ‘best’
policy-option by advocating an assessment of economic, social and environmental considera-
tions to inform decisions; a solution for how to steer the administration (or Commission)
by promoting methods which support the overarching objectives set out in the Lisbon and
Sustainable Development Strategies; and a solution for how to coordinate policies across
institutional sub-units by encouraging early and on-going coordination. With the intention
of advancing several ambitions, the eu ia system raises the question of whether the various
objectives or ambitions are complementary or contradictory.
To assist in answering the above question, the next section outlines the methodological
approach and empirical evidence needed to answer the thesis question. Chapter Two then
explores the wider literature by outlining the three theoretical considerations underpinning
this thesis, before Chapterree provides a blueprint for the ia process as well as indicators
to trace the three logics or ambitions across the policy-making process.
86Commission of the European Communities, Sta Working Paper: Impact Assessment: Next Steps, sec
(2004)1377.
87Commission of the European Communities, Impact Assessment Guidelines, (sec (2005) 791).
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3 Methodological Approach and Case Study Selection
e following section provides a brief overview of the methodological approach and empirical
evidence used in this thesis to explore the ia ambitions or logics of enhanced rationalisation,
control and coordination. While Chapterree provides a detailed account of the empirical
evidence and proxies to trace the three ia ambitions, the following focuses on the three-staged
approach to trace the ia process and provides an introduction to the methodology used to
select the empirical evidence, including the case study selection.
e following is not intended to outline the theoretical underpinnings of why and how
policymakers overcome the limitations of ‘techno-bureaucratic rationality’, the ‘principal-agent’
problem or to coordinate actors to make ‘mutually benecial’ decisions. Rather, the details of
the theoretical underpinnings are provided in Chapter Two along with expected outcomes
for each of the theoretical considerations by policy stage.is includes an exploration of the
potential for the ambitions or logics to be in conict with each other.
Conceptual Approach — Impact Assessment by Policy Stage
As outlined at the start of this chapter, ia is a set of procedural and analytical steps designed
to structure the policy-making process and provide decision-makers with policy advice.88
e ia report, the focus of many studies, is merely a summary or snapshot of a process which
provides the ocial and incomplete story of the policy process. For example, ia reports do not
fully capture the nuances and complexity of a policy-making process inuenced by dierent
actors. To overcome the limitations of ia reports, this thesis uses a dynamic methodological
approach to trace the ia process at three stages.is segmentation builds on the idea of an
“evolving staged approach to the policy-making process”89 which identies dierent sets of
issues and considerations at each ia stage.e most common policy stages identied by the
literature include:
• policy initiation: the recognition of a problem and the preparation of initial policy
recommendations;
88oecd, Dra oecd Recommendation on Regulatory Policy and Governance,
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/49/43/48087250.pdf (June 2011).
89H. D. Lasswell,e Decision Process: Seven Categories of Functional Analysis, College Park: University of
Maryland Press, 1956.
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• policy estimation: an analysis of the likelihood that any of the policy proposals will
prove to be a success or failure;
• selection: a stage at which an authoritative policymaker will choose among the policy
alternatives;
• policy implementation: the stage in which the selected policy option will be carried out;
• policy evaluation: that stage in which the policy option chosen during selection and
implementation is assessed in terms of eciency and results; and
• policy termination: that stage during which a poorly performing option is discontin-
ued.90
Applying this approach to the empirical evidence in this thesis allows for the segmentation
of the policy process into identiable stages with their own particularities and motivations.
In addition to providing a means for comparing dierent stages within the policy-making
process for a specic proposal (or ia), the staged approach also allows for the comparison
of particularities of each stage against those of other policy-making processes (or ias). For
example, the early stage of policy initiation includes a dierent group of actors and tensions
compared to the later policy stages of estimation or policy selection. While a simplication of
the policy process risks overlooking unintended consequences of policy implementation or
that policy oen develops in a “dense environment of already existing policies”,91 it provides a
heuristic approach to observe and contrast variations within the development of a policy, but
also to contrast them against the variations and processes of other policies (or ias). Further-
more, the challenge of the staged approach is overcome — at least in part — by the idea of a
cycle. A staged and cyclical approach takes into account the “bias on the input-side (political
behaviour, attitudes, interest organisations) of the political system”92 by identifying the impact
of policy ‘outputs’ on succeeding policy processes. erefore, as policies are implemented,
they eventually transform back as an input, becoming part of the “dense environment of
already existing policies”.93 As the case studies will show in the subsequent chapters, the staged
90P. deLeon and K. Kaufmanis, “Public Policyeory: Will it play in Peoria?”, in Policy Currents Vol. 10: No. 4,
2000.
91B. Hogwood and G. B. Peters, Policy Dynamics, Wheatsheaf Books, 1983.
92W. Jann and K. Wegrich, “eories of the Policy Cycle”, op. cit.
93B. Hogwood and G. B. Peters, Policy Dynamics, op. cit.
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approach provides a means to contrast similarities and variations within ia stages but also
across a number of policy proposals.
In particular, while a staged approach represents an ideal-type model of the policy process,
actual policy processes are usually seen as discontinuous and dynamic94 with dierent policy
initiatives and actors inuencing and impacting on each other. Decisions are oen made
through the interaction of ideas and debates95 which rarely follows a linear evolution of ideas.
Although this dynamic interaction of ideas and debates of policy-making poses a challenge to
the staged, procedural approach, it is also a reason for using it in this thesis. Separating the
policy process into identiable steps provides a dynamic approach able to move beyond the
formal analysis of institutions by “focusing on the contributions and interaction of dierent
actors and institutions in the policy process”.96 An examination of eu ia as a continuous
process provides a framework for the disaggregation of various actors, forces and institutions
that interact throughout the policy process to shape its outcomes. It also provides a heuristic
method to compare variations across policy proposals.
e staged approach therefore provides a basis for comparing and contrasting distinct
analytical, procedural and political interactions at specic stages of a single policy but also
across a number policies and institutions. It is not intended to be an explanatory model; rather
it is designed to provide a practical framework to examine, rst, the extent to which ia serves
to full dierent theoretical ambitions and, second, whether the motivations and ambitions
of actors change over the course of the policy-making process.e methodological approach
is built on the linear staged model reected in the ocial ia blueprint (the documents which
describe the specic ia steps and processes). By setting out the ia process and structure,
the ocial ia guidance also provides a link to the ia objectives and therefore the theoretical
ambitions. e ia guidance therefore provides a basis on which to contrast the process
blueprint with empirical evidence.is thesis thus uses the ocial guidance documents to
divide the ia process into three stages.e stages are:
Stage I— Inception of the impact assessment recognising a problem, selecting andprepar-
ing initial policy options (i.e. also described as the ‘agenda setting stage’);
94P. Sabatier,eories of the policy process, Westview Press, 1991.
95G. Majone, Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion in the Policy Process, Yale University Press, 1989.
96W. Jann and K. Wegrich, “eories of the Policy Cycle”, op. cit.
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Stage II—Development of the impact assessment data collection, objectives setting,
policy formation / renement through the analysis of the likely success of policy op-
tions, and internal agreement on the preferred option (by decision-makers within the
European Commission). Also described as the ‘policy formulation and decision-making
stage’, although this stage does not include the European Parliament and Council;
Stage III — Inter-institutional bargaining the European Parliament and Council use and
contribute to the ia report.is stage is the nal ‘decision-making stage’ whereby the
European institutions agree on the nal policy proposal.
e three stages outlined above form the three ia policy phases used in this thesis.ese
stages do not include the later policy stages, such as implementation at the Member State level,
evaluation or policy termination.ese later stages are not explicitly part of the European ia
system. Although an examination of the long-term eects of ia, for example in regard to their
accuracy in assessing future impacts or their inuence on implementation or enforcement of
policies, would be interesting, the ia system has not been in place long enough to assess these
later stages. Also, implementation is not solely the responsibility of the European Commission,
Parliament or Council, as both implementation and enforcement are the responsibility of the
27 Member States, which is not the focus of this thesis. While Chapterree provides greater
detail on the individual stages by establishing a set of proxies to trace each ia ambition, the
following gure provides a preliminary overview.
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Figure 1: Overview of the EU IA process
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Equipped with the conceptual approach to explore the ambitions, interests and dynamics
of each ia stage, the next section briey presents the empirical evidence upon which this
research is based.
Empirical Evidence
To examine the ambitions of the European Union’s ia process and test the theoretical logics
represented by enhanced rationalisation, control and coordination, a three-level approach
was used in the selection and presentation of the empirical evidence. e thesis starts by
establishing a baseline in Chapterree, identifying a set of proxies for each ia ambition
and outlining the ideal ia process as presented by the eu institutions.e second level is the
use of indicators to examine a large sample of ia reports and identify aggregate trends.e
third level picks up on the aggregate, overall trends and explores them in greater detail by
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examining ve detailed case studies.e case study selection is designed to test the theoretical
ambitions across policy areas and level of political importance.is provides a means to test
whether enhanced rationalisation, coordination, or control is context-specic or whether
there is a pattern across the three ia policy-making stages.
Quantitative and qualitative information are drawn from a variety of primary and secondary
sources, including ocial reports, surveys and face-to-face interviews.e survey and some of
the interview data are sourced from a study the European Commission commissioned in 2007
with the mandate “to review the experience with regard to the set-up, implementation and
results of the Commission’s approach to ias and to draw lessons for any necessary development
or further renement of the system in relation to its set objectives”.97e study was project
managed by the author of this thesis, and with the permission the European Commission,
takes advantage of the primary data collected over the course of the 2007 study. While clear
rules were established in relation to the empirical evidence used in this thesis, inevitably — as
Chapterree explores in greater detail — it is not possible to fully exclude the possibility that
the author of this thesis was a ‘participant’ and not merely an ‘observer’. However, using the
2007 study as a starting point, this research takes advantage of a unique source of empirical
evidence, but also builds on this source with additional research.
Indeed, as Chapterree discusses in greater detail, the survey and interview data from the
2007 study served as a starting point for extensive additional research. In particular, additional
research included the analysis of documents published by the European Commission, Euro-
pean Parliament, Council and media articles, as well as research reports, roadmaps, ia reports,
additional interviews with actors at Member State and Commission level, and information
available on the European Commission’s website and European Parliament’s Questions /
Legislative information portals. As a result of the 2007 study forming an important part of the
empirical evidence, the thesis focuses on the ia system that existed in themid-2000s. However,
in addition to new empirical evidence, this thesis also applies a dierent approach, departing
from the narrow examination of the operational improvements originally commissioned
by the European Commission. In particular, while the Commission study examined the
application and interpretation of the Commission’s ia guidelines, this thesis researches the
context and background of proposals, the roles of the European Parliament and Council, as
97e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, London, 2007.
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well as the public’s reactions. In doing so, this thesis goes beyond other studies that have used
the same case study information,98 using a three-staged approach to contextualise ia within
the wider theoretical considerations of enhanced control, coordination and rationalisation.
Nevertheless, this may raise questions of whether the eu ia system has signicantly changed
or evolved in recent years and how this might impact on this research.
While limitations to this research are discussed more widely in Chapterree, the answer
to whether the eu ia system has changed over time is yes and no. Although several additional
ia reports have been published since 2006 and the European Union’s ia process has been
up-dated, the staged approach identied here has not changed nor have the objectives been
changed or been further claried. Changes have been limited to systemic / operational ones
such as up-dates to methodological approaches to calculate certain costs as well as adding a
quality assurance process to increase compliance with the ocial iaGuidelines.ese changes
have not altered the underlying rationale of ia or theoretical ambitions (or logics). Indeed, an
advantage of using data from mid-2000s is that this time-lag provides a period to reect on
interviews and provides an opportunity to conduct follow-on interviews to explore how data
from the mid-2000s relates to a wider policy context.
In regard to the selection of case studies is based on a mix of policy area considerations
and an assessment of 155 available ia reports published between 2003 and 2007. ese ia
reports were classied by lead dg and type of policy instrument.is allows for the selection
of case studies which were developed for dierent policy intentions and within dierent
organisational context (i.e. balancing the three ‘pillars’ of the ia system, economic, social and
environmental policy). Furthermore, a mix of policy instruments is considered to test the
theoretical considerations across political importance. For instance, it is hypothesised that an
ia for a Directive will be more contentious than an ia for a non-legislative thematic strategy,
or a spending programme (e.g. mainly due to the legal implications of a Directive versus that
of a thematic strategy).e case studies do not include a counterfactual as the purpose of this
thesis is to examine the use of ia in particular. Using the criteria of: ‘mix of policy area’ and
‘mix of policy tool’, the following case studies are used in this thesis:
• dg Enterprise’s (entr) ia on Pack Sizes Directive (2004);
• dg Environment’s (env) ia on theematic Air Strategy (2005);
98For example: A. Meuwese, Impact Assessment in eu Lawmaking, op. cit.
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• dg Internal Market and Services’ (markt) ia on Postal Services Directive (2006);
• dg Justice Freedom and Security’s (jls) ia on Migration Spending Programme (2005);
and
• dgHealth and Consumer’s (sanco) ia on Plant Protection Products Directive (2006).
Each case study uses a variety of sources, including primary literature and primary data
collected through interviews and surveys with actors from three key groups described in
Chapterree. In total, this thesis includes six empirical chapters to examine the variation
of ambitions or logics in the use of ias by dgs. is thesis is therefore structured into ten
chapters. Starting with this introductory chapter, the eight additional chapters are as follows:
Chapter 2—Theoretical Considerations sets out the ambitions of enhanced rationalisa-
tion, control and coordination within the existing academic literature, exploring the potential
for the three ambitions to be contradictory as well as complementary. It also sets out a number
of expectations for each theoretical consideration by policy stage.
Chapter 3—Methodological Approach provides an overview of the methodology used
to collect the empirical evidence and develops a set of proxies to trace each theoretical ambition.
In particular, this includes detailing the use of existing empirical evidence, the collection of
new empirics, their limitations, and the method used to explore the research question: are the
ia ambitions complementary or contradictory?
Chapter 4—Testing the Theoretical Ambitions applies the proxies developed in Chap-
terree to trace the theoretical considerations against a large sample of ias.is establishes
an aggregate overview of whether ia is used dierently at each stage of the policy process
and sets the scene for the detailed case studies. Empirical evidence for this chapter includes
(i) a database of all Commission Legislative and Work Programmes (clwp) and roadmaps
published between 2003 and 2005; (ii) a database of all ias published between 2003 and 2006;
(iii) a survey conducted with actors outside the Commission; (iv) a survey of Commission
ocials who developed impact assessments and participated in their development; and (v) a
survey of Commission ocials who worked in the individual Directorates General ia units.
Chapter 5 — DG ENTR’s Pre-Packed Products is the rst of ve deep dives into the
empirical evidence. It traces the policy process of dg entr’s Pre-Packed Products Directive
by applying the proxies identied in Chapterree. Chapter Four shows that dg entr’s
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objectives and ambitions varied throughout the policy process. In particular, the ia played no
role during the early stages of the policy process, but ambitions of enhanced rationalisation
and control played an important part in presenting ia evidence to deregulate Pre-Packed
Products. is chapter is based on interviews with actors involved in the policy process,
including dg entr, a member of the secretariat to the European Parliament Committee on
Internal Market & Consumer Protection (imco), and representatives from eu Industry and
Consumer Groups.
Chapter 6—DG ENV’s Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution shows that dg env’s ambi-
tions varied over time.e ia played an important role during the later policy development
stage, providing key evidence to support dg env’s policy preference of establishing ambitious
environmental targets, while faced by signicant opposition from those seeking less ambitious
targets and defending economic interests.is chapter is based on interviews with 12 actors,
including ocials from dg env and other Commission services who participated in the
Inter-Service Steering Group, an external contractor, representatives from industry and ngos,
representatives from dg env’s Cabinet, the European Parliament and the European Council.
Chapter 7—DGMARKT’s Postal Services also nds that the use of ia changes through-
out the policy process, with a strong emphasis on rationalisation to support the full liber-
alisation of the Postal Services Market against opposition from actors seeking to protect
national markets. Sources include interviews with those who contributed to the ia, including
individuals from dg markt, dg sanco, dg entr, and two contractors; actors who were
consulted such as National Regulatory Authorities, and decision-makers who participated in
the negotiations in the European Council.
Chapter 8 — DG JLS’s Solidarity in Migration Flow traces the ia development for a
non-regulatory proposal, showing that with less political attention the ia plays a stronger
coordination role, but is otherwise of little value. is case study is based on interviews
with actors involved in the policy process, including dg jls, Member State representatives,
assistants to Members of the European Parliament, and a consultancy representative.
Chapter 9—DG SANCO’s Plant Protection Product shows that the ambitions and use
of the ia varies with an emphasis on the need for evidence to support the classication and ban
of certain Plant Protection Products (a mix of control and rationalisation between the policy
preference in support of economic competitiveness and environmental / social protection).
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Sources include interviews with Commission ocials from dg sanco, dg entr, and the
Secretariat General; a representative from a consultancy; actors involved in the consultation
process, including Member State representatives, ngos and Trade Associations; one Council
representative; and a Member of the European Parliament.
Chapter 10 — Conclusion summarises the ndings across the six empirical chapters,
identifying variation of ambitions across the policy-making process but also in characteristic.
It outlines the contribution of this thesis to the literature and concludes by providing thoughts
for future research.
4 Conclusion
is chapter briey outlined the three specic policy problems ia seeks to overcome by starting
to explore the wider ‘control’, ‘rationality’ and ‘coordination’ literature. In doing so, it identied
the research question of whether the ambitions (or logics) of enhanced rationalisation, control,
and coordination are complementary or contradictory. It argued for the need to examine ia as
a dynamic policy-making process — where the contributions and ambitions of actors change
over time — and to move beyond a static examination of ia reports to advance individual
theoretical ambitions. Briey describing how the consolidation of procedural and analytical
steps developed over 30 years did not result in a single underlying ambition for the eu ia
system, this chapter illustrated a multiplicity of eu ia ambitions which risks ia becoming
everything to everyone. In doing so, this chapter also introduced the debate between ia
proponents and ia sceptics.
To explore the debate between ia proponents and sceptics further, but also to answer the
research question, the second section of this chapter provided an overview of the methodology
and empirical evidence used in this study. is included the methodological approach to
segment the ia process into three distinct policy stages, the selection criteria for the empirical
evidence and the case studies. Before presenting the methodological approach and the individ-
ual case studies, the next chapter builds on the wider ‘rationality’, ‘control’ and ‘coordination’
literature to set out each of the three theoretical ambitions in greater detail. It then describes a
number of expected outcomes from each ambitions or logic and outlines the possibility of
them contradicting as well as complementing each other.
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As noted in the previous chapter, ias have been associated with three specic problems,
raising the question whether any single ambition dominates, whether they operate in parallel
or interact and if so, how they might do so across the various ia policy stages? To answer
this question, this chapter sets out the theoretical basis for the ia ambitions of enhanced
rationalisation, control and coordination.1 In doing so, this chapter explores the public policy
challenges each theoretical ambition seeks to address and the extent to which they can interact
in a complementary or contradictory manner.is chapter is therefore divided into three
parts: an overview of the three public policy problems or challenges to develop a denition for
each ambition, a discussion of the extent to which the theoretical ambitions can complement
or contradict each other and nally an outline of what outcome to expected from ia as a
means for each ambition at dierent stages of the ia process.
e rst part of this chapter starts with the ambition of enhanced rationalisation. Outlining
the problem of incomplete information where it is “impossible for a single, isolated individual
to reach any high degree of rationality”,2 this chapter builds on the wider ‘rationality’ literature,
arguing that ia seeks to respond to this challenge by advancing a structured process to
encourage policymakers to break away from an “action oriented policy-making paradigm”.3
e second challenge is posed by the principal-agent problem and addressed by the ambition
of ia to enhance control through ideas of procedural controls. ese procedural controls
mirror those known as ‘re-alarm’ and ‘police-patrol’ mechanisms4 and are designed to
advance the compliance of “unelected bureaucrats [or policy experts] to follow and implement
1While this has parallels to the typology developed by: A. Meuwese, Impact Assessment in eu Lawmaking, op.
cit., this chapter develops the theoretical considerations for the use of ia from a public policy perspective rather
than from an administrative law perspective.
2H. Simon, “A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organisations”, op. cit.
3T. O. McGarity, Reinventing Rationality:e Role of Regulatory Analysis in the Federal Bureaucracy, op. cit.
4M. McCubbins and T. Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms”, op.
cit.
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the policy preferences”5 of decision-makers. However, enhanced control also includes what
is referred to in this thesis as ‘stacking the deck’. Complicated by a multi-principal world,
enhanced control is also an ambition that seeks to use procedural rules to ‘stack the deck’6
against dierent principals and alternative policy preferences. e last policy challenge
explores the logic of enhanced coordination which searches for a means to overcome conicts
between dierent organisational interests and turfs (or organised anarchies).7 ia is therefore a
process intended to encourage decision and policymakers to make jointly considered choices,
ultimately promoting ‘positive coordination’.8
Part two of this chapter explores the potential for the theoretical ambitions to complement
or contradict each other. In particular, it discusses the implications of applying each ambition
to its logical extreme as oen advanced by both ia proponents9 and ia sceptics.10 In contrast,
this thesis also explores the implications of viewing each ambition as a theoretical ‘range’ or
‘scale’ — for example enhancing actors’ behaviour along the scale of complete irrationality
to complete rationalisation — and variable over the course of the policy-making process.
Building on the arguments of ia proponents and ia sceptics, part three of this chapter then
sets out a number of expectations for each ambition, establishing a set of indicators which
are followed up with detailed proxies for each ambition in Chapterree. Starting with
indicators to trace the problem-solving model of enhanced rationalisation, specic outcomes
are drawn out for each ia stage to map the ‘coherent and structured’ policy-making processes
that use “evidence to make informed decisions”.11is is followed by equivalent indicators to
trace the expectations and outcomes of ia as a means for enhanced control and coordination
respectively.e chapter concludes by setting out an expectation that the theoretical ambitions
can be complementary, suggesting that this complementarity may be hierarchal in nature.
Hierarchical whereby enhanced coordination plays a distinct yet supporting role for enhanced
5M. McCubbins, R. Noll and B. Weingast, “Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control”,
Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 3, 1987.
6G. Miller, “e Political Evolution of the Principal Agenteory”, op. cit.
7M. Cohen, J. March, and J. Olsen, “A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice”, Administrative Science
Quarterly, Vol. 17 1972.
8F. Scharpf, “Games Real Actors Could Play: Positive and Negative Coordination in Embedded Negotiations”,
op. cit.
9As do: N. Lee and C. Kirkpatrick, “Integrated impact assessment”, op. cit.
10H. Heclo and A. Wildavsky,e private government of public money, op. cit.
11F. Scharpf, “Games Real Actors Could Play: Positive and Negative Coordination in Embedded Negotiations”,
op. cit.
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rationalisation, and where in turn enhanced rationalisation plays a distinct yet supporting
role for enhanced control, in particular ‘stacking the deck’.
1 Impact Assessment Ambitions: A Response to Three Public
Policy Challenges
Public policy includes “anything that government chooses to do or not to do,”12 a denition
made up of four major areas: scope of policy, its nature, its locus, and the behaviour of
policymakers.13 While all four areas of public policy inuence the application and use of
ia, this thesis focuses on the behaviour and ambitions of policymakers. erefore, ia as a
process is about the behaviour of policymakers and the strategies they use to identify the
scope and nature of the required policy proposal in an environment where the locus is set.
Consequently, this thesis does not focus on policy scope which is about the idea of setting
out policy objectives or outcomes to, for example, regulate or deregulate; the nature of policy
which is about the choice of policy tools, such as whether to select a legislative instrument
over the use of permits; and the policy locus which is about the level of autonomy given to
policymakers, such as the need for centralised versus decentralised control.
e following section outlines each of the three policy challenges and how ia seeks to
overcome them through methods to enhance rationalisation, control and coordination. In
doing so, this section also denes each ambition and starts outlining the potential for the
ambitions or logics to complement or contradict each other.e question of contradiction
and complementarity is then picked up in part two of this chapter which outlines the risk that
ia can become ‘all things to all people’.
Enhanced Rationalisation
Behavioural organisation theory and decision theory have highlighted the failure of humans,
let alone policymakers, to conform to the classic utility model, whereby the individual’s
12T. Dye, Understanding Public Policy, 7th Edition, op. cit.
13M. Sparrow,e Regulatory Cra, Brookings Institution Press, Washing, 2000.
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behaviour maximises utility by behaving in a ‘rational’ manner.14 e challenge enhanced
rationalisation seeks to overcome is the quantity and diusion of information in public policy
which makes it dicult for policymakers to “consider the whole complex of consequences that
would follow on each policy choice [and to] single out one [solution] from the whole set of
alternatives.”15e mismatch between the “decision-making environment and the choices of
the decision-maker”16 results in so-called ‘bounded rationality’ where actors do not conform
to the classic utility model.
While policymakers do not necessarily act ‘irrationally’ by not following the classic utility
model, they develop a ‘rationality’ of their own.17is rationality is based on four principles:
• intended rationality, whereby policymakers are goal-oriented but simplify the complex-
ities of the policy problem to nd solutions to achieve their set goals. Indeed, while
policymakers are driven by their intention to achieve a set goal, they are hampered by
the interaction between their own cognitive architectures — such as habits, emotion,
attention — and the complexity of their environment;
• adaptation, whereby policymakers are shaped and inuenced by their ‘task environment’.
Over time policymakers adapt to the environment and circumstances in which they
solve specic policy problems. Policymakers therefore become less constrained by
cognitive architecture and environment, which provides a means to develop knowledge
and expertise. While this expertise can be deployed relatively quickly, it comes at a cost
and can result in policymakers dismissing considerations which lie outside the adapted
environment;
• uncertainty, whereby policymakers nd it dicult to understand the causal factors in
a policy problem.is results in policymakers being uncertain about outcomes and
possible solutions, resulting in simplied problem denitions and short time-horizons
which can be at the expense of long-term objectives; and
• trade-os, whereby policymakers nd it dicult to assess trade-os between dierent
choices. Instead, policymakers set aspirational goals and chose options subject to the
14B. Jones, “Bounded Rationality”, in Annual Review of Political Science, 1999. Vol. 2.
15H. Simon, “A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organisations”, op. cit.
16B. Jones, “Bounded Rationality”, op. cit.
17T. O. McGarity, Reinventing Rationality:e Role of Regulatory Analysis in the Federal Bureaucracy, op. cit.
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cost of information. Under these conditions, decision-making is based on satisfying
narrow aspirations.18
ese principles underpin the idea of “bounded rationality”19 and ‘incrementalism’ where
policymakers develop policy through “successive limited comparisons” and “partisan mutual
adjustments.”20e consequence is that policy ‘leaps’ are limited through the simplication
of policy problems and analysis which focuses on the review of alternatives similar to the
status quo.e situation is further aggravated through the fragmentation of the analytical
work amongst several policymakers and the short-cutting of analysis for complex policy
problems.erefore, while the advantage of ‘incrementalism’ (or ‘muddling through’) lies in
the ability of policymakers to take advantage of small and sensible improvements, advocates
of ‘re-inventing rationality’ see this as a shortfall. A shortfall, because ‘bounded rationality’
means policymakers avoid making large / signicant and potentially risky policy changes.21
Bounded rationality’ and ‘incrementalism’ are therefore elements of a ‘techno-bureaucratic
rationality’ characterised by a pragmatic, qualitative, turf conscious, and mission oriented
type of policy-making.22e result is that policymakers develop a narrow range of politically
palatable options which does not necessarily include the most ‘optimal’ one.23 Advocates
of ‘re-invented rationality’ argue that a set of procedural steps and methods can ‘enhance
rationalisation’ or go beyond the existing ‘techno-bureaucratic rationality’.e term ‘enhanced
rationalisation’ in this research therefore refers to more than just overcoming incomplete
knowledge.24 It refers to enhancing rationality along a scale ranging from an ideal-type view of
comprehensive or synoptic analysis and grossly incomplete analysis. Enhanced rationalisation
seeks to promote policy-making based on synoptic analysis builds on the notion that “models
of decision-making and structures where goals are dened at the outset, where alternative
courses of action are evaluated in terms of their appropriateness for achieving given ends,”25
can improve upon ‘techno-bureaucratic’ rationality. In doing so, the ambition of ia is public
18H. Simon, “A study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization”, op. cit. and B. D. Jones
“Bounded rationality and public policy: Herbert A. Simon and the decisional foundation of collective choice”, in
Policy Science, Vol. 35, 2002.
19H. Simon, “A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization”, op. cit.
20C. Lindblom, “Still muddling through not there yet”, op. cit.
21T. O. McGarity, Reinventing Rationality:e Role Of Regulatory Analysis Ine Federal Bureaucracy, op. cit.‘
22ibid.
23ibid.
24H. Simon, “A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organisations”, op. cit.
25W.West, “Institutionalizing Rationality”, in Regulatory Administration, 1983.
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policy analysis based on an ideal-type of synoptic analysis which increases the “net welfare of
the community“.26
e extreme or absolute ideal embedded in enhanced rationalisation assumes that pro-
fessional, scientic advice can be isolated from the political process and “translated into
the policy substance.”27 It is oen embodied by ia proponents who advance the idea that
processes can be introduced into policy-making to uncover the policy solution, “valued for
its [authoritative and] scientic authority.”28e isolation from the political process means
enhanced rationalisation can also seek to temper the ‘irrational’ demands on decision-makers.
In a world where policy proposals are developed in the response to a ‘market’, “complete
with the supply and demand of policy and regulation”,29 analytical and procedural rules play
a role in identifying policies that maximises the welfare of the community, not just those
“decision-makers [who] choose when seeking to maximise their rent by responding to the
demands of consumers, businesses, Non-Governmental Organisations (ngos) and others”.30
Challenges to this ideal-type model of uncovering the ‘optimal’ answer are rooted in the
ideas of ‘incrementalism’ and ‘bounded rationality’. Sceptics of the logic underlying enhanced
rationalisation reject the implicit linear progression of ‘incrementalism’31 and point out the
illusion of ‘objectivity’.32 For example, a number of studies have shown both a “signicant
‘non-use’ of analysis and information”33 as well as the “numinous legitimacy”34 of the rational
model. In practice, the result is that decision-makers use information in ways not necessarily
envisaged by those who seek to ‘enhance rationality’. As will be picked up in the following
section, decision-makers can use information to achieve tactical or political advantages35
26C. Radaelli, “Measuring policy learning: regulatory impact assessment in Europe”, Journal of European Public
Policy, Nov 2009.
27S. Owens, T. Rayner, O. Bina, “New agenda for appraisal: reections on theory, practice and research”,
Environment and Planning, Vol. 36, 2004.
28E. House, Professional Evaluation — Social Impact and Political Consequences, Sage, Newbury park, ca, 1993.
29G. Stigler, “eeory of Economic Regulation”,e Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 2. No. 1, 1971.
30S. Peltzman, “Toward A More Generaleory of Regulation”, op. cit.
31B. Jones, “Bounded Rationality”, in Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 2, 1999.
32R. Parker, Is Government Regulation Irrational? : A reply to Morrall and Hahn, University of Connecticut
School of Law Working Papers, 2004 and also referred to in regard to the ‘fallacy of rationality’ by: J. Meyer, and
B. Rowan, “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structures as Myth and Ceremony”, in American Journal of
Sociology, 1977.
33M. Nilsson, A. Jordan, J. Turnpenny, J. Hertin, B. Nykvist, and D. Russel, “e use and non-use of policy
appraisal tools in public policy making: an analysis of three European countries and the European Union”, op. cit.
34C. Clark and G. Majone, “e critical appraisal of scientic inquiries with policy implications”, in Science,
Technology and Human Values, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1985.
35C. Weiss,e many meanings of research utilization, Columbia University 1979.
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with critics accusing the rationality literature of “disguising important ethical and political
judgements as technical ones”.36
De ned: Enhanced Rationalisation
e idea or denition of enhanced rationalisation therefore acknowledges the illusion of
‘objectivity’ and makes a distinction between fact and judgement. In particular, it accepts that
information is not always incorporated into the policy process in a straightforward manner.
Borrowing from a post-positivist approach where information can never be neutral or objec-
tive, proponents of the logic underpinning enhanced rationalisation argue that information
should be used through ‘civil legitimacy’ by agreeing on “certain rules or consent to certain
procedures.”37 Within this context, enhanced rationalisation therefore seeks to combat the
irrationality of techno-bureaucratic rationality bymoving toward the ideal of synoptic analysis,
rather than actually achieving it.
Enhanced rationalisation therefore represents the logic of ia proponents as a process that
seeks to provide a structure for information to be analysed and for decisions to be made where
judgements and conicts are declared. By declaring shortcomings, policy options are to be
appraised and accepted in the context of their limitations. By identifying the ‘object’ of the
appraisal and level of ‘objectivity’ through clearly dened and mutually agreed procedural
steps, ia is intended to enhance rationalisation of the policy-making process by encouraging
policymakers to think outside their established rationality box.38
Enhanced Control
e challenge outlined by the principal-agentmodel has beenwell documented.39 It is broadly a
problem of incomplete, asymmetric information and the potential for asymmetric preferences
between the principal and the agent. Borrowed from economists, the model is applied to the
policy-making process where the principal refers to the publicly elected ocial (decision-
36S. Owens, T. Rayner, and O. Bina, “New agenda for appraisal: reections on theory, practice and research”, op.
cit.
37C. Clark and G. Majone, “e critical appraisal of scientic inquiries with policy implications”, op. cit.
38S. Owens, T. Rayner, O. Bina, “New agenda for appraisal: reections on theory, practice and research”, op. cit.
39G. Miller, “e Political Evolution of the Principal Agenteory”, op. cit.
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maker) and the agent to the civil servant or policy expert (policymaker).e specic problem
lies in the agent or policymaker who is armed with expertise and mandated to do the detailed
policy work, therefore putting him / her at an informational advantage over the principal or
decision-maker. e decision-maker therefore seeks to overcome the problem posed by a
situation where he / she has “delegated policy-making authority to unelected bureaucrats and,
because [of] limited resources to monitor performance, the risk that the bureaucrat will not
comply with his / her policy preference”.40
To overcome this problem, the decision-maker has a number of options.e most common
solution includes ex-ante procedural controls referred to as ‘police patrols’ and output based
controls known as ‘re-alarms’.41 ese are administrative procedures that are introduced
by decision-makers to increase bureaucratic accountability.e intention is to enfranchise
particular constituents, which in turn increases the likelihood that bureaucrats or policymakers
incorporate the decision-makers’— and his / her constituent’s—preferred policy option.42e
dierence between, so-called ‘police patrols’ and ‘re-alarms’, lies in the extent of monitoring
and involvement of the principal. Police patrols are a set of procedural controls whereby
oversight “is comparatively centralised, active, and direct”.43ey include on-going internal
clearance processes where decision-makers can review policy proposals and ensure proposals
reect their preferences, therefore limiting ‘policy dri’. Fire-alarm oversight on the other
hand is “less centralized and involves less active and direct intervention than ‘police-patrol’
oversight”.44 It establishes a set of rules, procedures and informalmechanism that provide those
outside the principal-agent relationship — such as citizens or interest groups — to examine
the administration’s work and to seek remedies from the administration, the courts or the
principal. Rather than providing a means for on-going monitoring, ‘re-alarm’ oversight can
take the form of formal and informal mechanisms for problems to be identied and addressed.
40M. McCubbins, R. Noll and B. Weingast, “Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control”, op.
cit.
41M. McCubbins and T. Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms”, op.
cit.
42ibid.
43ibid.
44ibid.
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De ned: Enhanced — Procedural — Control
Building on the above, the logic of enhanced control in the rst instance refers to the idea
of using ‘policing’ and ‘re-alarm’ mechanisms to ensure policymakers adhere to the policy-
makers’ preferences. For example, ia provides procedural rules with specic trigger points to
warn decision-makers and give him or her, the opportunity to intervene. Furthermore, by
encouraging external actors to bring problems to the attention of the principal — for example
through the introduction of internal and external consultation processes — external actors
are given the opportunity to voice their concerns, giving decision-makers or the principal a
means to check whether his or her constituents are content with relevant policy proposals.
In its basic incarnation, enhanced control is therefore a means for procedural rules to
enhance the principal’s preference, including (for example) a process which encourages
enhanced rationalisation or coordination. However, as noted in the previous section, sceptics
of the logic underlying enhanced rationalisation argue that policy “decisions should reect the
interplay among political forces”.45 e importance of ‘political forces’ therefore by extension
implicitly overshadows the ambition of enhanced rationalisation or the logic of procedural
rules advancing synoptic policy analysis.e diculty lies in distinguishing the principal’s
individual policy preferences from the preference of enforcing procedural rules to advance
the ambitions of enhanced rationalisation.
Procedural controls ‘can’ therefore enhance the implementation of decisions, such as the
use of the methods and process to support enhanced rationalisation.46 But this also creates a
tension, particularly in those instances where policymakers develop ‘rational’ proposals which
conict with the decision-maker’s preferences or those of his or her constituent. For instance,
while proponents of the logic underpinning enhanced rationalisation seek to solve this tension
by setting out a requirement for ex-ante declarations of shortcomings to any analysis, this
is unlikely to be a sucient answer to the challenge in a world where “society is unwilling
to accept erstwhile political considerations as an acceptable rationale for administrative
decision-making.”47 Under these conditions, the logic of enhanced control therefore inevitably
45T. O. McGarity, Reinventing Rationality:e Role Of Regulatory Analysis Ine Federal Bureaucracy, op. cit.
46P. Joyce, “e Reiterative Nature of Budget Reform: Is there Anything New in Federal Budgeting?”, op. cit.
47ibid.
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incorporates a degree of justication or the ‘stacking the decks’ not necessarily in support of
enhanced rationalisation, but in support of the decision-maker’s individual policy preference.48
De ned: Enhanced — Stacking of the Deck — Control
‘Stacking the deck’ in this research therefore is dened as an ambition which goes beyond the
procedural rules designed to achieve a specic outcome. It includes the exibility incorporated
into policy processes which allow dierent decision-makers to favour certain constituencies,
methodologies or information to promote an outcome reective of their own policy prefer-
ences.49 For example, by giving access to certain constituencies, the policy-making process can
be shaped to reect the decision-maker’s preferences, rather than a policy solution designed
as a result of an ideal-type model of uncovering the ‘right’ answer (or in accordance with
the logic of enhanced rationalisation). is establishes a tension between the ambition of
enhanced control to ‘stack the deck’ in favour of justifying a policy over enhanced control
to advance the logic of enhanced rationalisation or coordination.e level of tension and
‘stacking the deck’ or justication therefore implicitly depends on the variance between the
policy preference — based on political considerations — and the proposal developed by an
ideal process to enhance rationalisation. e dichotomy is brought further into focus by
multiple principals and principal-agent relationships.
In circumstances where multiple principals — for instance there may be several principals
within one executive — or where the principal-agent relationship changes — for example
when the principal within the executive becomes the agent at the time of putting a proposal to
the legislature — so does the nature of enhanced control. In these circumstances the ‘stacking
of the deck’ or policy justication takes on a more prominent role.is outcome is further
exacerbated as ex-ante tools — such as ia— are designed to provide greater information and
therefore a means for the executive to make its case or justify its proposal when engaging with
the legislature.50erefore, in the context of this research enhanced control embodies two
elements: enhanced control as a means to advance procedural controls to ensure rules are
48Also referred to as ‘policy-based evidence” rather than ‘evidence-based policy’ in S. Nutley, I. Walter and H.
Davies, “From Knowing to Doing: A Framework for Understanding the Evidence-into-Practice Agenda”, in
Evaluation, 2003.
49G. Miller, “e Political Evolution of the Principal Agenteory”, 2005.
50C. Radaelli and A Meuwese, “Hard Questions, Hard Solutions: Proceduralisation through Impact Assessment
in the eu”, op. cit.
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followed, such as advancing the rules for enhanced rationalisation; and the use of procedural
rules by multiple principals to ‘stack the deck’ (or justify) in favour of their individual policy
preferences.
Enhanced Coordination
Enhanced coordination points to the problems of aligning preferences across a set of dispersed
participants. For instance, the literature on ‘organised anarchies’ points to specic problems,
including the uid participation, unclear preferences,51 and turf consciousness of policymakers.
e public policy challenge lies in an uncoordinated overall approach which diminishes the
eective and ecient development of public policy.52 e logic of enhanced coordination
therefore seeks to tackle the problem of policies that are “designed by specialized sub-units
within the ministerial organisation, which [avoid] the established policies and interests of
other ministerial units”.53 Under these circumstances, policy-making does not result in policy
proposals which yield a high level of ‘joint payos’54 or achieve “the overall eectiveness
and eciency of government policy because it does not explore and utilize the joint strategy
options of several ministerial portfolios”.55
e challenge is to introduce structures that support mutually consistent decisions and
allow actors to realize ‘mutual gains’.e logic of enhanced coordination therefore advances
a solution for policymakers to overcome a world where they seek to protect and, if possible,
expand their turf at the expense of other policymakers. Turf in this context refers to the
policymaker’s policy domain, such as the responsibility over specic regulatory issues. It
also denotes the policymaker’s level of discretion or degree to which sign-o from other
policymakers is required.56erefore, while the segmentation (or turfs) of administrations
provides a means to create expertise, this can be at the expense of incorporating insights
from other parts of the administration. In this context and in order for policymakers to
51M. Cohen, J. March, and J. Olsen, A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice, Administrative Science
Quarterly, Vol. 17 1972.
52T. O. McGarity, Reinventing Rationality:e Role of Regulatory Analysis Ine Federal Bureaucracy, op. cit.
53ibid.
54F. Scharpf and M. Mohr, “Ecient Self-Coordination”, discussion paper for mpifg Cologne, 1994.
55F. Scharpf, “Games Real Actors Could Play: Positive and Negative Coordination in Embedded Negotiations”,
op. cit.
56T. O. McGarity, Reinventing Rationality:e Role Of Regulatory Analysis Ine Federal Bureaucracy, op. cit.
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achieve their policy preference, they develop networks with a larger number of government
and nongovernmental actors connected through formal or loosely coupled interactions.57e
extent of interaction with other policymakers is a trade-o between coordination that creates
‘added value’ and the cost of coordination.
e trade-o between achieving ‘added value’ and the ‘cost’ of coordination can lead to
incremental change — similar to that identied by the logic of enhanced rationalisation —
where policymakers follow a process “of adaptive variants of partisan mutual adjustment”.58
While this can provide amechanism for overcoming ‘organised anarchies’ and conict between
dierent turfs, it plays a small role in addressing the problem of policies designed by specialised
segments of an administration.erefore, with the level of coordination varying depending on
the extent of self-interest — such as “jurisdictional competencies or the loyalty of segments of
the population”59 — and the degree to which policymakers control specic action resources —
such as budgetary control — enhanced coordination seeks to go beyond the limits of voluntary
coordination.
De ned: Enhanced Coordination
Enhanced coordination acknowledges the limitations of voluntary coordination and takes into
account the challenge posed by self-interest (in particular, the quest to advance the decision
and policymakers’ policy preference in opposition of others in an administration/organisation).
e logic of enhanced coordination is therefore an ambition that seeks to introduce procedural
rules to encourage policymakers to work outside their established policy networks to limit
conict amongst ‘turfs’ and enhance rationalisation by utilising expertise from across an
administration.e introduction of requirements, such as consultation processes, where exter-
nal actors are given the opportunity to participate in the policy-making process, and steering
groups for internal actors, encourage decision and policymakers to work with actors outside
their individual ministerial units to work toward ‘joint pay-os’ or ‘positive coordination’.60
57M.atcher, “e Development of Policy Network Analyses: FromModest origins to Overarching Frame-
works”, Journal ofeoretical Politics, 1998.
58C. Lindblom, “Still muddling through not there yet”, op. cit.
59F. Scharpf and M. Mohr, “Ecient Self-Coordination”, op. cit.
60ibid.
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erefore, enhanced coordination refers to the use of ia to structure the policy-making
process to promote jointly considered choices, rather than unilateral ones. Enhanced coordi-
nation seeks to encourage policy and decision-makers to take notice of cross-cutting concerns
by moving away from ‘negative coordination’, which incorporates elements of the logic under-
pinning enhanced control, toward ‘positive coordination’.e logic of enhanced coordination
is therefore about moving beyond negative coordination, which is limited “in its aspirations
and about ensuring that any new policy initiative designed by specialized sub-units within
the ministerial organisation will not interfere with the established policies and the interest of
other ministerial units”.61 By using procedural steps to promote positive coordination among
policymakers enhanced coordination seeks to “maximize the overall eectives and eciency
of government policy by exploring and utilizing the joint strategy options of several ministerial
portfolios”.62
2 Rationalisation, Control and Coordination: Contradictory
or Complementary
As outlined above, the theoretical ambitions of enhanced rationalisation, control and coor-
dination have the potential to contradict or complement each other. e following pages
explore this further, starting with the potential for the ia ambitions to contradict each other
by drawing out the consequences of interpreting each ia ambition as an absolute. Indeed,
part of the challenge lies in ia sceptics and ia proponents representing dierent theoretical
or logical absolutes — ia sceptics represent enhanced control and ia proponents the logics
of enhanced rationalisation and coordination — and assuming the logics remain constant
over the course of the policy-making process. In doing so, the theoretical ambitions risk
becoming ‘all things to all people’ and contradicting each other, rendering ia potentially
useless or in support of anyone’s argument. For example, viewed as an absolute, the logic of
enhanced coordination — which seeks to achieve ‘joint pay-os’ through cross-institutional
(and inter-institutional) compromises — can contradict the logics of enhanced rationalisation
and control. e contradiction arises when the cross-institutional compromise achieved
61ibid.
62ibid.
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through positive coordination is incompatible with the policy solution generated by methods
and tools advanced through the absolute ambition of enhancing rationalisation (i.e. a result of
synoptic analysis). Equally, because the level of compromise is dictated by the degree of ‘joint
pay-os’, substantive compromises can be in conict with the policy preferences of specic
decision-makers and therefore the logic of enhanced control and ‘stacking the deck’.
However, as part two of this section explores, the potential contradiction of ia ambitions
can be mitigated through the acceptance of variation. In particular, by exploring the diering
expectations and roles of all three ambitions at dierent stages, this thesis identies important
variance in ia ambitions. Indeed, as outlined in the introductory chapter, while this thesis
accepts the dominance of enhanced control — albeit in a hierarchical manner — it rejects
the notion that this is to the detriment of the ambitions of enhanced rationalisation and
coordination.is thesis explores the potential for each ambition to play specic and varying
roles at each stage in the policy-making process. In doing so, the three theoretical logics of
enhanced rationalisation, control and coordination are viewed as ‘scalable’ ambitions within a
dynamic three-staged process. It is the dynamic process that provides each ambition or logic
with the opportunity and space to play a distinct role.
e following section is therefore divided into two parts. It starts by exploring the potential
of the three ambitions to contract each other, before discussing the possibility for comple-
mentarity, a theme picked up in the empirical chapters and ultimately in the concluding
chapter.
Contradictory Ambitions
As indicated above, the theoretical ambitions of enhanced rationalisation, control and coordi-
nation can contradict each other.is contradiction arises when each ambition is taken to
an extreme or absolute and viewed ‘statically’ without any variation over the course of the
policy-making process. For instance, enhanced rationalisation — as dened in the previous
section — seeks to overcome the irrationality of techno-bureaucratic rationality by proposing
amove toward synoptic analysis. In this thesis, enhanced rationalisation does equate achieving
‘synoptic analysis’, if it was dened in such a manner, it would be in contradiction with the
ambitions of enhanced control and coordination. Contradiction because a policy solution
50
JohannesM.Wolff Theoretical Considerations
derived from ‘synoptic’ analysis may not reect the policy preference of decision-makers
or the compromise achieved through coordination.is tension is resolved by ia sceptics
rejecting ia as a tool with illusionary ‘objectivity’63 which enjoys “numinous legitimacy”.64
is critique reects the insight that decision-makers or agents use information in ways not
always envisaged by those who seek to ‘enhance rationality’. For example, decision-makers
may use information to achieve tactical or political advantages65 by promoting rationality that
“disguises important ethical and political judgements as technical ones.”66 However, as will be
discussed in the following section, this contradiction does not mean ia as a means to enhance
the policy-making process should be wholly dismissed.
In regard to enhanced control, at rst the ambition of enhanced procedural control is
complementary with enhanced rationalisation, even if enhanced rationalisation is interpreted
as the extreme or absolute ambition of ensuring synoptic analysis.is is because procedural
controls can enhance the implementation of decisions, such as the use of the methods and
processes to support enhanced rationalisation.67 But, reecting the above critique of ‘numinous
legitimacy’, enhanced rationalisation creates tension in those instances where policymakers
develop ‘rational’ proposals which conict with the decision-maker’s preferences or those of
his or her constituency. While proponents of the logic underpinning enhanced rationalisation
seek to solve this tension by setting out a requirement for ex-ante declarations of shortcomings
to any analysis, this is unlikely to be a sucient answer to the challenge in a world where
“society is unwilling to accept erstwhile political considerations as an acceptable rationale for
administrative decision-making.”68
Under these conditions, the logic of enhanced control inevitably incorporates a degree of
justication or ‘stacking of the deck’.is ‘stacking of the deck’ is not in defence or support
of enhanced rationalisation; rather it supports the decision-maker’s individual policy prefer-
63R. Parker, Is Government Regulation Irrational? : A reply to Morrall and Hahn, University of Connecticut
School of Law Working Papers, 2004 and also referred to in regard to the ‘fallacy of rationality’ by: J. Meyer, and
B. Rowan, “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structures as Myth and Ceremony”, in American Journal of
Sociology, 1977.
64C. Clark and G. Majone, “e critical appraisal of scientic inquiries with policy implications”, in Science,
Technology and Human Values, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1985.
65C. Weiss,e many meanings of research utilization, Columbia University 1979.
66S. Owens, T. Rayner, and O. Bina, “New agenda for appraisal: reections on theory, practice and research”, op.
cit.
67P. Joyce, “e Reiterative Nature of Budget Reform: Is there Anything New in Federal Budgeting?”, op. cit.
68ibid.
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ence.69 For instance, while enhanced rationalisation seeks to move toward synoptic analysis,
‘stacking of the deck’ can act as a brake or limit to the ambition of enhanced rationalisation.
However, as will be explored in the following section, this brake does not mean enhanced
rationalisation should be dismissed, albeit it does mean enhanced control — in particular
stacking the deck — plays an important, even dominant, role.
Contradictions between enhanced control and enhanced coordination are similar to those
between enhanced control and rationalisation. Both enhanced coordination and rationalisa-
tion attempt to go beyond the established ‘turf ’ or ‘rational box’ and seek to take advantage
of additional expertise from across an administration. As such enhanced coordination is
dependent on enhanced procedural control to ensure processes are followed. However, by
seeking to take advantage of joint resources where decision and policymakers across an or-
ganisation participate in developing policy to achieve a high level of ‘joint pay-os’, enhanced
coordination is contradictory to both enhanced rationalisation and control or ‘stacking the
deck’.
e diculty lies in enhanced coordination seeking to achieve ‘joint pay-os’ which may
be the result of cross-institutional (and inter-institutional) compromises.is, in turn, has
the potential to contradict the logic of enhanced rationalisation as compromises may not
be compatible with the policy solutions generated by the methods and tools advanced by
enhanced rationalisation (i.e. a result of synoptic analysis). Furthermore, as the extent of com-
promise is dictated by the degree of ‘joint pay-os’, substantive compromises may also conict
with the policy preferences of decision-makers and therefore the logic of enhanced control.
Consequently, with those in support of the logic underpinning enhanced control arguing that
achieving the decision-maker’s policy preference would supersede any compromise, the logic
of enhanced coordination would be overshadowed. Equally, decision and policymakers can
use the logic of enhanced control to ‘stack the coordination deck’ to justify their own policy
preferences.
69Also referred to as ‘policy-based evidence” rather than ‘evidence-based policy’ in S. Nutley, I. Walter and H.
Davies, “From Knowing to Doing: A Framework for Understanding the Evidence-into-Practice Agenda”, in
Evaluation, 2003.
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Complementary Ambitions
As indicated above, it is at the extreme or absolute of each ambition when the contradictions
arise. However, if each ambition is viewed as a ‘range’ or ‘scale’ with dierent success criteria
and playing dierent roles across the ia policy-making stages, then their complementarity
comes into focus. Dividing the ia process into distinct policy stages does not only provides
this research with a means for observing competing interests but also to examine the extent —
if any — to which the three ambitions change over the course of the policy-making process.
In doing so, it also bridges a divide between ia proponents and ia sceptics, accepting the
opportunities and limitations of each side’s arguments.
For instance, building on the previous section and as will be illustrated in part three of this
chapter, enhanced rationalisation is not merely the intention of achieving absolute ‘synoptic
analysis’ nor does it remain static over the course of the policy-making process. Instead,
enhanced rationalisation seeks to encourage agents to go beyond the established ‘rational box’.
Additionally, enhanced rationalisation changes over time. For example, during the inception
stage policymakers are asked to provide information to understand the need or otherwise of
policy action. At the development stage, the ia process requires a more detailed assessment
of future impacts by going beyond the immediate policy area and incorporating economic,
social and environmental consequences. At the inter-institutional bargaining stage enhanced
rationalisation requires the ne-tuning of analysis to address policy challenges from other
institutions (or the public). erefore, the staged approach provides a means to examine
the tension between the ambition of enhanced rationalisation and policymakers’ entrenched
rationality paradigms to use ia as a means for justication.70
e variation across the policy-making process also exists for enhanced control and as
illustrated by the discussion around procedural control and ‘stacking the deck’. For example,
the failure of decision-makers to overtly sanction policymakers71 shis the focus of enhanced
‘procedural’ control — as a means to advance enhanced rationalisation — to enhanced control
as a means for the principal to ensure his or her policy preference is met.is interplay means
that the ia process is more enhanced procedural control to promote enhanced rationalisation
70C. Clark and G. Majone, “e critical appraisal of scientic inquiries with policy implications”, op. cit.
71M. Nilsson, A. Jordan, J. Turnpenny, J. Hertin, B. Nykvist and D. Russel, “e use and non-use of policy
appraisal tools in public policy making: an analysis of three European countries and the European Union”, op. cit.
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at the start of the process, but as a means to ‘stack the deck’ as the ia stages evolve.erefore,
depending on the policy stage, actors will have dierent ambitions and vary their use of
enhanced control. For instance, early in the process the decision-maker is the executive (i.e.
Commission) may be less concerned about controlling the inception of a policy idea,72 since
initial policy ideas will not be accompanied by much detail and will oen reect the decision-
maker’s ideas. On the other hand, the decision-maker may show considerably more interest at
the later policy stage when the policymaker has developed the details of the proposal, therefore
requiring a mechanism to limit policy dri. In particular, at the later ia stage one would
expect the principal within the executive (i.e. the Commissioners) as well as the principals at
the inter-institutional level (i.e. the European Parliament and Council) to show more interest
in using the ia process as a means for control.
In regard to enhanced coordination, again, there is a ‘scale’ of coordination ranging from
negative to positive coordination. Furthermore, the ia process provides for dierent and
changing coordination mechanisms. For instance, at the early ia stage, the development and
publication of a short policy document (the roadmap) assists actors inside the executive to
obtain an initial understanding of the status quo and provide signals to colleagues and actors
outside the executive (i.e. the Commission) the intention to collaborate on developing policy
process. However, enhanced coordination changes at the later stage of the policy-making
process as policy is developed. In particular, it becomesmuchmore intertwinedwith enhanced
rationalisation with ocials canvasing the executive (i.e. other Directorates General) for their
input, setting up inter-institutional steering groups to ensure greater coordination andmitigate
against any possible vetoes through policy cooperation.
Enhanced coordination therefore compliments the idea of enhanced rationalisation through
the incorporation of broad policy expertise and seeking the support from the wider policy
community. As such, both ambitions become increasingly subservient as the ia stages evolve.
Under benevolent circumstances, enhanced coordination throughout the policy-making
process should result in less or little resistance at every stage of the policy process, essentially
because the nal proposal would represent the sum of the best ideas and involvement of
actors. In those circumstances where this is not the case, the hegemony of one idea takes
dominance and so coordination becomes a mechanism in support of ‘stacking the deck’. As a
72Roadmaps are published early in the policy process and sometimes referred to as dra or initial impact
assessments.
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result, a hierarchical relationship between the ambitions becomes apparent, whereby enhanced
coordination plays a distinct yet supporting role for enhanced rationalisation and enhanced
rationalisation in turn plays a supporting role for enhanced control, in particular ‘stacking the
deck’.
3 Enhanced Rationalisation, Control and Coordination:
Expected Variations
is chapter started by arguing that ia is a procedural and methodological tool designed
to respond to three policy challenges and it provided an introduction to the contradiction
and complementarity of enhanced rationalisation, control and coordination.e following
builds on this by providing greater detail on the three ambitions or logics at dierent parts
of the policy-making process. In particular, it uses an ideal-type ia process or blueprint to
establish a number of expectations for ia to advance enhanced rationalisation, control and
coordination.is is picked up in greater detail in Chapterree which identies proxies to
trace the ambitions in the empirical evidence.
As outlined in Chapter One, the focus of this research is the European Union’s ia system.
Considered one the most comprehensive and systematic ia processes in the oecd,73 it provides
a basis for this research to trace the ia policy-making process. While this is not intended to
provide a detailed overview of the eu ia process — this is provided in Chapterree — it is
designed to explore the interaction of ambitions across the policy-making processes and to
establish broad indicators to trace the ambitions in the empirical chapters.
Enhanced Rationalisation Through Impact Assessments
As outlined in part one of this chapter, ia as a means for enhanced rationalisation of the policy-
making process is about structuring the analysis of information and, where judgements conict,
declaring these as well as any analytical shortcomings.e idea is to ensure policymakers do
not undertake ‘grossly incompetent’ analysis and move beyond established paradigms such as
‘bounded rationality’. Enhanced rationalisation therefore seeks to encourage policymakers to
73oecd, Indicators of Regulatory Management System, op. cit.
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move toward a systematic synoptic approach to analysis by improving analyticalmethodologies
and policy processes. At the same time, enhanced rationalisation also seeks tomake provisions
to balance various policy considerations by being explicit about limitations. In doing so, ia
introduces procedural and analytical steps “that seek to provide relevant information for
decision-makers by predicting and evaluating the consequences of various activities according
to certain conventions”.74
In the words of policymakers, ia is a means to enhance rationalisation to “improve the
quality of policy proposals”.75 To this end, the European Union not only introduced new
analytical methodologies, such as the use of quantitative information to assess economic
impacts,76 but also methods to increase analytical depth. By, for example, introducing re-
quirements to use both quantitative and qualitative information to assess policy from three
perspectives; economic, social and environmental.77e ia system’s blueprint is therefore spe-
cic about the idea of a broad, more scientic and structured approach to the policy-making
process, with the intention of supporting the European Institutions to ‘improve’ the regula-
tory environment. In particular, through the introduction of key procedural and analytical
components ia is designed to identify the policy problem, the policy objective, and relevant
policy recommendations, all of which are presented in a nal ia report.78
To understand the ia procedural and analytical steps, the ia report provides a guide but
should not be mistaken as the unit of analysis. As highlighted previously, the ia report merely
provides an overview of the analytical ndings presented along the prescribed structure.
Additionally, enhanced rationalisation seeks to go beyond the ia report by introducing the
various procedural and analytical steps that make up the entirety of the ia.erefore, a linear
three-staged approach to the policy process allows the ambition of enhanced rationalisation
to be used but only by acknowledging that there are competing interests, dierent ideologies
and availability of information.is acknowledgement allows to the ambition of enhanced
rationalisation to infuse ideas of synoptic analysis into dierent stages of the policy process.
74S. Owens, T. Rayner and O. Bina, “New agenda for appraisal: reections on theory, practice and research”, op.
cit.
75Commission of the European Communities, Impact Assessment Guidelines, op. cit.
76C. Cecot, R. Hahn, and A. Renda, “A Statistical Analysis of the Quality of the Impact Assessment in the
European Union”, op. cit.
77C. Radaelli and F. De Francesco, Regulatory quality in Europe: Concepts, measures, and policy process, Manch-
ester University Press, 2007.
78Commission of the European Communities, Impact Assessment Guidelines, op. cit.
56
JohannesM.Wolff Theoretical Considerations
As outlined in the previous section, although enhanced rationalisation applies across the
policy-making process by focusing on improving the analytical basis of the policy-making
process, it does not have the same requirements at each ia stage.erefore, there are dierent
expectations at each of the ia stages. For instance, in a perfect world enhanced rationalisation
would be an ex-ante assessment that starts with the problem identication and an assessment of
whether policy action is necessary. However, studies have shown that this does not necessarily
reect the policy-making process with ex-ante assessments oen not contributing to the
learning of decision-makers.79 In practice, ex-ante tools — such as ia— oen focus on policy
solutions, rather than on raising fundamental questions about whether there is an underlying
need to take policy action.80is is because policy decisions to take action are oen made in
advance of any analysis.81 While a focus on policy solutions poses a challenge to the notion of
ia contributing to the ambition of enhanced rationalisation across the policy-making process,
this holds mainly in regard to the early parts of the policy-making process. Although the
overall decision to take a policy action may have been made ahead of ex-ante tools being used,
the policy process to nalise a policy solution takes a number of steps.ese steps require a
number of individual decisions (i.e. such as determining the scope or ambition of a policy
solution) and create an opportunity for ex-ante tools — or ia — and therefore enhanced
rationalisation to play a role.
erefore, even if the overall or substantive policy decision is made before the start of an ia,
there are a number of smaller decisions or components that make up an overarching policy
proposal and therefore policy decision. While the policy direction may be set at an early stage,
the details and constituents of policies are developed over the course of the policy-making
process. It is here, by supporting the small policy decisions forming the overall decision, that
ia plays a key role in enhancing the rationalisation of policy-making. For example, ia can
enhance rationalisation by establishing base-lines or the status quo to determine the extent
of change required or the examination of segments of an overall policy problem. Enhanced
rationalisation creates a structure and space for information to be collected and analysed by
79M. Nilsson, A. Jordan, J. Turnpenny, J. Hertin, B. Nykvist and D. Russel, “e use and non-use of policy
appraisal tools in public policy making: an analysis of three European countries and the European Union”, op. cit.
80R. Baldwin, “Is better regulation smarter regulation?”, in Public Law, 2005.
81W.West, “Inside the Black Box:e Development of Proposed Rules and the Limits of Procedural controls”,
in Administration and Society, September 2009.
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policy experts (policymakers), while providing specic entry points for dierent actors to
engage in and shape the policy process (e.g. decision-makers).82
Dividing the ia process into distinct policy stages provides this research with a means for
observing competing interests and the extent to which rationalisation is enhanced throughout
the policy-making process. In particular by segmenting the ia policy processes into the incep-
tion, development, and the inter-institutional bargaining stages outlined in the introductory
chapter provides a means to test the variation of enhanced rationalisation across the policy-
making process as well as the extent to which it plays a role at dierent stages.erefore, as the
purpose of each ia policy stage diers, so too do the expectations for enhanced rationalisation
vary. For instance at:
Stage I— Inception of the impact assessment the objective is to ensure the status quo is
assessed and relevant policy proposals are developed even if the overall policy objective
has been set.e analytical steps include asking policymakers to identify the policy
problem, setting out the objective to be achieved and providing an initial analysis of
current policy situation and possible options.is stage has one procedural step, the
publication of a policy document (known as the roadmap) which presents the initial
analytical ndings.
Stage II—Development of the impact assessment the objective is to gather informa-
tion and to undertake an analysis to develop the proposal and identify the best policy
option. Building on the previous stage, the analysis is deepened and further data is col-
lected to determine the likelihood of policy success. To ensure relevant data is collected,
this stage has both internal and external procedural steps, including consultations to
give external actors the opportunity to contribute to the policy-making process, and a
forum for internal actors to develop the policy and decision-makers to reach agreement
on preferred options.is stage is completed when the ia report and the proposal is
transmitted to the other institutions.
Stage III — Inter-institutional bargaining the objective is to work with the other institu-
tions (i.e. the European Parliament and Council) to identify and ne-tune the preferred
policy option. Procedurally, the institutions are expected to consider the proposal based
82M. Nilsson, A. Jordan, J. Turnpenny, J. Hertin, B. Nykvist and D. Russel, “e use and non-use of policy
appraisal tools in public policy making: an analysis of three European countries and the European Union”, op. cit.
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on the information contained in the ia report and amendments are expected to undergo
their own ia.is stage is completed when the proposal is agreed.
e next chapter provides a detailed overview of the eu’s ia policy process and proxies for
assessing the extent to which ia contributes to the ambition of enhanced rationalisation. Table
1 provides a summary of what to expect of the ia process, which will serve as the basis for the
third chapter.
Table 1: Observable outcome for IA as a tool for enhanced rationalisation
Policy Stage i Policy Stage ii Policy Stage iii
Observable
implications
Objective: establish sta-
tus quo to develop rele-
vant policy proposals.
Objective: gather rele-
vant information / un-
dertake analysis to iden-
tify best policy option.
Objective: European Parlia-
ment and Council use ia to
identify / agree optimal pol-
icy option.
Enhanced rationali-
sation: Commission
conducts initial prob-
lem and objective
denition to determine
need for intervention.
Initial ndings pub-
lished in the form of a
roadmap.
Enhanced rationalisa-
tion: deepening data
collection / analysis
of for most important
policy proposals.
Ensure relevant data
is collected / robust to
assess policy options
and develop proposals.
Decision-makers reach
agreement on preferred
options, based on ia.
Enhanced rational-
isation: European
Parliament and Coun-
cil consider proposal
based on information
in impact assessment.
Amendments undergo
impact assessments.
(evidence in subse-
quent chapters will
show that the publica-
tion of roadmaps does
not always support
the idea of enhanced
rationalisation, as
problem / objective
denition usually
reect policymakers
choices)
(evidence in subsequent
chapters will show that
although decisions may
be taken without regard
of ia, ias still play a
role in developing the
detailed policy)
(evidence in subsequent
chapters will show that ias
on amendments are some
times a tool for enhanced
rationalisation, but also a
means for control)
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Enhanced Control Through Impact Assessments
ia as a tool for enhanced control and therefore a means for managing the principal-agent
relationship is achieved through a number of procedural controls. However, as already
identied, in a world with more than one principal, enhanced control is also about ‘stacking
the deck’ to not merely limit policy dri, but also ensure policy advice supports dierent
principals’ policy preferences. While ia as a procedural tool for enhanced control is not an
explicit aspect of the eu’s ia system, it is implicit in the blueprint with two clearly identied
sets of principals, the decision-maker within the executive (i.e. within the Commission) and
the inter-institutional principals (i.e. the legislative or Council and European Parliament),
ia seeks to both change and monitor the behaviour of policymakers. As the role of agents
changes over the course of the policy-making process, so does the ambition of enhanced
control and expectations from this ambition change across the three ia stages.e following
section rst examines expectations from enhanced procedural control before exploring the
‘stacking of the deck’ and how both types of control manifest themselves across the ia process.
Enhanced — Procedural — Control
e ia procedural controls at the institutional level include explicit ‘re-alarm’ and ‘polic-
ing’ mechanisms. For example, ‘policing’ processes are mechanisms whereby policymakers
present evidence or reports to the institutional principal (i.e. the College of Commissioners
or decision-maker) so he or she can “take the ia ndings into consideration during its de-
liberations.”83ese processes serve both as a means for the principal to promote the use of
enhanced rationalisation, but also to hold policymaker to account.e ‘re-alarm’ elements
of the ia process include the consultation process where external actors are provided an
opportunity to view the policy development and raise ‘the re alarm’ by making the principal
(i.e. Commissioners, the European Parliament or Council) aware of either their opposition to
proposals or problems of process (for instance not providing sucient time for consultation or
not consulting a wide enough range of actors).rough specic steps during which principals
can consider the ia and the accompanying proposal, decision-makers are able to actively
monitor policy at each of the three ia stages.
83Commission of the European Communities, Impact Assessment Guidelines, op. cit.
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However, as enhanced control goes beyond procedural control, it is important to understand
the change in principal’s preferences. Much of the ia research focuses on the extent to which
ia limits coalitional dri in the context of overall institutional objectives and how improved
‘police-patrol’ and ‘re-alarm’ mechanisms can ensure the ideals of enhanced rationalisation.84
For example, in examining ia reports, the principal monitors the extent to which the ia report
reects the decision-makers’ preference, which in the rst instance, is to ensure policymakers
have applied the ideals of enhanced rationalisation.is is manifested by monitoring the use
of analytical tools or the consultation of external actors. However, enhanced rationalisation is
framed within wider policy preferences. For example, the European Union refers to the goal
of ensuring Europe’s international competitiveness and sustainable development.85 Enhanced
control therefore also refers to the extent to which principals use the policy-making process
to ensure policymakers develop policy which achieves the overall institutional objectives and
by extension principals’ preferences.
Nevertheless, the segmentation of the policy process provides a means to untangle the two
elements of enhanced control. In regard to procedural controls, while much of the literature
focuses on the nal policy stage and in particular how enhanced procedural control can
contribute to the production of ‘high quality’ ia reports (i.e. enhanced rationalisation);86 this
is not the entire story. Enhanced procedural control is intended to ensure the information
asymmetry between the principal or decision-maker and the policymaker is overcome.ere-
fore, mechanisms to provide decision-makers with information early in the policy-making
process are one expected outcome of enhanced control. However, as the policy-making pro-
cess evolves, so does the principal-agent relationship. Indeed, the decision-maker changes
over time. For instance, the decision-maker at the ia inception and development stages, where
policy objectives are initially framed and when much of the ia evidence is collected to present
to the decision-maker within the executive (e.g. College of Commissioners) is dierent to
the nal ia stage. At the inter-institutional stage, the principal-agent relationship is between
the European Parliament/Council and the Commission.e procedural control mechanisms
are therefore dierent. Indeed, the legislature (i.e. the European Parliament and Council)
84C. Radaelli, “Regulating Rule-Making via Impact Assessment”, op. cit.
85C. Radaelli, “Better Regulation and the Lisbon Agenda”, op. cit.
86C. Radaelli and A Meuwese, “Hard Questions, Hard Solutions: Proceduralisation through Impact Assessment
in the eu”, op. cit. or N. Lee and C. Kirkpatrick, “Integrated impact assessment”, op. cit.
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uses formal mechanisms to hold the executive (i.e. Commission) to account.erefore the
expectations for enhanced procedural control are as follows:
Stage I— Inception of an impact assessment
IA as ameans for procedural controlmeans the decision-maker seeks to ensure the
policymaker has identied the policy problem, objective and options (i.e. ensuring
policymakers for the rules of enhanced rationalisation in the context of the Lisbon
Agenda).
Stage II—Development of an impact assessment
IA as a means for procedural control where decision-makers use the ia process to
ensures policymakers (i.e. ocials) collect and analyse policy options as well as consult
with both internal and external actors to achieve a balanced policy assessment. is
stage is completed when the agent (i.e. the Commission) transmits the proposal to the
principal (i.e. the European Parliament and Council).
Stage III — Inter-institutional bargaining
IAs as ameans for procedural control where the principal (i.e. the European Parlia-
ment and Council) holds the agent (i.e. the European Commission) to account based on
the evidence in the ia report.is stage is completed when the Council and European
Parliament agree on a proposal.
However, as the policy-making process evolves, so does enhanced control. Enhanced
control as a mechanism to merely encourage or ensure enhanced rationalisation within the
policy-making process becomes overinated.
Enhanced — Stacking of the Deck — Control
e idea of on-going monitoring and control has a second dimension whereby the process
is tweaked and ‘stacked’ to achieve certain outcomes. In this context, ia can play the role of
meta-regulation or regulation of the regulator.87 For example, studies have suggested that
the ia process is biased toward economic impacts (i.e. through an extensive examination of
87ibid.
62
JohannesM.Wolff Theoretical Considerations
administrative burdens on business).88e argument is that in avoiding political confrontation,
the principal establishes ia rules and procedures to structure the search for policy solutions.
is structure allows principals to directly intervene and modify outcomes by changing
the emphasis of the process as and when necessary. By emphasising and deepening the
consultation with industry or shiing the burden of proof through a greater emphasis on
quantied evidence (to the disadvantage of ‘qualitative’ evidence such as public health), the
process can be ‘stacked’ to support specic policy preferences. In changing the emphasis and
highlighting certain elements of the policy process, the principal can achieve his or her overall
policy preference while adhering to the ocial ‘rational’ objective of working toward the best
outcome.
e failure of decision-makers to overtly sanction policymakers89 shis the focus of en-
hanced control as a means to advance enhanced rationalisation to ia as a means for the
principal to ensure his or her policy preference is met.is interplay means that the ia process
becomes about enhancing rationalisation to ‘stack the deck’.is refers back to the dichotomy
between ia ambitions previously referred to. Depending on the policy stage, actors will have
dierent ambitions and therefore vary their use of enhanced control. For example, early in
the process the decision-maker is the executive (i.e. Commission) may be less concerned
about controlling the inception of a policy idea,90 since initial policy ideas will not be accom-
panied by much detail and will oen reect the decision-maker’s ideas. On the other hand,
the decision-maker may show considerably more interest at the later policy stage when the
policymaker has developed the details of the proposal, therefore requiring a mechanism to
limit policy dri. In particular, at the later ia stage one would expect the principal within
the executive (i.e. the Commissioners) as well as the principals at the inter-institutional level
(i.e. the European Parliament and Council) to show more interest in using the ia process as a
means for control.
88C. Radaelli and A Meuwese, “Hard Questions, Hard Solutions: Proceduralisation through Impact Assessment
in the eu”, op. cit.
89M. Nilsson, A. Jordan, J. Turnpenny, J. Hertin, B. Nykvist and D. Russel, “e use and non-use of policy
appraisal tools in public policy making: an analysis of three European countries and the European Union”, op. cit.
90Roadmaps are published early in the policy process and sometimes referred to as dra or initial impact
assessments.
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Indeed, studies have suggested that the European Commission’s ia system is designed
to ‘stack the deck’ in favour of business interests.91 e application of a staged approach
therefore provides a means to identify the potential for systematic ‘deck stacking’ whereby
certain interests and objectives are amplied throughout the policy stages. For example, where
ia plays a role in enhanced control as a means for ‘stacking the deck’ in favour of certain
methodologies in support of economic considerations. If this were the case, the empirical
evidence would show that at the institutional level there is preferential treatment of certain
actors, such as industry, and the promotion of specic tools, such as those showing the specic
impact on business. e ‘stacking of the deck’, whereby control mechanisms are used to
support specic policy preference of individual principals would be identiable if the ia
process resulted in analysis, which specically supported or justied the preferred policy
solution. is type of control would be most prevalent in the third ia policy stage, inter-
institutional bargaining, as the European Commission would use the ia to emphasise certain
analytical techniques or procedures to support its negotiations with the legislature (i.e. the
European Parliament and Council). Equally, the European Parliament and Council would be
expected to use the ia process to support its own policy preferences also.erefore, the role
of ia to ‘stack the deck’ is expected to take have dierent outcomes to procedural controls.
For instance at:
Stage I— Inception of an impact assessment
IA as a means to ‘stacking the deck’ where the decision-maker uses the ia process
to frame the debate and the development of the policy proposal by clearly setting out
overall policy objective. By mapping out the policy problem, setting out the objectives
and informing key actors, the policymaker (i.e. the Commission) actively sets the agenda
and shapes the type of methodologies to be used.
Stage II—Development of an impact assessment
IA as ameans to ‘stacking the deck’ where decision-makers build on the roadmap
(previous stage) emphasising certain data and methodologies as well as the consultation
of selected actors who will assist in building the case for a preferred option.
Stage III — Inter-institutional bargaining
91J. Hertin, K. Jacob, and A. Volkery, “Policy Appraisal”, in: A. Jordan and A. Lenschow, (eds.) Innovation in
Environmental Policy? Integrating the Environment for Sustainability, 2008.
64
JohannesM.Wolff Theoretical Considerations
IAs as a means to ‘stacking the deck’ the principal has become the agent (i.e. the
Commission) and uses the ia evidence to support its preferred option. It can also include
the principal (i.e. the European Parliament and Council) selecting ia evidence to support
their preferred position.
e next chapter provides greater detail on the proxies to assess the extent towhich enhanced
control occurs. Table 2 provides an overview of what is expected when ia is employed to
achieve the ambition of enhanced control.
Table 2: Observable outcome for IA as a tool for enhanced control
Policy Stage i Policy Stage ii Policy Stage iii
Observable
implications
Objective: decision-
maker assures policy
preference is developed.
Objective: monitor the
collection of information
/ analysis to ensure it sup-
ports policy preference.
Objective: European Par-
liament and Council use
ia to monitor / change
Commission proposals.
Procedural control: Com-
missioner can monitor
policymaker by review-
ing roadmap and ensur-
ing initial problem and
objective denition re-
ects their preference.
Procedural control: Com-
missioners monitor data
collection / analysis of
policy proposals to as-
sess policy options and
develop proposals in line
with policy preference.
Procedural control: Eu-
ropean Parliament and
Council use ia to ensure
Commission proposal re-
ects their policy prefer-
ences.
Stacking the deck:
Commission publishes
roadmap to frame debate
and emphasise the
need for information
and involvement of
actors to support policy
preference in context of
opposition from Council
or Parliament.
Stacking the deck: Com-
missioner and policymak-
ers emphasis the con-
sultation of certain ac-
tors and methodologies
to support their policy
preference in the wake
of opposition from other
Commissioners.
Stacking the deck: Com-
mission use ia to support
their policy preference in
opposition to Parliament
and Council (Parliament
and Council can also con-
duct their own ia in op-
position to suggested pro-
posal).
Amendments undergo
impact assessments.
(evidence in subsequent
chapters will show that
roadmaps are oen disre-
garded)
(evidence in subsequent
chapters will show that
ias mainly play a role in
‘stacking the deck’)
(evidence in subsequent
chapters show that ias are
oen used to generate in-
formation to support pol-
icy preference — ‘stack-
ing the deck’)
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Enhanced Coordination Through Impact Assessments
e ia process introduces procedural rules to develop policy through collective decisions
and to tackle a silo approach to policy-making. By applying a structured staged approach,
the ambition is for ia to enhance coordination by encouraging decision and policymakers to
move away from negative coordination — working in silos or in established policy networks
— toward positive collaborate coordination. To achieve this, the European Union ia process
casts a wide ‘policy net’, encouraging decision and policymakers to work with colleagues
from across policy areas (such as economic, social and environmental) and to draw on their
experiences and expertise.rough the introduction of analytical and procedural steps, ia
enhances coordination of policy and decision-makers to improve the exchange of expertise,
but also to reduce the risk of vetoes throughout the policy-making process. In doing so, the
ideal of enhanced coordination varies as the ia policy-making process takes its course.
Enhanced coordination gives two groups of actors the chance to participate in the policy
process, establishing dierent expectations of coordination.e rst group are decision and
policymakers within the executive (i.e. in the context of the European Union individual
Directorates General across the Commission). Policy coordination is improved through the
ia process by facilitating those with expertise in policy areas not usually part of existing
policy networks. For example, coordination is enhanced by encouraging the contribution of
environmental expertise to other policy areas such as market liberalisation policy.is goes
beyond the inclusion of those decision and policymakers who must be consulted to obtain
formal agreement and therefore avoid vetoes or those who may already belong to established
policy networks.erefore, enhanced coordination is about “maximising the overall eectives
and eciency of government policy by exploring and utilising the joint strategy options of
several ministerial portfolios”.92e second group of actors are those external to the executive;
this can include representatives from industry or decision-makers from the legislative (i.e.
European Parliament or Council) again moving beyond just those actors who may already
belong to established policy networks, therefore “improving the transparency and coherence
of policy designs”.93
92F. Scharpf, “Games Real Actors Could Play: Positive and Negative Coordination in Embedded Negotiations”,
op. cit.
93N. Stame, “e European Project, Federalism and Evaluation”, in Evaluation, Vol. 14, 2008.
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As with enhanced control and in drawing parallels to research on the use of ex-post evalua-
tion tools, enhanced coordination can be expected to vary over the course of the policy-making
process. For instance, studies have shown that broadly dened evaluation tools will be applied
to policies which have little Community agreement or where the Commission has limited
competencies.94 In these circumstances European consensus to cooperate may still be in
its infancy and evaluation tools (such as peer to peer assessment) play a role in laying the
foundation for establishing basic consensus. However, the use of policy or evaluation tools
changes for policy areas where the consensus to work together is much greater (i.e. in par-
ticular where the European Union and Commission have a clear mandate to act). In these
cases the Community method is applied and supported by stringent ex-post reviews to justify
the European Union’s added value and to explore the extent to which further policy action is
needed.95
Similarly, the ia process provides for dierent coordination mechanisms throughout the
policy-making process. At the early ia stage, the development and publication of a short
policy document (the roadmap) assists actors inside the executive to obtain an initial under-
standing of the status quo and provide signals to colleagues and actors outside the executive
(i.e. the Commission) the intention to collaborate on developing policy process. Enhanced
coordination changes at the later stage of the policy-making process. As policy is developed,
ocials canvas the executive (i.e. other Directorates General) for their input, setting up
inter-institutional steering groups to ensure greater coordination and mitigate against any
possible vetoes through policy cooperation. e following are the expectations of ia as a
procedural tool to enhance coordination at dierent policy stages:
Stage I— Inception of the impact assessment the ia process frames the policy debate
by publishing a roadmap to lay the ground for establishing the status quo, the need for
change, and a means for engaging actors and setting a platform to nd consensus for
action.
Stage II—Development of the impact assessment the ia process enhances coordina-
tion by building on the previous stage by following up with actors and setting up forums
to coordinate actors inside and outside the executive (e.g. establishing Steering Groups
94N. Stame, “e European Project, Federalism and Evaluation”, op. cit.
95ibid.
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and public consultations).is helps identify a preferred policy option which enjoys
broad support within the executive.
Stage III — Inter-institutional bargaining the ia process enhances coordination by pro-
viding the ia report as a basis for coordinating views and reaching consensus during
debates in the legislature, but limited by policy preferences and the temptation posed
through enhanced control.
Table 3 provides an overview of what would be expected if ia were a tool to achieve the
ambition of enhanced coordination.
Table 3: Observable outcome for IA as a tool for enhanced coordination
Policy Stage i Policy Stage ii Policy Stage iii
Observable
implications
Objective: lay founda-
tions for establishing sta-
tus quo and need for ac-
tion.
Objective: engage with
actors within and out-
side the Commission to
collect information and
build consensus for pro-
posal.
Objective: European Par-
liament and Council use
ia to coordinate policy
positions and reach agree-
ment.
Enhanced coordination:
Commissioner publishes
roadmap framing policy
problem and starts engag-
ing with actors inside and
outside Commission.
Enhanced coordination:
Commission sets up issg
and consultation process
to work with actors
and build consensus for
policy proposals to reach
agreed Commission
position.
Enhanced coordination:
European Parliament and
Council use ia during
debates to understand
other position and reach
agreement.
(evidence in subsequent
chapters will show that ia
plays little or no role in co-
ordinating actors at this
stage)
(evidence in subsequent
chapters will show that
ias play less of a coordi-
nation role and more of
an information gathering
and inuencing role)
(evidence in subsequent
chapters will show that
ias rarely play a coordina-
tion role at this stage)
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4 Conclusion
is chapter started by arguing that ia is a tool designed to respond to three distinct public
policy challenges. It illustrated how procedural and analytical steps provide a means to
overcome the ‘irrationality’ of existing policy-making approaches, policy dri, and negative
coordination. In doing so, it established denitions for each of the ambitions and set the scene
to then in part two set out the potential for the three ambitions to complement as well as
contradict each other. In particular, building on part one, part two of this chapter argued that
ia sceptics oen represent the logic of enhanced control, claiming that the ia ambitions have
and continue to be subservient to ‘political considerations’,96while ia proponents represent the
logics of enhanced rationalisation and coordination, proposing ever-improved ia processes
and analytical tools to develop ‘better’ policy.e third part of this chapter provided further
detail on the use of ia as a procedural tool to enhance each of the three ambitions. It established
a set of indicators and argued that each ambition changes over the course of the policy-making
process.
is chapter therefore provided the basis to examine the relationship between the three
theoretical logics across the policy process. Accepting contradictions between the three logics,
this chapter set out a number of expectations for complementarity to be further developed in
the next chapter. In particular, it set out the importance of contextualising the ia processes
within a wider agenda — in eect the search for a dominant policy preference — and the need
to acknowledge the dominant role of enhanced control or ‘stacking the deck’. However, at the
same time, the staged approach illustrated that all three logics or ambitions can play distinct
and complementarity role — albeit within a hierarchical structure — as policy preferences
and actors change over time.
e next chapter maps out the methodology used to collect the empirical evidence for this
thesis and establishes a set of detailed proxies to trace each ambition.
96H. Heclo and A. Wildavsky,e private government of public money, op. cit.
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III Methodological Approach
As outlined in the introductory chapter, the purpose of this thesis is to go beyond an ex-
amination of individual assessment tools or a review of individual ia reports.1 is thesis
therefore applies a three-staged approach to examine ia as a dynamic three-staged process
with changing ambitions.e introductory chapter also outlined the advantages of this staged
approach, arguing that it provides a structure to both trace the logics of enhanced rationalisa-
tion, control and coordination, and to assess whether these logics interact in a complementary
or contradictory manner. In short, the staged approach allows for the policy-making process
to be segmented into identiable steps, providing a dynamic, heuristic method to explore the
contributions and interactions of dierent actors and institutions at dierent ia policy-making
stages.2 By identifying proxies for each logic, the staged approach provides a framework
to systematically trace enhanced rationalisation, control and coordination in the empirical
evidence.
e empirical evidence for this thesis is derived from the eu’s ia system3, one of the most
comprehensive and systematic ia processes in the oecd. Using the three-staged approach
as a framework to structure the eu’s ia processes, this chapter’s focus is on setting out the
methodology to collect the empirical evidence — such as surveys, interviews, and other
primary research— and the proxies to trace the ambitions of enhanced rationalisation, control
and coordination in the empirical evidence.e evidence used for this thesis relies on a mix
of new research conducted specically for this thesis as well as a European Commission study
from 2007.4 Taking advantage of various empirical sources provides this thesis with material
1For example: N. Lee and C. Kirkpatrick, “Integrated impact assessment”, op. cit.
2W. Jann and K. Wegrich, “eories of the Policy Cycle”, in F. Fischer, G. J. Miller and M. S. Sidney, Handbook
of Public Policy Analysis:eory, Politics and Methods, crc Press, 2007.
3See: oecd—Regulatory Policy Committee, “Indicators of Regulatory Management Systems”, Paris, 2009. and
O. Fritsch, C. Radaelli, L. Schreer and A. Renda, “Regulatory Quality in the European Commission and the uk:
Old questions and new ndings”, Centre for European Policy Studies, January 2012.
4e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, London, 2007.
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to identify aggregate trends— presented in Chapter Four— and present detailed observations
of the ambitions underpinning the use of ia— presented in the ve subsequent case studies.
erefore, in addition to the empirical sources, this chapter also establishes a set of proxies —
using the eu’s ia process blueprint as described by the ocial literature — to trace each of the
three logics across the ia policy-making stages.
is chapter is therefore divided into two parts. It starts by explaining the methodology
to collect the empirical evidence. In particular, this includes detailing the use of existing
empirical evidence, the collection of new empirics, their limitations, and the method used to
explore the research question: are the ia ambitions complementary or contradictory?e
second part of this then builds on the theoretical discussions around the theoretical logics
of enhanced rationalisation, control and coordination presented in Chapter Two to identify
a range of proxies to trace each logic across the ia policy-making process. is includes a
discussion of the challenges in tracing each ambition, before the chapter concludes with a
brief summary of how the empirical evidence and proxies will be used in subsequent chapters.
1 Empirical Evidence
As already noted, this thesis takes advantage of a number of empirical sources to test the
prevalence of enhanced rationalisation, control and coordination across the ia policy-making
process. It draws on ocial reports, surveys as well as face-to-face interviews to go beyond
the analysis of ia reports and explore ia as a dynamic policy process. As indicated in the
introduction, the empirical evidence includes data from a European Commission study
conducted in 2007. Project managed by the author of this thesis during this PhD thesis,
the 2007 study — and empirical material gathered for the study was not included in the
eventual publication — provides a unique source of ia information. However, the 2007 study
was only one source, this thesis includes additional research, including further interviews,
new empirical evidence and the application of a unique three-staged approach to trace the
theoretical logics of enhanced rationalisation, control and coordination.
e following pages provide an overview of the methodology to collect the empirical
evidence used in this thesis, including a detailed description of the information used from
the 2007 study and the additional research conducted specically for this thesis.is section
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concludes with a discussion of research limitations, such as striking a balance between being
an ‘observer’ and a ‘participant’ or the challenge of linking the empirical evidence to the three
theoretical logics.
Collecting the Empirical Evidence
While this thesis takes advantage of the Commission’s 2007 study — which evaluated the way
in which the European Commission developed ias — arrangements were made to ensure that
only publicly available information was used and that the 2007 study served as one out of many
sources of evidence. As project manager of the 2007 study, the author of this thesis is intimately
familiar with the empirical evidence collected for the 2007 study.e familiarity is based on
the author’s role of designer and coder of an ia database, draer of ve questionnaires, manager
of three surveys, and interviewer of 75 actors. More recently, the author also beneted from his
experience as a civil servant for the United Kingdom’s Better Regulation Executive. In this role,
the author’s focus was on developing new regulatory— in particular domestic —management
processes.ese experiences inevitably advance the author’s understanding of the use of ia.
But — as is explored in greater detail in the ‘limitations’ section — these experiences also
required clear rules in regard to accessing and using information. For example, while working
for the Better Regulation Executive the author’s work was bound by the civil service code5 and
when engaging with relevant actors a clear distinction needed to be made between collegial
‘chats’ and ‘interviews’ for this thesis. Nevertheless, this thesis benets from the experiences
of being both a practitioner and an academic and it is not possible to fully exclude that the
author of this thesis was a ‘participant’ and not merely an ‘observer’.
While this thesis benets from the above experiences, the research question and approach
for this thesis diers substantially from the author’s mandate during the 2007 study and his role
as a civil servant. For instance, the 2007 study focused primarily on questions mandated by
the European Commission.ese questions were about detailed operational issues — such as
whether Commission ocials received sucient training or whether the quality of ia reports
was sucient — which was also the main focus of the author’s civil service career.e 2007
study devoted little attention to the use of ia and did not consider any theoretical ambitions.
Indeed, one of the 2007 study’s challenges was the wealth of ia objectives which provided a
5Civil Service Code http://www.civilservice.gov.uk/about/values
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starting point for this thesis to develop the theoretical ambitions outlined in Chapter Two
and explore the use of ia in more detail.e 2007 study’s original empirical evidence — such
as the survey monkey databases and interview notes — therefore serves as a rich source of
empirical evidence. By using the original evidence, this thesis is able to structure and use the
empirical evidence along the three-staged approach and analyse it against this thesis’ research
question. However, as a consequence of using the 2007 study, the time-period for this thesis
equals that of the 2007 study. It spans the point when the eu ia system was introduced in 2003
and the time the 2007 study was completed. While this time-period could have been extended,
replicating the depth of information would have been impossible within the connes of a
thesis, a point discussed further in the ‘limitations’ section.
Finally, substantial additional research was conducted to gain a better understanding of
the 2003 to 2006 time-period. In particular, additional interviews were held and empirical
evidence collected to deepen the understanding of the existing time-period, the ia ambitions
and ia stages. For example, the development of additional databases for published roadmaps
and available Commission Legislation Work Programmes (clwp) provided additional evi-
dence for the rst ia stage. A new database of Commission consultations and ia references
in the European Parliament provided additional evidence to support the analysis of the sec-
ond and third ia stages. Additionally, an extensive analysis of documents published by the
European Commission, European Parliament, Council and media articles helped develop
the background of individual case studies and the policy preferences of dierent actors not
apparent (or available) from interviews. While no further surveys were conducted — mainly
because the available information was more than sucient — sixteen additional interviews
with actors at Member State and Commission level were held under Chatham House rules.
ese interviews assisted the author in reecting on specic case studies. In many cases, the
interviews focused on the ia system’s overall logic or ambition as well as the emerging results
from this thesis.
e following table provides a summary of the information sources and empirical evidence
used in this thesis.
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Table 4: Summary of information sources and empirical evidence
Sources Method? To what end?
External
Commission
Stakeholder
Survey*
Questionnaire with closed questions
and facility for open-ended answers.
Posted on the internet for 8 weeks us-
ing the European Commission On-
line Consultation Mechanism.†
E-mails sent to organizations listed
on the European Commission’s Civil
Society website‡ and actors identi-
ed by the Commission.
Total number of respondents: 114
Questionnaire included questions on
specic ias; the overall ia System;
and suggestion for improvements to
gain insight into external views and
verify ndings from internal stake-
holder survey and interviews.
Information relevant to gain insight
into external views and verifying
ndings from internal actors and in-
terviews.
Internal
Commission
Stakeholders
(ec Ocials)
Survey*
Questionnaire with closed questions
and facility for open-ended answers.
Posted on the internet for 4 weeks us-
ing the European Commission On-
line Consultation Mechanism.†
e Secretariat General took the re-
sponsibility for contacting relevant
ocials, mainly due to privacy con-
cerns.
Total number of respondents: 89
Questionnaire included questions on
the ia Guidelines, Training and Sup-
port, Application and proportional-
ity, Timing and Data, Inter Service
Steering Groups, ia reports and sug-
gestions for improvements.
Information relevant to gain insight
into internal Commission views and
verifying ndings from external ac-
tors and interviews.
Interviews —
Contributors
(agents)§
Interviews with those actors who car-
ried out or provided input to the ia
work. Mainly Commission ocials,
but also included external experts
hired to carry out parts of the ia.
Total number of interviews: 34
Structured interviews conducted to
explore the degree to which the ia
blueprint was followed during indi-
vidual case studies.
Information relevant to gain quali-
tative insight into internal Commis-
sion views and verifying ndings
from quantitative information and
views from external actors.
*e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
†http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/ipm/forms/dispatch (August 2012)
‡http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/civil_society/ (August 2012)
§Note: Most interviews were conducted in the context of the European Commission’s 2007 study;
however, a number of follow-up interviews were conducted separately.
**http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/impact_en.htm (August 2012)
††http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/index_en.htm and http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/index_en.
htm (August 2012)
‡‡http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm (August 2012)
Continued...
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Sources Method? To what end?
Interviews —
External Actors§
Interviews with those actors who
were likely to be aected/interested
in the proposal and who would be
interested in the ia process. Mainly
Industry associations, Trade unions,
NGOS, Consumer organisation and
Member State authorities.
Total number of interviews: 15
Structured interviews conducted to
explore the degree to which external
actors rated ias and were able to con-
tribute during individual case stud-
ies.
Information relevant to gain qual-
itative insight into external actors’
views and verifying ndings from
quantitative information and views
from internal Commission actors.
Interviews —
Users
(principals)§
Interviews with those actors who
took account of the ia in the pol-
icy discussion and legislative process,
both inside the Commission and in
the EU institutions. Mainly Cabinet
members, representatives from the
European Parliament and Member
State representatives or Council sta.
Total number of interviews: 42
Structured interviews conducted to
explore the degree to which ‘users’
rated ias and made use of ias for in-
dividual case studies and more gen-
erally.
Information relevant to gain quali-
tative insight into ‘users’ views and
verifying ndings from quantitative
information and views from actors
involved in contributing to the ia pro-
cess.
clwp** Database for 2003–2006 listing:⋅ Number roadmaps listed in clwp⋅ Number of planned ias in clwp⋅ Number of planned issgs
Information relevant to gain insight
into rst ia stage — in particular
whether the European Commission
complied with ia Guidelines — and
verifying ndings from qualities sur-
veys and interviews.
Consultation
database††
Database for 2003–2006 listing:⋅ Number Commission led consulta-
tions with external actors⋅ Number of Commission led consul-
tation as part of the ia system
Information relevant to gain insight
into second ia stage — in particular
whether the European Commission
followed the iaGuidelines—and ver-
ifying ndings from qualitative sur-
veys and interviews.
*e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
†http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/ipm/forms/dispatch (August 2012)
‡http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/civil_society/ (August 2012)
§Note: Most interviews were conducted in the context of the European Commission’s 2007 study;
however, a number of follow-up interviews were conducted separately.
**http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/impact_en.htm (August 2012)
††http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/index_en.htm and http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/index_en.
htm (August 2012)
‡‡http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm (August 2012)
Continued...
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Sources Method? To what end?
Eurolex‡‡ Database for 2003–2006 listing:⋅ Number of Oral iaQuestions in Eu-
ropean Parliament⋅ Number of Written ia Questions in
European Parliament⋅ Number of European Parliament
amendments⋅ Number of Directives, Regulations
and Decisions passed
Information relevant to gain insight
into third ia stage — in particular
whether the European Parliament
complied with ia Guidelines — and
verifying ndings from qualitative
surveys and interviews.
*e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
†http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/ipm/forms/dispatch (August 2012)
‡http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/civil_society/ (August 2012)
§Note: Most interviews were conducted in the context of the European Commission’s 2007 study;
however, a number of follow-up interviews were conducted separately.
**http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/impact_en.htm (August 2012)
††http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/index_en.htm and http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/index_en.
htm (August 2012)
‡‡http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm (August 2012)
As Table 4 shows, the empirical evidence is designed to explore the ia ambitions at each
of the three ia stages. Also, the use of both qualitative and quantitative information allows
for the three ambitions to be explored rst from a ‘helicopter’ view — by exploring large ‘n’
information — and then up close — by exploring ve case studies.e variety of evidence
sources also allows for information to be triangulated and therefore to reduce the possibility
of single statements or misleading trends taking on unwarranted importance. For example,
the empirical chapters balance interview or survey information from internal actors against
interview or survey information from external actors.is triangulation of sources reduces
the possibility of bias from one group of actors.
An important source of evidence is a database of 158 ia reports published between 2003
and 2006.is database was originally developed for the 2007 study and used in this thesis
to serve as a baseline for a number of the large ‘n’ analysis — presented in Chapter Four
— but also to identify the case studies. While the coding criteria were designed primarily
to answer the questions mandated by the Commission in the 2007 study, the database also
provides information for this thesis. For example, being able to identify a high number of
ias that are accompanied by an assessment of social, economic and environmental impacts
provides a means to assume enhanced rationalisation plays a role; a high number of ias with
a focus on economic impacts suggests that economic and business interests play a greater role,
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Table 5: Criteria for the IA database
# Criteria # Criteria
1 Title 18 “eu policy” option
2 Reference of ia 19 “No policy change” option
3 Reference of proposal 20 “Instrument” vs. “substance” options
4 Type of proposal 21 Total no. of options analysed
5 Category of proposal 22 Economic impacts assessed
6 Date of adoption 23 Economic impacts quantied
7 Responsible dg 24 Environmental impacts assessed
8 Inter-Service Steering Group 25 Environmental impacts quantied
9 External expertise used 26 Social impacts assessed
10 Stakeholder consultation 27 Social impacts quantied
11 Language of ia report 28 External impacts assessed
12 Length of ia report 29 External impacts quantied
12 Length of annexes 30 Impacts monetised
13 Table of contents 31 Options compared explicitly
14 Executive summary 32 Preferred option made explicit
15 Problem identied 33 Monitoring and evaluation outlined
16 Objectives dened 34 Concrete indicators proposed
17 Total number of options presented
supporting the idea of enhanced control (stacking the deck in particular); and whether an
Inter-Service Steering Group was established provides an indication of whether the logic of
enhanced coordination plays a role. e next section provides more detail on the proxies,
with the following table giving a detailed overview of the criteria for the ia database.
e database was also used during the 2007 study to select case studies and relevant inter-
viewees. Again, while the case study selection was originally designed for the 2007 study, the
selection criteria are also appropriate for this thesis.e selection criteria were designed to
limit any bias toward specic policy areas or Directorates General dg), possible challenges
early ias may have faced because of the recent adoption of the ia system, and bias toward
policy instruments.e detailed criteria are presented in Table 6.
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Table 6: Case study selection criteria
Criteria Description
Lead dg in charge of the
ia
dgs selected by nding a balance between the three pillars (i.e.
economic — dg entr, dg markt; social — dg empl / dg jls /
dg sanco; and environmental — dg env)
Year of ia ias selected by nding a balance between recently completed ias
and older ones (2003 — 2008)
Level of detail / Quality Taking into account the degree to which the ias adhered to the
criteria set out in the ia Guidelines, to provide an indication of
completeness and procedural quality.
Type Type of policy tool the Impact Assessment accompanied, i.e. Leg-
islative, Financial Instrument, Action Plan,ematic Strategy.
Using the original interviewnotes from the 2007 study, this thesis benets from the empirical
evidence but uses it to a dierent end. In particular, by conducting further research, the case
studies explore the ambitions of enhanced rationalisation, control and coordination.e ve
case studies are:
• dg Enterprise’s (entr) ia on Pack Sizes Directive (2004);
• dg Environment’s (env) ia on theematic Air Strategy (2005);
• dg Internal Market and Services’ (markt) ia on Postal Services Directive (2006);
• dg Justice Freedom and Security’s (jls) ia on Migration Spending Programme (2005);
and
• dgHealth and Consumer’s (sanco) ia on Plant Protection Products Directive (2006).
Limitations of the Empirical Evidence
While every eort was made to overcome limitations in the collection and use of the empirical
evidence, there are three challenges that warrant further discussion. First, as identied earlier,
it could be argued that the focus on ia reports published between 2003 and 2006 ignores
important developments to the EuropeanCommission’s ia system. Although several additional
ia reports have been published since 2006 and the European Union’s ia process has been
up-dated, the three-staged approach to the development of ia has not changed nor have
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the ia system’s objectives. Changes have been limited to systemic / operational ones such as
up-dates to methodological approaches to calculate certain costs as well as adding quality
assurance processes to increase compliance with the ocial ia Guidelines. ese changes
have not altered the underlying rationale of ia or the theoretical ambitions (or logics). Indeed,
advantages of using data from mid-2000s is that this time-lag provides a period to reect on
interviews and that it provides an opportunity to conduct follow-on interviews to explore
how data from the mid-2000s relates to a wider policy context.
Another potential limitation is that this thesis takes advantage of a large amount of qualita-
tive information to trace three theoretical ambitions across a dynamic process.is raises
questions of the challenges in applying a three-staged — eectively linear — approach to a
‘uid’ policy-making process. However, as the introductory chapters argued, the advantage of
using such an approach lies precisely in the segmentation of the policy-making process.is
segmentation allows for the contributions and interactions of dierent actors and institutions
to be traced at dierent stages in the ia policy-making process.is tracing requires proxies
to establish a link between the theoretical ambitions and the empirical evidence. While the
proxies are explored in greater detail in the subsequent section, it is important to note that
identifying a direct link between the empirical evidence and each ambition is not always
straightforward. To this end, this thesis builds on the wider literature underpinning the
three theoretical logics outlined in Chapter Two. While this provides a coherent framework
to develop the proxies, inevitably, the choice of proxies requires a degree of interpretation.
Additionally, some proxies refer to more than one theoretical logic requiring careful analyses
of interview responses and the assessment of policy background to link them to specic
theoretical logics.is ‘contextualisation’ will be picked up in greater detail in the following
section and concluding chapter.
Finally, as outlined earlier, this thesis benets from the author’s experiences as a consultant,
a civil servant and an academic researcher. While this experience is of a great advantage to this
thesis — particularly in developing and understanding of the ia ambitions and the empirical
evidence — this also requires clear rules for ensuring only publicly available information was
used and limiting potential bias. To overcome this challenge, the author used only publicly
available information.is included the empirical data from the Commission’s 2007 study
— which is publicly available — and adhering to the civil service code (which prevents him
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from misusing his ocial position to use information acquired in the course of his duties).6
In practice, this means that the author ensured his civil service role did not also focus his area
of study (for example focusing on United Kingdom regulation rather than on eumatters).
Furthermore, when engaging with relevant actors, a clear distinction was made between
collegial ‘chats’ and ‘interviews’ as part of this thesis and the focus of this study was very
dierent from the ‘operational’ considerations of many practitioners. Nevertheless, this thesis
benets from the experience and research conducted as both a practitioner and an academic.
As indicated above, it is therefore not entirely possible to exclude that this thesis’ author was a
‘participant’ and not merely an ‘observer’.
2 Tracing Impact Assessments — Proxies by Policy Stage
As argued in the introductory chapter, ia is a set of procedural and analytical steps designed
to structure the policy-making process and provide decision-makers with policy advice.7
e ia report — the focus of many studies — merely represents a summary or snapshot of a
process, providing an ocial and incomplete story of the policy process. To overcome this
‘snapshot’ limitation, this thesis applies a three-staged approach, segmenting the ia policy-
making process into stages.e approach builds on the common policy stages identied in
the academic literature8 and eu Guidelines underpinning the eu’s ia system. Because the
details of the three-staged approach were outlined in the introductory chapter, the following
section does not present these again. Instead, the focus is on developing proxies to link the
three theoretical logics — represented by enhanced rationalisation, control and coordination
— to the empirical evidence.
Using the eu’s ia blueprint as a basis, the following pages develop a set of proxies for each ia
ambition at each of the three ia stages.ese proxies are based on the literature surrounding
the three public policy problems ia seeks to overcome. In particular, the proxies draw on
the wider literature around enhanced rationalisation, control and coordination discussed in
Chapter Two.e following section therefore starts with a brief overview of the genesis of
6Civil Service Code http://www.civilservice.gov.uk/about/values, (August 2012).
7oecd, Dra oecd Recommendation on Regulatory Policy and Governance,
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/49/43/48087250.pdf (June 2011).
8P. deLeon and K. Kaufmanis, “Public Policyeory: Will it play in Peoria?”, in Policy Currents Vol. 10: No. 4,
2000.
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policy proposals by developing proxies to identify the start of an ia and to trace the ambitions
of enhanced rationalisation, control and coordination during the inception of an ia. For
example, the extent to which roadmaps or ias accompany ‘important’ policy proposals or
whether a roadmap is published at all serves as proxies for enhanced rationalisation.ese
serve as proxies for enhanced rationalisation because roadmaps are intended to support initial
problem and policy analysis assessments. Examining survey and interview responses — from
actors involved in the ia process in particular— therefore provides an indication as to whether
the ia process is contributing to enhanced rationalisation. Similarly, the following pages also
develop appropriate proxies for enhanced control and coordination.
Aer establishing proxies for the rst ia stage, proxies to trace the theoretical ambitious
during the second ia stage are developed. For example, whether an ia process is accompanied
by an inter-service steering group (issg) serves — as outlined in the ia Guidelines — as a
proxy for enhanced coordination. However, while the existence of an issg is primarily a
tool for coordination, issg can also — as highlighted in Chapter Two — serve as a tool for
enhanced rationalisation and control. For instance, Commission actors may use an issg to
‘stack the deck’ in favour of their policy preference. By selecting participants supportive of
specic policy preferences, issgs can help garner support for policy preferences. Identifying
whether establishing an issg is a proxy for ‘stacking the deck’ requires careful assessment of
interview responses against the proposals background. Using research into the history of
individual cases — for example the long-standing argument behind liberalising the postal
services market — along with interviews and media reports sets the empirical evidence within
a wider context to assess whether proxies represent one or several theoretical ambitions.
e third section establishes proxies for the nal ia stage. For example, whether the
European Parliament and Council conduct ias on proposed amendments — as required by
the Inter-Institutional Agreement on Impact Assessment — serves as a proxy for whether
analysis was conducted and therefore the ambition of enhanced rationalisation. But as outlined
above, proxies can represent more than one ambition For example, amendment ias may serve
to develop evidence to support specic policy preferences, therefore representing the ambition
of ‘stacking the deck’. Tracing these proxies will require a detailed assessment of interviews —
in particular actors in the European Parliament and Council — and an understanding of the
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background surrounding individual cases. Additionally, detailed assessment of media reports
will also contribute to determining whether a proxy reects one or several proxies.
e following pages are structured along the three-staged approach and intended to easily
trace the ambitions of enhanced rationalisation, control and coordination.e structure serves
to organise the six empirical chapters and ultimately to code — along with the proxies -the
results of the case studies in a tabular format. For example, if an actor uses a procedural step to
enhance coordination or an analytical step to enhance rationalisation or a procedural control
mechanism to promote his or her policy preference, then this is recorded as ia supporting
each respective ambition.is coding is done in the nal chapter and visually presented with
the assistance of two three-by-three — ia ambition against ia stage — matrices.
Stage I — Inception of an Impact Assessment
e European Commission is the main architect and defender of the Union’s regulatory rules.
However, while it has the right of initiative, the European Council and European Parliament
are also able to request proposals.9 Indeed, the number of actors that can inuence the
development of proposals can be broad. is is due to a system that provides “extensive
opportunities for stakeholders, especially economic actors, but sometimes other societal
actors, to be consulted about, and to inuence, the shape and content of European market
rules”.10
What, therefore, is the role of ia as this early policy stage? According to the ia Guidelines,
it has several. First, ia is intended to enhance rationalisation by supporting the architects
of regulatory rules; second, it also intended to enhance coordination by informing external
Commission actors, and third it is also intended to enhance control by allowing the other
institutions to act as agents. For example, while proposals may be developed in response to
technical policy problems identied during the implementation of a Directive, an ia— or
roadmap — is intended to support the Commission in determining whether and how to
respond to the policy problem (i.e. enhanced rationalisation).e roadmap can also assist the
European Parliament and Council in monitoring (i.e. procedural control) the Commission,
9H. Wallace, “An Institutional Anatomy and Five Policy Modes”, in H. Wallace, W. Wallace and M. Pollacke
European Union, Oxford University Press 2005.
10ibid.
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as well as serve to signal the opportunity for eternal actors to (i.e. enhanced coordination)
participate through consultations. Divided into two sub-sections, the following pages develop
these proxies further.
Enhanced Rationalisation and Control: Policy Proposals that Require an Impact
Assessment
e ia Guidelines require that a systematic assessment of policy options and their potential
impacts be done as a matter of course, supporting the ambition of enhanced rationalisation
whereby policymakers should follow specic analytical steps to ensure their assessment to
develop a proposal is robust. However, not all policy proposals need to be accompanied
by a formal ia. Indeed, ias are only required for major proposals included in the Commis-
sion’s Legislative and Work Programme (clwp), such as “regulatory proposals, White Papers,
expenditure programmes and negotiating Guidelines for international agreements.”11 e
requirement for important or ‘major proposals’ to be accompanied by an ia also underpins the
idea of enhanced control. By giving decision-makers — either those within the Commission,
such as the Commissioners, or the European Parliament and Council — including an ia in
the clwp provides an opportunity to monitor the early development of signicant proposals.
Initiatives or proposals that are not ‘signicant’ or are considered routine are exempted from
the ia process.ese include “periodic Commission decisions and reports, proposals following
international obligations and Commission measures deriving from its powers of controlling
the correct implementation of ec law and executive decisions.”12erefore, whether’ relevant’
proposals are accompanied by an ia provides a proxy of enhanced control, and whether
analysis has been conducted in the roadmap a proxy for enhanced rationalisation.
Enhanced Rationalisation, Control and Coordination: Roadmaps and the CLWP
When a formal ia is required, the Commission is obliged to complete a roadmap — in eect
a pre-ia— and publish it in the clwp. According to the Guidelines, the roadmap’s primary
purpose is early planning, therefore representing the ambition of enhanced coordination.
11Commission of the European Communities, Impact Assessment Guidelines, op. cit.
12ibid.
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Because major policy proposals require signicant resources and coordination (including
budgets for studies and ocials to develop and implement the proposal) roadmaps assist the
planning of resources and coordination of actors inside the Commission.
To manage, coordinate and prioritise both resources and policies across the Commission,
major policy proposals are rst announced in the Commission’s Annual Strategic Planning
and Programming cycle (spp). e spp also allows the College of Commissioners — the
decision-maker or agent at this ia stage — to dene and prioritise strategic objectives. As the
policy work evolves, roadmaps provide not only a means for coordination but also a source of
management information. Roadmaps are also updated periodically by Directorates General
before they are included in the clwp.is role supports the ambition of enhanced procedural
control, but can also function as a means for ‘stacking of the deck’. For example, a roadmap
can focus on specic policy preference and establish a trajectory for the further development
of a policy proposal.erefore, while the roadmap can act as a procedural control mechanism
for decision-makers external to the Commission to monitor proposals, the Commission can
also use roadmaps to promote its policy preference and ‘stack the deck’.
Another prominent feature of the ia Guidelines at this stage is the ambition of enhanced
rationalisation.e roadmap encourages policymakers to follow a number of analytical steps,
such as identifying the availability of data, what complementary data may be needed, and
how it will be developed. Roadmaps are designed to include a brief statement on the likely
impact of policy options and whether an Inter-Service Steering Group will be set up. Inter-
Service Steering Groups are of particular importance as they support the work on important
crosscutting policies. In particular, they should provide specialised inputs and expertise
from across the Commission to reach nal agreement during the second stage of the impact
assessment, in particular the Inter-Service Consultation.
Enhanced coordination and enhanced rationalisation are prominent elements outlined
in the ia Guidelines. e logic of control on the other hand is less prominently featured.
While ocials are required to identify and describe “as concretely as possible the issue at
stake [because] oen, political statements at the origin of a policy initiative do not provide a
detailed description of the problem,”13 the Guidelines seek to limit potential ‘stacking of the
deck’ by obliging ocials to dene the policy problem, identify key components and make
13ibid.
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Table 7: IA Stage I — proxies for enhanced rationalisation, control and coordination
Logic / Proxy Policy Proposals at Require an
ia/ Roadmap
Roadmap Published in clwp
Enhanced
Rationalisation
Relevant proposal accompanied by
IA/ roadmap to underpin analysis
(yes/no)
Roadmap published in clwp incor-
porating analysis of policy problem,
establishing baseline to proceed and
what additional analysis is required
(yes/no)
(Source: quantitative analysis of clwp,
survey responses & interviews)
(Source: quantitative analysis of
clwp, survey responses & inter-
views)
Enhanced Control Procedural Control:
relevant proposal accom-
panied by IA/ roadmap for
principal to monitor agent
(yes/no)
‘Stacking the Deck’:
Roadmap focuses on promot-
ing specic policy preferences
(Source: quantitative analysis of
clwp, survey responses & inter-
views)
(Source: qualitative analysis of ia re-
port and interviews)
Enhanced
Coordination
Roadmap published in clwp to indi-
cate (to external actors) that they can
contribute in future
(Source: quantitative analysis of
clwp, survey responses & inter-
views)
rough estimates of the scale of the problem. Nevertheless, the emphasis of the roadmap is on
the identication of policy options, not to question the necessity for a policy proposal.e ia
Guidelines therefore inadvertently seek to justify policy action, supported by the following
statement: “the assessment of the problem should not be solely based on a general feeling.”14
e rst ia stage therefore represents all three ambitions with the roadmap playing a vital
role.e proxies identied in this section are summed up in Table 7, including the evidence
sources to identify each proxy.
14ibid.
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Stage II — Development of an Impact Assessment
e second ia stage contains most of the procedural and analytical work, promoting all three
theoretical ambitions. A key feature of the ia Guidelines is an emphasis on enhanced ra-
tionalisation by encouraging ocials to build on the work completed for the roadmap. By
expanding and deepening the initial analysis by encouraging the consideration of economic,
social and environmental impacts, the Guidelines place particular importance on enhanced
rationalisation. Enhanced coordination also plays an important role during this stage, with
the requirement for Directorates General to establish Inter-Service Steering Groups for pol-
icymakers across the Commission to work together. e logic of enhanced control — in
particular procedural control — is also a feature, illustrated by a mechanism for the College
of Commissioners to review the ia and (if necessary) veto proposals.
To trace the ambitions of enhanced rationalisation, control and coordination, the following
section is divided into four sub-sections: i) the six procedural and analytical steps in developing
an ia which act as proxies for the ambitions of enhanced rationalisation and coordination; ii)
the steps the Commission takes to collect relevant data and to consult external actors therefore
acting as proxies for enhanced rationalisation and external coordination; iii) the mechanism
by which the Commission conducts quality assurance of the ia process serving as a proxy for
both the ambitions of enhanced rationalisation and control; and iv) the format of the nal ia
report. While, each sub-section focuses on proxies contained in the ia Guidance, proxies not
clearly featured in the ia Guidelines — in particular ‘stacking of the deck’ — are also included.
Enhanced Rationalisation, Control and Coordination: Analytical and Procedural Steps
According to the ia Guidelines it is important for policymakers to ensure that ias take cross
cutting issues into account, both as a means for enhanced rationalisation but also coordination.
e main mechanism for ocials from dierent Directorates General to participate in the ia
process is the Inter-Service Steering Group (issg), which forms one out of several procedural
and analytical steps to be followed during the second ia stage.e main six procedural and
analytical steps outlined for the second stage are as follows:
• identication and examination of the policy problem;
• denition of the objectives;
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• development of the main policy options;
• identify the potential economic, environmental and social impacts of policy options;
• compare and contrast policy options; and
• outline the mechanism by which the proposal will be monitored in future.
e rst step is the detailed identication and examination of the policy problem. In
particular, the analysis of the policy problem, identication of key actors and an exploration
of underlying causes.e second step is the objective’s denition which includes both the
overall and specic objectives the intervention or policy proposal is expected to achieve. To
support policymakers, the ia Guidelines also include a number of analytical tools such as
‘objectives trees’ and suggests that the objectives meet the smart principals (i.e. specic,
measurable, accepted, realistic, and time-dependent). Once the policy problem and objectives
are identied, policymakers are encouraged to develop the main policy options using these
analytical tools.is step includes the consideration of the type of delivery mechanisms (i.e.
regulatory or non-regulatory) and the examination of options for delivery (e.g. whether to
regulate an entire industry or only specic companies).
Once the policymaker has identied dierent policy options, the next step is the exploration
of the option, with an emphasis on the identication of direct as well as indirect environmental,
economic and social impacts; who will be aected; and a qualitative and quantitative assess-
ment of the potential future impacts.e ia Guidelines provide a range of analytical tools
to support this — or enhance rationalisation — and also ask policymakers to consult with
relevant actors — or enhance coordination — either formally or informally.is can include
the services of external experts to collect data.e h and penultimate step the comparison
of options which, according to the Guidelines, should balance dierent considerations, such as
impact on society, the environment and business.is results in an overall recommendation
to address the policy problem and achieve the policy objectives.e sixth and nal step is an
outline of the mechanisms by which the proposal will be monitored and evaluated in future.
e steps outlined above focus primarily on enhanced rationalisation, but the iaGuidelines
also provide direction on how ocials should be supported and how to assess the ia quality
(quality in the sense of whether it has complied with the ia Guidelines, but also whether
key actors are content with the analytical work and supporting evidence).is serves as a
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proxy for control to enforce the ia Guidelines, which in the rst instance is expected to be
provided by ia support unit / functions in individual dgs, with the Secretariat General playing
a supporting role. As with the rst ia stage, control as a means for ‘stacking of the deck’ is
not explicitly outlined in the Guidelines, nor is it implicit. Rather, a proxy for ‘stacking of the
deck’ would be the views and opinions of actors sourced from surveys and interviews, as well
as an emphasis on specic evidence or policy options to support certain policy preferences
(e.g. extensive assessment of economic impacts at the expense of environmental or social
considerations).
To ensure ias take cross cutting issues into account and to coordinate work across the
Commission, the Guidelines include mechanisms to involve ocials from dierent dgs. As
outlined in the previous section, this is done through an Inter-Service Steering Group (issg).
ese groups provide guidance about the processes and balance the expertise across the
Commission. issgs usually include Commission services (i.e. member state representatives
and other stakeholders are not invited) and should guide the impact assessment process.
While the main objective is enhanced coordination, they can also serve as a proxy for the
lead-dg to integrate relevant views and evidence from other dgs (i.e. as a means for enhanced
rationalisation).e proxy for enhanced coordination is therefore whether the issgmeets and
the extent to which dgs are represented.e proxy for enhanced rationalisation is both the
procedural and analytical steps, but also the degree to which issg participants and contractors
contribute to the analysis underlying the ia. Based on interview and survey responses, the
issg also serves as a proxy for ‘stacking of the deck’. For example, if the lead-dg used the issg
as a means to promote its preferred policy preference, this would indicate ‘stacking of the
deck’ and be highlighted by those actors participating in the relevant issgs.
Enhanced Rationalisation and Coordination: Data Collection and Consultation
According to the ia Guidelines, consulting interested parties from outside the European
Commission is an important element of the ia process, providing a means for enhanced
coordination and “transparency”.15 Another explanation for why the ia Guidelines promote
“transparency” is that the gathering of opinions and information can help ensure policy is
practically workable but also legitimate in the eyes of relevant actors (i.e. enhanced rationali-
15ibid.
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sation).16e ia Guidelines suggest that this process be done using such tools as consultative
committees, expert groups, open hearings, ad hoc meetings, consultation via the Internet,
questionnaires, focus groups, seminars, or workshops.erefore, whether such consultative
processes are used provides yet another proxy for both enhanced rationalisation and coordina-
tion. However, if this process is used in such a way that certain actors are granted preferential
access, this provides a proxy for the idea of enhanced control or ‘stacking of the deck’.
e extent to which these consultation mechanisms represent proxies for the individual
logics is dependent on the views and opinions of actors involved in the process. While
interviews provide some insight into this, the extent to which consultation mechanisms allow
a wide range of actors to participate is a straightforward proxy for enhanced coordination and
mechanisms designed to collect further data a proxy for enhanced rationalisation. For example,
the ia Guidelines provide a minimum standard for consultation17 to be ‘open and transparent’
by requiring dgs to provide clear consultation documents, target relevant groups, ensure
sucient publicity and provide enough time for participation to respond. e Guidelines
also include steps intended to increase the reliability of data or rationalisation (e.g. providing
access to the scientic network that have already been established by other dgs or by making
use of previous studies in the eld).
Enhanced Rationalisation and Control: Quality Assurance
e ia Guidelines also outline a process whereby the Commission seeks to ensure the quality
of ia (level of enhanced rationalisation). A key aspect is the issg because, in addition to
coordinating policies across the Commission, it provides a mechanism for the ia to achieve
a standard supported by policymakers across the Commission.is plays a signicant role
during the nal step, when the proposal — along with the ia— is submitted for inter-service
consultation and consideration by the College of Commissioners. While the Secretariat-
General manages this process and intervenes if it deems the quality of the ia not sucient,
the dgs hold the responsibility of ensuring the proposal has broad support from across the
Commission ahead of its transmission to the European Parliament and Council.
16ibid.
17Commission of the European Communities, Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue —
General principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties, com(2002) 704.
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is nal step of quality assurance and policy clearance therefore provides a proxy for
enhanced rationalisation based on whether the Secretariat-General agrees that the ia has
followed the analytical steps. It also represents a proxy for enhanced control, both procedural
and ‘stacking of the deck. Procedural control as the Secretariat General or any dg can veto
the policy on its merits and ‘stacking the deck’ as dgs can veto the policy if the ia does not
reect their policy preference.
Enhanced Rationalisation, Control or Coordination: The IA Report
e nal output of the second ia stage is the ia report.is document receives the greatest
attention from external Commission actors, both those who use it to make decisions, such as
the European Parliament and Council, and students of the Commission ia process. While
the ia report provides a check-list of procedural and analytical steps — for instance com-
pleteness of analytical steps required by the ia Guidelines represents a proxy for enhanced
rationalisation, completeness of coordination steps a proxy for enhanced coordination and
overall completeness of the report a proxy for enhanced procedural control — what it does
not include can be revealing too. For instance, the exclusion of options or assessment of
certain impacts provides a proxy for enhanced control — or ‘stacking of the deck’ — but only
if supported by interviews and wider research into whether divergent policy preference may
be present, therefore explaining the absence or emphasis of options. Table 8 gives an overview
of the various elements the nal ia report should contain.
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Table 8: IA report as outlined by IA Guidelines
Executive summary
Context / background
Problem
Objectives
Policy options
Impact assessment (economic, social and environmental)
Assessment of impacts outside the eu
Quantication of impacts
Comparison of options
Presentation of preferred options
Framework for future assessment
In summary, the second ia stage includes a number of proxies to represent enhanced
rationalisation, control and coordination. Requirements for policymakers to build on the work
outlined in the roadmap, such as expanding and deepening the analysis conducting during the
rst ia stage, represents a proxy for enhanced rationalisation. Mechanisms for consulting with
internal and external actors mainly represent proxies for enhanced coordination. On the other
hand, the completeness of ia reports and the veto role of the College of Commissioners act as
proxies for enhanced control. However, while many of the proxies for enhanced rationalisation
and coordination are easily identiable, may play dual roles. Only by understanding the
preferences, views and opinions of actors will it be possible to determine whether the proxies
represent one or several ambitions. To this end, interviews with actors will play an important
role in tracing each ambition, in particular the ambition of ‘stacking the deck’.e proxies
identied in this section are summarised in Table 9.
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Stage III — Inter-Institutional Bargaining
e nal stage in the life of an ia starts when the report is completed and transmitted from
the European Commission to the European Parliament and Council. It is the stage during
which the European Parliament and Council debate the policy proposal using the ia process
to enhance rationalisation — by conducting ias on amendments — hold the Commission
to account — by using the ia to question proposals — and coordinate debates by using the
ia report. While the ia Guidelines provide some guidance by recommending Commission
ocials use the ia report to help argue the merits of the proposal — a proxy for both enhanced
rationalisation and control or ‘stacking the deck’ — it is the 2003 Inter-Institutional Agreement
on Better Law-making and Inter-Institutional Common Approach18 to Impact Assessments
which provide the blueprint for this stage.e Common Approach and Agreement set out
detailed rules for the three institutions in relation to the preparation and use of ia, emphasising
the logics of enhanced control and rationalisation in particular, therefore providing a number
of proxies to trace the ambitions at this nal ia stage.
Enhanced Rationalisation and Control: Impact Assessments on Substantive Amendments
Under the Inter-Institutional Common Approach to ias, the European Parliament and Coun-
cil are committed to assessing the potential impacts of the legislative proposals and any
amendments before they negotiate and adopt them.e Common Approach states that ias
should be reviewed to ensure proposals are “rigorous and comprehensive, based on accurate,
objective and complete information, proportionate and focused on the proposal’s aims and
objectives.”19 e Common Approach also calls on the European Parliament and Council
to, “on the basis of jointly dened criteria and procedures, have impact assessments carried
out prior to the adoption of any substantive amendments, either at rst reading or at the
conciliation stage.”20is provides a proxy for both enhanced rationalisation and control as
proposals should, according to the ocial literature, not be accepted, modied or rejected
without the consideration of potential impacts.
18European Parliament, Council and Commission, Inter-Institutional Agreement on Impact Assessment: General
Principles, 2005.
19ibid.
20European Parliament, Council and Commission, Inter-Institutional Agreement on Budgetary Discipline and
Sound Financial Management, Ocial Journal of the European Union, (2006/C 139/1).
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However, although the above strongly supports the theoretical ideal of enhanced rationali-
sation, this nal ia stage includes scope for ‘stacking the deck’.e Common Approach seeks
to safeguards against the ia being used as a means for ‘stacking of the deck’, stating that the
use of ias should not “lead to undue delays in the legislative process, nor be abused as an
instrument for opposing undesired legislation or prejudice the legislator’s capacity to propose
amendments.”21 Nevertheless, the level of policy preference divergence and interview results
will provide insight into the extent to which the ia process is used to ‘stack the deck’.
Enhanced Rationalisation, Control and Coordination: Consideration of Impact
Assessments
As noted in the Common Approach, consideration of the evidence contained in the ia is
an important element of the nal stage. Once proposals are transmitted to the Council, the
appropriate Council Working Group is expected to review the proposal and ia to enhance
rationalisation and control, and to a limited extent coordination.
While proxies for each logic are dicult to identify at this stage, attempts from eu presi-
dencies — in particular the uk— to encourage the use of ias during Council deliberation
provide a number of helpful proxies. For example, the uk developed guidelines on how
to use ias as a tool to support decision-making and initiatives to cultivate an environment
where deliberations of proposals included time devoted to the discussion of the ia report.
An example was the ‘four presidencies’ initiative for joint action on regulatory reform.22e
initiative called for a more formal quality control system and the competitiveness-proong of
all proposed regulations by the Competitiveness Council.erefore, a proxy for enhanced
rationalisation is whether ias are used during negotiations or debates. However, this proxy
also supports the ambition of enhanced control — in particular ‘stacking the deck’ — as the ia
can be used to emphasise the analysis of economic consideration over social or environmental
impacts.
In the case of the European Parliament, once the proposal and ia is received, it is delegated
to the responsible Working Group and relevant Rapporteur. Although Members of the
21ibid.
22Joint statement of the Irish, Dutch, Luxembourg, uk, Austrian and Finish Presidencies of the European Union,
Advancing Regulatory Reform in Europe, December 2004.
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European Parliament are encouraged to use the ia reports as part of their deliberations, no
detailed procedures exist. Nevertheless, as with the European Council, whether the ia is
used during debates provides a proxy for enhanced rationalisation, control and coordination.
Distinguishing between the logics is achieved by setting individual ias against awider backdrop
of dierent policy preferences, derived from interviews and media reports.
e nal ia stage emphasises the need for further analysis and deliberation, supporting
the ideas of enhanced rationalisation and control, with aspects of ‘stacking the deck’. While
the requirement for the European Parliament and Council to consider the ia report during
debates also supports enhanced coordination, this is implicit and provides a very limited
proxy which will require support from interview responses. Table 10 provides a summary of
the proxies for each of the three logics for this nal stage.
3 Conclusion
is chapter provided an overview of the methodology used to collect the empirical evidence.
Using the eu’s ia blueprint — as set out in the ia Guidelines and the Inter-Institutional
Agreement on Impact Assessment — this chapter also identied a set of proxies to trace the
logics of enhanced rationalisation, control and coordination. Starting with an overview of
the sources of evidence used in this thesis, the rst part of this chapter outlined the empirical
evidence from a 2007 study project managed by the author of this thesis. To this end, the
chapter illustrated the advantages of using the 2007 study as one source of evidence and how
— along with additional sources of evidence — the three-staged approach provided a means to
answer the research question under consideration.is was followed by the steps taken to
mitigate against possible limitations to the collection and use of the empirical evidence.is
included the need for clear rules to ensure only publicly available data was used and rules for
distinguishing the author’s role as a practitioner and researcher.
Part two used the iaGuidelines to develop a set of proxies to trace each theoretical ambitions
across the three ia stages. While this chapter established a number of specic proxies to trace
each ambition, some proxies served to identify more than one ambition. For example, while
the existence of an issg can serve to enhance coordination, it can also support enhanced
rationalisation and control depending on the preferences and motivations of actors. Also,
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Table 10: IA Stage III — indicators for enhanced rationalisation, control and coordina-
tion
Stage III IA on Substantial
Amendmends
Consideration of IA
Enhanced Rationalisation European Institutions conduct
ia on substantial amendments
(yes/no)
European Institutions con-
sider ia during negotiations
(Source: quantitative analysis
of ia conducted by EP &
interviews)
(Source: quantitative analysis
of iamention in EP debate &
interviews)
Enhanced Control ‘Stacking the Deck’:
ia emphasis one pillar (eco-
nomic, social or environmen-
tal impacts) promoting a pol-
icy preference
Procedural Control:
European Institutions use ia to
promote policy preferences
(yes/no)
European Institutions use ia to
stop Commission proposal
(yes/no)
(Source: quantitative analysis
of ia & interviews)
(Source: research of media re-
ports & interviews)
‘Stacking the Deck’:
IA used to promote one pillar
(economic, social or environ-
mental)
(Source: interviews & media
reports)
Enhanced Coordination ia report is read by actors
to establish position and
coordinate engagement
(yes/no)
(Source: research of media re-
ports & interviews)
some proxies were dicult to identify, such as enhanced control, in particular the ‘stacking
of the deck’. For example, while the ia blueprint provides proxies for enhanced (procedural)
controls, control as a means for ‘stacking the deck’ is not explicit. To overcome the challenge
of implicit proxies and one proxy serving multiple ambitions, the empirical evidence will be
analysed against the backdrop of long-standing policy-preferences of individual case studies.
Additionally, interviews with actors will be used to provide further detail on individual case
studies and policy preferences, supported by explicit references in media reports.
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e next chapters apply the structure and proxies developed in the preceding pages to trace
each of the three ambitions.e nal chapter summarises the ndings from the six empirical
chapters, considering the potential limitations identied in this chapter.
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IV Testing the Theoretical Ambitions: A
Helicopter View
e previous chapter set out themethodology to collect the empirical evidence and established
a number of proxies to trace the three ambitions across the ia policy-making process.is
chapter is the rst in a series of six empirical chapters to use the proxies established in Chapter
ree to trace the theoretical ambitions in the ia policy-making process. It uses a large ‘n’
sample — in particular an ia database and surveys with actors from both inside and outside
the European Commission — to establish a ‘helicopter view’ of the theoretical ambitions
underpinning the use of ia. In doing so, this chapter argues that while the large ‘n’ data
indicates that the three ia ambitions play distinct roles, these roles vary over the course of
the policy-making process. Indeed, the logic of enhanced control, in particular ‘stacking of
the deck’, seems to plays a dominant role. Nevertheless, while enhanced control seems to be
dominant, this is not to the detriment of enhanced coordination or rationalisation. However,
this chapter also sets out a number of limitations to the use of large ‘n’ analysis which will be
further investigated in the subsequent case studies and in the concluding chapter.
As outlined in Chapter One, a study of ia based on ia reports does not provide a granular
enough understanding of the ambitions for which they are developed.is approach only
provides limited insights into constraints and challenges of particular policies at dierent
stages in the ia process. Nevertheless, this chapter uses a large ‘n’ dataset to provide an overview
perspective as an introduction to the empirical evidence presented in the case studies.e
data sources for this chapter include:
• a database of all Commission Legislative andWork Programmes and roadmaps pub-
lished between 2003 and 2005;
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• a database of all ias undertaken between 2003 and 2006;
• a survey conducted with actors outside the Commission;
• a survey of Commission ocials who developed an ia and participated in its develop-
ment; and
• a survey of Commission ocials who worked in the individual Directorates-General
(dg) ia units, with the responsibility of making the overall Commission impact assess-
ment system work.
Using the above empirical evidence the following pages explore the extent to which ias
are i) used to achieve dierent policy preferences, by exploring whether there are dierences
in the opinions of the utility of ia from survey respondents; ii) a vehicle for coordinating
diering viewpoints, or iii) a means for enhanced rationalisation by assisting Commission
actors to develop and identify ‘balanced’ policy solutions. As outlined in Chapterree, the
proxies are organised along the three ia stages: inception, development and inter-institutional
bargaining stage.is chapter is therefore divided according to the three ia stages and nishes
with a short conclusion.
1 Stage I — Inception of an Impact Assessment
e rst ia stage includes two key elements: the draing of a roadmap for major policy
proposals, which should include an overview of the policy problem, the policy objective,
whether an Inter-Service Steering Group will be established; and the publication of the
roadmap in the Commission’s Legislative andWork Programme.is section examines the
empirical evidence to explore the extent to which Directorates General (dgs) implement these
key elements of the ia inception stage and whether this reects the ambitions of enhanced
rationalisation, coordination and control. It argues that the empirical evidence does not
provide strong support for the ambitions of enhanced rationalisation, control and coordination
due to the low number of roadmaps but that this is in contradiction with qualitative survey
responses. Survey responses fromCommission policymakers’1shows support for the ambitions
of enhanced coordination and rationalisation.
1e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
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is section starts by looking at the number of roadmaps developed by dgs to determine
the extent to which the ia process has been implemented across the Commission.is also
provides a baseline to contrast against the number of announced policy proposals to determine
the extent to which ia has been used to accompany policy proposals.e higher the number
of policy proposals accompanied by an ia, the stronger the evidence to support the ideas of ia
as a tool to enhance rationalisation, control and coordination. In particular, the completion of
roadmaps provides an indication to the extent to which the idea of enhanced rationalisation
is reected in the data.is section also early or enhanced coordination, by examining the
extent to which actors believe ‘major policy’ proposals were accompanied by a roadmap and
the extent to which the roadmaps provided a means for coordinated action. is section
concludes with preliminary ndings on the extent to which the expectations of enhanced
rationalisation, control and coordination are reected in the data.
Number of Roadmaps by Directorates General
Looking at the Commission’s Legislative and Work Programmes published between 2003 and
2006 provides an understanding of the extent to which dgs participated in the ia system and
an indication of how widely the new ia process was adopted. A uniform and high level of
adoption provides an indication of the extent to which enhanced rationalities, control and
coordination through ia is possible. For example, if only a few dgs comply with the ia process,
that supports the logic of enhanced rationalisation in those dgs but low level of enhanced
control or coordination across the institution.
A review of clwps shows that out of the 23 relevant Directorates General2 each published at
least one roadmap between 2003 and 2006.is includes dgs responsible for the introduction
of major legislative and non-legislative measures.e results show a good level of up-take
across the Commission, although some dgs were more active. For instance, dg empl, entr,
env, jls, markt and tren all published over 10 roadmaps each.e variance in the number
of roadmaps by dgs likely reects the dierent levels of policy activity across the Commission,
with larger dgs developing a higher number of roadmaps.
2Note:ese dgs undertake policy work and pursue legislative and non-legislative instruments to achieve
policy outcomes, they are not purely administrative.
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Figure 2 provides a visual representation of the number of ias completed by dgs between
2003 and 2006, showing that all major dgs take part in the rst ia stage. While this does
not capture legislative activity, it shows that dgs across the Commission participate in the
system.e next section provides an insight into the level of legislative activity and how this
corresponds to degree to which ias are developed.
Figure 2: Number of roadmaps between 2003 and 2006 by DG
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2007 tep Data — total number of ia Reports: 155
Proposals Announced/Introduced Compared to Number of Roadmaps and
Impact Assessments
Proxies to test the proposition that ias are intended to enhance rationalisation and coor-
dination include: the extent to which roadmaps have been completed and the number of
roadmaps that have been published, therefore giving actors the opportunity to be made aware
of the ia and policy proposal. Completion of the roadmap also reects the idea of enhanced
rationalisation, as the roadmap contains the analysis policymakers should undertake at the
early policy-making stage.
e clwp is intended to provide actors with an overview of important upcoming Com-
mission proposals and whether policymakers conducted any initial policy analysis. Details
include the:
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• number of policy measures and roadmaps announced in the clwp compared to the
number of impact assessments published at the end of the second ia stage;
• number of policy measures awaiting action compared with the number of impact
assessments (both expected at the end of the second policy stage); and
• number of total regulatorymeasures introduced comparedwith the number of published
impact assessments.
Looking at the number of published roadmaps during the period of 2003 and 2006 shows
a year-to-year variation in the number of planned and conducted ias. For instance, in 2003
around 50% of planned ias (or roadmaps) announced in the clwp were followed by an ia
within 12 months. In 2004, 115% (i.e. 4 additional ia reports) of planned ias were followed
up by an ia, and in 2006 the gure of planned and conducted ias was around 70%. ere
is a data gap for 2005 (information was not available on the Commission website), but the
evidence shows that the number of roadmaps published in the clwp, do not reect the
subsequent number of published ias. Two possible explanations for this nding are that
either a substantial number of proposals did not move past the initial roadmap stage possibly
because the evidence did not support the need for policy action (potentially supporting the
idea of enhanced rationalisation) or the discrepancy may also be a reporting error or lack of
compliance.
e above ndings cast doubt on the ideas of enhanced rationalisation and coordination.
To get an understanding of whether these result may be enhanced rationalisation playing a
role in stopping unneeded or irrational proposals; it is worth examining measures that have
moved past the initial policy stage. Comparing the number of proposals awaiting action (i.e.
those proposals the European Commission has transmitted to the European Parliament and
Council) and the number of ias published alongside policy proposals, provides a proxy for
understanding the extent to which roadmaps (or planned ia) are followed by the second ia
stage.is provides an indication of whether the policy proposal has been dropped, or whether
it was developed without an ia. e number of measures awaiting action also provides a
proxy for ‘signicant’ proposal or those which, according to the iaGuidelines, should undergo
formal internal clearance and therefore accompanied by an ia.
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e number of proposals awaiting action between 2003 and 2006 shows that in 2003 some
37% of measures awaiting action were accompanied by an ia, in 2004 some 34%, and in 2005
46% measures were transmitted along with an ia.ere was no data available for 2006, but
based on the 2003, 2004 and 2005, the evidence shows that ias do not accompany all proposals
awaiting action, providing only limited support for the ideas of enhanced rationalisation
or coordination at this stage. Using proposals ‘awaiting action’ as the proxy for ‘signicant’
proposal may be contested as inaccurate; the idea of ‘signicant’ proposal will be examined
later on.
A nal set of data provides another insight into the role ias play at this early stage. Com-
paring the total number of legislative proposals implemented by the European Institutions
with the number of roadmaps and ias indicates the extent of ia adoption. A low number
of roadmaps or ias compared to legislative proposals would cast further doubt on ia as a
tool for anything, let alone enhanced rationalisation, control or coordination. According
to the Commission website and the Ocial Journal, the ratio of ias to legislative proposals
shows that: in 2003, the Commission conducted around 20 ias while 634 legislative measures
were introduced. In 2004 were 30 ias were completed for 735 legislative measures. In 2005
there were 72 ias for 685 legislative measures and in 2006 just under 67 ias for 866 legislative
measures.e number of legislative proposals far outweighs the number of ias seemingly
supporting the idea that ias play, at best, a minor role in the policy process, let alone one
which supports any of the three theoretical ambitions. Table 11 summarises the above ndings.
Without a more detailed examination of individual measures or a more qualitative under-
standing of what constitutes a ‘signicant’ proposal, it is not possible to determine how many
‘signicant’ proposals are accompanied by an ia. Based on this quantitative information, it is
therefore also not possible to make any denite conclusions on the role of ia in enhancing
rationalisation, control and coordination. Using qualitative information from surveys of
Commission actors instead, sheds some further light on the matter. For instance, asking actors
whether, in their opinion, major proposals were accompanied by an ia gives a qualitative
understanding of the extent to which ia plays a signicant role.
Qualitative results provide a means to examine one of the ia Guidelines’ key concepts
known as ‘principle of proportionality’. e principle states that “the more signicant an
action is likely to be, the greater the eort of quantication and monetisation that will be
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expected”.3 It goes on to state that “depending on the political and legal nature of the proposal
... aspects of the (impact assessment’s) analysis will ... need to be developed more than others”.4
Commission actors know this as the ‘principle of proportionate analysis’, the more important
a proposal is, the more analysis is conducted, therefore providing another explanation for the
discrepancy between the number of proposals and ias identied earlier on.
A survey conducted in 20075 with actors who worked on ias inside the European Com-
mission provides further insight. Asked whether, in their opinion, they thought the right
measures were accompanied by an ia. Some 73 out of the 96 respondents agreed or fully
agreed that proposals with most signicant likely impacts were accompanied by an ia, while 12
disagreed.is shows that although the coverage of the ia is not comprehensive, policymakers
believe the ia system targets the right proposals.is nding is supported by a survey with
actors inside the Commission who work in central ia units,6 playing a coordination role, with
6 out of the 21 dgs describing instances when an ia should have been undertaken.
Table 11: Planned proposals, proposals awaiting action, number of measures versus ias
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006
Number of planned ias 42 26 n/a 96
Number of ias 20 30 72 67
% of planned ia and actual ia 48% 115% n/a 70%
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006
Number of proposals awaiting action 54 87 155 n/a
Number of ias 20 30 72 67
% of awaiting actions with an ia 37% 34% 46% n/a
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006
Number of Regulation and Directive 634 735 685 866
Number of ias 20 30 72 67
% of Legislation with an ia 3% 4% 11% 8%
2010 Analysis of roadmaps, CLWPs and Ocial Journal
3Commission of the European Communities, Impact Assessment Guidelines, op. cit.
4ibid.
5e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
6e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
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e low numbers of ias compared to the total number of proposals and legislative mea-
sures initially suggests a minor role for ia in the policy-making process. However, the high
agreement among Commission ocials that the right proposals are accompanied by an ia
contradicts this nding.e survey results support the idea of enhanced rationalisation as
‘signicant policy’ proposals are accompanied by roadmaps and enhanced coordination as the
roadmap is made (through the publication of the clwp) available to external actors.
Roadmaps, CLWP and Early Coordination
e iaGuidelines explain that the content and publication of roadmaps are intended to provide
greater transparency and coordination to the policy-making process.is is accomplished
by giving actors the opportunity to identify relevant proposals and plan their involvement
appropriately. By including roadmaps, the publication of the clwp is a key instrument to
provide additional transparency and therefore enhanced coordination.
A 2007 survey7 of Commission actors in the ia units shows that 6 out of the 14 respondents
suggested roadmaps fullled the role of providing an early warning of upcoming proposals, 7
answered neutrally and only one disagreed. 2007 survey results from Commission actors who
undertake ias provides8 a similar picture, 39 out of 87 respondents agreed that the preparation
of roadmaps enhanced the ability of the Commission to nd out more and inuence other
Directorates General’s proposals. A third responded neutrally and 13 disagreed.
Another proxy for enhanced coordination is the use of Inter-Service Steering Groups.
Although these do not feature during stage I, the intention to form an issg is, according to the
ia Guidelines, to be announced in the roadmap. A review of the number of roadmaps, which
outline the intention to establish an Inter-Service Steering Group, provides an indication of
the extent to which cooperation is explicitly planned during the early stages. An examination
of roadmaps reveals that out of the 42 planned ias in 2003, 9 explicitly outline plans to set up
an Inter-Service Steering Group. Proportionally the results improve in 2004, in 2005 the data
was missing and in 2006 none of the roadmaps explicitly set out the intention to set up an
Inter-Service Steering Group.
7e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
8e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
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e ndings provide evidence that, in the opinion of Commission actors, the develop-
ment and publication of roadmaps contribute to coordination. However, the low number of
roadmaps which explicitly outline the intention to establish Inter-Service Steering Groups
suggests that the idea of planning future coordination activities is not an important element
of stage i.
Conclusion for Stage I
e empirical evidence examined in this section does not strongly support the ideas of
enhanced rationalisation, control and coordination due to the low number of roadmaps.
In particular, the quantitative information did not provide an insight into whether the low
number of roadmaps was due to non-compliance or whether the ia process is only applied to
a few, ‘signicant proposals’ (which according to the ia Guidelines require an ia). Qualitative
information provided through survey ndings shed further light onto the notion of ‘signicant
proposals’, showing that, in the opinion of Commission actors, ‘signicant proposals’ are
accompanied by ias. is supports, in particular, the idea of enhanced rationalisation. In
regard to the ambition of enhanced coordination, Commission actors also responded positively,
explaining that roadmaps helped them engage earlier in the policy-making process. However,
without digging deeper the evidence makes it dicult to identify elements of enhanced
control beyond the application of the ia process to a small number of proposals.ere was
also insucient depth of information to reconcile the qualitative results suggesting the ia
process contributes to enhanced rationalisation and coordination, with the disappointing
ndings from the quantitative analysis showing a low take up of ias.e in-depth case studies
are intended to provide a more complete understanding.
2 Stage II — Development of an Impact Assessment
Stage ii, development of an ia, is when the main policy work is conducted. is stage is
intended to enhance rationalisation of the policy process by asking policymakers to deepen and
widen the analysis of the options by examining potential economic, social and environmental
impacts. It is also intended to enhance coordination of colleagues across the Commission by
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establishing Inter-Service Steering Groups. Finally, stage ii also enhances procedural control
through the nal quality assurance process and internal clearance process.
is section is divided into three parts; rst it looks at the extent to which the analytical and
procedural steps are followed; then at the number of Inter-Service Steering Groups established
and consultations undertaken; and nally, at the quality assurance process and the ia report.
A review of the extent to which economic, social and environmental impacts are presented
(i.e. analytical steps are followed) in the nal ia report provides a proxy for both enhanced
coordination across policy areas, but also enhanced rationalisation whereby policymakers
take a cross-pillar approach to understanding future impacts of policy proposals.e number
of issgs and the degree to which the views and opinions of actors are taken into account,
provides a further proxy for examining the idea of enhanced coordination.e mechanisms
for quality assurance provide a proxy to the notion of enhanced control.
is section argues that there is evidence of enhanced coordination, strong support for the
idea of enhanced rationalisation and limited traces of enhanced control. However, as was
identied in the previous section (stage I), the data provides puzzling results between the
quantitative information and qualitative information, with one set of information supporting
the ideas of enhanced rationalisation in particular and the other, ideas of ‘stacking the deck’
or enhanced control.
Extent to which key Analytical and Procedural Steps are Followed
e following section builds on the evidence presented for the rst ia stage and widens the
analysis by looking at the analytical and procedural steps policymakers should follow during
the second ia stage. In particular, this section examines the requirement to establish an issg
as well as the examination of economic, social and environmental impacts to support the idea
of enhanced rationalisation and / or coordination. Specically, this section examines:
• whether economic, social and environmental impacts were assessed by each ia report
(a proxy for enhanced coordination / understanding of impacts across policy areas, as
well as enhanced rationalisation by examining impacts outside normal policy eld);
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• the extent to which key actors inside the Commission believe the ia Guidelines and
analytical tools support a more balanced approach across economic, social and environ-
mental policy areas (a proxy for enhanced rationalisation);
• the extent towhich key actors outside the Commission believe the ia system and the anal-
ysis conducted by policymakers is balanced across economic, social and environmental
impacts (a proxy for enhanced rationalisation);
• the types of options assessed, in particular whether dierent policy instruments were
identied vs. variations of options for one policy instrument (type of option as a proxy
for level of analysis, whereby assessment of dierent policy instruments indicates a more
detailed engagement with the identication of policy solutions and therefore enhanced
rationalisation);
• the extent the economic, social and environmental pillars were quantied (a proxy for
the depth of analysis, with increased quantication acting as more in-depth analysis in
particular and therefore evidence of enhanced rationalisation);
• the number of issgs (a proxy for enhanced coordination across the Commission); and
• the views of actors involved in issgs as to their helpfulness to participate and contribute
to the policy process (a proxy for both enhanced coordination and rationalisation).
An examination of ia reports completed between 2003 and 20069 shows that dgs examined
impacts for all three pillars (economic, environmental and social) albeit to a varying degree.
In 2003 almost all ias examined all three pillars, with the assessment of environmental impacts
dropping to around half of all ias by 2006.e assessment of social and economic impacts
also dropped between 2003 and 2006 showing that dgs did not focus on all three pillars, rather
focusing on the pillar most relevant to their policy area.is provides evidence that policy-
makers complied with the requirement to examine all three pillars just aer the introduction
of the ia system, but that over time the focus of ias continued to be the assessment of eco-
nomic impacts rather than all three pillars, providing some support for the idea of enhanced
rationalisation and coordination, particularly for economic and social considerations.
Figure 3 provides a summary of the ndings, showing that over time Directorates General
were less compliant with the ia Guidelines.
9e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
108
JohannesM.Wolff Testing the Theoretical Ambitions: A Helicopter View
Figure 3: Types of impacts identied in IAs
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2007 tep Data — total number of ia Reports: 155
Survey responses from actors inside the Commission10 provide an insight into why the
assessment of environmental impacts dropped o over time and whether, in their opinion,
the ia process contributed to enhanced rationalisation. When asked whether Commission
actors believed there was a balance across the three pillars (in terms of guidance and tools
provided), a third agreed there was an overall balance. However, a number of respondents
stated that the tools to examine the economic pillar were better (such as analytical tools) than
those to assess environmental impacts. Compared with the nding from the previous graph,
whereby economic impacts were consistently assessed between 2003 and 2006, the nding
that internal Commission actors believe economic assessment tools were better, suggests a
dominance of economic considerations.
Figure 4 provides a summary of respondents’ views in regard to whether the ia Guidelines
provide balanced support for all three pillars and the extent to which analytical tools for each
pillars are useful (i.e. economic, social and environmental pillars).
10e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
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Figure 4: Balance of IA Guidance and tools by pillar in percentage
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A survey of actors outside the Commission11 — such as industry and ngos — provides
a dierent perspective. Interested actors outside the Commission indicate that there is no
balance across the three pillars. In particular, a majority of respondents indicate that, in
their opinion, they thought there was a need to develop stronger tools to examine potential
economic impacts. External actors therefore did not agree with Commission ocials’ view, in
so far that they strongly believed more work needed to be done to improve the analysis of the
economic pillar, whereas Commission actors felt this was already the strongest feature of the
new ia process. Figure 5 provides a summary of external Commission respondents’ views in
regard to the balance of analysis by pillar (economic, social and environmental).
11e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
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Figure 5: Degree to which the IA system is balanced and requires more in-depth analysis
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To account for the discrepancy between internal and external Commission responses, it is
worth looking at the demographics of the external survey respondents.e data shows that a
large proportion of respondentswork in the economic pillar (i.e. were industry representatives),
suggesting the ia process is of greatest interest to those in the economic pillar. It also suggests
that economic interests are prominent and therefore provides support to the idea of enhanced
control.
Figure 6 provides a summary of the demographics of the external survey respondents and
explains why respondents felt a greater need to assess economic impacts.
Figure 6: External survey respondents by type of organisation
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A key element of the second ia stage includes the level to which policy options are assessed,
also a proxy for enhanced rationalisation.is can be achieved by examining the delineation
of substantial and instrumental policy options presented in ia reports. Instrumental options
are those which assess whether there is a need for a legislative option and if so, whether the
type of instrument should be a Directive or a Regulation. Instrumental options provide a proxy
for fundamental policy design. Substantial options are those variations once the instrument or
overall policy objective is determined: for example, determining whether a Directive should
include certain industries or set certain environmental levels. An assessment of ia reports
shows that less than a third of ias provided both types of options.is provides evidence that
a considerable number of ias did not consider alternative policy options, raising questions of
the extent to which enhanced rationalisation was at play as the expectation would have been
the analysis of more policy instruments.
Figure 7 provides a summary of ias and the presented policy options divided by substantial
and instrumental policy options for the period of 2003 to 2006.
Figure 7: IA reports assessment of instrument and substance policy options
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A further proxy to explore the extent of enhanced rationalisation is to examine the level of
quantication in ia reports. Although this is not a conclusive indicator (because identifying
the extent of quantication is not always straightforward), it provides an insight into tools
and level of analysis.e assumption is that an increased level of quantication is equivalent
to a more detailed analysis of the policy. e analysis shows limited quantication for the
assessment of environmental impacts and most quantication for economic impacts.is
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imbalance mirrors the previous ndings, whereby economic considerations are dominant,
supporting enhanced rationalisation, but also indicating support for the idea of enhanced
control (in particular ‘stacking the deck’ in favour of economic considerations).
Figure 8 provides a summary of ias and the quantication of impacts for each of the three
pillars (economic, social and environmental) for the period of 2003 to 2006.
Figure 8: Quantication of impacts in IAs
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In addition to the idea of enhanced rationalisation, the extent to which ias include an
analysis of all three pillars also supports the idea of enhanced coordination.e ia Guidelines
encourage policymakers to include experts from policy areas outside the normal policy eld;
therefore, examining potential impacts across the economic, social and environmental pillars
is also a proxy for coordination.e nding that all three pillars were taken into consideration
provides some support for the idea of enhanced coordination, but a clearer indicator for
enhanced coordination is the number of Inter-Service Steering Groups.
According to the ia Guidelines, it is during the second ia stage that Directorates General
should set-up issgs and use them to assist the development of the ia report. ia reports
completed between 2003 and 2006 show that the number of issgs increased steadily from
seven in 2003 to 17 in 2006. is increase may not reect the actual number, since the ia
reports do not consistently report whether an issg has been set up. Nevertheless, this shows
that a signicant number of ias — over a third annually — were accompanied by an issg,
providing evidence for the idea of enhanced coordination.
Figure 9 provides a summary of the number of issgs between 2003 and 2006.
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Figure 9: Number of ISSGs between 2003 and 2006
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Qualitative information in regard to the contribution of issgs to enhanced coordination
comes from a survey of ocials who chaired and led issgs.12 When asked whether, in their
opinion, the issg allowed the lead dg to integrate the views of their colleagues, most respon-
dents answered positively. When asked whether, in their opinion, the issg was a mechanism
to provide early warning about potential criticism and contribute to clarifying controversial
issues, there were also a high number of respondents who agreed. e situation was less
distinct when actors were asked whether issgs assisted in identifying and assessing dierent
technical options. About a quarter stated it was not and about half agreed/agreed strongly.
ese results provide evidence that issgs are a mechanism for lead Directorates General to
engage and inuence colleagues across the Commission, supporting the logic of enhanced
coordination and control.e evidence is less strong for enhanced rationalisation, with the
same number of respondents agreeing and disagreeing that the issg supported the assessment
of technical option.
Figure 10 provides a summary of respondents’ views as to whether issgs are a tool to assist
Directorates General in the ia process.
12e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
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Figure 10: ISSG as a tool to assist lead DG
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Ocials who participated (i.e. contributed rather than led) in issgs provide similar re-
sponses to those above. A majority agreed that the lead dg organised the issg in a transparent
manner and that it had allowed them to contribute. However, when askedwhether the issgwas
set up early enough to have any substantive eect, many disagreed.is provides evidence that
dgs had a limited amount of inuence through the issgs, but supports the notion that issgs
are a means for early warning by providing a forum for the exchange of ideas.is is evidence
in support of enhanced coordination in particular, less so for the idea of rationalisation.
Figure 11 provides a summary of respondents who were involved in issgs and their views as
to whether issgs are a tool to participate in the impact assessment process.
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Figure 11: ISSG as a means for other DGs to be involved
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is section showed that the policymakers analysed potential impacts across the economic,
social and environmental pillars and used issgs.is provides evidence to support the ideas of
enhanced coordination and rationalisation. However, the dominance of economic assessments
and support from industry actors also provides an indication that enhanced control is at play.
In particular, enhanced control as a means for ‘stacking the deck’ in favour of economic
considerations.
Actor Participation and Consultation
According to the ia Guidelines, gathering opinions and information from interested parties
is a means to enhance the transparency of the ia process, ensuring the policy is practically
workable and legitimate from the point of view of actors outside the Commission. To this end,
the ia Guidelines stipulate two key steps; i) the consultation of external actors and experts,
which is measured by the number and type of consultation processes conducted; and ii) to
take external actors’ views and opinions into account when draing the ia report which is
measured by the qualitative results from a survey of external actors. ese two steps also
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JohannesM.Wolff Testing the Theoretical Ambitions: A Helicopter View
provide proxies for the idea of enhanced coordination, whereby the inclusion of external
actors provides a means to ensuring a coherent and agreed policy outcome.
A review of the types and numbers of consultations conducted between 2003 and 2006
provides an indication of the extent to which Commission ias take outside actors into account.
According to the ia Guidelines, the Commission can use dierent types of consultations,
including open consultations (i.e. via a consultation document). A review of ias shows that
most include some type of consultation, usually a mixture of targeted and open consultations.
is supports the idea of enhanced coordination, but does not reveal much about the outcome
of the consultation events or use of evidence obtained during the events.
Figure 12 provides a summary of number and type of consultations conducted between
2003 and 2006 as set out in ia reports.
Figure 12: Number and type of consultation
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Greater insight into the outcome of the consultations is provided by survey responses from
external Commission actors.13 When asked whether the ia system was easy to follow and
there was adequate opportunity to provide input, about half agreed. However, a quarter
responded neutrally and a quarter disagreed, suggesting dissatisfaction with the extent to
13e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
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which the Commission engaged external actors.e evidence as to whether the consultations
contributed to enhanced coordination is therefore inconclusive.
Figure 13 provides a summary of the external actors’ views on the extent to which the ia
system is easy to follow and provides opportunity to contribute.
Figure 13: Degree to which IAs are easy to follow and provide opportunity to contribute
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A further response to the survey of external actors14 provides insight into the inconclusive
nding of enhanced coordination. In response to a question about the extent to which ias
helped explain the need for action and included the justied evidence for the proposal, almost
half of respondents disagreed. In response towhether the ia report was an accurate justication
for action, a majority of respondents disagreed.is suggests that external actors did not feel
the ia process and evidence included in the ia report justied the nal policy proposal.is
does not clearly support the idea of enhanced coordination.
Figure 14 provides a summary of the external actors’ views on the extent to which the ia
report explains the necessity for action, provides a justication for action and whether the
evidence is justied to support the proposal.
14e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
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Figure 14: IA report as an explanation for action and specic policy proposal
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is section showed that the ia process plays a role in coordinating external actors. However,
the survey evidence did not support the idea of enhanced rationalisation. Rather, the nding
that a number of respondents believed the ia report did not provide the justication for action
provides an indication that ia reports may be ‘stacked’ to support policy action without the
evidence to support it.
Quality Assurance
Before the ia report is submitted to the other eu institutions, it undergoes a quality assur-
ance process. Quality assurance, as laid out in the ia Guidelines, is a proxy for the idea of
enhanced procedural control. In the rst instance the lead Directorates General’s ia sup-
port unit/function provides guidance and an initial assessment of quality and the Secretariat
General undertakes a nal check. Once the ia report is reviewed the proposal and the ia is
submitted for Inter-Service Consultation and presented to the College of Commissioners.is
nal stage is also a mechanism for decision-maker or Commissioners to exercise a nal check
(control) before the ia is agreed and transmitted to the European Parliament and Council. To
assess the ia Guideline’s rules on quality assurance this section reviews survey ndings from
actors inside the Commission, in particular answers to questions on the extent to which the
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Secretariat General ensures consistent implementation of the ia Guidelines and the extent to
which actors understand the quality assurance requirements.
A 2006 survey result of policymakers inside the Commission ia units15 provides some
initial insight. When asked whether, in the context of quality assurance and consistent use
of the ia Guidelines, the coordination between the Secretariat General and Directorates
General was adequate, two-h agreed, a quarter responded neutrally and roughly one-
third either disagreed or disagreed strongly. When asked whether the Secretariat General
was able to ensure consistent implementation of the ia Guidelines, the results were more
positive. However, when asked whether individual Directorates General undertook their
own quality assurance, a majority responded negatively. While respondents agreed that that
coordination and implementation of the ia Guidelines was consistent across the Commission,
this does not directly support the logic of enhanced control whereby the decision-maker
actively participates, but does support the notion that the procedural steps around quality
assurance were followed.
Figure 15 provides a summary of the ia unit / function actors’ views on the coordination
and quality control inside the Commission.
Figure 15: Coordination and quality control for consistent implementation of IA Guide-
lines
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15e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
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The IA Report
e previous section provided an overview of the processes and analysis underlying the nal
ia report. Although a review of ia reports does not provide much detail to the use of ias,
it does provide an insight into the extent to which the Commission Directorates General
complied with the ia Guidelines. is provides proxies for both enhanced rationalisation
as much of the ia report is about presenting the analytical work and enhanced control as a
completed ia report illustrates that procedural steps were followed.e ia Guidelines provide
a template for the layout of the nal ia report, which includes elements such as:
• a short executive summary;
• an overview of the problem;
• an outline of the policy objective to be achieved;
• an examination of the options, including an overview of potential impacts;
• a presentation of the preferred option; and
• indicators for future monitoring.
ia reports completed between 2003 and 2006 show that the Commission did not consistently
comply with the ia Guidelines. While more than one third included an executive summary,
less than a quarter provided an overview of the policy problem, and almost all provided an
overview of the policy objective. As for the analysis of options, roughly a quarter of ia reports
looked at one option, three quarters examined economic and social impacts and about a
half provided an examination of environmental impacts. When comparing policy options,
about half did so, but a majority presented preferred policy option and an overview of future
monitoring requirements.
e high number of detailed policy explanations, limited examination of more than one
policy option and a focus on economic impacts, show that ocials used ias mainly to justify
proposals. In particular, the focus on economic considerations provides evidence of ‘stacking
the deck’, rather enhanced rationalisation by providing an examination of the policy problem
or full assessment of policy options across the three pillars.
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Figure 16 provides a summary of ia report compliance with Commission Guidelines
between 2003 and 2006.
Figure 16: Compliance of IA reports with IA Guidelines
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
120 
140 
160 
180 
Ex
ec
u-
ve
 Su
mm
ar
y 
Pr
ob
lem
 id
en
-ﬁ
ed
 
Ob
jec
-v
es
 de
ﬁn
ed
 
Se
ve
ral
 O
p-
on
s p
re
se
nt
ed
 
No
 'E
U 
Op
-o
n' 
pr
es
en
te
d 
No
 Po
lic
y' 
ch
an
ge
 op
-o
n 
pr
es
en
te
d 
M
or
e t
ha
n o
ne
 op
-o
n a
na
lys
ed
 
Ec
on
om
ic 
im
pa
cts
 id
en
-ﬁ
ed
 
En
vir
on
me
nt
al 
im
pa
cts
 id
en
-ﬁ
ed
 
So
cia
l im
pa
cts
 id
en
-ﬁ
ed
  
Op
-o
ns
 co
mp
ar
ed
 
Pr
efe
rre
d o
p-
on
 m
ad
e e
xp
lic
it 
Fu
tu
re
 m
on
ito
rin
g o
ut
lin
ed
 
No 
Yes  
2007 tep Data — total number of ia Reports: 155
Conclusion for Stage II
A review of the extent to which the analytical and procedural steps were followed shows
that the Commission broadly implemented the blueprint outlined in the ia Guidelines, in
particular, the analysis of potential impacts across the economic, social and environmental
pillars. It also shows the use of issgs, supporting the idea of enhanced coordination and
rationalisation. However, the dominance of economic assessments supports the ambition of
enhanced control, in particular ‘stacking the deck’ in favour of economic considerations.
e Commission’s work to coordinate actors through the issg and consultation process
did not provide clear evidence to support either the idea of enhanced rationalisation or
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coordination. Rather, it provided evidence that ia reports may provide a means for ‘stacking
the deck’ in favour of certain policy action.is was supported by survey evidence that many
ia reports dedicate signicant attention to the analysis of impacts, in particular, economic
impacts, not questioning the rationale for policy action.
3 Stage III — Inter-Institutional Bargaining
e third ia stage starts once the ia report is transmitted to the European Parliament and
Council.is is when the European Parliament and Council consider and negotiate the nal
proposal. As outlined in rst part of this chapter, the European Parliament and Council should
consider the proposal based on the information contained in the ia report and undertake
an additional ia for major amendments. e idea of enhanced rationalisation is reected,
with the requirement for the European Parliament and Council to conduct ias on their own
amendments. e idea of enhanced procedural control is highlighted by the requirement
of the European Parliament and Council to use the ia as a means to deliberate the policy
proposal and hold the Commission to account.e following section reviews ias conducted
by the European Parliament and Council. It argues that although the empirical evidence
on European Parliament and Council impact assessments is limited (because they do not
maintain central records of ias and amendments), it shows that the European Parliament and
Council do not generally comply with the requirements outlined in the Inter-Institutional
Agreement on Impact Assessment.
e proxy of the number of times the term ‘ia’ was used (either raised as an oral question
or written question) during debates provides an insight into the extent to which ias were used
during deliberation. Using the European Parliament’s website to examine the number of times
Members of the European Parliament submitted written questions on ias, shows that none
were raised in 2003. Questions referring to ias started in 2004 with over 30 written questions
and 115 questions in 2006.e record for the number of ia references during oral questions
and question time shows that the term used less than 10 times both in 2005 and in 2006. No
questions were raised during 2004.is shows that there was little discussion of ias in the
European Parliament; most references were in the context of environmental ias, in contrast
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to the emphasis on economic assessments highlighted during the second ia policy stage. No
records are available on questions raised in the Council.
Figure 17 provides a summary ia references in the European Parliament.
Figure 17: Parliamentary questions with reference to IA
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
120 
2003  2004  2005  2006 
Oral ques2ons for IA 
Ques2on 2me for IA 
Wri<en ques2on for 
IA 
Number of IAs 
2010 Analysis of Eurolex
e number of amendments undertaken by the European Parliament compared to the
number of ias conducted shows the extent to which the Parliament adhered to the Inter-
Institutional Agreement on Better Law-making. It is also a proxy for whether ias contributed
to enhanced rationalisation. A review of the European Parliament’s annual reports and website
provide two sources to determine the number of amendments.e results show that hundreds
of amendments were conducted annually, as illustrated in Figure 18.
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Figure 18: Parliamentary amendments
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ese results show that number of amendments far outweighed the number of ias conducted
by the European Parliament. Although the European Parliament awarded framework contracts
for ia studies, only three were conducted on substantial amendments, ve complementary
ias of Commission proposals, and four studies.is was a small number compared with the
total number of amendments and total number of Commission ia, most of which focused
on consumer protection related issues.e European Parliament conducted roughly one ia
study for every 10 ias received.e Council itself had only carried out one ia, referring to a
September 2006 proposal on batteries.
Conclusion for Stage III
Results from the empirical evidence show that the European Parliament and Council under-
took very few ias and that Commission ias were not considered in any great detail.ese
ndings raise doubts about ias playing any role in enhancing control or rationalisation during
the nal ia stage.is low take-up suggests the dominance of political debates over the ia
policy process, which will be explored in further detail in the subsequent chapters.
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4 Conclusion
e large ‘n’ evidence examined in this chapter shows that all three theoretical ambitions are
reected in the ia process, including the idea of ‘stacking the deck’.e ia inception stage
illustrated the challenge of identifying ‘signicant proposals’ which — according to the ia
blueprint — should be accompanied by an ia report. While many dgs participated in the
new ia system, the number of measures for which ias were conducted was low. However, this
result was in contradiction to survey results that showed ‘signicant proposals’ followed the
ia process, therefore lending support the idea of enhanced rationalisation and that roadmaps
contributed to enhanced coordination.erefore, the low number of ias means that caution
should be exercised, but that this nding also suggests that ia supports the ambitions of
enhanced coordination and rationalisation for those proposals accompanied by an ia.
An examination of the extent to which the analytical and procedural steps were followed
during the second ia stage, supported the idea of enhanced coordination and rationalisation.
However, the dominance of economic assessments indicated a trend of ‘stacking the deck’ in
favour of economic considerations, not necessarily a form of procedural control as outlined in
the ia blueprint. Evidence for the third ia stage indicated that while the European Parliament
made eorts to comply with the Inter-Institutional Agreement on Better Law-making — at
least in a few cases — the Council did not show any level of compliance.erefore, enhanced
rationalisation, control or coordination played minor to no role during this nal ia stage.
Finally, this chapter showed that the ambitions of enhanced rationalisation, control and
coordination vary across the ia stages. Also, it found that the ambitions are not necessarily
contradictory; rather, that by emphasising economic considerations the ia process reects
both the ambition of enhanced rationalisation and control, albeit ‘stacking of the deck’. Table
12 provides a summary of the ndings for each of the three ia stages which are examined in
greater detail in each of the ve case studies presented in the following chapters.
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Table 12: IA as a tool for rationalisation, control or coordination (practice)
Policy Stage /eoretical Con-
sideration
Stage i Stage ii Stage iii
Enhanced rationalisation Yes Yes Some
Enhanced coordination Yes Yes No
Enhanced control No Yes Some
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V Case Study 1: Pre-Packed Products
is case study examines dg Enterprise’s (entr) impact assessment (ia) for the legislative
proposal on Nominal Quantities for Pre-Packed Products (nqppp). As one of the rst ias
completed under the new Commission ia system, this case study provides an insight into how
an early ia was used in an environment divided between two competing policy preferences.
e iawas used by dg entr as a means of illustrating its commitment to the newly established
ia system, while also supporting its policy preference to deregulate the pre-packed products
market through enhanced rationalisation during the later ia stages in particular. A separate ia
was developed by the European Parliament during the third ia stage to question and change
dg entr’s proposal, by providing further evidence to protect consumer rights. is case
study therefore provides evidence to support the ia ambition of enhanced rationalisation and
control in particular, with little evidence of enhanced coordination.
Nominal Quantities for Pre-Packed Products (nqppp) were a set of rules designed to x
the size of packaging for a range of consumer products across various Member States.e
intention was to provide consumers with greater clarity but also to facilitate trade and limit
environmental damage. A new proposed Directive was intended to balance legal certainty
against moves to enhance the Single European market by promoting competitiveness through
the removal of potential obstacles to the internal market posed by nominal quantities of
pre-packed products. eu legislation in the area started in the 1970s with an on-going attempt
to harmonize rules across the Union. Over time a number of regulatory frameworks were
established resulting in calls for simplication in the 1990s and two competing positions:
those who were looking to promote greater exibility and competitiveness, and those who
were concerned with the protection of consumers.
Work on the proposed Directive started in the early 2000s as part of a wider initiative to
simplify European legislation. With the recent introduction of the ia system in 2003, dg entr
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used the proposal on nqppp as a pilot project and was one of the rst proposals accompanied
by an ia report.e European Commission adopted nqppp and transmitted it with the ia to
the European Parliament and Council in October 2004.e nqpp proposal was received with
political opposition on the part of the European Parliament and Council. So much so, that
the European Parliament commissioned its own extended ia study.
e following case study explores the extent to which the ia was i) used to achieve dierent
policy preferences, in particular by those who were seeking to deregulate the sector versus
those who sought to enhance consumer protection; ii) a vehicle for coordinating diering
viewpoints, or iii) a means for enhanced rationalisation, assisting dg entr in identifying
policy solutions. As outlined in Chapter Two, the complementarity or otherwise of the three
ambitions (of enhanced control, rationalisation, and coordination) is examined by tracing
them across the three ia stages: inception, development and inter-institutional bargaining
stage. is chapter is divided according to the three ia stages and nishes with a short
conclusion.
1 Background
is section provides a brief overview of the background and context in the nqppp proposal
was developed, before moving into an examination of the three ia policy stages. It shows
that this proposal and ia was part of a longstanding programme to deregulate European
legislation, supported by dg entr as well as a number of Member States.e origins of nqppp
go back to the 1960s and early 70s, when Member States applied dierent national rules on
nominal quantities of pre-packaged products. Dierent packaging sizes were barriers to the
free movement of goods (such as wine or bread) across the European Union and in 1975 the
rst Directive was introduced to harmonise pre-packed goods.is was followed by another
Directive in the early 1980s, specifying the metrological requirements and ranges of sizes for
various liquid and non-liquid products.1 However, while the European Commission started
to harmonise a number of package and bottle sizes, companies, which operated exclusively at
a national level, were exempted resulting in four dierent legislative frameworks:
1European Commission Enterprise and Industry, Legal metrology and pre-packaging: Pre-Packaging —
Pack Sizes, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/legal-metrology-and-prepack/documents/pack-sizes/(January
2010).
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• mandatory harmonised sizes for 5 sectors: wine, spirits, coee extracts, sugar and
knitting yarns;
• mandatory harmonised sizes alongside optional national ones (i.e. mutual recognition
rule);2
• national package size rules but no harmonised rules for such goods as chocolate, canned
sh, chips, biscuits and honey (i.e. mutual recognition rule); and
• no regulations exist, neither harmonised nor national.
e regulatory framework had become so complicated by the 1990s, that the Commission
identied the need to simplify and clarify the situation.3e simplication of the regulatory
framework for nqppps became part of a wider Community initiative started in the mid-1990s,
known as the Simpler Legislation for the Internal Market (slim) programme.
e slim programme was based on the change introduced by the Single Market and the
direct eects principle. eu legislation increasingly became the “only source of relevant law
available to national judges”4 and over time, a situation developed whereby new European
legislation overlapped with previously established frameworks. Member States increasingly
became concerned about the importance and quality of eu legislation, in particular, the quality
of legislative draing. As a result, the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament
adopted an Inter-Institutional Agreement in 1994 on the ocial codication of legislative texts.
is resulted in the eu Institutions developing a number of additional criteria and practices to
improve the situation throughout the 1990s.5
e 1992 slim programme was strongly supported by the eu’s Internal Market Ministers6
and endorsed by the Council at the Dublin European Council meeting in December 1996
and the European Parliament through the Crowley Report.7 slim was designed to identify
2European Court of Justice, Case C-3/99, Judgement of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 12 October 2000, (Cidrerie
Ruwet sa v Cidre Stassen sa and hp Bulmer Ltd).
3Commission of the European Communities, Extended Impact Assessment — Commission Sta Working Paper:
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down rules on nominal quantities for
pre-packed products, repealing Council Directives 75/106/eec and 80/232/eec, and amending Council Directive
76/211/eec, (sec (2004) 1298).
4H. Xanthaki, “e Slim Initiative”, in Statute Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 22, 2001.
5Commission of the European Communities, Supplement to European Report no 1808, 1992; and Commission
Communication on Sunderland report, com (93) nal.
6Commission of the European Communities,Communication from the Commission to the Council and European
Parliament:e slim Initiative, com (96) 559.
7H. Xanthaki, “e Slim Initiative”, op. cit.
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specic ways in which to simplify eu legislation, with a particular focus on making it easier to
do business in the Internal Market. To this end, small teams of experts fromMember State
administrations were set up and asked to identify ways in which to remove “unnecessary red
tape and excessive compliance costs”.8
slim had ve phases and examined 17 dierent legislative sectors, including areas such
as company law and dangerous substances legislation. As part of phase iv and “taking into
account the requests made by Member States, the European Parliament, the Economic and
Social Committee and business representatives”, and the Commission would also examine
“pre-packaging”.9 Based on preliminary work undertaken during phase iv, the Commission
announced in early 2000 that “simplication could be attained and improvements made in
the areas of Community ranges of prescribed quantities for pre-packaged products.”10is
marked the start of the Commission’s work on the legislative proposal for nqppps.
e background to this ia illustrates the wider context in which it was developed. Various
national and Community legislative actions were developed between the 1960s and 1990s,
resulting in four distinct regulatory legislative frameworks and subsequent calls for their
simplication. e nqppp proposal, launched as part of the slim Programme, was a key
element of the Commission, the European Parliament and Council’s drive to simplify eu
legislation.e nqppp and the ia were therefore based on a long history of legislative action
both at the European and national level, and while they enjoyed the support of the three key
European Institutions, the two policy preferences at play were the need to balance the removal
of unnecessary red tape and, as will be shown in the subsequent pages, to protect consumers.
Figure 19 provides an overview of the key activities in the area of nqppps starting in the
1960s.
8Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament
and the Council, com (2000) 104 nal.
9Commission of the European Communities, Simpler Legislation for the Single Market (slim): Extension to a
Fourth Phase, sec (1998) 1933.
10Commission of the European Communities, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council: Results of the Fourth Phase of slim, com(2000) 56 nal.
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Figure 19: Background of the simplication of pre-packaged products
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2 Stage I — Inception of the Impact Assessment
As set out by the ia blueprint, the inception of each ia is about answering a number of basic
questions. Accordingly, this section provides an insight into the extent to which the ia, or
at this early stage, the roadmap, provided a means for enhanced rationalisation, control or
coordination. In particular, it will show that, the Commission did not follow the ia procedures
as laid out in the ia Guidelines. Instead, inception, as indicated in the background section,
was embedded in the wider initiatives to simplify regulation.e early stage of this ia was
before the introduction of the ia process and therefore the ia requirement for a roadmap. As
one of the earliest Commission ias, ambitions of enhanced rationalisation, coordination and
control were achieved through the slim progress reports, not through the publication of a
roadmap. dg entr embedded the nqppp proposal in the simplication agenda, using the ia
process to achieve the objectives of slim: to de-regulate the pre-packed products market.
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e expectation from the ia blueprint is that this ia should have been included in the 2003
Commission Legislative Work Programme (clwp).e clwp does not make any reference
to this ia, indicating that dg entr did not follow the usual processes outlined in the ia
Guidelines.is did not of itself violate the Guidelines as they state “the Commission may,
on a case-by-case basis, decide to carry out an impact assessment of a proposal which does
not appear on the Work Programme”.11 Nevertheless, although dg entr did not publish a
roadmap, it did follow the basic objectives for this stage, in particular to provide a means for
“transparency and communication with the European citizen”12 and an analysis of the basic
premises of the policy problem to be addressed.
As outlined in the background section, the ocial slim literature indicates that a number
of actors were aware of the measure well ahead the start of the ia in 2003. As part of the slim
programme, the explicit intention to examine legislation around pre-packaged products was
expressed in 2000. A 2003 slim progress report to the European Parliament and Council
stated that the objective to “simplify legislation around nominal quantities for pre-packaged
products goes back to 2000, when the intention to repeal Council Directives 75/106/eec and
80/232/eec, and amend Council Directive 76/211/eec” was announced.13
e 2000 slim report includes a section on the ndings from a small team of Commission
andMember State ocials who undertook a preliminary review of the pre-packaged legislation.
e report states that the “application of the Directives has proved to be dicult, notably as a
result of the variety of rules and practices applied to ranges”.14e report further explains that
aer an extensive review of the legislation, the team recognised the existing Community rules
“contained a number of deciencies that gave rise to problems which needed to be addressed”.15
In an ocial response to the 2000 slim report, the Commission agreed to “carefully review
the various recommendations and, where appropriate, propose the necessarymeasures in close
co-operation with Member States and other concerned parties”.16e Commission’s intention
11Commission of the European Communities, Impact Assessment Guidelines, op. cit.
12Commission of the European Communities,e Commission’s legislative and work programme for 2004, com
(2003) 0645.
13Commission of the European Communities, European Commission Sta Working Paper, Updating and simpli-
fying the Community Acquis, sec (2003) 1085.
14Commission of the European Communities, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council: Results of the Fourth Phase of slim, op. cit.
15ibid.
16ibid.
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to examine the recommendations, and in particular the rules on pre-packaged products,
would have been supported by Member States, the European Parliament, and trade/business
organisation, as they all took part in the slim programme.17e slim programme provides
an explanation as to why the Commission did announce its intention to review the nqppp
rules in the clwp and why no formal roadmap was published.
However, although a public roadmap was not available, according to the desk ocer re-
sponsible for writing the ia, a roadmap was developed and used to provide a rough guide
on the dierent tasks which needed to be undertaken.18 But, an analysis of the unpublished
roadmap shows that it did not follow the ia Guidelines. Updated on the same day as the
European Commission adopted the ia, it presents a short overview of the proposal’s history
and a year-by-year account of what was done. It does not “provide potential options, an
estimate of the time required for completing the ia, a statement on likely impacts, who is
likely to be aected, or whether an Inter-Service Steering Group will be established.”19
e above evidence shows that the rst ia stage played a minor role, raising the question as
to why dg entr undertook an ia for a measure that started well before the ia process was
introduced, particularly if dg entr was not going to comply with the initial procedural ia
steps. An answer lies in that the nqpppmeasure was part of dg entr’s ambition to implement
the slim programme. e introduction of the new Commission ia system was the latest
development under the Commission’s better regulation agenda and the nqppp proposal played
an important de-regulatory role. dg entr had already invested signicant time into engaging
with (or coordinating) actors, supported by signicant analytical resources (or rationalisation).
dg entr used the work completed under slim as the basis for a successful, high-prole, pilot
project under the new ia system.is was conrmed by a dg entr ocial stating that the “ia
started o as a pilot project and was the rst one in dg entr using the 2003 (ia) rules as they
were being developed.”20 Without a published roadmap, stage I of this ia did not comply with
the iaGuidelines and none of the three theoretical ambitions (enhanced control, coordination,
or rationalisation) are attributable to the ia process, although they do apply, in part to the slim
17Commission of the European Communities, European Commission: Review of slim: Simpler Legislation for
the Internal Market, com (2000) 104 nal.
18e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, London 2007.
19Commission of the European Communities, Impact Assessment Guidelines, op. cit.
20dg entr Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
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programme. Because slim’s objective of reducing red-tape was the policy preference dg entr
was pursuing (i.e. simpler legislation), rather than enhanced coordination or rationalisation.
3 Stage II — Development of the Impact Assessment
is section traces the ia process’ analytical and procedural steps in view of the drive to
simplify nqpps. It is divided into four parts, starting with an overview of how dg entr
incorporated elements of the slim programme into the ia; it then traces the ia process;
the participation of key actors; the process of quality assurance; and nally the ia report.
As outlined in Chapters Two andree, these sections provide proxies for observing the
ambitions of enhanced rationalisation, coordination, and control (or ‘stacking the deck’).
e previous section showed that in the context of this case study much of the analytical
work was done outside the context of the ia process, in part because the ia system had not been
established at the time dg entr commenced work on the nqppps proposal, but also because
slim provided much of the work expected during the rst ia stage.e second ia stage should
show an expansion and deepening of the underlying analysis, with the Commission therefore
continuing to build heavily on the work in the context of the slim programme. With the rst
ia stage playing a small role, the 2003 introduction of the European Commission’s new ia
system gave dg entr the impetus to showcase their work by assessing the proposal’s potential
impact on specic sectors. In 2004, an ia report was completed, but the underlying ambition
was to simplify eu legislation. A press release from 2000 conrms this, as it stated: “setting
packaging free: Commission welcomes Council agreement to simplify eu legislation”.21
Set in the context of legislative simplication, there is an immediate question around the
extent to which the ia contributed to the rationalisation of the policy proposal or whether
it was designed to achieve a specic outcome (i.e. ‘stacking’ into one direction).e press
release strongly suggests that the development of the proposal and subsequently the ia was
of high political importance, with dg entr investing a lot of time and resources in showing
that it was undertaking a “thorough investigation by conducting extensive as well as inclusive
21Europa Press Release, Setting packaging free: Commission welcomes Council agreement to simplify eu leg-
islation, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=ip/06/1253&format=html&aged=0& lan-
guage=en&guiLanguage=en (September 2008).
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stakeholder consultations”.22 Stage ii of this ia was an opportunity for dg entr to illustrate a
strong commitment to the new ia Guidelines, while using existing processes and in doing
so full its original commitment to simplify pre-packed legislation. A dg entr interviewee
conrms the importance of this proposal as a means for showing dg entr’s commitment to
the simplication process, stating that dg entr saw the simplication of pre-packed legislation
as a pilot project and therefore willing to spend “all the time in the world”.23
e simplication of the legislation included a number of external studies and consultation
exercises, an element referred to in the ocial literature as integral to improving the quality of
proposal (i.e. rationalisation as well as coordination). Between 2000 and 2003 the Commission
collaborated with both the Institute for Prospective Technological Studies and Euro Barometer
to assess the technical merits of changing pre-packed standards (such as the potential impact
on storage or transport) and to understand consumer concerns (such as examining potential
impact on the ability of consumers to compare prices if products used dierent size packaging).
dg entr itself also held a number of formal and informal consultations with interested actors.
e legislative proposal and the nal iawere nalised inAugust 2004 and entered Inter-Service
Steering Consultation in September. In October 2004 the Consultation process was completed
and the proposal was transmitted to the European Parliament and Council.
It will become evident, compared to the other case studies, the level of eort dg entr
invested into this proposal was not unusual, particularly in light of the wider ambition of
illustrating dg entr’s commitment to the deregulatory slim programme and the new ia
system. Table 13 provides an overview of the various activities andmilestones which ultimately
culminated in the nal ia report.
The Impact Assessment’s Analytical and Procedural Steps
e ia Guidelines state that it is “compulsory for all items of a cross-cutting nature”24 to
establish an Inter-Service Steering Group (issg) to seek expertise from colleagues and to
coordinate policy that reaches Commission consensus.e establishment of an issg provides
a proxy for the idea that the ia is a tool for enhanced coordination. As a cross cutting measure
22e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia System, op. cit.
23dg entr Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
24Commission of the European Communities, Impact Assessment Guidelines, op. cit.
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Table 13: Activities and milestones under SLIM and the IA
Activities and milestones as stated in the roadmap
Date Activity
December 2000 Kick-o of process to look at simplifying legislation
related to pre-packed products announced formally
June 2001 Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (ipts)
commissioned to conduct a study on the innovation in
the area of pre-packing
Summer 2001 Further evidence collected during aworkshop heldwith
key stakeholders to discuss results of the ipts innova-
tion study
November 2001 Euro barometer commissioned to conduct an eu wide
consumer survey
Summer 2002 — January 2003 Numerous workshops held and an on-line public con-
sultation launched to solicit consumer opinions
May 2003 Initial assessment of potential impacts developed
December 2003 Impact assessment of special sectors
First quarter 2004 Further informal consultations held
August 2004 ia and the legislative proposal nalised
September 2004 ia and proposal submitted for Inter-Service Consulta-
tion
October 2004 Proposal and ia accepted
which needed to take consumer protection and economic considerations into account, reforms
to the pre-packed legislation was relevant to both dg entr and dg sanco. An issg specically
for this ia was not set-up, instead, one that had been established under the slim programme
continued to operate and guide dg entr in its on-going work.e group included dgs entr,
env, sanco, markt and agri, who worked together to make sure “nothing was ever made
public without other dgs’ agreement”.25
e ia blueprint also set out various analytical steps designed to enhance the rationalisation
of the policy process, such as the collection of data, the assessment of economic, social and
environmental impacts, and the evaluation of various policy options. However, most eort was
placed on understanding economic impacts, constraining the idea of enhanced rationalisation
across policy area (i.e. economic, social and environmental considerations). To support the
25dg entr Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
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data collection and stakeholder consultation following the slim programme, dg entr invited
the Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (ipts); one of the scientic institutes of
the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (jrc); and Euro Barometer to conduct
studies on consumer behaviour and packaging requirements. Although these studies had
not been commissioned for the impact assessment itself, the results were used in the nal
impact assessment. However, the Commission explained that although it had been “useful
to have a study on innovation”, mainly because it resulted in a number of “interesting case
studies in dierent sectors”,26 it had in fact been very challenging to “identify and reach all
relevant stakeholders — in this case, representatives of vulnerable consumers”.27 In the end,
although economic data existed for inclusion in the nal ia, little social impact information
was available. According to dg entr, the economic data was of limited quality (e.g. did not
cover the whole of the eu) and mostly qualitative in nature. As for environmental impacts, dg
entr did not “deem it a high priority”,28 and the examination of environmental impacts was
not given prominence in the ia. When nalising the ia, dg entr looked to hire an external
economist to assess the potential economic impact of various options, but, according to dg
entr ocials, there was no interest in the call for tender and so the work was conducted
internally.
According to the dg entr desk ocer, the assessment of social impacts caused most
diculties. Although social impacts were considered important, it was the assessment of
“economic impacts, which were deemed the most important”.29 In the end, the economic
assessment was the strongest despite the fact that “clear-cut data on the industry wasmissing”.30
One external actor stated that the analysis “was not balanced, despite the proposal satisfying
most (industry stakeholders), it would not have satised consumers”.31 With regard to the
selection of options, according to interviews with actors outside the Commission (such as the
trade associations and members of the European Parliament and Council), there was a general
consensus that the selection of policy options, presented in the ia was relevant. However, one
interviewee reported that the analysis of options was not adequate, echoed by others who did
26dg entr Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
27ibid.
28e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia System, op. cit.
29ibid.
30dg entr Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
31Food Industry Organization Representative, Interview, Brussels 2006.
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not feel that the quality of the ia was high. In particular, one interviewee stated that the ia
report had been more “conceptual than factual.”32
e ia Guidelines state that the “depth and scope (of an ia) will be determined by the
likely impacts of the proposed action” by applying the principle of proportionate analysis.33
is principle accounts for the variation in the extent to which ia plays a role in enhancing
the rationalisation of the policy process.e principle of proportionate analysis gives policy
ocials the scope to determine the extent to which certain impacts need to be assessed, taking
into account the important and potential impact of the proposal. In light of the principle,
this ia suered from political inuence (control), as explained by dg entr’s desk ocer who
stated that, “at the end of the day, proportionality was a political choice”.34 Generally, this view
was supported by external actors who stated that “the proportionality analysis was probably
ok”35 and that “it (the ia) was proportionate given that it was part of the slim process”.36 dg
entr emphasised economic aspects, using the slim process to support the ia, resulting in
less focus on consumer related considerations or environmental impacts, a clear indication of
enhanced rationalisation to ‘stack the deck’.
Participation and Consultation
According to the ia Guidelines, gathering opinions and information from interested parties
is intended to enhance the transparency of the impact assessment process,37 supporting
the notion of ia as a tool for the coordination and management of dierent opinions and
standpoints. While the Commission put signicant eorts into the consultation of key actors,
dg entr found it dicult to obtain contributions from consumer groups.
Interviews with dg entr ocials reveal that they considered the engagement with actors
a success, not necessarily due to the level of information they collected, but because of the
eort and frequency of engagement. Consultation results were in fact limited, in particular
in building an understanding of consumer concerns. Regular consultations were not only
32Consumer Group Organization Representative, Interview, Brussels 2006.
33Commission of the European Communities, Impact Assessment Guidelines, op. cit.
34dg entr Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
35Consumer Group Organization Representative, Interview, Brussels 2006.
36Food Industry Organization Representative, Interview, Brussels 2006.
37Commission of the European Communities, Impact Assessment Guidelines, op. cit.
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held with other dgs but also European trade and industrial associations, such as the European
Consumer Association (beuc), the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of
Europe (unice), as well as direct consultation with some Member State consumer representa-
tives. Between November 2002 and January 2003 a 10 week public consultation exercise using
the Commission’s Interactive Policy Making (ipm) website was held.e Commission also
sought to engage consumers and citizens using other mechanisms, such as Euro barometer
questionnaires and “advertising in ‘Metro’ in certain countries (daily free sheet)”.38 Interviews
with external actors (i.e. such as those who contributed to the Impact Assessment via the
consultation) suggested that they believed the Commission was genuine in attempting to run
an open process. A representative of a food association stated that he “found it a transparent
process, but [he] had good direct informal connections”39 which helped. Others, for example
actors from the drinks industry, reported a less positive view, a representative from a Drink
Industry Organisation stated that “the level of transparency and reproducibility was very low
particularly as the Euro 3.7 billion [claimed saving] was unbelievable”.40
Limited consumer information would later become a problem for dg entr, triggering
the European Parliament to undertake its own ia. A European Parliament representative
stated that “the only real discussion the ec [European Commission] seemed to have had was
with the wine and spirit sectors.e ec’s ia on these sectors is very accurate and relevant . . .
otherwise the consultation wasn’t sucient”.41 Another actor stated that in their opinion “the
ia process was driven by the desire to deregulate the market in light of the slim programme,
at the expense of consumer considerations”.42
Quality Assurance
Quality assurance, according to the ia blueprint, is ensuring that the ia has adequately taken
into consideration the analysis. It contributes to enhanced rationalisation, by ensuring the
analytical steps are followed and also provides a mechanism whereby Commissioners can
intervene in the policy process, blocking proposals until their preferences are reected in
38e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
39Food Industry Organization Representative, Interview, Brussels 2006.
40Drinks Industry Organization Representative, Interview, Brussels 2006.
41European Parliament Representative of imco Committee, Interview, Brussels 2006.
42e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
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the nal policy (enhanced control). In the context of nqppps, the Commission desk ocer
explained that the main quality assurance mechanism was the support and guidance provided
by dg entr’s evaluation unit, with little assessment of the quality of the actual impact assess-
ment.e Commission desk ocer stated that dg entr’s evaluation unit was “very useful43
and maintained close contact throughout the process. Guidance from the evaluation unit
included support on managing the external contracts and the consultation events. As for the
involvement of the Secretariat General, dg entr’s desk ocer reported that they played a
more prominent role at the end of the process; albeit not necessarily in ensuring the rules
were followed. Rather, as an early ia, the Secretariat General looked at it in order to “learn
from it rather than criticise or support it”.44
According to dg entr, the iawas completed in August 2004 and submitted to Inter-Service
Consultation. None of the actors interviewed pointed to any substantial controversy during
this process. One actor reported that during the Inter-Service Consultation, the Secretariat
General insisted on changes to the structure of the ia report, asking dg entr to better
dierentiate the economic, social and environmental analysis. However these changes were
minor and represented a presentational change, rather than substantial improvements to the
underlying analysis of potential consumer or social impacts. Because the slim programme
drove the analysis and consultation around the nqppp proposal, the ia did not receive much
attention within the Commission. Stage ii of the ia was overshadowed by slim; dg entr was
keen to provide strong economic analysis to support the simplication of the legislation, using
the evidence to support its policy preference.
The Impact Assessment Report
e nal product is the ia report itself. As outlined in Chapter Two, following the structure set
out by the ia blueprint provides a proxy for all three theoretical considerations. For instance, an
easy to understand report provides opportunity to explain the impacts to actors and coordinate
policy positions with them (enhanced coordination); it also provides a means by which to
have an informed discussion (rationalisation); and it provides a means for decision-makers to
ensure the report reects their policy preference (control).e nqppp ia report is broadly
43e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
44dg entr Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
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compliant with the ia Guidelines and based on a quick analysis, it is dicult to identify any
pattern.
A review of the pre-packed ia shows that it complied with a number of aspects.45 It provides
an overview of the context in which the proposal was developed but does not systematically
describe the problems. It does, provide an overview of the proposal’s objectives and sets
out ve policy options, ranging from xing sizes, to completely liberalizing the market, to
establishing voluntary standards.e number of options presented is comprehensive in that
they cover a range of policy options.e ia report complies with the requirement to explore
the economic impacts by presenting mostly qualitative information. As for environmental
and social impacts, the ia report states that there are no expected environmental impacts, but
provides a list of potential social impacts, including impacts on consumers.
e ia report broadly follows the structure laid out in the ia Guidelines. However, with
a length of 17 pages, it is relatively short, compared to the average length of 31 pages and
usually includes extensive technical annexes.46 According to the desk ocer in charge, it was a
deliberate choice to make the ia as concise as possible to serve as a better basis for discussion.
e result were divided opinions among key actors with some stating that the “(ia) report
length was ne”47 and others explaining that “they don’t like taking decisions based on a mere
“leaet”.48
Table 14 provides an overview of the extent to which the ia report complied with the key
elements as laid out in the ia Guidelines.
45e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
46ibid.
47Consumer Group Organization Representative, Interview, Brussels 2006.
48European Parliament Representative of imco Committee, Interview, Brussels 2006.
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Table 14: Compliance of IA report with IA Guidelines
Report outline according to the iaGuidelines
Section Status
Executive Summary Not done
Context/Background Done
Problem Done
Objectives Done
Policy Options Done
Impact Assessment Done (except env)
(economic, social and environmental)
Assessment of impacts outside the eu Not done
Quantication of impacts Some
Comparison of Options Done
Presentation of preferred options Done
Framework for future assessment Done
In summary, this section showed that dg entr complied with the ia Guidelines. Although
the ia was an add-on to the well-established slim programme, it leveraged the extensive
data collection and consultation exercises launched under slim.is included the previously
established coordination group which worked as an issg, as well as the studies commissioned
from the Institute of Prospective Technological Studies.is suggests the ia played a role in
enhancing the rationalisation and the coordination of this proposal. However, although the
data collection exercises provide strong support for the idea of enhanced rationalisation, this
was mainly due to slim programme, not the ia process, and two factors give weight to the
argument of enhanced control. First, slim had a clear mandate to reduce burdens on business
and this ia was draed within that context. Second, dg entr’s lead ocial explained that the
level of proportionate analysis was a political decision, providing an indication that political
ambitions were at play.
4 Stage III — Inter-Institutional Bargaining
e third ia stage begins when it is transmitted from the European Commission to the Eu-
ropean Parliament and Council. e role of the European Parliament and Council in the
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ia processes is explained in the 2003 Inter-Institutional Agreement on Better Law-making.
Under the agreement, both the European Parliament and Council are committed to con-
sider ias alongside proposals and, more importantly, to assess potential impacts of proposed
amendments.49is stage can provide a means for the ia to enhance the rationalisation and
coordination of policy, by encouraging debate and further analysis of proposed amendments.
ias can also provide a mechanism for the European Parliament and Council to hold the
Commission’s proposal to account based on the evidence presented in the ia report. is
section is dived into two parts, how the European Parliament and Council, respectively, used
the ia report. In particular, this section will illustrate that this ia was met with great suspicion
on the part of the European Parliament and became central to diering policy preferences or
ambitions; one that was geared toward simplifying legislation, making it easier for business to
package their products; and another that was concerned with consumer protection issues.
is ia was transmitted in October 2004 and accompanied a legislative proposal for a new
Directive designed to replace two Directives (75/7106/eec and 80/232/eec). Under the slim
programme, the Commission, European Parliament and Council already agreed the need
to work toward deregulating the pre-packed market. e ia argued that the Commission
reviewed the existing legislative framework and, in examining dierent policy alternatives,
determined that free sizes and voluntary standardisation for a number of products would be
appropriate.is would liberalise the market, keeping xed sizes for only a small number of
products. According to the European Commission, other Directives, such as the Unit Pricing
or Waste Directives, met consumer and environmental protection concerns.50
e committees responsible in the European Parliament and Council included the Council’s
Economic and Social Committee and the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (imco)
Committee respectively. Shortly aer the European Parliament received the proposal an imco
representative reported the European Parliament asking “the European Commission about
the position of consumer organisation . . . ” raising serious questions around whether the ia
“provided an answer on the key question of the extent to which this proposal would increase
competition and whether this was good for consumers”.51
49European Parliament, Council and Commission, Inter-Institutional Agreement on Impact Assessment: General
Principles, 2005.
50Commission of the European Communities, Commission Sta Working Paper: Annex to the Report ‘Better
Lawmaking 2006’, sec(2007)737.
51European Parliament Representative of imco Committee, Interview, Brussels 2006.
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The Impact Assessment in the European Parliament
According to an interviewee on the imco committee, the European Parliament did not “trust
the Commission on this . . . ”52 because mep’s believed business considerations were being
prioritised over consumer rights. e imco committee was therefore not willing to “base
[its] opinion on the ia.”53is was based on a mistrust of the slim programme, wherebye
European Parliament had decided it wanted “to get another point of view”54 and so the imco
committee requested the Presidency of the Parliament to contract its own ia. In November of
2005, the European Parliament commissioned a consultant to assess the proposal on their
behalf.is ia was the rst formal one undertaken by the European Parliament, although it
had commissioned numerous studies on other issues in the past. In formally commissioning
the ia, the European Parliament had joined the Commission in its new practice of conducting
ias and took advantage of a budget line which had been made available that year and was
specically dedicated to this purpose. e intent of the ia was to assess the Commission’s
“policy option on consumers (in particular vulnerable consumers) and small and medium
sized enterprises (smes)”.55
e company contracted to do the work took a “grass roots”56 approach whereby they
collected data directly from consumers rather than base it on representative bodies or pre-
viously available information to understand the issues faced by consumers.e contractor
“actually went into supermarkets and took a look themselves”.57 In the end, the results of
the European Parliament’s ia provided evidence to support the policy option favoured by
the imco Committee. e policy option favoured by the imco Committee supported the
deregulation of a number of products but called for an increase in the number of products
which would retain xed sizes (i.e. pasta, milk, butter, coee and sugar). In early 2006, the
European Parliament held its rst reading taking imco’s ia into account, and made over 30
amendments. Many of these were aimed at expanding sectors which had products requiring
52European Parliament imco Committee Secretariat, Interview, Brussels 2006.
53ibid.
54ibid.
55European Parliament, Impact Assessment Parliament’s Amendments to a Commission Proposal on Nominal
Quantities for Pre-Packed Products, 2005.
56European Parliament imco Committee Secretariat, Interview, Brussels 2006.
57European Parliament Representative of imco Committee, Interview, Brussels 2006.
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obligatory pack sizes, the reduction in scope for some specic sectors (i.e. free pack-sizes for
bread, tea and coee) and changes to ensure consumer protection.58
Unusually, the European Commission decided to resubmit the proposal, taking into account
the European Parliament’s changes. In 2006, the Commission revised the original proposal
and transmitted a revised ia.59 Based on this, the European Parliament andCouncil considered
the proposal again.e Council adopted a Common Position, but introduced a number of
amendments to allow Member States to phase-out existing rules governing national sizes
for a number of additional sectors. e European Parliament accepted these changes, but
made a number of further changes, resulting in a nal agreement in September 2009. Except
for the European Parliament’s ia, therefore no further ias were conducted. Further ias on
amendments would have shown a strong commitment to better regulation and the notion of
enhanced rationalisation, particularly as the proposal was heralded as an important element
in “delivering the Commission’s work programme to simplify eu legislation under the Better
Regulation initiative”.60
e fact that the European Parliament undertook an ia was unusual.is was supported by
a representative of the European Parliament who stated that “the majority view in the ep seems
to be rather sceptical of ec [Commission] ias . . . hopefully that [the establishment of new
framework contracts] will enhance [the European Parliament’s] ability to carry out its own
ias, which has been very dicult in the past”.61e motivation of the European Parliament in
developing its own ia seemed in part to have been to improve the proposal by reecting the
preferences of the European Parliament by strengthening the consumer protection elements
in particular.e following statement from an imco representative supports this nding: “the
introduction of [the] ia system is real progress for democracy and transparency. But they
have to increase the ias’ ‘power of conviction’, i.e. have more information, more analysis, and
58Europa Press Release, Commission Vice-President Verheugen welcomes Parliament vote on pre-
packed goods deregulation, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?referen-ce=ip/07/657&format
=html&aged=0&lg=cs&guiLanguage=en (January 2010).
59Commission of the European Communities, Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying
down rules on nominal quantities for pre-packed products, repealing Council Directives 75/106/eec and 80/232/eec,
and amending Council Directive 76/211/eec, com (2006) 171.
60European Parliament Press Release, More choice of package sizes for shoppers,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=im-press& reference=20070507ipr06411&language=en
(January 2010).
61European Parliament imco Committee Secretariat, Interview, Brussels 2006.
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answer the key questions in a relevant way . . . the Commission has to make a more serious
eort to produce complete ias to get more trust from meps”.62
The Impact Assessment in Council
e treatment of the ia in Council was dierent to the European Parliament. Representatives
fromMember States explained that the ia played a minor role, with one representative stating
that although the:
“situation was improving, when it comes to the nal political decision and adop-
tion by the College, the impact assessment tends to stay where it was and the
proposal is the result of a nal arbitrage; there is always a political step at the
end”.63
Another representative suggested that his administration discussed the Commission’s ia with
the food sector specialists and with the national Ministry of Agriculture, but that it was
not used during negotiations. However, according to a few members of the Council, the
Commission ia was discussed during the relevant Council Expert Working Group meeting,
serving mainly as a means to focus on certain options, in particular on the categories for
exemptions. Despite this, there was a general recognition that the nal decision was and
would continue to be a political one.64
One exception was the uk. According to a letter from Gerry Sutclie mp, Minister for
Employment Relations and Consumer Aairs, to the Chairman of the uk Parliament’s Select
Committee on eu, better regulation or the drive for simplication was an element in the
negotiating position the uk took. An extract from the letter supports this, showing that:
“the uk remained committed to seeking an early agreement that would bring the
benets of the deregulation of specied sizes for most products, to uk businesses
and consumers as soon as practicable . . . As I have previously mentioned, our
62European Parliament Representative of imco Committee, Interview, Brussels 2006.
63e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
64European Parliament Representative of imco Committee, Interview, Brussels 2006.
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own consultations with business and consumer groups have shown that there is
support for the retention of xed sizes for particular products . . . ”65
In the end, the uk’s nal negotiation in Council was also political in nature, in so far that
deregulation was the main objective, as a further quote of the letter indicates:
“you say that these additions are acceptable to the Government and would not
materially detract from the essential deregulatory purpose of the Proposal. But
we note your comment that you are still some way from being able to see the nal
picture and that you do not expect early agreement to be reached between the Par-
liament and the Council. Indeed, your letter suggests that further consideration
may well stretch beyond the tenure of the current Presidency.”66
Perceptions of the Impact Assessment
Interviews with actors outside of the European Commission, Parliament and Council shed
further light on the nal stage of this proposal. Actors who participated in the consultation
explained that, in their opinion, the ia was weak because the economic argument was un-
convincing and the ia was draed in such a manner that it attempted to be a “solution for
all”67 rather than a document to provide an overview of the facts and option. One reason for
this seemed to be the weak quantication of information.68 Interviews with actors inside the
European Parliament, on the other hand, indicate that there was an ideological split about
the purpose of the proposal. In particular, there were those in the European Parliament who
thought the Commission ia was too much “linked to the simplication initiative”69 and that
eu level ias were particularly dicult because “you cannot take an average over the eu and
say that the eect is not high without dealing with localised issues”70. Further comments from
Member State Governments indicated that they felt the Commission ia was not clear on the
costs to industry and was too neutral on the costs to consumers. One actor explained that
65e United Kingdom Select Committee on European Union, Letter from Gerry Sutclie mp, Minister for
Employment Relations and Consumer Aairs, Department of Trade and Industry to the Chairman http://www.
publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/ldeucom/187/187337.htm (January 2010).
66ibid.
67e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
68 ibid.
69ibid.
70European Parliament Representative of imco Committee, Interview, Brussels 2006.
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the ia was “a subjective justication of the proposals, rather than an objective evaluation”.71
Furthermore, although external actors praised the Commission for its consultation process,
there was a concern that it had focused too much on eu level trade associations and in doing
so “not getting nuanced information fromMember States”.72
In summary, this section provided evidence that the Commission, in particular dg entr,
used this ia to further the deregulatory ambition set out in slim. It also provides some evidence
to support the notion that the ia played a minor role in Council, mainly assisting in focusing
discussions on specic exemptions. With the exception of the uk’s attempt to use the ia as a
means for enhanced control, the Council used the ia as a reference document. In regard to the
European Parliament’s use of ia in this nal stage, interviewees from the European Parliament
revealed that the Commission ia was viewed as a means to justify the policy and therefore
to ‘stack the deck’.e European Parliament in turn developed its own ia, not to assess all
amendments, rather to support their preferred policy preference of promoting consumer
protection (i.e. enhanced rationalisation in support of control).
5 Conclusion
dg Enterprise’s nqppp ia followed the main analytical and procedural steps outlined by the
ia Guidelines and the Inter-Institutional Agreement on Better Law-making, supporting the
ambitions of both enhanced rationalisation and control in particular. However, the proposal
and therefore the ia were rooted in the deregulatory objectives of the slim programme and so
the Commission focused on the simplication of pre-packed products to support business and
improve the internal market.is supports the ambition of enhanced control, in particular
‘stacking the deck’. A consequence of slim was that Member States, the European Parliament
and Council expressed their support for the need to reform nqppps well ahead of the ia
process. However, the European Parliament had concerns about consumer rights during nal
negotiations and used the newly established ia process as a tool to legitimise its own position
and draw a line between the need to liberalise nqppp and protect consumers.
71e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit. .
72ibid.
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is case study therefore provides evidence to support the idea that the ia ambitions vary
over the course of the policy-making process. In particular, it illustrates ia to advance two of
the three theoretical ambitions, albeit to varying degree dependant on the policy stage.e
rst ia stage was subsumed under slim with the ia playing no role at this stage. Instead of the
ia playing a role, the evidence suggests that slim was the mechanism used by the Commission
to coordinate the data collection and inform actors. However, as one of the rst ias conducted
under the new Commission ia system, dg entr considered this ia a pilot project, explaining
why the rst ia stage was, essentially, skipped.
e slim programme continued to play a prominent role during the second ia stage. While
dg entr complied with most of the ia Guidelines by delivering an ia Guidelines compliant
report, this built heavily on slim. For example, the ia used the evidence collected through
Euro-Barometer and the Joint Research Centre. dg entr used this information to understand
the economic rationale for simplifying the regulatory framework and attempts were made to
understand consumer issues. Although this, in part at least, supports the idea of ia to advance
enhanced rationalisation, the analysis and arguments laid out in the ia focused primarily on
the benets to business, suggesting ‘stacking the deck’.
ia as a means for enhanced coordination played a minor role. While the working group
structures established under slim were used for the consultation of external actors and the
ia, this was within the deregulatory objective of the slim programme.e ia was therefore
not a driving force in advancing positive or enhanced coordination. Enhanced procedural
control, as outlined in the ia Guidelines, also played a minor role. For example, during
the nal Inter-Service Consultation Stage the Secretariat General showed greater interest in
the presentation of the ia as one of the rst conducted under the new ia system, not as a
means for enhanced rationalisation through a balanced assessment of economic, social and
environmental impacts.
However, this ia played an unusually prominent role during the ia nal stage, particularly
in light of the other case studies presented in this research. Although the Council did not use
the ia to improve the proposal, some Council members did take note of the ia and used it to
inform their initial negotiation position.e European Parliament on the other hand, unhappy
with what was provided by the European Commission, used the ia process extensively to
advance its own policy preference. In particular, the European Parliament undertook its own
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ia to defend consumer protection. Although this case study did not identify sucient evidence
to determine the extent to which the European Parliament’s ia contributed toward improving
the proposal (therefore as a means to enhance rationalisation), the focus of the Parliament’s
ia was on consumer impacts.e ia therefore promoted the European Parliament’s policy
preference and supports the idea of ia as a means for enhanced control. In regard to the
ambitions of enhanced coordination, most of the coordination among actors was a result of
the slim programme.
As slim established broad agreement for Commission action among the Council and
European Parliament, this ia was overshadowed by the slim programme, therefore playing a
secondary role. Table 15 provides a summary of the three ambitions found in this case study,
before moving to the next case study which examines a proposal divided between actors in
support of environmental protection and those in support of economic growth.
Table 15: IA as a tool for rationalisation, control or coordination
Policy Stage /eoretical Consideration Stage i Stage ii Stage iii
Enhanced Rationalisation No Yes Yes
Enhanced Coordination No Some No
Enhanced Control No Yes Yes
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Pollution
is case study examines the Directorate General for the Environment’s (dg env) impact
assessment (ia) entitled theematic Strategy on Air Pollution. With a long history of
environmental ias in the European Commission, this case study explores the extent to which
dg env used this ia as a means to manage polarised policy preferences, in particular that
of environmental protection versus economic growth.is case study provides evidence to
support the ambitions of ias as a means for enhanced rationalisation and control (in particular
‘stacking the deck’), and to some extent enhanced coordination.
eematic Strategy of Air Pollution (tsap) proposal set out a legislative strategy to agree
a targeted ‘ambition level’ for eu air pollution reduction by 2020. Adopted by the European
Commission in 2005, the proposal was one component of the Commission’s Sixth Community
Environment Action Programme (6th eap). In developing this proposal and the corresponding
ia, dg env built on the experiences gained during the 5th eap. Using numerous studies and
environmental models, the Commission developed a proposal that enjoyed broad European
Parliament and Council support. However, although there was strong support for action, there
were disagreements on the level of the environmental challenge and the need to take action.
e diversions in policy preferences were between those concerned about environmental
degradation and arguing for an ambitious target and those who believed a less ambitious
target was necessary taking economic considerations into account. dg env tried to bridge
this divide by investing considerable time and resources into the collection of evidence.
In tracing the policy-making for theematic Strategy of Air Pollution, this case study
examines the extent to which the ia process reects the logics of enhanced rationalisation (for
example through the use of data collection) and enhanced control (for example through the
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presentation of information to ‘stack the deck’ in favour of dg env’s policy preference, which
in this case was a more ambitious target level). It also considers whether the ia was used for
enhanced coordination, whereby dierent actors, both inside and outside the Commission
were brought together to nd a mutually agreeable policy outcome. While the following
pages will show traces of all three theoretical ambitions, they will also show that the drivers
were the rationalisation of the policy process to support dg env’s policy preference. As dg
env’s sought to use this ia to enhance renationalisation and control, a number of actors, in
particular those who were looking for a less ambitious target used the ia process to ‘stack’ or
control the outcome to support their own preferences.
e ia under consideration covers a number of proposals, including two Directives.e
focus here is on the Airematic Strategy, which sets out the Commission’s broad political
ambition.is case study’s scope excludes the two accompanying implementation Directives
(i.e. the Directive on Ambient Air Quality and Cleaner Air for Europe).
1 Background
Environmental action at eu level goes back over thirty years.is section provides an overview
of the context in which this proposal was developed, before assessing the three ia stages.is
ia was developed under the sixth Environmental Action Programmes (eap).is Programme
provided the overall mechanism to develop strategies, framework Directives, individual
daughter Directives and various research projects, building on a long period of eu activity
in this area. It is within this wider context that the development of this iamust be assessed,
particularly in light of a multi-year programme designed to provide dg env with on-going
analytical support.
Since the early 1970s the European Commission used a series of Environmental Action
Programmes to structure and coordinate its work in addressing environmental issues at the
European level. e rst eap ran from 1973–1976 and was designed to address a number
of urgent environmental issues, establishing basic principles such as the “Polluter Pays”.1
From the 1970s onwards, the Commission launched six additional programmes covering
1e United Kingdom House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, Environmental Audit — First
report; 1999.
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various environmental themes. Under the penultimate eap of 1992–2000, entitled “Towards
Sustainability”, the Commission introduced an environmental Framework Directive which
set out a number of targets. With the 1996 introduction of the Directive on Ambient Air
Quality Assessment and Management2, the European Commission created a framework
for a monitoring system to collect and publish measurements related to climate change.
To implement key elements of the Ambient Air Quality Directive, the Commission also
introduced four, so called daughter Directives designed to set out individual targets for air
pollutants in ambient air.e Directives included:
• 1999/30/ec on sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, particles and lead;
• 2000/69/ec on benzene and carbon monoxide;
• 2002/3/ec on ground-level ozone; and
• 2004/107/ec on polyaromatic hydrocarbons (pah) and a number of heavy metals.
Although the Framework Directive set out the broad approach and established a number
of targets, it did not dictate an approach by which the limit values would be achieved.is
was le for individual Member States to determine. e lack of a uniform approach was
considered by a number of observers to be a key weakness, as an evaluation of the h eap
programme in the mid-1990s conrmed.e evaluation stated that:
“the programme identied most of the elements to make the process work. What
is lacking is the political will to make them work. Equally lacking are a pragmatic,
operational set of tools and the appropriate institutional arrangements at all levels
of government to nurture the process and ensure its success . . . In the end, the
most important task is to nd the means to exert the pressures which will result
in real progress and to develop a sense of urgency to move forward.”3
By the late 1990s the European Parliament and Council asked the Commission to start work
on establishing the sixth Environmental Action Programme which would become the vehicle
for launching a new Airematic Strategy. With a start date sometime in the early 2000s,
2e Council of the European Union, Council Directive 96/62/ec of 27 September 1996 on ambient air quality
assessment and management, (96/62/ec).
3Commission of the European Communities, Progress report from the Commission on the implementation of the
European Community programme of policy and action in relation to the environment and sustainable development:
Towards Sustainability (5th eap), com (95) 624.
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the Commission was given time to prepare. As part of this preparatory work, in 2001, the
Commission launched the Clean Air for Europe programme (cafe). cafe was intended to
prepare the Commission for the new eap and was the vehicle by which a number of technical
research and analysis projects were commissioned. All were designed to support long-term,
strategic policy advice on the eects of air pollution on human health and the environment.4
Results from cafe were intended for later use, in particular, to provide a basis for designing
the Airematic Strategy and the accompanying ia.
As work under cafe progressed, the Commission used the technical analysis to propose
and adopt the sixth eap in September 2005.5e sixth eap included two key intentions:
• the publication of theematic Strategy on Air Pollution (com(2005) 446); and
• the introduction of the Directive on Ambient Air Quality and Cleaner Air for Europe
(the “cafe” Directive).
In addition to providing greater clarity on the target levels, one of the key objectives of this
proposal was to streamline and improve the existing regulatory framework. By proposing
a new Air Quality Directive, the Commission was going to combine the 1996 Framework
Directive with its Daughter Directives to simplify the regulatory framework.is reected
the strong better regulation theme of the late 1990s and early 2000s, which was of a particular
interest to dg entr. To illustrate the point, the ia later stated that “while the impacts of
this modernisation and simplication exercise cannot be quantied in monetary terms, it is
certain to have positive eects on competitiveness by reducing bureaucracy and increasing
transparency”.6
e assessment of environmental impacts was an important element of eu policy-making.
With the introduction of the Directive on Environmental Impact Assessment (eia) in 1985,
there had been a requirement for Member States to consider the eects of projects (i.e. such
as planning projects7) on the environment.e intention of the eia Directive was to ensure
4Commission of the European Communities,e Clean Air for Europe (cafe) Programme: Towards aematic
Strategy for Air Quality, com(2001) 245.
5Europa Press Release, Commission proposes clean air strategy to protect human health and the envi-
ronment, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=ip/05/1170&format=html&aged=0&lang-
uage=en&guiLanguage=en (January 2010).
6Commission of the European Communities, Impact Assessment ofe Communication onematic Strategy
on Air Pollution and the Directive on Ambient Air quality and Clean Air for Europe, sec (2005)1133.
7European Commission Environment, Environmental Impact Assessment — eia, http://ec.europa.eu/
environment/eia/eia-legalcontext.htm (January 2010).
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national and local administrations took environmental consequences into account whenever
they considered regulation, a requirement the European Commission followed in its own
policy development. Since the 1980s, the Commission periodically up-dated the eia Directive
and from the late 1990s onward all Member States transposed it in some shape or form.8e
introduction of the European Commission’s ia system was the most recent change in how the
Commission assessed its environmental legislation, extending the requirement to take into
consideration social as well as economic impacts.
A review of the background and context to this Directive shows that theematic Air
Strategy’s ia followed a long tradition of environmental action, supported by both the European
Parliament and Council. By undertaking an extensive exercise to collect relevant data, cafe
was designed to provide dg env with the foundations to develop the Air Strategy and in doing
so support the policy preference of higher environmental protection.is was not new for
dg env, undertaking environmental ias started in the early 1980s. What was new was the
inclusion of economic and social considerations. e Airematic Strategy was the most
recent development in the area of eu environmental policy going back several decades.
Figure 20 provides a visual representation of eu action in this area going back to the 1970s.
8Commission of the European Communities, On the application and eectiveness of the eia Directive, com
(2009) 378 nal.
156
JohannesM.Wolff Case Study 2: Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution
Figure 20: Background of EU environmental policy over the past 40 years
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2 Stage I — Inception of the Impact Assessment
is section traces the steps laid out in the Guidance, it shows that the ia process played a
minor role during this early stage. In the context of the ia requirement to publish a roadmap
alongside the Commission’s Legislative Work Programme (clwp), enhanced rationalisation
would manifest itself by dg env using the roadmap to assist in establishing an understanding
of the policy challenges and an analytical base-line from which to develop theematic Air
Strategy. From the control perspective, dg env should use the roadmap and its publication
in the clwp to set the agenda and ensure actors are conned to discussing the policy within
the framework outlined in the roadmap. From a coordination perspective dg env should
use the ia to bring relevant actors together. Particular actors from the economic pillar, to
identify common ground and nd an optimal solution to establish new targets, with the result
of little or no political reservations at the later stages.e section will show that much of the
preparatory work was conducted under the cafe programme, and so outside the ia process.
By including the roadmap in the Commission’s 2005 Legislative and Work Programme
(clwp), dg env announced its intention to undertake an ia in January of 2005.e clwp
stated that:
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“theematic Strategy on Air Pollution will outline the environmental objectives
for air quality and measures to be taken to meet the set objectives.eematic
Strategy will be based on a long-term, strategic and integrated policy advice to
protect against signicant negative eects of air pollution on human health and
the environment”.9
It also explained that:
“in respect of the simplication of existing legislation, one of the measures that is
envisaged for inclusion in the strategy is the recasting/merging of the air quality
framework directive (96/62/ec) and the rst three daughter directives (1999/30/ec,
2000/69/ec, 2002/3/ec) and possibly the Decision on the exchange of air quality
monitoring data (97/101/ec).”10
Although the iawas announced in 2005, according to the Commission desk ocer responsible
for the ematic Air Strategy “the ia work started in 2001 [when the cafe programme
started]”.11is included an initial roadmap which was formally published in the 2005 clwp.
By that time “the ia work was already well under way and the roadmap was therefore able to
describe the ‘initial ia screening’, the available data, consultation arrangements, Inter-Service
Steering Group and expected timing of the work in relative detail”.12
e Commission ia Guidelines state that an ia should help “ensure early coordination
within the Commission . . . demonstrate the Commission’s openness to input from a wide
range of external stakeholders, and show its commitment to transparency.”13 If the 2005
roadmap was the rst step in publically acknowledging the ia process, this ia would not have
achieved the objectives of early coordination and openness. However, according to dg env’s
desk ocer the Commission considered the initial steps of the ia to be the activities conducted
under cafe.is indicates that the ia processes started, at least informally, back in 2001. It is
therefore worth exploring the work undertaken during that time period to examine the extent
to which the late announcement of the iamay have inuenced the ia process.
9Commission of the European Communities, Commission Work Programme for 2005, (com(2005) 15 nal).
10ibid.
11dg entr Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
12e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
13Commission of the European Communities, Impact Assessment Guidelines, op. cit.
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e origin of this ia lies in the cafe programme. In 2001 the Commission communicated
its plan for a new sixth eap to the European Parliament and Council. A key element of the eap
was coherence, which the Commission said required the “development of a comprehensive,
integrated and coherent framework for all air legislation and related policy initiatives under the
title ‘Clean Air For Europe (cafe)”’.14 In May 2001 the Commission put forward its proposal
for cafe to lay the foundations for the sixth eap and theematic Air Strategy. Announced
in 2001, the cafe proposal reads like a roadmap as it informs the European Parliament and
Council that the thematic strategy on air pollution will involve:15
• a review of the implementation of air quality directives and eectiveness of air quality
programmes in the Member States;
• improvements in the monitoring of air quality and the provision of information to the
public; and
• priorities for further actions, the review and updating of air quality thresholds and
national emission ceilings and the development of better systems for gathering infor-
mation, modelling and forecasting.
With regular updates from the Commission, cafe enjoyed the support of the European
Parliament and Council. As part of this endorsement, the European Parliament and Council
called on the Commission to strengthen the dialogue with “environmental ngos through
appropriate support, including Community nance”.16 e Commission was also encouraged
to improve policy-making by undertaking:
“ex-ante evaluation of the possible impacts, in particular the environmental im-
pacts, of new policies including the alternative of no action and of the proposals
for legislation and publication of the results; and ex-post evaluation of the eec-
tiveness of existing measures”.17
14Commission of the European Communities, On the sixth environment action programme of the European
Community ‘Environment 2010: Our future, Our choice, (com (2001) 31 nal).
15Commission of the European Communities,e Clean Air for Europe (cafe) Programme: Towards aematic
Strategy for Air Quality, (com(2001) 245nal).
16e European Parliament and the Council of the Union,Decision No 1600/2002/ecOf the European Parliament
and of the Council of 22 July 2002 laying down the Sixth Community Environment Action Programme, (ojec, l242
/ 1).
17ibid.
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Based on this mandate the Commission established mechanisms to actively engage with
a variety of actors. Interviews with external Commission actors indicate that the openness
and transparency of the process was seen positively, in so far that actors felt they were able to
contribute to the policy process. For example, one “Council member representative thought
the roadmap was helpful, but he had been fully aware of the process due to cafe”.18 An ngo
representative suggested that “the number and quality of consultations on this ia had been
much better than for other [policy] areas”.19 However, there was an asymmetry in expectations
regarding the ocial start of the ia process. External actors saw a clear distinction between the
ocial ia process which started in 2004/2005 and the activities under cafe. One Oil Industry
representative stated that “the consultation process was positive, but Industry regarded the
ia as a separate process . . . it was like watching a marathon and missing the last stage”.20
is was supported by a Commission ocial’s statement who suggested that the “politicians
[Commissioners] forced the schedule for this process . . . with most of the time (4 years) spent
on methodologies, developing tools, gathering information, consultation and validation” . . .
and the “last bit (analysis/ia report) done under considerable time pressure”.21
ere was uidity in the start-date of the ia process, as it was not actually launched at the
time it was announced in the clwp.e proposal and underlying analysis began before the
new Commission ia system was established (in 2003) and was very much part of the cafe
programme.is uidity is acknowledged in ia Guidelines which state that:
“since most Commission initiatives are embedded in policy processes and legal
obligations . . . many key elements for a formal impact assessment are generally
already available at pre-Annual Policy Strategy / Work Programme stage . . . the
Roadmap will therefore determine what data are available, what complementary
data are needed, and how they will be produced”.22
Although dg env’s intention to develop the sixth eap, cafe and therefore the Airematic
Strategy was well known by key actors since 2001, the formal process did not start until
2005. Similar to dg entr’s nqppps proposal examined during the rst case study, dg env
18e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
19eeb— Swedish National representative, Interview, Brussels 2006.
20concawe—Oil industry Representative, Interview, Brussels 2006.
21dg env Desk Ocer Support, Interview, Brussels 2006.
22Commission of the European Communities, Impact Assessment Guidelines, op. cit.
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sought to comply with the new ia system even though work started well before the system
was established.
In summary, the rst ia stage followed the ia Guidelines with dg env draing a roadmap
and publishing it in the clwp. However, this was overshadowed by cafe, the multi-year
programme designed to provide the analytical underpinning for the new eap and theematic
Air Strategy. In dg env’s view the ia process started with the launch of cafe and the roadmap
merely marked the start of draing the ia report and proposal.is roadmap did not play
a role in enhancing the rationalisation or control of the policy process. Its contribution to
enhanced coordination was limited to reports from one representative of the Council who
suggested it was helpful.is report should not be overemphasised as the desk ocer who led
cafe and draed the ia stated that he “would have done the analysis anyway, even without
requirement for an ‘ia’ . . . but it would have been done dierently . . . probably resulting in a
less complicated / formalistic report”.23
3 Stage II — Development of the Impact Assessment
e following traces the second ia stage within the framework of the three theoretical con-
siderations. It does so in four parts, rst by looking at the ia process, the participation of
key actors, the process of quality assurance, and the nal ia report. If dg env used the ia
process as a means to enhance coordination, one would expect signicant consultation to
ascertain the best policy solution. As a tool for enhanced rationalisation, dg env would have
used various analytical steps to collect and incorporate evidence into the nal proposal. As
a tool for enhanced control, dg env would have used the ia to develop stricter air targets
and for other actors, such as dg entr to try and ensure their economic interests are taken
into account.e following section shows traces of all three ia ambitions, but that enhanced
rationalisation and control played a prominent role.
Ensuring a variety of actors were involved in the cafe programme was a priority for dg env
as well as the identication and use of scientic data as illustrated by a 2000 Communication
which stated that:
23dg env Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
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“cafe will benet from an organisational structure ensuring that the policy is
science-based and involves stakeholders at all levels of policy-making . . . taking
full account of the latest and best available scientic and technical information”.24
Accordingly, the Commission undertook a number of major projects and established various
mechanisms to engage with actors. Between the launch of cafe in 2001 and the announcement
to develop theematic Air Strategy in 2004/2005, the Commission spent four years collab-
orating extensively with experts.is included regular communication with the secretariat
of the un Convention on Long Range Trans-boundary Pollution (clrtap), a cafe Steering
Group consisting of representatives of all Member States and Accession Countries, as well as
industry, green ngo’s, the World Health Organisation (who), the European Environmental
Agency (eea) and others. Additionally, dg env established severalWorking Groups to support
the development of the cafe programme. Working Groups included one to establish the
cafe-baseline scenario, one for an Air Pollution Target, one for the assessment of Policy, and
one on Particle Matters. dg envmade progress reports on these Working Groups publicly
available on a periodic basis.
However, as explained by a dg env interviewee, the cafe programme did not “start from
zero”25 and also looked at existing as well as previous environmental targets. For example, one
of the key features of cafe was to review the implementation of the existing Directives on Air
Quality. Furthermore, the World Health Organisation (who) researched the adverse eects of
exposure to specic air pollutants on human health throughout the 1990s and dg env had used
who data in the past. As part of cafe, dg env “asked the who to review the latest scientic
evidence”26 using the samemethodology as applied in the past to help up-date key data in time
for theematic Air Strategy. Building on this, further research was commissioned to develop
a baseline from which to establish and assess policy scenarios. dg env hired a consortium to
do this work in 2003 and to work closely with the European Environmental Agency (eea) and
Joint Research Centre (jrc).e consortium was asked to review various environmental and
transport model simulations, such as the Regional Air Pollution Information and Simulation
model (rains) and a number of others. In addition to the collection of scientic data, a
24Commission of the European Communities,e Clean Air for Europe (cafe) Programme: Towards aematic
Strategy for Air Quality, (com(2001) 245nal).
25dg env Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
26Task Force on Emissions Inventories and Projections, Background document http://www.tfeip-secretariat.org/
Warsaw/{tfeip}_Warsaw_{cafe}_doc.doc (April 2010).
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contract was also awarded to assess the impacts, as well as “the costs and benets of cleaner
air on health and environment (e.g. increased life expectancy, better health status, better soil
and water quality, etc.)”.27 In doing so dg env collected information on the economic aspects
of their proposal between September 2003, and early 2005.
Part of the cost benet work included a public consultation in late 2004 and the peer review
of scientic ndings. In particular, dg env wanted a review of the methodology of the:
“cost-benet analysis of the clean air for Europe programme . . . to establish the
extent to which the methodology was based on scientic knowledge and was t
to be used to estimate the eects of air pollution on health, materials, agriculture,
ecosystems and cultural sites, and the valuation of such eects in carrying out
welfare and macroeconomic analysis”.28
Much of the work was complete by early 2005, with the ia “nalised in May (of 2005) when it
was submitted for Inter-Service consultation . . . and debated by the Commission in dierent
formations”.29
As can be seen from the above, the Commission conducted extensive research which mostly
fell outside the ocial ia period. Compared to the other case studies examined in this study,
dg env put a lot of time and resources into this programme, with cafe playing a signicant
role in driving the development of theematic Air Strategy.e formal ia process was not
central to this proposal; rather, it was an addition to this agship measure. Similar to dg
entr’s work for the Pre-Packed Proposal, this ia provided dg env the opportunity to use
cafe to illustrate its strong commitment to the new ia process. Table 16 provides a short
overview of the various activities and milestones, ultimately resulting in the nal ia published
in September 2005.
The Impact Assessment Process
As outlined in the previous section, theematic Air Strategy was based on work conducted
under cafe.e process took four years and included extensive stakeholder consultation ex-
27ibid.
28A. Krupnick, A. Ostro and K. Bull, “Peer Review of the Methodology of Cost-Benet Analysis of the Clean Air
for Europe Programme”, http://www.cafe-cba.org/assets/cafe_peer_review.pdf(April 2010).
29dg entr Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
163
JohannesM.Wolff Case Study 2: Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution
ercises.e inclusion of key experts and actors was ensured through several Working Groups.
In particular, dg env established one cross-Commission issg for the overall coordination of
cafe. Under dg env lead, an issg was set up in 2001 with “about 10 dgs . . . dealing mainly
with theematic Strategy . . . discussing two elements: establishing the facts [and] results
of modelling scenarios”.30is issg was later also intended to provide guidance on the work
around the ia report.
Table 16: Activities and milestones under CAFE and the IA
Date Activity
November 2000 Results of feasibility study on implementing the cafe programme published
January 2001 Environmental Action Programme announced, providing the framework for
cafe to be launched.
May 2001 Commission announces the cafe programme, kick starting the research and
analysis necessary for theematic Air Strategy
December 2003 —
September 2004
Review of the Regional Air Pollution Information and Simulation (rains)
framework, a key methodological component, to determine its usefulness
for scientic and economic understanding to develop European air pollution
policies under cafe and beyond
February 2004 rains review is peer reviewed
2003—March 2005 Cost-Benet and Cost-Eectiveness Analysis of the cafe Programme, in-
cluding an assessment of the impact on health and marginal external costs of
air pollution in Europe
Summer 2004 Formal peer review of cafe cba
June 2004 World Health Organisation (who) conducts systematic review of the health
eects of air pollution in Europe
December 2004 who publishes position paper on Particular Matter in Europe
2004 — 2005 Baseline scenarios developed for cafe
November 2004 —
October 2005
Public reports on the analysis of various scenario options (i.e. no change in
legislation versus various changes/improvements)
June 2004 — Jan-
uary 2005
Reviews and Ex-post assessments of existing legislative and non-legislative
measures and policies (e.g. review of Directives)
December 2004 —
January 2005
Public consultation on the objectives and content of theematic Air Strategy
2001 — 2005 Various groups were set up to assist in developing and implementing cafe
(i.e. cafe steering Group; Working Groups on Target Setting and Policy
Assessment, on Particular Matter, and on Implementation)
March / April 2005 Proposal and Impact Assessment nalised
May 2005 Proposal and Impact Assessment submitted for Inter-Service Consultation
September 2005 Proposal and Impact Assessment accepted
30dg env Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
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Although dg env’s policy unit saw the issg as a “formalistic exercise . . . to communicate
results . . . feedback was useful . . . with lower level [ocials] being more constructive”.31 dg
env’s ia support unit thought the issg was very useful in order “to get early warnings . . . of
problems”.32 issgmembers from other dgs explained that because of the complexity of the
programme, it was “necessary to follow all meetings, not just [this] issg, to fully understand
the process”33 and also reported that their “work oen had to be done under a lot of time
pressure”.34
e coordination dg env undertook was intended to ensure the work with various external
actors was monitored on a regular basis. dg env commissioned a number of external experts,
but the main contractor was the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (iiasa).
With a long-standing relationship between dg env and iiasa, iissa previously worked on the
Emissions Ceiling Directive and on cafe. According to iiasa they worked “hand in hand
with the ec, supplying [regular] materials and reports up until 2005”.35 As part of the contract,
iiasa also held a number of “bilateral consultations with all 25 Member States and Industry . . .
to get buy-in, [and] avoid discussions at later stages”.36
From dg env’s perspective the money spent on contractors (e3–4m)37 was money well
spent, as it provided the evidence and framework to work with key experts in Member States,
industry, Non-Governmental Organisations and also internationally.is was supported by
dg agri with the desk ocer stating that they did “very important work . . . to make informed
decisions”38 and supported also by dg entr, stating that “input was absolutely key” although
iiasa seemed to have “a monopoly position”39 in providing the European Commission with
environmental advice.
Work with contractors suered from timing diculties, requiring dg env to put forward
policy recommendations regarding the Airematic Strategy without full ‘buy-in’ from
external actors. Although four years would have been sucient to develop the proposal, an
31dg env Desk Ocer Support, Interview, Brussels 2006.
32dg env Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
33dg agri Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
34dg env Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
35Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (iiasa) Contractor, Interview, Phone 2006.
36ibid.
37dg env Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
38dg agri Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
39dg entr Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
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interviewee from dg entr stated that the “public procurement processes are very complicated
. . . and take at least a year to get results [i.e. to get the contract up and running]”.40 Despite
much detailed “planning . . . political pressure created the time pressure”.41is resulted in
“considerable frustration by stakeholders”.42 Part of the time pressure was due to the mandate
the Commission had to provide the European Parliament and Council with a proposal.is
political timetable combined with diculties in collecting data, created additional pressures.
Accordingly, dg env had not put enough eort into engaging “with those [experts, industry
and Member States] who were able to generate data and provide necessary tools for informed
discussions”.43
From dg env’s perspective a lot of eort had been put into stakeholder engagement, but it
was clear that “more eorts were required, which was conrmed during . . . the workshops”44
with Member States. Interviewees from dg env admitted that they created expectations
among external actors, but that a rushed nal stage in the process resulted in one external
actor being “very angry about the nal phase . . . because the process didn’t reach its natural
conclusions . . . and the timetable was brought forward, shortening stakeholder dialogue”.45
To mitigate against this, dg env considered “presenting a dra ia [to Member States] . . . but
the Commission, as a political body, had to take the nal decisions”.46 As a result the external
actors felt they were not part of the nal policy decision.
In addition working with experts, dg env also held a public consultation. Ocials ques-
tioned the “usefulness of the consultation, which was translated into 19 languages . . . drawing
approx. 11,000 responses”.47 Although the results indicated wide public support for setting
environmental targets, even if that meant increased economic costs, the issues were “very
complicated and hard to explain”,48 therefore resulting in high-level / broad engagement with-
out much detail. Another problem with the consultation was that “more than half of those
40ibid.
41ibid.
42ibid.
43ibid.
44ibid.
45dg env Desk Ocer Support, Interview, Brussels 2006.
46ibid.
47dg env Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
48ibid.
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[consulted] came from Portugal (where the consultation was apparently widely publicised in
the media)”,49 making the results non-representative of the eu as a whole.
e ia process included the extensive work undertaken by the cafe programme, despite
dg env only viewing the ia process as the nal draing of the report.is is, as illustrated in
the following section, in contradiction to accounts from external actors, such as ngos and
industry representatives, who considered the nal ia draing phase as the main and most
important aspect of the process. External actors were disappointed with the nal outcome,
mainly because in their view the nal policy decision did not reect the work from the various
Working Groups and cafe. As will be illustrated later in this chapter, the discontent of external
Commission actors resulted in challenges during the nal stages of this ia.e time pressures
to complete the analytical work ultimately resulted in a breakdown in stakeholder engagement
during the Inter-Service Consultation stage and therefore the Inter-Institutional Bargaining
stage.
Participation and Consultation
Interviews with Commission ocials show that they thought the entire process was open,
explaining that “everyone was involved [because] . . . validation of data inputs was important,
as were workshops at the end, to pull the whole thing together [and to] get away from the
notion of a ‘black box’, and make interested parties understand where the results come from”.50
is was reected both by industry and environmental ngos, with the caveat of the nal
part of the second ia stage. For example, an industry representative stated that “cafe is an
example of open access . . . [there was] no problem with being able to present industry’s own
assessments directly to cafe team in dg env . . . [we] had access to all centres of excellence
and information . . . [communication] was all great up until the last stage — that’s when ‘the
screen went blank”’.51e industry representative acknowledged that the inception “phase was
stretched out because of problems [with procurement], so the last stage (scenario analysis)
was compressed in time”.52 He further explained that “the 3 years’ worth of data” was not fully
reected in the nal ia. In fact, according to the industry representative “crucial information
49e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
50dg env Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
51concawe—Oil Industry Representative, Interview, Brussels 2006.
52ibid.
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on uncertainties underlying analysis and conclusion”53 was omitted. In an attempt to inuence
the nal stage of the process, industry “worked with dg entr” to highlight “his key message
that [scenario] C was not justied”.54
ose interviewed from the ngo perspective also indicated that the process was “very
good, transparent . . . [with] lots of information exchange, on a very factual level”.55 With
2–3 meetings a year, in addition to ad-hoc engagements with Working Groups, the ngos
made sure they had at least “1 person in each Working Group, plus 2–3 at sg [Stakeholder
Group] meetings” . . . despite it taking “quite some time to follow everything”.56 ere was
a general appreciation that the Commission made “money available to pay stakeholders to
come to Brussels”57 and participate, although this apparently only started halfway through
the cafe programme. However, in the end, ngos did not think the nal ia stage was very
open.e ia was “criticised from a political” perspective because the “results of the internet
consultation showed people wanted a high level of ambition” but the nal ambition level
“was reduced in the nal political process”.58 Furthermore, there was a feeling that the nal
“costs were exaggerated” and felt that the analysis was not “the nal truth” because data is the
“interpretation of a changing reality”.59
e perception of external actors reected dg env’s assessment of how the process worked:
generally open, but a rushed nal ia writing stage.
Quality Assurance
e main support and quality assurance for the ‘ematic Air Strategy’ proposal was provided
by dg env’s own Sustainable Development and Economic Analysis unit (i.e. dg ia support
unit) and was, according to the dg env’s policy ocial “extremely useful”.60 However, the
introduction of the ia system created confusion because it was not clear whether the ia was
going to require further work over and beyond cafe. In time, it became clear that dg env’s
53ibid.
54ibid.
55eeb— Swedish National Representative, Interview, Brussels 2006.
56ibid.
57ibid.
58ibid.
59ibid.
60dg env Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
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work was “by far the most comprehensive [ia] ever made in the ec”61 and was therefore
deemed compliant with the new ia system.62 Nevertheless, dg env had a “dispute over
the [interpretation of the] Guidelines” with fellow dgs, looking to the “Secretariat General
as the enforcer”.63 Contact with the Secretariat General was managed by the Sustainable
Development and Economic Analysis unit, who focused on engaging with the Secretariat
General to interpret the idea of “proportionality . . . [which was] important to fend o requests
by other dgs to do something”.64 However, the helpfulness of the Secretariat General was
questioned, with dg env ocials stating that “they don’t want to get involved . . . so there is
no arbiter”.65
Final quality assurance was “primarily done through the interaction between dierentdgs at
both the Inter-Service Steering Groupmeetings and Inter-Service Consultation stage”.66is is
conrmed by dg env ocials who explained that “comments [provided] by other dgs served
as quality assurance”.67 However, the extent to which ‘objective’ assessment was provided was
not clear. According to dg env ocials “directors [those responsible for providing clearance]
cannot assess quality of an ia without going back to their services . . . [whose] views will never
be objective”.68 Quality assurance therefore was arbitrary and based on ensuring the right
individuals were inuenced at the appropriate time.is was not unique to the ‘ematic
Air Strategy’ proposal. Final decisions seemed to have taken the analysis into account, but
were mainly political in nature, as an interview with a member of one of the Commissioner
Cabinets indicated. She stated that in the end “quality control of ias is generally a combination
of dierent procedures, both internal to dg env and as a result of the discussions with other
dgs . . . [with] intense discussions [on this ia/proposal being] about the most appropriate
ambition level”.69 In fact, although the ia was published in September 2005, nal Commission
agreement took some time. e ia was “nalised in May (2005) and submitted for Inter-
61ibid.
62ibid.
63dg env Desk Ocer Support, Interview, Brussels 2006.
64dg env Desk Ocer Lead, Interview, Brussels 2006.
65dg env Desk Ocer Support, Interview, Brussels 2006.
66e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
67dg env Desk Ocer Support, Interview, Brussels 2006.
68ibid.
69dg envMember of Cabinet, Interview, Brussels 2006.
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Service consultation . . . and debated by the Commission in dierent formations”,70 but it took
four months of internal debate before it was published.
AWorldWildlife Fund (wwf) letter sent to President Barroso in July 2005 sheds some light
on why it took several months of Inter-Service Consultation for the Commission to nally
adopt and publish the ‘ematic Air Strategy’ proposal.e letter stated:
“it is now widely reported that the two environmental thematic strategies due
to be presented to the College of Commissioners in July — air quality and ma-
rine protection — have been ocially removed from the agenda and postponed
until an unspecied date. It is further reported that the decision to delay the
presentation and approval of the two strategies is one that has been taken by you
personally”.71
Furthermore, the media reported that:
“several commissioners criticised the costs of seven future thematic strategies
and expressed fears that new legislative action in areas such as air and marine
pollution might undermine Europe’s economic competitiveness in the world”.72
But by September, dg env Commissioner Dimas won the debate, convincing his colleagues
“that the costs of non-action would be higher in the long run”.73e ia, or at least the gures
included in it were used to decide on the nal policy proposal, providing some support for the
idea of enhanced rationalisation, but a stronger indication that the gures and numbers were
used as a means to achieving certain political objectives. In this instance, deciding between
the benets to the environment and society, and the costs to the economy.
The Impact Assessment Report
A review of the report provides only limited insight into the ia process. At the time the ia
was completed, ocials were not provided with a suggested number of pages for the nal
report. With well over 170 pages in length, this report is longer than the others considered
70dg entr Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
71wwf European Policy Oce, Letter to Barroso, Brussels, July/2005.
72EurActiv, “Dimas given green light to present environmental strategies”, Brussels 22 July 2005.
73ibid.
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in this study. However, it follows the structure laid out in the ia Guidelines. In particular,
it provides an executive summary and a description of the problems to be tackled. It also
outlines the objectives to be achieved and sets out ve policy options with dierent ambition
levels (targets).ree options are analysed in detail presenting extensive data on the economic,
social and environmental eects. It also outlines the preferred option and sets out a structure
for future assessment.
Table 17 provides an overview of the extent to which the ia report complied with the key
elements as laid out in the ia Guidelines.
Table 17: Compliance of IA report with IA Guidelines
Section Status
Executive Summary Done
Context/Background Done
Problem Done
Objectives Done
Policy Options Done
Impact Assessment Done
(economic, social and environmental)
Assessment of impacts outside the eu Done
Quantication of impacts Done
Comparison of Options Done
Presentation of preferred options Done
Framework for future assessment Done
e second stage of this ia showed that dg env complied with the ia Guidelines, but that
much of the work was conducted through the cafe programme. dg envmade extensive use of
the results from numerous studies and consultation exercises with external actors. Although
considered useful a number of actors raised concerns that the studies and consultation exercises
where not completed in time for the nal ia. e externalisation of the data collection
contributed to enhanced rationalisation, but as part of the cafe programme, it is not clear the
extent to which the ia was responsible for this. Similarly, there is considerable evidence to
suggest enhanced coordination was at play. With an issg and numerous consultations, dg
env worked hard to coordinate policy across actors both inside and outside the Commission.
Despite the eort, dg env was under pressure to nalise the proposal and nalised the ia
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behind closed doors. Although little evidence was available to determine the level of political
tensionswithin theCommission, interviewees andmedia reports show that the policy proposal
was ercely debated during the Inter-Service Consultation. In particular, the balance between
economic and environmental impacts was the centre of internal Commission debates. With
many dierent political interests, the policy was highly politicised.e ia certainly played
a role, if maybe not a prominent one, in the attempt on the part of dg entr and dg env to
control or ‘stack the deck’ in favour of their respective policy preference.
4 Stage III — Inter-Institutional Bargaining
is section shows that the ia played a minor role during the debate on theematic Air
Strategy, as it was a “blue-print for further action, and would therefore not of itself give
rise to any costs or benets”.74 Instead, it mapped out action for “further, more specic
Commission proposals”,75 which were of greater interests to the European Parliament and
Council. Nevertheless, there is evidence of all three theoretical considerations, in particularly
that the Council, or at least the uk presidency, used the ia to increase the rationalisation of the
policy process. However, there is also evidence that the ia was used as a means for furthering
two diering political positions: one supported by those actors who supported stringent
environmental targets with clear European rules; and those who were more concerned with
economic considerations and were looking for Member States to be given the exibility in
achieving any targets.
eematic Air Strategy was part of a wider legislative package, which included the
Directive on ‘Ambient Air Quality and Cleaner Air for Europe’. Although the Directive is not
the focus of this case study, it is worth briey reviewing the Directive’s legislative story as an
indication of the level of disagreement.e Ambient Air Quality and Cleaner Air for Europe
proposal was met with such controversy, that the European Parliament undertook its own ia
in September 2006. Based on this ia, the European Parliament voted to give Member States
more exibility to comply with the proposed limit values. To support this amendment, the ia
found that “in order to reach an equitable implementation of the limit values, dierences in
74e United Kingdom, Parliament Select Committee on European Scrutiny 16th Report, December 2005.
75ibid.
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measurement strategies and methods between Member States needed special attention”.76e
European Parliament argued that it was necessary to provide more exibility to mitigate the
dierences across between Member States in the European Union.
In October 2006 the Council reached a dierent conclusion. In a political agreement the
Member States decided to “tighten the limit value for Particle Matters (pm 2.5), making them
legally binding instead of just indicative. However, the Council also allowed Member States
more time, leaving three more years to reach the proposed limit values”.77 Over a 12-month
period, the European Parliament, Council and Commission held a number of meetings and
by June 2007 the Council formalised an agreement, which by December of 2007 resulted in
an agreed package of compromised amendments with the European Parliament. Finally in
June 2008 the ‘Air Quality Directive’ was adopted.
According to media reports the cost resulting from the actions outlined in the ‘ematic
Air Strategy’ was around 7.1 billion Euros per annum until 2020. However, as explained by dg
env Commissioner Dimas at the time, “the related health benets — fewer premature deaths,
less sickness, fewer hospital admissions, improved labour productivity etc. — would be worth
at least e42 billion per year”,78 ve times as much as the costs.e European Parliament and
Council spent signicant time discussing and negotiating the levels of ambition, using, in part
the evidence contained in the ia. However, except for the European Parliament’s 2006 ia, no
further ias were conducted, although the Commission did publish further up-dates on cafe.
In the end, the Strategy and accompanying Directive were viewed as compromises, much to
the disappointment of environmental groups, which criticized the ‘ematic Air Strategy’
for being “far too weak”79 and not going far enough in improving air quality.e European
Environmental Bureau was especially critical of the lack of legal obligation and that “only an
indicative target was being set”.80 Others thought the proposals were the “lowest-common-
denominator”.81
76Institute for European Environmental Policy, Assessment of the Environmental impact of Parliament’s amended
proposal,e Netherlands 2006.
77EurActiv, eu Clean Air Strategy, Brussels 26 June 2008.
78ibid.
79ibid.
80ibid.
81ibid.
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The Impact Assessment in the European Parliament
e European Parliament’s Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety
considered theematic Air Strategy. According to a member of the Committee, the ia was
“very good [and the Committee] made a lot of use of it . . . [although] it was very dicult to
understand”.82e interviewee also reported that the Rapporteur and shadow Rapporteurs
read the ia, at least in a summarised form. Because the report was over 170 pages, summaries
were important with some suggestions that some type of “Q&A type summary would have
been helpful to get more meps [of the Committee] informed and interested”.83 For those
who did read the ia, it was deemed “helpful in that it made the Commission’s thinking
more transparent, and provided valuable information on the scientic basis for the political
decisions,”84 which were oen debated during the Committee’s discussions.
e Committee’s report made a number of references to the ia. However, although “the
Commission’s ia was thorough and took both Better Regulation and the Sustainable Devel-
opment Strategy into account”,85 the Committee thought the ia was too rigid, not providing
enough exibility between various scenarios. Although interviewees suggested the ia was
useful for understanding the proposal, but because “[it was] not legislative, the European
Commission did not have to act on the ep resolution”.86is meant the European Parliament
did not spend much time debating the proposal. Rather, more eort was put into debating
and negotiating the Ambient Air Directive.
is section showed that although the iawas acknowledged and played a role, theematic
Air Strategy was not the main battleground. Eorts focused on the legal instrument — the
Directive on Ambient Air Quality — instead. Although the European Parliament undertook
its own ia, this was not for theematic Air Strategy. Rather, it underpinned the changes
made to the Ambient Air Quality Directive. Nevertheless, although the ia was not examined
in great detail, the options and headline gures were the basis for debates. is supports
the ideas of enhanced rationalisation and coordination. But, as with the previous case study,
82e European Parliament Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety Rapporteur, Interview,
Brussels 2006.
83ibid.
84ibid.
85e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
86e European Parliament Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety Rapporteur, Interview,
Brussels 2006.
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policy preferences were of paramount importance to the European Parliament, using key
gures and the ia as a driver to control and ensure its policy preference.
The Impact Assessment in Council
Council representatives, in particular from the uk, were positive about the ia. For example,
one interviewee involved in negotiations stated that “it was a good ia, and dg env should
be proud of the work put into it,”87 even going so far as to say that it was “a model ia for
other dgs to use”.88 e interviewee also suggested “credit go to iiasa, unece, because of
the preparatory work they had done over many years”.89 e extensive preliminary work
undertaken as part of cafe was important for members of the Council. In their opinion
this made the ia comprehensive, transparent, with the result of a nal report which included
reliable analysis and data. One Council interviewee pointed out that as comprehensive as the
preliminary work was, the Commission would not be able to “do this every day and on all
proposals”.90 Overall, members of the Council agreed that theematic Air Strategy was a
direct output of the analytical work undertaken under cafe and the analysis conducted for
and included in the ia.
Holding the European Council’s presidency, the ukwas particularly interested in promoting
the use of ias. It had expected the proposal earlier in the year, but “because of the delay, had
little time to devote to it”.91 Nevertheless the ukmade better regulation a priority and built
it into the Council’s working agenda.e presidency asked “everyone at Council to actually
look and think about the quality, scope, etc. to discuss it [ia and proposal] and make the ec
accountable”.92 To make this happen, the uk set time aside during Council proceedings for
delegations “to prepare for a discussion of the impact assessment itself ”.93e uk’s ambition
was to highlight the better regulation agenda and to ensure the Council took the ia into
account.eematic Air Strategy was seen as a particularly important proposal because the
economic cost gures were large and so the Council Working Group was asked to carefully
87Council of the European Union uk Attaché, Interview, Brussels 2006.
88ibid.
89Council of the European Union nl Attaché, Interview, Phone 2006.
90Council of the European Union aus Attaché, Interview, Phone 2006.
91Council of the European Union uk Attaché, Interview, Brussels 2006.
92ibid.
93ibid.
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consider the potential impacts of the proposal. To facilitate this, the uk sent the Member State
delegations questionnaires in advance of meetings to encourage discussions and invited the
European Commission to present their analysis.e result was a note to coreper providing
an overview of Council opinions regarding the ia, although it was not discussed in “Council
because it [the note] was only in English”.94
To encourage the use of ias by future presidencies, theuk produced a handbook forWorking
Group chairs and “worked closely with the Austrians” (the upcoming presidency) to develop
one.95e intention was to “turn the handbook into a Council document”96 to ensure future
presidencies would start debates by discussing the ia. However, theematic Air Strategy
debate “revealed that ias are seen very dierently in dierent Member States”97 (for example
some see ia as a means for rationalisation, some for justication and some do not use ia at
all).erefore, due to “a lot of resistance to creating a separate process for ia”98 it was very
dicult to institutionalise the new process.is was, in part, because the Council Secretariat
did not “have capacity to facilitate these discussions”.99 Also, Working Group discussions were
made up of attachés that did “not have a background of ias”100 and it was dicult to avoid
political discussions.e uk was frustrated by the experience as explained by an interviewee
who stated that there might be a greater chance of using ias for “more technical discussion
on other [less politically sensitive] dossiers”.101 is sentiment was shared by the Austrian
representative who stated that “delegations had largely made their political points and ignored
the methodological questions the uk had posed.”102 e Austrian representative believed
it was important “not to overestimate the inuence of an ia— [as it] will not override any
political preferences.”103
In summary, the uk Presidency tried to incorporate the use of ias into the Council negoti-
ations, in part to follow the better regulation agenda and therefore to full the obligations
under the 2004 Inter-Institutional Agreement on Better Law-making. In doing so, there was
94ibid.
95ibid.
96ibid.
97ibid.
98ibid.
99ibid.
100ibid.
101ibid.
102Council of the European Union aus Attaché, Interview, Phone 2006.
103ibid.
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an intention to enhance the rationalisation of the policy process. However, Member State
representatives focused primarily on their own policy preferences (or political objectives). As
a consequence, the uk focused the discussion on the costs and benets of the proposal, in
particular economic costs.rough this, the ia was used to inuence and control the debate.
Interviewees agreed that the ia served a number of purposes. On the one hand to “frame the
parameters of the negotiation . . . [by using] the ia to narrow down the options, which meant
that no-one would argue for a scenario outside of the three [scenarios] examined”. On the
other hand, it was “the process of producing it [ia], which forced the Commission to do its
homework in a transparent way and in consultation with relevant stakeholders”,104 allowing
the Council to hold it to account (or classic procedural control).
Perceptions of the Impact Assessment Report
According to interviews with actors not directly involved in the European Parliament and
Council discussions the ia was balanced in its considerations of the issues. In particular, inter-
viewees agreed that although the economic calculations were “based on historic data [which]
nearly always exaggerated costs . . . therefore creating problems when level of ambitions are
motivated by cba”,105 the data presented was impressive. Interviewees also explained that
in their opinions, the examined options were appropriate because they were “selected based
on test runs of the rainsmodel, and on discussions in the Target Setting and Policy Assess-
ment Working Group (comprising of the Commission, Member States, Industry, ngos, the
European Environment Agency and the jrc)”.106 However, interviewees felt strongly that the
selection of the nal options “ultimately come down to ‘gut feeling’ as to which problems were
most important, which ambition levels should be analysed”.107 e nal decision was political
in nature, as there were “fundamental dierences between scientic schools on approaches
for monetisation of health eects”.108
In summary, the third ia stage showed that the Commission was heavily criticised for its
proposal. Criticism focused on the nal targets, highlighting the tension between environmen-
104e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
105eeb— Swedish National Representative, Interview, Brussels 2006.
106e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
107ibid.
108ibid.
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tal protection and economic considerations. Environmental groups in particular suggested
the target was not ambitious enough. In an interview Commissioner Dimas admitted “it
was a compromise. We had to further decrease our level of ambition, but tried very hard to
bring the benets to the fore in the discussion [with fellow Commissioners]”.109 Media reports
suggested that the better regulation agenda and the Lisbon Strategy for employment and
growth had limited Dimas’ ability to put forward environmental legislation, mainly because
economic considerations took precedent. In a response to this suggestion, Commissioner
Dimas explained that “the purpose of an impact assessment [is to] look at all three dimensions
[economic, social and environmental] . . . a good impact assessment considers all the costs and
benets.” However, clearly dg env spent time thinking about how to develop mechanisms to
counter the ‘economic’ arguments. Dimas went on to explain that:
“if the destruction to the environment has to be undone in ve years, this will
require greater levels of investment. It is dicult to estimate in monetary terms,
but it is possible.ere are means that have been developed in order to calculate
what the cost will be — and the impact assessments we have initiated up until
now have successfully achieved this”.110
e Commission wanted to use the ia to achieve its policy preferences of ambitious envi-
ronmental targets, as made evident through the use of cafe. In doing so, dg env used the
ia to enhance the rationalisation of the process to support its policy preference. Equally, in
Council the uk tried to encourage debate based on the ia, providing further support for the
notion of enhanced rationalisation in Council. However, neither the European Parliament
nor the Council undertook an ia on this proposal itself and as a non-legislative instrument;
it received less attention than the accompanying Ambient Air Quality Directive. Polarised
policy preferences (or political interests) overshadowed the processes and as a result, the ia
played a minor role, although gures were used extensively.e fact that numerous actors
were aware of both the gures from cafe and the ia supports the idea of coordination, but
provides greater support to the idea of enhanced control.
109EurActiv, Dimas given green light to present environmental strategies, Brussels 22 July 2005.
110EurActiv, Interview with Environment Commissioner Stavros Dimas, Brussels 5 May 2005.
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5 Conclusion
dg env, the European Parliament and Council followed the ia blueprint in developing the
ematic Air Strategy ia. However, like with dg entr’s Pre-Packed Products, this was against
the backdrop of work mandated by the European Parliament and Council (i.e. dg env’s work
towards the sixth eap).e cafe programme was established to provide the analytical and
data needed to develop the sixth eap. Although cafe was not formally part of the ia process,
it was the main driver behind the ia. While the consideration of environmental impacts was
a long standing practice in dg env, the new ia system required dg env to place a greater
focus on social and economic considerations.erefore, with strong support from both the
European Parliament and Council, dg env’s initial ia work was about coordinating various
views and opinions, but also enhancing the scientic basis for new stringent environmental
targets. Over time, dg env sought to use the ia and cafe to counter the economic argument
for less ambitious environmental protection levels.
is case study showed a variation in the three ia ambitions across the policy-making
process. During the rst ia stage, dg env followed the steps outlined in the ia Guidelines,
but overshadowed by the cafe programme. Most of the engagement with key actors and the
data collection was undertaken through cafe not the ia.e ia process therefore played a
minor role at the initial stage, as all the major policy decisions, such as whether to develop the
programme, were already taken. cafe essentially played the role of an extended roadmap,
providing the framework the Commission used to coordinate various positions. Similar to dg
entr’s Pre-Packed Products proposal, this ia was an add-on to the policies already underway,
although one Council representative did agree that the roadmap served to better understand
dg env’s policy plans.
cafe also played a signicant role during the second stage of this ia. Again, dg env followed
the iaGuidelines, delivering a nal report that ticked all the boxes. However, although external
actors viewed cafe as an open and inclusive process whereby dg env collected evidence
and completed studies in a transparent fashion, external actors also felt that the draing
of the nal ia was done behind doors and did not reect cafe ndings. According to dg
env ocials, the ia draing was a core element of the ia process but did not need external
input.e nal ia draing was plagued by considerable internal discussions evident by a four
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months Inter-Service Consultation period. During this time, dg env spent considerable time
defending the merits of ambitious targets against actors who highlighted the economic costs.
While cafe played a key role in enhancing the coordination and rationalisation of the policy
process and the ia, the gures contained in the document played a key role in dg entr and
dg env’s attempt to inuence the nal policy outcome in favour of their respective policy
preferences.
e case study showed that this ia played a more prominent role during the nal stage.
While the uk presidency attempted to use the ia to enhance the rationalisation of Council
discussions, the Council debates also support the idea that the uk used the ia to frame
the debate around the economic costs (therefore seeking to ‘stack the deck’). Although the
European Parliament conducted its own ia, this was focused on the accompanying Directive,
not theematic Air Strategy itself. is showed that both the European Parliament and
Council were more concerned about the details outlined in the Ambient Air Quality Directive,
not the broad policy directions outlined in theematic Air Strategy. Perhaps surprisingly,
the Commission ia played a role in coordinating other actors, such as environmental groups
and also provided the basis for questioning the Commission’s nal position.
Table 18 provides a summary of this case study’s ndings, showing the changes in theoretical
consideration across the three ia stages.e next case study will examine a proposal, which
was equally controversial with the battle-lines not mainly drawn inside the Commission,
rather between two groups of Member States in support of liberalisation and another against.
Table 18: IA as a tool for rationalisation, control or coordination
Policy Stage /eoretical Consideration Stage i Stage ii Stage iii
Enhanced Rationalisation No Yes Yes
Enhanced Coordination Some Yes Some
Enhanced Control No Yes Yes
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VII Case Study 3: Postal Services
is case study explores an impact assessment (ia) developed by Directorate General for
the Internal Market and Services (dg markt). Entitled the Postal Directive it is the third
in a series of Directives planned to liberalise the market. An examination of this legislative
proposal provides further insight into the role of the three ia ambitions in the development
of proposals where policy preferences are polarised. In this case study, the diering policy
preferences were between a number of Member States focused on the liberalisation of the
Postal Services market and others who were concerned about future job losses.
e initial policy idea for the Directive went back over 10 years, providing an important
backdrop to the third Postal Directive. Although the European Commission’s ia process
was introduced in 2003, the European Commission’s policy in this area was underpinned
by numerous on-going studies and market assessments.ese were intended to encourage
market liberalisation and political ‘buy-in’ from the European Council, the Member States
and the European Parliament. Although there was agreement across the eu to build a single
market, there was resistance in the area of postal services, based on public concerns about
guaranteed service and job losses through the privatisation of mostly state-owned service
providers. With the adoption of the rst Postal Directive1 in 1997, the European Commission
provided an overall framework for the harmonisation of eu postal services. In 2002 the second
Postal Directive2 established the rst steps in gradually opening up the market to competition.
e latest Directive was intended to achieve full liberalisation of postal services across the
European Union.
1e European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Directive 97/67/ec of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 15 December 1997 on common rules for the development of the internal market of Community
postal services and the improvement of quality of service, (ojec (97/67/ec)).
2e European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Directive 2002/39/ec of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 10 June 2002 amending Directive 97/67/ec with regard to the further opening to competition
of Community postal services, (ojec (2002/39/ec)).
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In light of this context, this case study traces the extent to which the ia was used and its
inuence at each of the three ia stages. With clear, yet diverging, policy preferences on the
part of dierent decision-makers, this case study provides insights into the extent to which
the ia was used as a mechanism for enhanced control, in particular ‘stacking the deck’. With
potentially signicant economic and social impacts, this case study also explores the extent to
which ia enhanced the rationalisation of the policy process. Finally, taking into account the
dierent interests of decision-makers across the eu, this case study also explores how the ia
was a tool to reduce conict and improve the coordination of actors.
1 Background
is section provides an overview of the background and context in which the third Postal
Directive was developed, highlighting the 15-year strategy to liberalise postal services in the
European Union.e origins go back to 1992 when the Commission published a Green Paper3
on the creation of a singlemarket for postal services, mapping out a course for a new regulatory
framework to complete the single market. Acknowledging this would be a gradual process, the
Green Paper set out a process by which the postal sector would be liberalised over time.e
objective was to achieve “ecient, reliable and good-quality postal services throughout the
European Union for all its citizens at aordable prices”.4 Although the European Parliament
and the Council endorsed the original intention, liberalisation was only going to be possible
through a series of Directives, to open the market and safeguard the quality of service and
price structures.
In response to the Green Paper, the European Parliament adopted a resolution supporting
the creation of a single market for postal services. However, the resolution also highlighted
the need to ensure the liberalisation was gradual and controlled, calling on the Commission to
ensure any liberalisation would protect the rights of citizens to universal service provisions.5
3Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on the development of the single market for postal
services, com/91/476.
4e European Commission, eu Single Market — eu Postal Legislation, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
post/legislation_en.htm (April 2010).
5e European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, Directive 97/67/ec Of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 1997 on common rules for the development of the internal market of
Community postal services and the improvement of quality of service,
ojec (C 42, 15. 2. 1993).
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Soon aer the endorsement, the Commission consulted on a number of options by publishing
Guidelines for the development of the market for postal services. Endorsed in 1994 by the
European Council,6 the Commission also received an ocial mandate to dra the rst of three
Directives to create a “single market” while at the same time ensuring “universal service”.7 A
provision of this endorsement included a call on the Commission to provide regular up-dates
on the postal services market.
With a clear political mandate, the Commission presented the rst out of three Directives.
In it, the Commission put forward proposals on the joint rules for developing a single postal
services market. Reactions to the proposal were mixed, with a number of Members of the
European Parliament questioning the degree and speed of liberalisation. e result was a
two-year negotiation period between the European Parliament and Council, which led to
a number of amendments to the original proposal and the eventual enactment of the 1997
Postal Directive.8 e agreed Directive included a number of important elements, such as
the provision of a universal postal service within the eu (i.e. good quality postal services at
aordable prices for all users/citizens), the criteria of the reserved area for suppliers (i.e. state
funding for suppliers who deliver postal items of less than 350 grams in weight or in other
words letters), the creation of independent national regulators and the overall objective of
harmonisation and liberalising postal services in the eu.9
e Directive also established a number of quantitative objectives for improving the quality
of postal-delivery (e.g. stating that 85% of post would in future be delivered within 3 days) and
set out a rough timeline by which the market would ultimately be liberalised.e timeline
was to be based on progressive stages, opening up specic elements of the market at dierent
times (i.e. according to weight and taris of the postal items).e rst milestone was set for
1999, at which time Member States were required to implement an initial reduction of the
reserved area, the area reserved for the national providers of universal postal services, which
6Council of the European Union, Resolution 94/C 48/02 of 7 February 1994 on the development of Community
postal services, (94/C 48/02).
7Eurosig.eu, Postal services: a key aspect of economic, social and territorial cohesion, http://www.eurosig.eu/
article105.html (April 2010).
8e European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Directive 97/67/ec of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 15 December 1997 on common rules for the development of the internal market of Community
postal services and the improvement of quality of service, op. cit.
9Eurosig.eu, Postal services: a key aspect of economic, social and territorial cohesion, op. cit.
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in many Member States was a national entity.is move would allow private sector providers
to enter the market for post outside the reserved area (e.g. packaged delivery).
Although the European Parliament and Council endorsed the Directive, a number of Mem-
ber States were reluctant to allow private sector companies to enter the market.is reluctance
was because many postal service providers were national entities. To facilitate the gradual
reduction of the ‘reserve area’ the Commission published a Communication in 1998 on the
extent to which Member States could support their national providers.e Communication
also provided an “interpretation of the relevant Treaty provisions and the guiding principles
according to which the Commission intended to apply the competition rules”.10 In doing
so, the Communication highlighted the work Member States were undertaking toward the
implementation of the rst milestone, and kicked o work on the second Postal Directive.
Following the 1998 Communication, the Commission put forward its proposal for the
second Postal Directive in 2000. is proposal amended the rst Directive by requiring
additional decreases in weight and tari limits and reductions in the reserved area. Once
again, the European Parliament and Council raised concerns about the speed and extent of
liberalisation, taking two years of negotiation to reach an agreement on the second Postal
Directive.11 Setting out further steps for the “gradual and controlled market opening and
further limiting the services sectors that can be protected from competition,”12 the nal
proposal mandated the Commission to assess “the impact of liberalisation on universal
service of full market opening in 2009”.13is assessment was to be undertaken by 2006 and
completed for each Member State. Based on the results, the Commission would be invited
to “submit, by 31 December 2006, a report to the European Parliament and the Council
accompanied by a proposal (i.e. the third Postal Directive) conrming, if appropriate, the
date of 2009 for the full accomplishment of the postal internal market.”14 is meant that
10Commission of the European Communities, Notice from the Commission on the application of the competition
rules to the postal sector and on the assessment of certain State measures relating to postal services, (98/C 39/02).
11e European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Directive 2002/39/ec of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 10 June 2002 amending Directive 97/67/ec with regard to the further opening to competition
of Community postal services, op. cit.
12Single Market News, Delivering the Internal Market: A new postal Directive and a rst Report, http://ec.europa.
eu/internal_market/smn/smn30/a27_en.htm (May 2010).
13e European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Directive 2002/39/ec of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 10 June 2002 amending Directive 97/67/ec with regard to the further opening to competition
of Community postal services, (ojec (2002/39/ec)).
14ibid.
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if the evidence did not support the liberalisation of the postal internal market by 2009, the
Commission would need to provide further proposals.
e agreement on the second Postal Directive laid the foundation for the Commission
to start work on the third Directive, which included an assessment of the postal markets
of the Union’s members. As the rst and second Directives were developed well before the
Commission had introduced the ia system, none were undertaken. However, for the third
Directive, the Commission was required to both undertake an in-depth market study as well
as an ia.
is background section illustrated that this policy was not developed in isolation. Rather,
it was based on 15 years of policy development with broad political support to liberalise the
postal services market from the Council and the European Parliament. However, the support
was conditional as Member States and the European Parliament were concerned about the
speed and extent ofmarket liberalisation. Both the European Parliament and Council asked for
evidence before full liberalisation would be agreed, providing an indication of the challenges
and polarisation of policy preferences.
Figure 21 provides a visual overview of the history behind the third Postal Services Directive.
Figure 21: Background to the liberalisation of the EU Postal Services
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2 Stage I — Inception of the Impact Assessment
is section traces the rst ia stage, building on the background provided in the previous
section, showing that because the Commission had a mandate to act, the ia played a role in
determining ‘how’ theDirective would be implemented rather than ‘whether’. From theoretical
consideration of enhanced rationalisation, the expectation is that the Commission uses this
stage to establish an understanding of the policy challenge and develop a base-line from
which to develop the parameters of the new Postal Directive. From the enhanced control
perspective, the ia blueprint set out the expectation that the Commission uses this stage as a
means to set the agenda and to reduce political reservations later on in the process. From an
enhanced coordination perspective the ia should assist in bringing actors from across the
postal services industry together to nd an agreed policy proposal. e following section
will show that signicant amount of work was conducted before dg markt started the ia.
is work provided a means for coordinating various interests and to set the policy direction.
However, the following also shows that this ia stage started aer signicant preparatory work
as part of the second Postal Services Directive.
As outlined in the previous section, work to liberalise postal services in Europe did not
start with this ia. It began in the mid-1990s, with two Directives. As a result of negotiations
with the European Parliament and Council, the second postal Directive detailed the need for
a third Directive and called on the Commission to undertake a detailed market study before
presenting newproposals. Consequently, actors both in and outside theCommissionwere fully
aware of the intention to liberalise the postal market, and the requirement to assess the future
impact of the third Postal Directive. However, the Commission’s 2006 Legislative and Work
Programme announced an intention to present a proposal to “progress the accomplishment
of the internal market for postal services while ensuring the provision of universal postal
services for all users, irrespective of their location in the Union”.15
dg markt also published a roadmap which covered all the necessary elements called for by
the iaGuidelines.is included the policy background, an overview of the policy problem, the
policy objectives and potential economic impacts. In particular, the roadmap acknowledges
15Commission of the European Committees, Commission Legislative and Work Programme 2006, com(2005)
531 nal.
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that, although the previous Directives had resulted in signicant changes to the industry, a
number of challenges remained.e roadmap stated that the:
“conditions of greater competition [remained] uneven across Member States (ms)
. . . [as] the speed of adaptation may have been signicantly inuenced by the
level of competitive or regulatory pressure in ms . . . [resulting in] a risk that full
market opening in 2009 may have dierent nancial impacts across ms postal
services, and hence the continued provision of the Universal Service”.16
e roadmap also proposed a number of specic options, including non-action, but went on
to build a strong case for continued Community action to:
“facilitate market entry /exit; greater choice for large mailers through increased
competition; downward pricing pressure in competitive segments to reduce
operating costs for enterprise etc.”17
Responding to a concern raised by Member States during the negotiations of the previous
Directives, the roadmap acknowledges potential job losses, but dismisses this consequence
stating this would be “oset by new jobs created by market entrants”.18 In addition to the
identication of the policy problem and a blueprint for continued action, the roadmap also
provided an indication of anticipated consultations with external actors, the commissioning
of contractors and the expected data to be used for analysis.19
Although the roadmap complied with the ia Guidelines, it included a timeline which
did not provide sucient time for the planned work. For example, it outlined dg markt’s
intention to undertake a consultation exercise with external actors in late 2005, the same
time-period the roadmap was published. It also explained that the ia was going to build on
“already available [data provided] by recently completed studies” and data which had already
been commissioned “through the external study ‘Main developments in the European postal
sector 2004–2006’ ”.20
In fact, the roadmap was published a year before the proposal was completed. is was
well aer the data collection started and long aer the second Postal Directive indicated dg
16Directorate General Internal Market, Roadmap: Proposal on Postal Services, (2006/markt/006).
17ibid.
18ibid.
19ibid.
20ibid.
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markt’s intention to develop the legislative proposal.e roadmap therefore did not mark the
start of the policy process; it was merely an informational exercise. Considering the timing,
the roadmap would therefore not have provided greater coordination, analysis or a means for
the European Parliament and Council to review progress.
A key element of the 2002 Directive called on the Commission to:
“keep the European Parliament and the Council informed about the development
of the Internal Market for postal services . . . [and required] the Commission
to submit, every two years, a report on the application of the Postal Directive
including the appropriate information about developments in the sector, as well
as about the quality of service”.21
erefore, in practice, this ia started in 2002, as the Commission, submitted its rst report
to the European Parliament and the Council in November 2002. e report provided “an
analysis of the transposition of the Directive in the Member States and included the results
of several sectoral studies undertaken by the Commission.”22e studies indicated that the
application of the Directive would have a positive impact. Two years later the Commission
published another report, which provided a further up-date on the implementation of the
Directive and progress towards liberalising the postal services market.is report highlighted
the Commission’s intention to:
“open as soon as possible the debate on the future of postal policies to a wide
audience, including all stakeholders (public and private operators, customers, con-
sumer associations, social partners, National Regulating Authorities, Ministries,
experts, academics, and industry) at national level as well as at eu level”.23
e 2004 report also announced that the Commission was going to launch two further studies:
“on the development of competition and the evolution of the regulatory model
for European postal services . . . with stakeholders being invited to participate in
21Single Market News, Delivering the Internal Market: A new postal Directive and a rst Report, http://ec.europa.
eu/internal_market/smn/smn30/a27_en.htm (May 2010).
22Commission of the European Communities, 1st Commission Report to the European Parliament and the Council
on the application of the Postal Directive, (com/2002/632).
23Commission of the European Communities, 2nd Commission Report to the European Parliament and the
Council on the application of the Postal Directive, (com/2005/102).
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two workshops to comment on the progress of the two studies and to provide
feedback to the Commission on the conclusions of the consultants”.24
Since the 1997 Directive the Commission intended to use a legal instrument to complete the
liberalisation of the market. is meant that those actors involved in the policy were long
aware of the work (including running external consultations and hiring contractors to collect
data and do the analysis) the Commission intended to undertake.e roadmap conrmed
this, stating that “the scope and timing for the external Prospective Study in 2006 had been
set to enable a strong linkage with the ia.”25
is shows that much of the iawork started long before the roadmap was published, namely
at the time of second Postal Directive.e secondDirective set out the Communities intention
to develop an additional Directive, underpinned by a number of market studies (information
which would be expected in a roadmap). According to policymakers in dg markt, the
“roadmap was developed very early, before they knew what they were doing . . . [this was
because the] Annual Management Cycle had forced them to produce a roadmap”.26 Also,
because the roadmap asked for a mixture of things, it was “very general” and in eect consisted
of a “tick box lling exercise”.27 Ocials in dg markt reported that they had known as far
back as “2002 that they had to produce something by 2006”.28is included the knowledge
that “they had to do the ia”29 and “commission various studies”.30 e roadmap therefore
played a minor role in the development of the Directive.
e marginal role the roadmap played did not reect the internal challenges dg markt
has faced in developing its proposal. According to dg markt, the commissioning of studies
throughout 2002 and 2005 were not free of interests from across the Commission. dg markt
ocials reported that the “Terms of Reference for the studies were a compromise”31 between
dierent policy preferences within the Commission. One ocial stated that “there were people
[inside the Commission] who were competing (wanted dierent things out of the study)”.32
24ibid.
25Directorate General Internal Market, Roadmap: Proposal on Postal Services, (2006/markt/006).
26dg markt Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
27ibid.
28ibid.
29ibid.
30ibid.
31ibid.
32ibid.
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Although dg markt ocials did not explain what these preferences were, the dierences in
opinion were likely between dg sanco, representing the consumers and employees of Europe,
dg entr representing the preferences or interests of business, and dg markt seeking to open
up the market. By the time the second Directive was agreed, it became clear that Member
States would need to reform their national postal providers, potentially resulting in signicant
job losses. Inuencing the Terms of Reference for the studies and therefore the evidence
supporting the future Directive would be a means to use the ia in order to ‘stack the deck’.
Policymakers in other parts of the Commission hadmixed views on the role of the roadmap.
Ocials in dg entr, for example, stated that the roadmap was “an excellent tool to know
what markt was going to do and to see what was going on.”33 A policymaker from dg sanco
agreed that the “roadmap in the clwp was useful”34 but reported that it would have been
helpful to be “involved before that”35 period, particularly because dg markt “started [work]
more than a year before the proposal”36 was developed. An apparent explanation for this
was that the Postal Directive proposal was “very political . . . and it had not been easy for the
lead dg to implement the [ia] Guidelines”.37is supports the assumption that negotiations
were on-going inside the Commission, presumably around the commissioning of the studies,
which were of greater importance than the publication of the roadmap.
Among actors external to the Commission, few provided views on the usefulness of the
roadmap. One Member State representative in the Council reported that their country’s
ocials were not clear about how the preparatory studies were “going to be used for this impact
assessment”.38 In the view of the interviewee, the process was not transparent; explaining that
it was not possible to get “feedback from the [external] studies”,39 which made it dicult to
engage in the process. Most actors heard about the development of the newDirective when the
second Directive was enacted and were concerned with the market studies the Commission
undertook in preparation.
33dg entr Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
34dg sanco Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
35ibid.
36ibid.
37ibid.
38Representative from Portugal, Interview, Phone 2007.
39ibid.
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e ndings outlined in this section showed that the roadmap may have marked the
beginning of the ocial ia, but did not mark the beginning of the policy proposal. is
mirrors similar ndings from other case studies, such as the Airematic Strategy. Although
dg markt did not consider the preparatory work as part of the ia, a number of interviewees
did. From dg markt’s perspective, the ia was a mechanism to bring the various arguments
and ideas together in preparation for the nal legislative proposal.is provides some evidence
for the consideration of enhanced coordination; however, the ‘stacking of the deck’ was a
strong theme during this stage, with diering policy preferences exerting their inuence
on the ia process. Although the draing and publication of a roadmap fullled the criteria
set out in the ia blueprint, this was a ‘box ticking’ exercise, with the ambition of enhanced
rationalisation clearly supporting the ambition of staking the process in favour of dg markt’s
policy preference.
3 Stage II — Development of the Impact Assessment
is section traces the extent to which key actors participated in the development of the ia
report, the process of quality assurance, and whether the nal ia report complied with the ia
blueprint. Before examining the ia process, this section builds on the background section, by
assessing the preparatory work dg markt undertook ahead of the ia.
As outlined in the previous section, dgmarkt identied the policy problem back in themid-
1990s.40 Along theway, dgmarkt, with the Parliament andCouncil’s support, determined that
the preferred policy tool would be the use of Directives.e ia therefore focused on enhanced
rationalisation and coordination within the connes of draing the Directive. Furthermore,
as the policy preferences within the Commission diered — particularly between those who
were concerned about the social aspects, such as job losses and those who were in support of
opening the market to industry — the ia process was an opportunity to control and inuence
the policy development in support of dg markt’s policy preference and counter other actors
inside the Commission.
40e European Parliament, Resolution on Green Paper on the development of the single market for postal services,
ojec (C 42, 15. 2. 1993).
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By the time the third Postal Directive ia was completed, dg markt commissioned over
20 studies, covering various aspects of the postal services market. Most of the studies were
completed before the ia started. In total a half dozen studies were conducted including: one
on the main developments in the sector over the period of 2002–2004; the economics of
postal services; the main developments for the period of 2005–2006; regulatory models; the
development of competition; and on the impact of the universal service on the full liberalisation
of the internal market. In the rst instance, these studies were designed to contribute to the
Commission’s bi-annual update to the European Parliament and Council, as stipulated in the
2002 Directive. Ultimately, these studies fed into the ia and proposal itself.
According to policymakers in dg markt there were two types of external expertise: an
“ex-post [element]41 on what was going on in the sector”42 and a “forward looking one”43 about
the impact of liberalising the postal services market.44 All of the studies were undertaken by
external contractors “because of resource issues . . . and the need to have an ‘independent’
third party contractor working on specic issues to ensure impartiality and independence
of data”.45 Although there was support for completing the Internal Market, the postal sector
had traditionally been publicly owned and its liberalisation presented a big political challenge.
Liberalisation of themarket was likely to result in signicant changes in the working conditions
and therefore job losses.
Although the studies were intended to support dg markt’s policy development, by provid-
ing independent advice, the studies posed a number of challenges. First, as indicated in the
previous section, agreeing the terms of reference (ToR) for the various studies was dicult.
Various interests, both inside and outside the Commission came into play, with those looking
for studies to show the social impact and others looking for the studies to show the benets
to consumers.e draing of the ToRs therefore resulted in “a compromise”46 because, as
conrmed by an interviewee, dierent “people were competing internally [Commission]”.47
41wik Consult, Study on the evolution of the regulatory model for European postal services, 2005.
42dg markt Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
43ibid.
44PicewaterhouseCoopers,e impact on Universal service of the full market accomplishment of the postal internal
market in 2009, 2006.
45e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
46dg markt Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
47ibid.
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e discussions about the ToRs indicate a limitation to the extent to which the studies
contributed to the idea of enhanced rationalisation.is was conrmed by a policymaker
in dg markt who believed that the contractors clearly understood the political sensitivities
and delivered a “politically clever [report]” which did “not make too many black and white
statements”.48 Instead the study provided high-level results which made “life harder”49 for dg
markt.e result was that many of the studies could not be translated into clear and denite
policy proposals. Despite this, it would be wrong to underestimate the value of the various
studies. Compared to a number of other ias, the Commission spent a signicant amount of
time and resources conducting the studies. Furthermore, according to an interviewee the
studies “did help focus the available policy options, therefore pre-empting and driving some
of the ia work”.50
Due to the polarised policy preferences, dg markt invested a lot of resources and time in
developing this proposal. Although the studies were commissioned before dgmarkt ocially
started work on the ia, they provided the basis for the ia and the proposal.e data collection
was therefore outside the framework of the ia, which does not match the ideal ia process
laid out in the ia blueprint. However, this proposal was the latest iteration of a multi-year
process to liberalise the postal services market, reecting the ndings from other case studies,
whereby stage ii was about collating the available evidence.
Table 19 provides an indication of the level of resources and complexity of collecting
information. All of these studies ultimately fed into the updates the Commission was required
to provide to the European Parliament and Council outlining the developments and challenges
faced by postal services in the various Member States.
48ibid.
49ibid.
50e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
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Table 19: Activities and milestones between 2002 and 2006
Activities and Milestones
Date Activity
October 2002 Study on employment trends in the European Postal sector (Contractor
– Rambll)
November 2002 1st Commission Report to the European Parliament and the Council
on the application of the Postal Directive
August 2003 Survey on some main aspects of postal networks in eu adhesion candi-
date countries (Contractor –wik Consult GmbH)
August 2003 Quality of Service Objectives, Performance and Measurement in rela-
tion toCommunityUniversal Postal Service (Contractor –wikConsult
GmbH)
July 2004 Study of the Relationship between the Constitution, Rules and Practice
of the Universal Postal Union (upu), the Rules of the World Trade
Organization (wto), in particular the gats (General Agreement on
Trade in Services), and European Community (ec) Law (Contractor –
tmc Asser Institute)
July 2004 Study about the economics of postal services (Contractor – nera)
July 2004 Study of main developments in the European postal sector (Contractor
–wik Consult GmbH)
March 2005 2nd Commission Report to the European Parliament and the Council
on the application of the Postal Directive
May 2005 Initial work on the Impact Assessment
July 2005 Study on the development of competition in the European postal sector
(Contractor – Ecorys)
July 2005 Study on the evolution of the regulatory model for European postal
services (Contractor –wik Consult GmbH)
February 2006 Work on Impact Assessment starts
May 2006 Main developments in the postal sector (2004–2006) – (Contractor –
wik Consult GmbH)
May 2006 e impact on Universal service of the full market accomplishment of
the postal internal market in 2009 (Contractor – PricewaterhouseC-
oopers)
September 2006 Proposal and Impact Assessment enters Inter-Service Consultation
October 2006 Proposal and Impact Assessment accepted and submitted to Council
and Parliament
October 2006 3rd CommissionReport to the European Parliament and theCouncil on
the application of the Postal Directive (accompanies ia and Proposal).
194
JohannesM.Wolff Case Study 3: Postal Services
The Impact Assessment Process
dg markt established an Inter-Service Steering Group designed to support the development
of the ia, specically the data collection and consultation of external actors, rather than the
draing of the nal ia report. According to interviewees, there was a very practical reason
for establishing the issg, namely an attempt to limit the polarisation of policy preferences
within the Commission. By including actors from across the Commission, dg markt sought
to limit resistance to the policy at a later stage. Despite initial reservations that the Group
allow “things [sensitive information] to be leaked to the press”,51 the need to “ensure an open
process and allowing other dgs to provide input outweighed the dangers of the press gaining
insider information”.52 e issg was made up of a number of services, including dg comp,
sanco, taxud, empl, entr, ls and the SecGen, each representing dierent interests.
e issg provided a mechanism for dg markt to understand dierent positions and the
extent of opposition to policy proposals within the Commission. For example, dg sanco
represented the consumer protection perspective and was able to provide an insight into oppo-
sition to potential job losses. dg entr was able to represent the business perspective. Overall,
interviewees believed that the “most subject relevant dgs were represented, providing balance
[across issues and sectors]”.53e usefulness of the issg was explained by an interviewee from
dg markt who stated that the establishment of the Group was to help “build up other dg’s
awareness and understanding/buy-in”54, which was particularly important in preparation for
the “Inter-Service Conclusion, [as this ultimately] resulted in less push-back”.55 Otherwise, he
added, the value of the Group was limited. Despite the usefulness of the issg, the dg markt
ocial suggested it was “a pain in the neck”56 because of the “huge turn-over in personnel”57,
which resulted in “innocent perceptions”58 and long “ad-hoc, arm-chair critic”59 discussions.
e issg therefore provided early indications of potential opposition within the Commission,
but due to a large turnover in membership, produced limited opportunities to resolve them.
51dg markt Evaluation Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
52e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
53ibid.
54dg markt Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
55ibid.
56ibid.
57ibid.
58ibid.
59ibid.
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Reports from other ocials on the issg provided a dierent perspective. Interviewees
indicated that participation did not always mean “you were inuencing the proposal”.60
Although there was an expectation that the “issg would be able to talk about the rst dra [of
the ia], [the issg] never saw it”.61e Group was involved in monitoring the data collection,
but was not given the opportunity to assist in the draing of the nal ia report. is also
meant the issg did not have the opportunity to provide views on the nal proposal. Although
establishing the issg was intended to provide a forum for open discussion, its members did
not have the opportunity to discuss the nal report, which was viewed as the most important
element of the Group’s mandate.is was a particular concern on the part of ocials in dg
sanco, to the extent that they raised their concerns about consumer data at the Inter-Service
Consultation (isc) stage, resulting in a “suspended opinion”.62is meantdg sanco’s concerns
were escalated at a late stage. A suspended opinion at the isc stage is oen triggered by the
Commissioner’s Cabinet or some other senior ocial who is unsatised with the proposal.
is was supported by an interviewee who suggested that the ‘suspended opinion’ was “more
of a political issue, rather than a problem with the composition and professional behaviour of
individual issgmembers”.63
e data collection and stakeholder consultation was conducted by external contractors.
As part of the conditions set out in the second Postal Directive, the consultations and studies
were the foundation upon which the Commission provided the European Parliament and
Council with regulator updates. Although the data collected and consultation started before
the ‘formal’ ia work, it was an important element that fed into the ia. It is therefore worth
exploring this briey from the perspective of dg markt. According to a number of inter-
viewees, the “working relationship between the Commission and the two consultancy rms
were overall positive, and the results of their reports fed into the impact assessment and ulti-
mately the proposal”.64 During the ia stage (2005 and 2006) the Commission organised three
stakeholder consultation exercises: an on-line consultation on consumer protection issues, in
part managed by dg sanco; one specically targeted at National Regulatory Authorities; and
a number of workshops open to dgs, the public and experts in order to discuss the results
60ibid.
61dg sanco Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
62ibid.
63e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
64ibid.
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from the Pricewaterhouse Cooper (pwc) study, which had assessed the future impact of the
liberalisation of the postal market. All of the results were made available on dg markt’s
website.
Although a number of interviewees believed the appropriate actors were targeted, according
to one interviewee, it was dicult to get consumers to participate and engage on the technical
aspects of the proposal.65 In the case of national authorities, the perception on the part of
the Commission’s contractor was that they were not “very helpful”.66e contractor stated
that national authorities were either not willing or able to provide relevant data, with some
countries taking “a position against the study to defend their political position”67 in light
of future Council debates. For others, such as the ten new Member States, the “data was
just not available”.68e outcome of the consultations resulted in broad conclusions, as the
“standard errors [in the data] were everywhere”.69 e proposal and ia provided “data in a
general, granulated manner, in an eort to avoid a debate about specic gures, trying instead
to present a document which talks about substantive issues”.70 Ironically, the mechanism
designed to provide objectivity in the collection of information, was too technical for the
average consumer to engage with and too political for Member States to provide factual
information for.e result was a high level report which avoided a denitive answer.
With regard to the type of impacts which were examined, interviewees agreed that it
was important to ensure all three pillars (social, environmental and economic impacts) were
considered, but noted that, in practice “this was not always possible.”71 For this ia, interviewees
from dg markt reported “that although economic and social impacts needed to be assessed,
there was no need to review possible environmental impacts”.72 Furthermore, interviewees
suggested that “although dg env was invited to participate in the issg”73 they declined. dg
env also chose not to comment during the isc which started in September of 2006.
65ibid.
66PricewaterhouseCoopers Contractor, Interview, Brussels 2007.
67ibid.
68ibid.
69ibid.
70e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
71ibid.
72ibid.
73ibid.
197
JohannesM.Wolff Case Study 3: Postal Services
In spite of the diculties outlined above, interviewees considered the ia to be good quality,
both in terms of the depth of analysis and the extent of consultation.is did not necessarily
mean interviewees agreed with the ndings, nor did it mean they believed the iawas complete.
Rather, the ia was viewed to have been extensive in comparison to many other ia, both in the
level of data collected, as well as in the degree to which dg markt attempted to consult with
actors. Consequently, dg markt reported that there were “clashes within the Commission”74
during the isc stage. Although interviewees did not provide further detail on this point, an
internal Secretariat General document provides some insight. It states that:
“it is crucial that the impact assessment report can be read as a pedagogic and
fair assessment of the various possible steps and scenarios.is is particularly
important when discussing the impact on employment and territorial cohesion
. . . [e problem identication section] reads less as a problem denition and
more as a statement of what was planned. It would be preferable to set out more
the evidence of the problem, instead of arguing in favour of an approach.”75
is reected concerns on the part of dg sanco that employment issues were not suciently
taken into account. e overall work on the ia took nine months with the “most time-
consuming aspect being the consultation process.”76 According to the Commission, “the
original plan was to drive the proposal forward by using the ia results but it became apparent
that this was not going to be possible because of time constraints, and so much of the work
was done in parallel”77 to meet the 2006 timeline mandated by the second Postal Directive.
e above ndings do not indicate fundamental problems with the process or analysis.
ey do, however, indicate that rather than the ambition of enhanced rationalisation (which
was an important element) it was a political momentum that was the driving force behind the
proposal which in turn meant dg markt used the ia to support its preferred policy option or
‘stack the deck’.e externalisation of the data collection allowed the institutions (Commission,
Parliament and Council) to monitor the situation, but also to set the parameters for future
debates. e use of external contractors helped the Commission; in particular, to set the
parameters of the debate, by on the one hand having a third party to deect any accusations
74dg markt Evaluation Lead, Interview, Brussels 2006.
75Internal Secretariat General, Opinion Document, September 2006.
76e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
77ibid.
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of bias, and on the other hand by requiring the contractor to engage with stakeholders in such
a manner that political opposition to the proposals would be limited.
Participation and Consultation
Participation and consultation of actors is a key aspect of the ia system and an indication of
the extent of coordination. Despite dg markt’s eorts to provide external actors with regular
up-dates, not all actors agreed that the process was open and transparent. In particular, a
number of Member State representatives were concerned that the data they provided as part
of the external contractors data collection exercise was either incorrectly recorded or did not
support the ndings included in the nal ia. One Member State representative explained that
“when the Commission promoted participation in the studies, it was not been clear what the
aim” was nor that “the data was going to be used for this impact assessment”.78 Another stated
that although the Commission and contractors provided “information . . . [they] did not know
what the output”79 was going to be. One Member State in particular explained that they had
“tried to correct some of the information but could not do so”.80 ese ndings reect the
concerns previously raised by the external contractor, who stated that some Member States
had attempted to use the studies as an initial battling ground to support their own political
position.
Explanations for why external actors did not feel the process was fully transparent are
similar to those in the other case studies. First, the draing of the ia was conducted aer the
data was collected and did not include any further stakeholder consultation. Although the
data collection was open, the nal analysis and draing of the ia was not. One Member State
interviewee defended this practice, stating that “it is better to keep it [the ia] non-published
before the proposal”.81 Another provided further insight, stating that the Commission had
tried to “keep their hands clean”82 and remain neutral.e Commission removed itself from
the contractors’ work and was not able or willing to accept further changes to data once the
contractor completed his work, a practice, which helped dg markt deect criticism.
78National Authority in Portugal, Telephone Interview, 2006.
79National Authority in France, Telephone Interview, 2006.
80National Authority in Portugal, Telephone Interview, 2006.
81National Authority ine Netherlands, Telephone Interview, 2006.
82National Authority in Portugal, Telephone Interview, 2006.
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Further evidence of the political tensions surrounding this ia come from media reports
where “so-called ‘Northern countries’, such as Sweden, Finland and the uk”83 where classed
as supportive of the liberalisation of the postal services market in contrast with, according
to media reports, a “Southern Group”84 which was less supportive. Some of the concerns of
transparency were due to this political divide.
Quality Assurance
Tomitigate against any last minute surprises the iaGuidelines recommend that the Secretariat
General is “kept up to date with progress on the ia throughout the process, either as part of
the Inter-Service Steering Group or on an ad-hoc basis”.85 In practice this meant that in the
rst instance dg markt’s ia support unit/function would provide guidance and an initial
assessment of quality, with the Secretariat General undertaking a nal check later on in the
process to ensure compliance with the ia Guidelines. In the case of the third Postal Services
Directive the quality assurance followed the process mapped out in the Guidelines. According
to the desk ocer he received “no help at all” for the “rst 9 months”86, but once there was a
change in the leadership of dg markt’s ia supporting unit, “things got better”87 and the desk
ocer received help in “designing consultation questionnaires, developing the structure of
the ia” and also “moral support”.88
is was supported by an ocial in the Secretary General who stated that they “did not
get involved” directly with the unit developing the ia. Instead, the relationship between
dg markt and the Secretariat General was managed directly by the ia support unit in dg
markt. Although the ia support unit was oen able to assist in interpreting the ia Guidelines,
according to the ocial developing the ia, it was a challenge to know “what was important
and what wasn’t”.89 Hearing it from the “horse’s mouth”90 would have made things easier.
According to dg markt’s ia unit, the Secretary General’s main role was to ensure the structure
83EurActiv, Postal services liberalisation, http://www.euractiv.com/en/transport/postal-ser\discretionary{-
}{}{}vi\discretionary{-}{}{}ces-liberalisation/article-161377 (May 2010).
84ibid.
85ibid.
86dg markt Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
87ibid.
88ibid.
89ibid.
90ibid.
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of the ia report was in line with the ia blueprint and that the “process”91 was being followed,
rather than monitoring that the ambitions of enhanced rationalisation were being achieved.
As there were sucient “ocials working on the proposal”92 on the part of dg markt, the
ia unit did not feel there was a strong need for the Secretariat General to have been more
involved. A nal quality assurance was provided by dg markt’s ia support unit, but for
internal purposes to learn about the process and improve future ias.e nding was that this
ia was the most detailed and extensive ia the dg had conducted to date, a similar compliment
bestowed on dg env’sematic Air Strategy.93
As for other dg’s involvement in providing quality assurance, one report suggests that much
of the internal check was conducted through the Inter-Service Steering Groups.e ultimate
check or control was done during Inter-Service Consultation. During the isc two suspended
opinions were issued (see previous section). Not all dgs were content with the ia. According
to dg sanco the “Inter-Service Steering Group did not act as the qa”94 and so the Secretariat
General should have “played the role of facilitator”95 and been “pro-active from the perspective
of quality control”96 and ensuring the evidence supported various policy preferences. e
nal decision on whether the ia and the proposal were acceptable was le to the Inter-Service
Consultation stage, late in the policy process and as such at a point when policy was escalated
up to the Commissioner level and became political and in doing so supporting the theoretical
consideration of ia as a tool for enhanced control.
The Impact Assessment Report
With around 60 pages, the nal ia report was longer than the suggested length of 30 pages.97
In terms of content and structure, the report covered all the major elements, including a table
of contents, an executive summary, the identication of the overall policy problem, and a
description of the policy objectives.e nal ia report also laid out various policy options
(including a non-eu action proposal), and assessed a number of potential impacts. As noted
91dg markt Evaluation Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
92ibid.
93ibid.
94dg sanco Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
95ibid.
96ibid.
97ibid.
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previously, dg env had declined an invitation to get involved and so, not surprisingly, the
assessment of impacts focused on economic and social impacts.
e ia report also provided extensive quantitative information on potential impacts, un-
usual for Commission ias and provided strong evidence for the economic benets of market
liberalisation. Table 20 provides an overview of the various key ia Guideline elements the
report completed.
Table 20: Compliance of IA report with IA Guidelines
Section Status
Executive Summary Done
Context/Background Done
Problem Done
Objectives Done
Policy Options Done
Impact Assessment Done (except env)
(economic, social and environmental)
Assessment of impacts outside the eu Done
Quantication of impacts Done
Comparison of Options Done
Presentation of preferred options Done
Framework for future assessment Done
To conclude, this section illustrated the ia as a tool for extensive data collection and
consultation exercises, but also showed that according to dg markt the ia was about the nal
analysis and draing of the report, not the collection of data and consultation.is view was
not shared by a number of actors both inside and outside the Commission who believed they
should have been part of the nal analysis and write up of the ia report.e separation of
tasks resulted in concerns on the part of a number of Member States in regard to the content
of the nal ia report. It resulted in conict between dg sanco and dg markt during the
Inter-Service Consultation Stage.e signicant amount of time and resources invested in
the data collection provides support for the idea that dg markt used the ia as a means to
enhance rationalisation by using the evidence to underpin the nal proposal. Equally, the
extensive consultation dg markt undertook provides strong support for the idea of enhanced
coordination. However, the proposal was marked by a high level of political interest with two
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opposing policy preferences.e draing of the ToRs for the studies, the manner in which
the issg was used, and the conict during nal clearance support the idea that the ia was
also a means for control. In particular, despite reservation to establish the issg, dg markt
sought to use the process to set the agenda and used external contractors to deliver evidence
to support the objective of market liberalisation. Equally, the struggle in agreeing the ToRs
and Member State complaints around the data collection indicates that actors tried to use the
process to achieve their own objectives.
4 Stage III — Inter-Institutional Bargaining
is section traces the context in which the European Parliament and Council used the
ia process in the context of the three theoretical ambitions. e following shows that the
third Postal Services Directive’s ia played a minor role, although the proposal was debated
extensively. Transmitted to the European Parliament and Council in October of 2006, the
Commission provided the proposal, the ia,98 a prospective study on the impact of full market
opening,99 and a progress report on the Application of the Original Postal Directive.100e
1997 Postal Services Directive had already laid the ground for gradually opening up the
market, but had not allowed competition for the delivery of letters of a certain weight (i.e. 50
grams).is category of letters accounted for almost half of all letters delivered in Europe in
a sector with an estimated turnover of more than e88 billion euro annually.e economic
considerations were signicant, but with a large number of jobs at risk, so were the social
consequences.ese economic and social impacts were the underlying reasons for the conict
between dg sanco and dg markt observed during the Inter-Service Consultation stage,
taking on a more prominent role during this nal ia stage.
In the proposal, the Commission argued that total liberalisation would lead to better, faster
and cheaper services. However, trade unions and a number of Member States were reluctant
to open their public services — which many postal services across Europe were — to private-
98Commission of the European Communities, Accompanying document to the Proposal for a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 97/67/ec concerning the full accomplishment of the
internal market of Community postal services (Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment), sec(2006) 1292.
99Commission of the European Communities, Report from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament: Prospective Study on the impact on universal services of the full accomplishment of the postal internal
market in 2009, com/2006/596 nal.
100ibid.
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sector and foreign competition. ere was a deep divide across eu Member States. Some
Member States such as the uk had already introduced competition into their postal sector in
2006. Other countries like France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Greece and Poland still had some
way to go to achieve full liberalisation. For this reason, the countries that were still some way
from full liberalisation preferred to formally put in place nancing mechanisms designed to
guarantee universal service obligation and to prolong the transition period, allowing national
administrations to continue to provide state funding for national postal service providers.
e ocial position was that universal postal service would not be guaranteed unless specic
mechanisms were put in place to safeguard this guarantee. e Polish postal operator, for
example, expressed their concern stating that full liberalisation would lead to a “decline in
quality service [regarding] on-time delivery and frequency as well as a decline in the frequency
of emptying collection boxes and oce hours of postal outlets”.101 uni Europa Postal, the postal
sector’s trade union stated that they had “diculties in nding any positive social impact
which could result from a full market opening.”102
However, these nancing guarantees were viewed by some Member States as hidden state
funding designed to support national champions. According to media reports, the uk’s Royal
Mail believed that the liberalisation of the sector would allow for “a ourishing ‘upstream
market’ . . . by ensuring competitors are able to choose between building alternative networks
or accessing existing networks on a non-discriminatory basis”.103 Providers from other coun-
tries, such as those from Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Finland and Denmark believed “only an
increase in the provision of end-to-end services would ensure a “dynamic and viable universal
service”.104
In the context of these two opposing positions, Member States’ reached an agreement to
liberalise postal services in October 2007, but this took over a year of negotiation. Member
States also agreed to open up markets by 2011, but acknowledged the need for a number of
amendments and concessionsmade both at Council and by the EuropeanParliament. Evidence
of some of the concessions became evident during the European Parliament’s reading of the
proposal.e main elements of the nal proposal included:
101EurActiv, Commission to push for open postal markets by 2009, http://www.euractiv.com/en/innovation/
commission-push-open-postal-markets-2009/article-158821 (May 2010).
102ibid.
103ibid.
104ibid.
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• full liberalisation by 2011, two years later than what the Commission had proposed;
• the possibility of granting certain members states an additional two years to liberalise
their markets;
• a minimum pay provision and a right for workers to strike; and
• a universal service obligation.
Furthermore, Member States in the Council also agreed to establish a universal nancing
provision based on a decision by individual Member States to be “either funded with monies
from state coers or through an obligation by operators to pay into a common fund”.105
e underlying idea was that Member States would continue to have the ability to nance
national champions.e European Parliament reached nal agreement of the third Postal
Services Proposal in January 2008, just two months aer the Council ocially signed o on
the amendments provided by the European Parliament.106 From an analysis of media reports
at the time, neither the European Parliament nor the Council undertook a separate ia on
the suggested amendments, nor did the ia itself play a prominent role during negotiations,
although much of the data and ndings from the accompanying market study reports had
been used to bolster the arguments of each side of the story.
The Impact Assessment in the European Parliament
Media reports indicate deep divisions between the main political groups on the question of
postal services liberalisation. Although the media reports did not provide information on
whether the ia was used or whether it inuenced the negotiations itself, they show that the
European Parliament fought hard to ensure social standards weremaintained. Working closely
with interested actors, the European Parliament developed a number of detailed proposals,
including provisions around exible funding for universal service oerings. Discussions
within the European Parliament were divided between the Socialist Group who were sceptical
of liberalisation and the conservatives who were more supportive.
105EurActiv, eu pushes through postal services liberalisation, http://www.euractiv.com/en/transport/eu-pushes-
postal-services-liberalisation/article-167246 .
106EurActiv, Postal liberalisation approved amid bitter wage battle, http://www.euractiv.com/en/transport/postal-
liberalisation-approved-amid-bitter-wage-battle/article-170029 .
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e European Parliament’s Socialist Group, in particular, was supportive of ensuring the
new Directive contained “the necessary guarantees on the universal service and its nancing,
and on the protection of postal workers and their employment conditions”.107e Members
of the European Parliament representing the Green Party shared similar concerns, but also
feared that:
“employment and social standards for those working in the sector would dete-
riorate under the current proposals. Previous liberalisations [ . . . ] have led to
employment conditions being frittered away. Without sucient guarantees, this
risks occurring with this liberalisation.”108
e European Parliament’s rapporteur responsible for seeking agreement on the proposal wel-
comed “the compromise reached between Parliament and Council on postal liberalisation”.109
Although he saw “the necessity of opening up postal markets”110 he felt it was important
to do so with the universal services provision rmly in place to ensure adequate consumer
protection. To achieve this, he welcomed a two-staged approach which would “ensure that we
[Parliament & Council] take into account the interests of all Member States.”111is was to be
done by the insertion of the reciprocity clause which was intended to stop a situation whereby
protected monopolists would “act as cannibals in liberalised markets.”112 Although the merits
of the proposal were discussed in detail, the ia played no signicant role.
The Impact Assessment in Council
Member States’ representatives in the Council were generally positive about the ia, in so far
that they felt it had covered the most relevant options. However, a number of representatives—
those from countries which were less supportive of the proposal — reported discontent with
the ia report rather than with the ia process itself.e ia report did not play a central role
during the Council discussions and according to representatives in the Council, discussions
were focused on the proposal. One Member State representative questioned the neutrality
107ibid.
108ibid.
109EurActiv, mepMarkus Ferber ‘optimistic’ of 2009 postal liberalisation, http://www.euractiv.com/en/transport/
mep-markus-ferber-optimistic-2009-postal-liberalisation/article-163347 .
110ibid.
111ibid.
112ibid.
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of the process, in particular regarding the data was collected, stating that “evaluations [ias]
can’t be made by people who are in charge of them . . . [rather they should be done] outside
the Commission”.113 Other concerns included discontent around the detail included in the
ia. One interviewee reported that “the studies were general”114in so far that they “did not
present the national impact of the proposal”115 therefore resulting in generic conclusions that
“all Member States were in the state to have their markets liberalised”.116e main criticism
from one representative was that “numbers were presented in an aggregate manner” which
was not “sucient” or “appropriate” and did not reect the “national circumstance”.117
Other Member States, such as the uk, were more positive about the ia. According to one
interviewee from the uk, the Commission presented the ia “which was good [and] covered
most issues”.118 For the uk, this was “very useful because it suited the uk policy in this sector”119,
although the representative acknowledged that the ndings did not suite the French and Polish
position.120is was because much “of their [the French/Polish] work-force”121 was employed
in the postal sector. e uk therefore did not have any reason to oppose the ia. However,
the uk representative explained that opposition to the ndings presented in the ia would not
have made much of a dierence because “everybody was interested in and focused on the
proposal itself ”.122
e observation that “it [the ia] was not very important for this dossier”123 and that it was
more of a “background document [which] explains how and why the Commission came to
its conclusions”124 was shared by a number of other Member States.e Swedish representa-
tive went further and indicated that “not many people read background documents”125 and
therefore did not think “the ia was widely distributed or read” or that it had an “impact on
the decision-making procedure”.126
113National Authority in France, Telephone Interview, 2006.
114ibid.
115National Authority in Portugal, Telephone Interview, 2006.
116ibid.
117ibid.
118National Authority in the uk, Interview, London 2006.
119ibid.
120ibid.
121ibid.
122ibid.
123National Authority ine Netherlands, Telephone Interview, 2006.
124National Authority in Sweden, Telephone Interview, 2006.
125ibid.
126ibid.
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A further explanation for why Council Members’ did not think the iawas a “very important
document”127 was provided by the Dutch and Spanish representatives. e Netherlands’
representative explained that if they had “found something strange in the proposal”128 they
would have looked at the iamore carefully, but, although the “ia is a worthwhile exercise”,129
they focused on the “proposal itself ”.130e Spanish explained that the ia would have been
helpful if they had not had “national data”131 to further their own position. However, as most
Commission proposals receive political backing well before the Commission starts working
on “the proposed legal instrument”132 the Council discussion will almost always be a political
one, not a technical one. Despite that, interviewees pointed out that the ia was useful for the
Commission to show it had done its homework.
Perceptions of the Impact Assessment Report
Perceptions from Member State representatives in the Council agreed that the ia analysed
the various aspects in a sucient manner. However, there were some concerns that the ia
did not take “social problems” into account or “workers employment” aspects, which was a
particular problem for France with up to “250,000 employees in the postal sector.”133 All of
those interviewed agreed that the supporting studies conducted over the previous ve years
“illustrated the robust analysis that was done”.134 One interviewee explained that the reports
and the numerous workshops served as a good mechanism to ensure quality, providing actors
with the opportunity to see the gures and understand the Commission’s thinking (provide
transparency to the entire process).135
As forwhether the ia provided a balance across the three key pillars, a proxy for coordination,
the interviewees agreed that the ia report provided an “adequate balance in the analysis” and
that “environmental aspects were not of concern.”136e examined policy options were also
127National Authority ine Netherlands, Telephone Interview, 2006.
128ibid.
129ibid.
130ibid.
131National Authority in Spain, Telephone Interview, 2006.
132ibid.
133National Authority in Spain, Telephone Interview, 2006.
134e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
135National Authority in Sweden, Telephone Interview, 2006.
136e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
208
JohannesM.Wolff Case Study 3: Postal Services
considered the relevant and appropriate ones according to interviewees. What was considered
particularly important was that the policy options had not come as a surprise, interviewees
felt that that “the evidence and gures were, in principle, correct and suciently presented”.137
In summary, the third ia stage illustrated that although the ia report received support
from actors outside the Commission, the ia played a minor role. Because of polarised policy
preferences the focus of was on the proposal rather than the ia report. Although much
of the debates in the European Parliament and Council included the gures and analysis
included in the ia, the Spanish representatives explained that “this [the ia] was in many ways
an academic exercise, as real impacts will only become evident once a policy is actually in
place”.138is explains the limited role of the ia. Playing no role in enhancing the coordination
of actors, the evidence that actors read and acknowledged the ia report suggested the enhanced
rationalisation of the process. However, in consideration of the wider context the ia was
clearly used as means for enhanced control, in particular by providing evidence to support
the liberalisation of the market.
5 Conclusion
is Postal Services Directive was the third legislative vehicle developed in a 15 year policy
process undertaken not only by the European Commission, but also the European Parliament
and Council.is iamust therefore be viewed within a wider context. First, although the
ia started in 2005, much of the work started in 2002.e 2005 date only marked the write
up of the nal ia report. Second, concerns raised throughout the previous two Directives by
key actors at the Member State level, such as the speed and extent of market liberalisation,
were reected in the development of the ia, in particular the tension between opening up the
market and potential job losses. Finally, context matters in so far that this ia was only one
element of a larger policy initiative. As part of the second Postal Directive, the Commission
was mandated to provide various studies on the future of the postal market.e ia built on
these, but did not replace the information provided through these studies.
137ibid.
138National Authority in Spain, Telephone Interview, 2006.
209
JohannesM.Wolff Case Study 3: Postal Services
Although the rst ia stage was a box-ticking exercise, it did allow some policymakers inside
the Commission to follow dg markt’s policy intentions, supporting the idea of enhanced
coordination. However, the Commission’s broad policy intensions had been laid out in the
second Postal Services Directive and supported by the European Parliament and Council. Part
of this support included the condition to provide regular updates on market liberalisation
before the Commission could propose another Directive.e ia therefore played no role in
enhancing the rationalisation of the early policy process. As a means for enhanced control,
the European Parliament and Council used the second Directive to control the Commission,
not the roadmap or ia process.
While dg markt complied with the requirements set out in the ia Guidelines during the
second ia stage, a signicant amount of work had already started before dg markt formally
undertook the second ia stage. For dg markt the policy-development stage was about
the nal analysis and write-up of the ia report, but for external actors and some inside the
Commission, the expectation was that they would be able to inuence the nal proposal
through the ia. Despite dg markt following the procedural and analytical steps, there
was a focus on economic considerations which overshadowed social ones, supporting the
ambition of ‘stacking the deck’ (or enhanced control).e nal Inter-Service Consultation
stage was slowed down by dg sanco who raised concerns around the social impact of the
proposal.is was not due to the ia alone; rather it was because the nal proposal did not
reect dg sanco’s views that the economic benets should be balanced by the social impacts.
Viewed from the coordination perspective the ndings are mixed. Although various dgs were
involved via the Inter-Service Steering Group and external actors were included in the work,
interviewees stated that the issg was used by dg markt to inuence other dgs rather than to
work with them.is further supports the idea of enhanced control or ‘stacking the deck’, not
coordination. In terms of the rationalisation of the policy process this case study shows that
the ia built on external studies and made extensive use of market analysis, although this was a
key element of the wider Commission mandate received in 2002.
e ia played no signicant role during nal stage of the process. Both the European Par-
liament and Council made a number of changes to the original proposal without undertaking
ias. Also, there is little evidence that the ia was considered many of the discussions, both
inside the European Parliament and Council, used evidence contained in the various studies
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the Commission provided, including the ia. ese gures and facts were used to support
dierent policy preferences during negotiations, divided between those who supported the
liberalisation of the market and those concerned with the social impacts in Member States.
Table 21 provides an overview of the role the ia played in the context of the third Postal
Services Directive.
Table 21: IA as a tool for rationalisation, control or coordination
Policy Stage /eoretical Consideration Stage i Stage ii Stage iii
Enhanced Rationalisation No Yes No
Enhanced Coordination Some Yes No
Enhanced Control No Yes Some
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VIII Case Study 4: Solidarity in Migration
Flow
is case study examines dg Justice Freedom and Security’s (jls) impact assessment (ia) in
support of establishing new budget lines in the area of migration. Unlike the previous case
studies, this proposal was not regulatory in nature and was also not marked by polarised
policy preferences. A small group of Member States championed the expansion of existing
nancial programmes, seeking compensation for the disproportionate burden of securing
the European Union’s external borders. dg jls was under considerable time pressure, with
an April 2005 budget deadline.e European Commission had only four months to develop
both the proposal and the ia.
e proposal is a communication document designed to establish a Framework Programme
on “Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows”. Work started in December 2004 and
completed in April 2005. It sets out a proposal for a nancial programme to support Member
States in the management of migration, traditionally managed by the nancial rules set out by
the Directorate General (dg) for Budget.e proposal’s objective was to provide Member
States, in particular southern Member States with external borders, nancial support in
securing “an area of freedom, security and justice”.1 Although work to implement common
policies on asylum and immigration started 30 years ago, it focused on building networks
and funding programmes to support national ocials, rather than coordinating action at the
Community level.is proposal provided the Commission with an opportunity to promote
its role in this new policy area, building on joint networks and systems to coordinate the ght
1Council of the European Union,e Hague Programme : strengthening freedom, security and justice in the
European Union, (ojec (2005/C 53/01)).
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against terrorism and enhance cross-border policing. Equally, it was an opportunity for some
Member States to receive additional nancial support from the eu.
Like the other case studies, the three theoretical ambitions are traced across the policy
process. However, unlike the other case studies, this one provides an insight into an ia
supported by two complementary policy preferences. In particular, it explores an ia designed
to increase the Commission’s policy remit while at the same time supporting some Member
States in seeking increased nancial support.
1 Background
Community action to secure the borders of the Union goes back over 30 years. During this
time a number of activities were designed to support the Member States, rather than the
transfer of competencies to the Community level. Before tracing the three ia stages, this
section provides an overview of the background and context in which this proposal was
developed, highlighting Member States’ interest in nancial support in securing the Union’s
borders and the Commission’s interest in expanding its mandate.
e proposal to establish the Framework Programme on “Solidarity and Management
of Migration Flows” was the most recent incarnation in a long series of attempts to build
institutional and legal frameworks to encourage Member State cooperation. One of the rst
initiatives was launched in 1975 when the European Council created trevi. Prompted by a
number of terrorist attacks in the early 1970s, trevi was designed to help European countries
to work together more eectively in ghting terrorism. Over time, collaboration was extended
to other areas and trevi was replaced by the Justice and Home Aairs pillar of the European
Union when the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1993. Since then, the European Union
continued to develop its competencies in this area, building on institutional initiatives, such as
Europol, the organisation for police cooperation; Eurojust, designed to enhance cooperation
between European prosecutors; Frontex, established to support the collaboration of control
authorities; and the Schengen Information Systemwhich coordinates the work of immigration
authorities.
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e Treaties ofMaastricht, Amsterdam andNice also established common legal frameworks
in the area of justice and home aairs. Known as the third pillar, these frameworks were
based on inter-governmental cooperation, with minor roles for the European Parliament
and Commission. But during the 1999 Tampere European Council meeting the European
Commission received the mandate to develop a more coordinated approach through the
establishment of a framework for justice and home aairs.e Tampere Conclusions called
for the consolidation of initiatives through the establishment of a common asylum and
immigration policy, the harmonisation of border controls, improved police cooperation, and
creating the groundwork for judicial cooperation.2is led to an agreement amongst Member
States in 2000 to set up the European Refugee Fund (erf), a nancial instrument designed
to share the costs “of reception, integration and voluntary repatriation of people in need of
asylum or humanitarian protection”.3e fund provided those Member States which managed
the Union’s external borders with nancial support in receiving refugees and displaced persons
and the Commission with a greater role under the third pillar.
In 2004, the Rome Treaty further extended the role of the European Commission and
Parliament in the area of justice and home aairs. Following this, the 2004 European Council
meeting ine Hague proposed the so-called Hague Programme. Endorsed by the European
Parliament, the Commission was asked to develop a programme which built on the European
Refugee Programme. As a new multi-annual funding programme, the Hague Programme
was designed to improve “the common capability of the Union and its Member States to guar-
antee fundamental rights, minimum procedural safeguards and access to justice, to provide
protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention on Refugees and other international
treaties to persons in need, to regulate migration ows and to control the external borders
of the Union . . . ”4 with the details of the budget of the newly expanded European Union
scheduled to be agreed in early 2005, the Commission was asked to present an Action Plan in
2005 setting out the details of this new multi-annual funding programme would be turned
into action. An integral part of the mandate included yearly Commission reports on the
implementation of the Hague Programme.
2European Commission Justice and Home Aairs, Area of freedom, security and justice, http://ec.europa.eu/
justice_home/fsj/intro/fsj_intro_en.htm (June 2010).
3Europa, European Fund for Refugees (2000–2004), http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/key_issues/refugee/
refugee_1104_en.pdf (June 2010).
4Council of the European Union,e Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security and justice in the
European Union, op. cit.
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e European Commission started work on the proposal in late 2004 and developed a
proposal entitled the Framework Programme on Solidarity and Management of Migration
Flows.e Framework Programme was designed to provide Member States with nancial
support to mitigate against various challenges and established common legal frameworks,
including the Schengen acquis.e proposal recognised that, from a geographic perspective,
some countries bore more of the migration burden and therefore needed support. e
programme included four specic proposals:
• Member States would receive support in reducing illegal entries, in particular to secure
the coastlines of the Mediterranean and the Eastern land borders.
• Member States would receive support in returning illegal entries into the Schengen
area.
• a common immigration policy would be developed with recognition for nancial
support to develop programmes to integrate legal entries.
• the Member State which received individual refugees would be responsible for them,
regardless of their nal destination. In return, a fund would be set up to support the
management of these entries.
e short-timeframe within which this ia needed to be developed was because the Com-
mission had to provide the European Parliament and Council details on the European Union’s
upcoming budget.e proposal needed to be ready by early 2005 and included four funds
designed to “take over and develop to their full operational level the actions of existing pro-
grammes and preparatory actions such as argo, inti, the preparatory actions in the area of
return management and the European Refugee Fund”.5
e proposal was a result of a mandate the Commission received from the European Parlia-
ment and Council and included a tight timeframe. It was built on a decade long collaboration
in the area of securing the Union’s borders, whereby the Commission extended its remit and
Member States received increased nancial support to secure the Union’s boarders.
Figure 22 provides a visual overview of the 30-year history preceding this proposal.
5Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Decision establishing the European Fund
for the Integration ofird-country nationals for the period 2007–2013 as part of the General programme ‘Solidarity
and Management of Migration Flows, com(2005) 123 nal/2.
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Figure 22: Background of justice and home aairs policy in Europe
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2 Stage I — Inception of the Impact Assessment
is section will show that although the ia blueprint was followed, building on previously
presented background section, because the Commission had a strong mandate to develop this
proposal in time for the new Financial Perspective, the inception stage was mainly a formality.
dg jlsmechanically following the requirements set out in the ia Guidelines, but the roadmap
did not play any role and so there is little evidence to support the theoretical considerations
of enhanced rationalisation or control in particular. Rather, the rst ia stage was used to
strengthen dg jls’ and Spain’s case for an increased remit and increased funding respectively.
e clwp was published in 2005 providing the public with an overview of a number of
Commission priorities for the following year, including a reference to the migration proposal.
e clwp states that:
“the free movement of persons within the Union requires a common approach to
border control, asylum and immigration. Common rules on legal migration and
return procedures would oer a level playing eld for potential immigrants; and
it is necessary to collect the data required to target policy eectively. But border
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control is costly, and Member States facing disproportionate obligations should
have the load lightened by a system of burden sharing.”6
To accompany the announcement in the clwp, dg jls draed a roadmap. e roadmap
included an overview of the identied policy problem, the policy objective, the policy options
that were being considered, the impacts, the availability of existing data, whether experts and
stakeholders would be consulted, and whether an Inter-Service Steering Group would be set
up.e roadmap therefore complied with the ia Guidelines.
According to the roadmap, the Commission intended to put forward a proposal by March
2005, only 3 months aer the clwp was published. Due to this short timeframe, the roadmap
explained that the Commission “will rely fully on internal resources, with very limited use
of external expertise”7 for the collection of data. Furthermore, much of the data for the ia
would come from existing data ascertained from pilot projects, studies and other preparatory
actions, in particular, actions and studies developed for the European Refugee Fund and
published in 2003.e time constraint also meant that, according to the roadmap, “no public
consultation is forecasted”,8 instead “results of the public consultation on the guidelines for
the new programme on establishment of an area of freedom, security and justice, carried out
during summer of 2004 will be used”.9 Another consequence of the time constraint was that
dg jls did not intend on setting up an issg. According dg jls the nal ia and communication
proposal needed to be completed by 8 April 2005 (a deadline to which the Commission had
committed itself under the terms of the upcoming Financial Perspectives for 2007–2013).
e timing was driven by the nancial perspective for 2007–2013. In July of 2004 dg jls
made the case for funding in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice which:
“covers a range of issues related specically to the protection and rights of individ-
ual citizens. It includes the framing of a common policy on asylum, immigration
and border control, taking a more eective, joint approach to cross-border prob-
lems such as illegal immigration and tracking in and smuggling of human
6Commission of the European Communities, Commission Work Programme for 2005, com(2005) 15 nal.
7dg jls, Roadmap: Programme cadre sur la solidarité et les gestion des mouvements migratoires, 2005.
8ibid.
9ibid.
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beings, as well as to terrorism and organised crime, promoting fundamental
rights and developing judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters.”10
Aer making the case, the Commission received the ocial endorsement from the European
Parliament and Council through the adoption of the Hague Programme in November 2004.
e Hague Programme set out the intention to:
“improve the common capability of the Union and its Member States to guarantee
fundamental rights, minimum procedural safeguards and access to justice, to
provide protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention on Refugees and
other international treaties to persons in need, to regulate migration ows and to
control the external borders of the Union . . . ”11
is provided dg jls with the ocial endorsement to work on its proposals, although, accord-
ing to the desk ocer tasked with developing the proposal and the ia, they had started the
“serious thinking in 2003”12 in preparation for the Hague Programme.
e roadmap was published in January 2005, just a few months before ia completion.
Because the roadmap was developed quickly, it was according to the desk ocer at dg jls
“not helpful”13 and more of a “box-ticking exercise”.14 However, the desk ocer did state that
roadmaps usually provided “a guide”15 on how policies would be developed in light of big
policy announcements, such as the Hague Programme. Other Commission ocials shared
this sentiment as “there were indications that other dgs found it [the roadmap] helpful, yet
not essential, in their eorts of following the communication”.16 ‘Not essential’ was an impor-
tant aspect as there is no evidence the roadmap made any impact outside the Commission.
According to a Member State representative, she “heard about the roadmaps for the rst time
from this questionnaire [the research questionnaire]”.17 However, this does not mean the
proposal had been developed without key actors being involved.e European Parliament
10Commission of the European Communities,e Financial Perspectives 2007–2013, com(2004) 487 nal.
11Council of the European Union,e Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the
European Union (Annex 1 to the Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council), 2004.
12dg jls Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
13dg jls ia Support Unit Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
14ibid.
15ibid.
16e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
17Member State Representative from Estonia, Completed Questionnaire, 2006.
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and Council mandated the Commission to establish these proposals in time for budget; this
was therefore a driving force in encouraging the Commission to develop the proposal.
In summary, dg jls complied with the ia blueprint for the rst ia stage by publishing a
roadmap, but the tight timeframe meant that this was a box-ticking exercise. is did not
mean actors inside and outside the Commission were not aware of the Commission’s plans.
e Hague Programme provided the Commission with the mandate to develop the proposal,
backed by an endorsement to develop this proposal for the upcoming Financial Prospectus.
Interested actors were clear on the direction the Commission was going, knowing that the
proposal would be based on the experiences gained from the European Refugee Fund.e
roadmap therefore played a minor role, although there was some evidence that it explained
dg jls’s intention to actors within the Commission, in doing so providing some support to
the idea of enhanced coordination.e roadmap received little to no attention and it would
therefore be a stretch to suggest it contributed to enhanced control or rationalisation.
3 Stage II — Development of the Impact Assessment
As described in the previous section, dg jls had a mandate to establish new nancial funds.
e ia therefore did not focus on whether to establish the funds, rather, on the development
of the detail. As a means for enhanced coordination the expectation is that dg jls would
use the ia to coordinate the views of key actors both inside and outside the Commission
to ensure the proposal reected all relevant opinions. However with the short time-frame,
the extent to which dg jls would be able to coordinate key stakeholders is questionable.
Under the theoretical consideration of enhanced rationalisation, the expectation is that the ia
provides the evidence and analysis necessary to set up the new nancial mechanisms. Under
the consideration of enhanced control the expectation would be that the policy preference of
a small group would prevail and be reected in the nal ia report and proposal.is section
is divided into four parts: the ia process, the participation of key actors, the process of quality
assurance, and the nal ia report itself. It will show that the need to develop a proposal to
support the Commission’s and Spain’s policy ambitions was the main driving force, supporting
the proposition of ia as a means for enhanced control.
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e short timeframe required ocials to develop the proposal alongside the ia and to
use previously available data. Data used included those obtained from an evaluation of the
European Refugee Fund, which had been established in 2000. Furthermore, as part of the
2000 Tampere agreement, the Commission was mandated to monitor the extent to which
the European Union was creating an area of freedom, security and justice.is included a
scoreboard to review progress every six months, forming a major element of the analysis for
this ia.18
e ia and nal proposal were largely based on the experiences of the European Refugee
Fund (erf). Initially established for a ve-year period, the ndings of an erf’s evaluation were
used in the Commission’s work to develop the Solidarity andManagement of Migration Flows
Framework Programme. dg jls also used studies conducted by the International Organization
on Migration, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, as well as data made
available by Eurostat and Member States during workshops held in Brussels. According to the
Commission’s desk ocer, work on the ia “started in December of 2004,”19 and was supported
by an external consultant who provided specic expertise on migration issues. In March
2005 the proposal, along with the ia, entered Inter-Service Consultation and by April 2005,
transmitted to the European Parliament and Council.
Like the three previous case studies, this ia was heavily reliant on work conducted under
previous initiatives. Table 22 provides an overview of the key activities andmilestones, showing
that the level of eort was not as high as with the other case studies.
18European Commission Justice and Home Aairs, Area of freedom, security and justice: Scoreboards, http:
//ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/scoreboard_en.htm (July 2010).
19dg jls Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
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Table 22: Activities and milestones for the IA
Date Activity
December 2003 dg Justice and Home Aairs Mid-term Evaluation of the European
Refugee Fund
October 2004 Internally dg jls starts work on the proposal
December 2004 Work on the Impact Assessment starts
January 2005 —
February 2005
Workshops with Member States and external expert to collect data
March 2005 ia and proposal submitted for Inter-Service Consultation
April 2005 Proposal and ia accepted & deadline according to the Financial
Prospectus
The Impact Assessment Process
According to dg jls’ desk ocer there was “no issg because of time constraints”,20 but also
because it was “questionable whether it [the issg] was really needed for this area [other dgs
were not relevant]”.21 Because time was at a premium and based on past experiences whereby
the management of “issgs had become dicult”22 dg jls did not believe there was a need for
an issg.e desk ocial reported that “bringing people on board during the issg process
did not mean they provided support during the Inter-Service Consultation”.23 Instead, dg jls
opted for bi-lateral conversations with dg empl to discuss the interaction of the new proposed
funding mechanisms, and dg empl’s European Social Fund. In particular, dg jls worked “to
make sure there was no overlap”.24
dg jls also did not have time to hold formal consultations for the collection of data. Instead,
the Directorate used “a mix of paper based information requests and workshops”25 with Mem-
ber States to collect relevant data. To assist in this, dg jls hired a consultant who previously
helped develop a number of the Directorate’s Framework Programmes. According to dg jls
“the external work provided for this ia was not ‘conventional’ . . . as he [the consultant] was
closely involved in the development and draing of the impact assessment, thus essentially
20ibid.
21ibid.
22ibid.
23dg jls ia Support Unit, Interview, Brussels 2006.
24dg empl Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
25e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
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part of the team”.26e consultant’s focus was on “dening the border line between competen-
cies of dg jls, empl and regio”.27 He also provided extensive support in the identication
and collection of relevant data and “helped dra the cost-eectiveness part”28 of the ia, taking
advantage of his expertise in completing other ias in the area of “employment, and social
aairs”.29
According to the external consultant, data collection was dicult. dg jls collected some
primary information by “sending out questionnaires to the Member States”30 and held a
number of workshops in early 2004 with Member State authorities. However, “immigration
gures were particularly hard to nd”31 because they were considered “politically sensitive”32
and Member States were not willing to share the information with the external consultant.
erefore, dg jls was forced to look “for other sources of data”.33e compromise was the
extensive use of Eurostat data and ndings from the 2003mid-term evaluation of the European
Refugee fund.34 In an attempt to further improve the data, additional meetings with the
International Organisation on Migration (iom) and the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (unhcr)35 were held.
In the end, the available data provided the basis of the ia despite the fact that much of the
information “was not comparable”.36 In addition, dg jls reported that, in their opinion, “the
ia Guidelines were not well suited to 3rd pillar issues [the area of justice, freedom and home
aairs]”37. It was therefore dicult to undertake an assessment of all economic, social and
environmental impacts from dg jls’s perspective, particularly within the data constraints.
Findings were therefore extrapolated based on illustrative examples. Nevertheless, “great
eort had been made to nd a balance between the three areas of economic, social and
26ibid.
27ibid.
28dg jls Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
29ibid.
30External Consultant — Alphametrics, Interview, Brussels 2006.
31ibid.
32ibid.
33ibid.
34pls Ramboll Management, dg Justice and Home Aairs Mid-term Evaluation of the European Refugee Fund,
2003.
35e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
36dg jls ia Support Unit, Interview, Brussels 2006.
37e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
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environmental impacts”.38 Although there was “a focus on security and social issues”39 dg jls
also attempted to include an assessment of environmental impacts. For example, the ia stated
that there would be indirect environmental impacts through an increase in “control boats and
aircras, and an increase in physical barriers in border zones . . . ”40 which, could potentially
be oset by some positive impacts such as the “purchase of less polluting surveillance boats,
usage of more ecient technologies”.41
As for the options which dg jls did assess, policymakers developed several options for each
of the four nancial instruments. However, through both “formal and informal discussions
with other dgs and Member States”42 it became clear what the preferred option was going
to be and so most analytical work was placed on supporting the option which enjoyed most
support.e nal policy option:
“was not expected to be completely new to Council or European Parliament.
Overall, it was clear that there was already a clear notion about what was going to
be expected, even before the impact assessment commenced”.43
roughout the process the desk ocer reported that there was continued contact at working
and Head of Unit level with key dgs, such as Legal Services, dg sanco and dg empl.e
result was a “relatively smooth Inter-Service Consultation procedure”.44 However, there was
little evidence that discussions were based on the ia. Rather, discussions were informal and
based on the need to ensure this proposal, which was a high political priority, was cleared in
time to meet the April deadline. By April 2010, as required by the Financial Prospectus, the
European Commission nalised and agreed the proposal. From the perspective of enhanced
rationalisation of the process, the ia process, although short, did allow dg jls to work toward
identifying the best legal policy option. In regard to enhanced coordination, this process was
driven by the need to work with veto players, rather than working with a broad range of actors,
supporting the idea of control.
38Commission of the European Communities, Extended Impact Assessment for the General programme ‘Solidarity
and Management of Migration Flows, sec(2005) 435.
39ibid.
40ibid.
41ibid.
42dg jls ia Support Unit, Interview, Brussels 2006.
43ibid.
44ibid.
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Participation and Consultation
As identied above, the signicant time constraint meant dg jls did not launch a formal
consultation exercise. Instead, questionnaires were sent out to Member States, followed by
workshops designed to discuss data and ndings around the integration and return of persons
from outside the eu and the policing of the Union’s external borders.is information was
bolstered through a number of workshops held with Member States, but also the Organisation
on Migration and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
e focus was on Member State authorities. As explained by one dg empl ocial, this was
considered appropriate at the time because “overall it seemed that the appropriate people were
contacted and consulted”.45 Justication for the focus on Member States was also based on the
fact that although “there are one or two organisations in the eu who focus on asylum, there
are no partners in the area of border control or return”.46 Overall, there was a feeling amongst
those who attended the workshops that “generally it [the process] seemed transparent”.47
Member States were well aware that “the proposal would use the European Refugee Fund as
the proto-type”48 and were given the opportunity via two specialised “workshops to clarify
data and [explain to the] Commission what data would be available”.49 ose interviewed
agreed that there was “general awareness and agreement on the direction the Commission
was heading in”.50
Quality Assurance
In the case of this ia “there was no real support role available at dg jls, other than one person
who actively was part of the team developing the impact assessment itself ”.51is was because
dg jls was a relatively young dg and the ia unit had been established in 2005, just when this
ia was being draed.e Secretariat General had provided one training course on ias, but
other than that, their “input was zero”.52 Consequently, the desk ocer found it dicult to
45dg empl Ocial, Interview, Brussels 2006.
46dg jls Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
47Member State Representative from Poland, Completed Questionnaire, 2006.
48ibid.
49ibid.
50e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
51e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
52dg jls Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
224
JohannesM.Wolff Case Study 4: Solidarity inMigration Flow
write the ia in “such a short period of time”53 and believed the requirements placed on them
by the Secretariat General were “onerous”.54
Final quality assurance was undertaken by making “an advanced copy [of the ia] available
to the Secretariat General and dg budg before the Inter-Service Consultation, asking for
input/feedback”.55 is was considered sucient on the part of the Secretariat General as
they told dg jls the “ia would receive so treatment”,56 presumably due to the tight political
time-frame. dg budg played an important role, as they were responsible for nancial matters
and were consulted ahead of time. As the proposal included nancial instruments, dg jls
had also been required to develop an ex-ante evaluation of nancial impacts for dg budg.
Both the ia and ex-ante nancial evaluation “were combined into one”57 and were submitted
together for Inter-Service Consultation, which was completed in time for the Commission to
comply with the requirements as set out in the Financial Prospectus.
The Impact Assessment Report
e previous section found that a number of short-cuts were taken in developing the ia,
short-cuts not evident in the nal ia report. A review of the ia report shows that it provides
an overview of all of the key analytical steps. In this case, although the ia does not provide an
executive summary, it does provide an overview of the context in which the ia was developed
and the problems to be tackled. It also provides an overview of the objectives and sets out
16 policy options, ranging from ‘no action’ to dierent funding proposals for each of the
four funds. e report also provides an overview of impacts on all three pillars, although
there is limited quantication of impacts, other than illustrative examples.e ia report was
therefore a text book answer to the requirements set out in the ia blueprint. Table 23 provides
an overview of the extent to which the ia report complied with the key elements as laid out in
the ia Guidelines.
53ibid.
54ibid.
55e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
56dg jls Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
57e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
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Table 23: Compliance of IA report with IA Guidelines
Report outline according to the iaGuidelines
Section Status
Executive Summary Not done
Context/Background Done
Problem Done
Objectives Done
Policy Options Done
Impact Assessment Done
(economic, social and environmental)
Assessment of impacts outside the eu Not done
Quantication of impacts Not done
Comparison of Options Done
Presentation of preferred options Done
Framework for future assessment Done
e second ia stage showed that dg jls worked to use relevant data and maintain contact
with key actors. Although this provides some support to the theoretical considerations of
enhanced coordination and rationalisation, there is a stronger argument for enhanced control
or the need to use the ia as justication. Although no formal consultation mechanisms were
used, dg jlsmade sure they understood Member States’ expectations and maintained close
contact with dg empl to ensure key dgs were content. Although the Head of Unit in dg jls
had contacted dg empl and dg budg ahead of key decision points (such as Inter-Service
Consultation) this was to ensure the new proposal did not overlap with the legal basis of the
European Refugee Fund and that it would receive easy Inter-Service Consultation clearance.
e implicit agreement with the Secretariat General that the proposal would not be given a
‘hard time’ during Inter-Service Consultation, indicates that the ia did not play a major role;
rather, political considerations were of greater importance. Challenges in identifying relevant
information and the fact that analysis focused on the policy option which both dg jls and
Member States agreed on, indicate limited rationalisation of the policy process. Although the
ia was completed, the political necessity of getting the proposal ‘out of the door’ on time was
clearly the main objective.
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4 Stage III — Inter-Institutional Bargaining
Once the proposal and ia were transmitted to the European Parliament, a unanimous resolu-
tion was adopted in November 2006, with only minor changes.58 However, it is important to
note that in December 2005, the uk Presidency had already made a proposal on the Financial
Perspective for 2007–2013. is included an overview of the nancial breakdown on the
‘General Programme on Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows’.59 e nal stage
of this ia therefore did not face any substantial opposition. Indeed, “the ia was not a major
element in the consideration of the Commission’s Communication. At best, the ia provided
some basic helpful information to initiate discussions within the Parliament and to inform
people at ministry level.”60
e Council rst considered the proposal in February 2006.e Working Party on Migra-
tion and Expulsionwas responsible and quickly reached a compromise whichwas submitted by
the Dutch Presidency.e main change was the inclusion of local administrations, providing
them with greater access to the proposed funds.e proposal, now entitled the ‘Communica-
tion of the Programme on Solidarity and Management of Migration Flow’, mapped out the
Commission’s overall objective in this area and was accepted by both the European Parliament
and Council early on in the negotiation process. Agreement on the funds and the levels of
funding took longer. In June 2007 both the European Parliament and Council formally agreed
to establish the four funds.61e nal proposal was a large “nancial commitment of eur 1,381
million for the European area of freedom, security and justice in 2006 rising progressively to
eur 3,620 million in 2013”.62
58Committee of the Regions, Information Notices, (ojec c115/47 16) May 2006.
59Council of the European Union, Financial Perspective 2007–2013, cadrefin 268 Brussels, December 2005.
60e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
61European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Decision on establishing the European Refugee Fund
for the period 2008 to 2013 as part of the General programme ‘Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows,
(ojeu l144 6 June 2007).
62European Economic and Social Committee, Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and
the Council establishing the European Refugee Fund for the period 2008–2013 as part of the General pro-
gramme “Solidarity and management of migration ows”, http://eescopinions.eesc.europa.eu/eescopinion docu-
ment.aspx?language=en&docnr=0234&year=2006 (May 2010).
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The Impact Assessment in the European Parliament
e European Parliament’s European Economic and Social Committee was responsible for
this proposal. Interviews with the assistants of two Members of the European Parliament
(mep) sitting on the Committee provide an insight into how the ia was used. Out of the two
interviewees, one stated clearly that her mep did not use the ia. She reported that “she had
not read the impact assessment;”63 instead she tried to get in touch with “organisations which
may benet of the programme in order to evaluate it”.64
e other interviewee indicated that although his mep did not read the ia, he provided the
mep with a summary. Because the “whole legislative proposal was put forward as a package
[with four proposed funds] . . . and the dossier was ‘huge’ everyone was looking for something
short and to the point”65 to provide a good oversight of what the proposal was about. e
document which provided this overview was the ia. Although the ia was a good tool to
develop some basic brieng, the interviewee felt that it was simplistic and required more “on
the ground examples”66 to explain the benets to other meps. For example, the ia did not
illustrate how the funds would support individual border guards in their work.e interviewee
went on to suggest that he and one person in the secretariat were the only ones who had
actually read the ia, speculating that this was “due to a lack of resources at the Parliament . . .
[and the fact that] the proposal was one of three framework decisions,”67making this a large
amount of work to handle at one time.e mep assistant also suggested that the programme
had two untold objectives, namely that it was a “solution for Spain”68 in managing its borders
and an attempt by the Commission to “strengthen its inter-institutional power”69 under the
third pillar by providing Member States with “nancial incentives”.70e former claim was
supported by a media report which suggested that “Spain will be the main beneciary of
the European funds for migration ows . . . nanced by the Solidarity and Migration Flows
63European Parliament esc Committee Assistant to mep 1, Interview, Brussels 2006.
64ibid.
65European Parliament esc Committee Assistant to mep 2, Interview, Brussels 2006.
66ibid.
67ibid.
68ibid.
69ibid.
70H. Goeman,Migrant integration policy at European level, Institute for European Studies 2010.
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Management”.71 In the end the European Parliament made a number of amendments to the
proposal without undertaking any ias to examine the potential impacts.
The Impact Assessment in Council
ose interviewed reported that the ia was not used during the negotiation stage. One
Member State representative suggested that “during the negotiations, everybody did their
own numbers and relied on those.”72 Two of the interviewees explained that they had read the
ia to “understand the Commission’s line of thinking”73 and to “understand the idea at the very
beginning”.74 However, one Member State representative raised the concern that the proposal
did not clearly outline the burden that the various Member States were facing and suggested
that key ndings from the ia should be part of the main proposal’s explanatory memorandum,
so as to give it more prevalence.is was not supported by another interviewee who suggested
that there might not be a need for ‘Communications’ to be accompanied by an ia, questioning
the “benet of an ia if nobody reads it”.75
As with the European Parliament, the proposal was discussed over a one-year period and
amended on a number of occasions.ere are no records of the Council undertaking ias to
support the amendments, most of which were related to the legal basis of the Commission’s
proposal.
Perceptions of the Impact Assessment
Interviews with actors outside of the European Commission shed further light on the nal
stage of this proposal. Only a few number of actors read the ia, those who had reported that:
“in principle, the analysis seemed proportionate . . . [but] there were concerns
that the impact assessment may not have addressed some of the more sensitive
71Pnews, Spain: 87 Million Euro in European Funds for Migration Flows, http://www.mail-archive.com/pnews-
l@yahoogroups.com/msg00901.html (May 2010).
72Member State Representative from Estonia, Completed Questionnaire, 2006.
73ibid.
74Member State Representative from Poland, Interview, 2006.
75Member State Representative from Germany, Interview, 2006.
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issues, such as distribution of funds; and that it did not examine how the funds
may support the challenges faced by new Member States”.76
As for whether the ia examined the right impacts, external actors agreed that it would have
been challenging to accurately examine all potential impacts, but thought that some, in
particular “the environmental ones [impacts] were not relevant”77 and had probably been
“completed last minute”.78 Other concerns included a suggestion by one external actor that the
ia “was biased towards old Member Sates issues, and maybe have been inuenced by political
decisions”79 in particular the need to provide Spain with nancial support.
e ia played, at best, a minor role during the process of Inter-Institutional Bargaining.
Although mep assistants used it to provide initial briengs and some Member State repre-
sentatives used it to ‘get up to speed’, it would be a stretch to claim the ia helped ‘stacked the
deck’ or assisted in the coordination of policy.e fact that no further ias were conducted to
support amendments also discredits the idea of enhanced rationalisation. In the end, the two
‘untold policy objectives’ of providing Spain with nancial compensation and the Commission
attempting to expand their inuence in this area provide explanations for why this proposal
did not receive signicant challenge during the nal stages. Much of the negotiation was
completed during the second ia stage and although there is some indication that the delay in
the Parliament and Council were due to questions around the legal basis of the funds, the ia
did not play a role during this debate.
5 Conclusion
e proposal and ia for the Framework Programme on Solidarity and Management of Mi-
gration Flows built on the experience of over 30 years.e groundwork for the Framework
Programme was provided by the 2000 Tampere Conclusions and in the establishment of
the European Refugee Fund. e 2004 Rome Treaty ande Hague Programme gave the
European Commission the mandate to develop the proposal and establish funds to support
Member States in the management of migration ows. With high-level support from the
76e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
77European Parliament esc Committee Assistant to mep 2, Interview, Brussels 2006.
78e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
79ibid.
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European Parliament and Council and with an April 2005 deadline, dg jls had little time to
develop the proposal. Making use of data from previous pilot projects, dg jls completed the
proposal and ia in only three months.
As for the three theoretical ambitions, this case study provided traces of (negative) coordi-
nation, but very limited evidence for ia as a means to enhance rationalisation and control.
Although dg jls complied with the ia Guidelines during the rst stage of the policy process,
publishing its intention to introduce the proposal along with a roadmap, the announcement
was made three months before the proposal was nalised. Key actors, such as Member States,
the European Parliament and Council were already aware of the Commission’s intention.
e timing of the roadmap therefore played a minor role. Despite this, some actors inside
the Commission suggested the roadmap provided a guide to dg jls’ work although not an
essential one. ere was no evidence the roadmap played an active role in enhancing the
rationalisation of the policy process other than the fact that it was completed and in doing so
outlined the policy intention and was underpinned by some basic analysis.
ere was evidence that the ia played a greater role during the second ia stage. Although dg
jls used previously available information, it undertook a data collection exercise withMember
States. Despite the fact that the work with Member States did not yield much additional data,
it provided a means for coordinating positions and developing agreed policy options. Further
data collection was undertaken with the assistance of a consultant and Eurostat, but this served
to complete the ia and provided marginal assistance in adjusting the nal proposal.e main
driver of the second ia stage was to support the option which the Commission and Member
States developed together or ‘stacking of the deck’. Policy coordination within the Commission
was limited to the Head of Unit making sure that key actors, for example in dg budg and the
Secretariat General, were content with the policy proposal ahead of the nal Inter-Service
Consultation.is limited internal coordination resembled negative coordination, as in the
end, the political timetable of April 2005 was paramount in nalising the proposal.e ia
provided a means to explain the underlying rationale and to illustrate compliance with the ia
blueprint.
e nal stage provided only minor traces of the ia’s role. Some actors used the ia report to
get up to speed on the policy in preparation for debates on the proposal. However, it is unlikely
this contributed to an enhanced rationalisation of the process. It is easy to overstate the impact
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the ia report may have had on setting the agenda, or the ia report to have been used by the
Commission to justify its position. Some evidence suggests that the prolonged negotiation in
the European Parliament and Council were based on challenges to the proposal’s legal basis.
is was one key element of the ia, but it is not clear whether the debates were based on or
even triggered by the ia. Member States, in this case Spain, were keen on receiving further
funding regardless of the ia.e ia therefore merely served as a means to do ‘everything by
the book’ to ensure the proposal was adopted as quickly as possible.
Table 24 provides a summary of the extent to which the three theoretical considerations
were applicable in each of the ia stages.
Table 24: IA as a tool for rationalisation, control or coordination
Policy Stage /eoretical Consideration Stage i Stage ii Stage iii
Enhanced Rationalisation No Some Some
Enhanced Coordination Some Some No
Enhanced Control No Yes No
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IX Case Study 5: Plant Protection Products
e nal case traces the ia process for ameasure designed by theDirectorateGeneral forHealth
and Consumer (dg sanco). It is set in the context of a long standing political division between
the policy preference of those whose primary concern are a high degree of environmental
and public protection, and the policy preference of those who prefer a risk-based approach
to support agricultural and therefore economic competitiveness.is is the second impact
assessment (ia) dg sanco undertook for this proposal, as the rst ia did not provide sucient
economic analysis as required by new ia Guidelines issued in 2005. Political divisions around
the economic impact of dg sanco’s proposal ultimately resulted in the European Parliament,
the uk and a number of industry associations to undertake their own studies during the nal
Inter-Institutional Bargaining stage.
e use of Plant Protection Products (ppp) poses risks to humans, animals and the environ-
ment. To mitigate against these risks, the European Commission embarked on a process of
harmonising the rules regarding the use of ppps, including an extensive review of existing
ppps in the European Union.e regulatory proposal this ia supports was designed to replace
a pre-existing Council Directive governing the rules on Plant Protection Products (ppp). Work
to replace the Directive started in 2001 and took ve years to complete. During this time, dg
sanco conducted a number of studies to support its policy development and manage diering
policy preferences. Building on the 1993 Directive, the new Regulation was to take stock of
the experience gained over the previous 13 years.e result was to be a proposal designed to
modify the original Directive based on an agreed mechanism to assess the safety of individual
products. Although the initial work began in 2001, the ia formally started in 2005.
Taking each of the three theoretical ambitions in turn, this case study traces enhanced
control by exploring the extent to which key actors used the ia to promote their individual
policy preference. For example, dg sanco tried to use the ia to manage the tension between
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economic interest and environmental concerns. Improved coordination is examined by
reviewing the extent to which dg sanco used the issg and consultation exercises to coordinate
key actors to reach an agreed position. Enhanced rationalisation is explored by looking at the
extent to which dg sanco used the analytical tools outlined in the ia Guidelines to contribute
toward updating the 1993 Directive. As will be shown, dg sanco’s ambitions for the ia changed
over time, with a particular emphasis on using the ia to enhance the rationalisation of the
policy process and to coordinate the economic and environmental tensions inherent in the
ppp proposal during the second ia stage. As with the rst three case studies, the polarised
policy preferences resulted in ‘stacking of the deck’, although dg sanco invested heavily in
enhanced coordination and rationalisation, particularly in the run up to the ia.
1 Background
e nal case study examines dg sanco’s eorts to manage diering interests over a long
period of time. Action to control ppps goes back to 1976 when the European Community
rst established the Council Directive 76/895eec. e Directive set out maximum levels
for pesticide residues (so called mrls) for a number of active substances used for fruit and
vegetables intended for mainly human consumption.1 e levels set out in the Directive
were controversial at the time. Some Member States argued that, to ensure food security
and for European farmers to be competitive on the global market, there was a need for a
liberal approach to the use of ppps. Other Member States were concerned about the potential
environmental and public health impacts. In particular, there were concerns over the impact
of pesticides on groundwater, wildlife, communities which lived close to farmers using certain
substances and the general public who would ultimately purchase and consume the agricul-
tural products. Over the course of 13 years, Directive 76/895/eec was followed by Directive
86/364/eec. Directive 86/364/eec set a number of maximum levels for the use of pesticides in
crop production and was followed by Directive 90/642/eec in 1990, which set levels for crops
intended for export.2 Despite these Directives, eu harmonisation of plant protection products
1A. J. Karabelas, K. V. Plakas, E. S. Solomou, V. Drossou and D. A. Sarigiannis, Impact of European legislation on
marketed pesticides—A view from the standpoint of health impact assessment studies, Environmental International,
Vol. 35, 2009.
2I. Arvanitoyannis, S. Choreaki and P. Tserkezou, “An Update of eu legislation”, Journal of International Food
Science and Technology, 2005.
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was limited and continued to be managed mainly through national legislation.is situation
continued until the early 1990s.3
In 1991 the European Council adopted Directive 91/414, designed to assist the development
of a harmonised European framework for the authorisation, use and control of ppps.e Di-
rective was the rst step in developing a coordinated European approach to ppps, establishing
“not only the principle of subsidiary, but also the precautionary principle”.4 Placing human
health and the environmental protection above other considerations — such as concerns
about agricultural yields — it established a formal approval system to grant substances eu
approval. Entering into force in 1993, with a four-year transposition period, the Directive
also kicked o a large systematic review programme, whereby existing substances and plant
protection products would be reviewed over the course of the next decade.
Under the 1993 Directive the European Commission started a review of substances which
were on the market (some 920 in total)5 and established a process to permit new products to
be sold.e review of products was completed at the end of 2008 and consisted of four stages.
One of the key elements of the review process included a risk assessment of each substance.
Individual Member States presented risk assessment reports, which were peer reviewed by
experts from other Member States. Each substance, which received approval through this
process, was added to a newly established approved Active Substance List.
e list of approved Substances was made widely available, for example on web databases
maintained by various International Organisations and Networks, including theWorld Health
Organization (who) and the International Agency for Research on Cancer (iarc). In addition,
the European Commission provided the European Parliament and Council with regular
updates on progress and, over the course of almost 15 years, issued around 50 guidance
documents and reports.eCommission also commissioned a number of research institutions
to undertake independent assessments of the regulatory framework. ey used various
methodologies and, at times, drew inconsistent conclusions on the impact of the approach
taken.is fuelled the divide between those Member States in support of the competitiveness
of European farmers and those concerned about the potential environmental and public
health impacts.
3C. Ansel, Pesticide regulation in the eu and California, University of California, February, 2008.
4ibid.
5ibid.
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To keep pace with the evaluation of substances, Directive 91/414/ec was up-dated several
times.ree basic legal changes were introduced, starting with the Commission providing
further detail on the data requirements and assessment criteria for the evaluation of substances
between 1993 and 1996.is was followed by an up-date designed to take into account the
accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden and another regulatory change was introduced to
permit further evaluations.is included additional legislative changes to accommodate data
requirements to ensure comparability across the eu. Finally, substantial work was undertaken
to delineate the denitions and borderlines with otherDirectives, such as theWater Framework
Directive, and the Biocides Directive.6
To support all of these legislative changes and to manage the dierent interests, the Com-
mission established a number of Working Groups.ese groups managed and coordinated
actors both inside and outside the Commission. For example, to manage the interests from
dierent dgs inside the Commission an Inter-Service Group on Pesticides was established
in the late 1990s. It oversaw issues related to consumer protection, environment, agriculture,
industry, trade, development and research. To reach common agreement on the approval of
products in particular, a Standing Committee on Plant Health was established.e Standing
Committee included representatives from Member States and to support the Committee with
scientic expertise, the Commission established a Scientic Committee on Plants.
In 2001, as mandated by the original Directive of 1991, the Commission presented the
European Parliament and Council with a progress report.7 e report provided an overview
of the evaluation of the plant protection products and an outline of next steps.is included
a proposal for several amendments to the original Directive, some of which would require
legislative changes. To provide more detail for the next steps, the Commission put forward
aematic Strategy entitled ‘Towards the sustainable use of plant protection products’.e
Strategy informed the European Parliament and Council of the Commission’s intention to
achieve the full implementation and review of the legal framework. Both the progress report
and theematic Strategy were considered by the European Parliament and Council.e
result was that the Commission received the mandate to work on a new Regulation to replace
Directive 91/414/ec.
6dg sanco, Report to the Council and Parliament on the evaluation of the active substances of plant protection
products, (sanco/2692/2001).
7Commission of the European Communities, Commission Report to the European Parliament and the Council:
Evaluation of the active substances of plant protection products, (com (2001) 444).
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Following theematic Strategy, dg sanco held four workshops with experts and Member
States. As part of the Commission’s mandate, the European Parliament and Council were
provided with regular updates starting in September 2003.e rst workshop was held in
2002. Hosted by Greece, it brought together various interested actors to assess progress and
discuss next steps.8 In 2004, 2005 and early 2006, the Commission held additional workshops.
e European Parliament and Council were regularly informed and in some cases invited to
participate.e outcome of these workshops formed an integral part in the development of
the new Regulation.
dg sanco completed and transmitted the proposal to replace Council Directive 91/414/
eec in July 2006. Figure 23 provides a visual summary of the background, showing that Com-
mission action goes back 20 years with clear European Parliament and Council engagement
throughout the process.
8Commission of the European Communities; Overview of the State of main work s in dg Health and Consumer
Protection with regard to the Implementation of Directive 91/414/eec (sanco/629/00 rev. 61).
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Figure 23: Background of the new regulation for plant protection products
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2 Stage I — Inception of the Impact Assessment
is section will show that although dg sanco complied with the ia blueprint, work on the ia
started well aer amendments to the Regulation9 were considered. Although an initial ia was
draed in 2003, it was delayed due to quality and concerns about the analysis underpinning
the economic impacts of the proposal.e result was that the ocial start of the inception
stage was moved to 2005 with the publication of the roadmap in the 2006 clwp. As with the
other case studies, the inception stage therefore provided a limited coordination function as
key actors were fully engaged from a much earlier stage. Furthermore, as the roadmap was
not developed at the genesis of the policy, it played no role in enhancing the rationalisation
of the process. Evidence will show that the roadmap did, however, play a role in setting out
dg sanco’s agenda and served to enhance the dg’s control over the process.e 2006 clwp
9Regulation (ec)/107/2009 of the European Parliament and Council of 21 October 2009.
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included a reference to a “proposal amending Council Directive 91/414/eec concerning the
placing of plant protection products on the market”.10 As part of the clwp, dg sanco also
published a roadmap, which was compliant with the ia blueprint.e roadmap shows that
the proposal had, in fact, been on the Commission’s agenda for some time. In particular,
the clwp states that the intention to replace Directive 91/414/eec was in accordance with
“commitment of the Commission in its progress report to Council and European Parliament
(com 444 (2001) nal) 2003/sanco/61”.11 Furthermore, the roadmap states that “ia work has
been carried out internally” with an intention to “gather additional data and to rene this ia”12
via the assistance of an external contractor”.13e roadmap also indicates that “stakeholders
have already been consulted in 2002, 2004 and 2005”14 with a nal consultation “on the impact
assessment to be carried out in December 2005 or January 2006”.15
e 2006 clwp was not the rst time the European Commission expressed its intention
to change Council Directive 91/414/eec. Building on concerns raised by Member States, the
Commission provided the European Parliament and Council with a report in 2001 high-
lighting problems with the original Directive, including an overview of proposals for future
amendments.16e report also included a proposed timeline as well as a preliminary assess-
ment of potential impacts.e 2001 report was the second time the European Parliament and
Council was informed of the challenges with the original Directive. In 1998, the Commission
informed the European Parliament and Council that it was considering amendments based
on concerns raised by Member States.is included the uk’s questions about the evaluation
and assessment procedures stipulated in the Directive and their nancial and human resource
implications.
Considerable work was undertaken well before the introduction of the European Com-
mission’s ia system. dg sanco had engaged actors both within and outside the Commission
through various consultation events and the development of close bi-lateral relationships.e
10Commission of the European Communities, Commission Legislative and Work Programme 2006, (com(2005)
531 nal).
11ibid.
12Commission of the European Communities, Roadmap on Directive on the authorization of Plant protection
products, 2005.
13ibid.
14ibid.
15ibid.
16Commission of the European Communities, Evaluation of the active substances of plant protection products,
(doc. com (2001) 444).
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roadmap stated that “there has been already an informal inter-service consultation . . . [and]
the main associated Directorate General (dg env) was closely associated with the work on
this initiative, which was related to the dg env initiative on sustainable use of pesticides”.17
e 2001 Progress Report explained that “possible amendments listed in the Report to the
Parliament and its Technical Annex . . . were discussed at a stakeholder workshop in Greece
on 10–11 July 2002 with participation of Commission, Member States and stakeholders”.18e
outcome of those meetings was used as the basis upon which the Commission would dra
proposals to amend the original Directive.
Interviews with policymakers conrmed that the Commission started to work on the
proposal well before 2006. Interestingly, according to one of the dg sanco desk ocers
working on the le “work actually started in 2003”19 when a rst dra proposal and an ia
were developed. It was reported that at the time (before 2005), dg sanco followed the 2003
ia Guidelines and held two consultation events between 2003 and 2005. During that time, the
Secretariat General up-dated the ia Guidelines and according to the desk ocer, the up-date
meant that dg sanco had to revise the proposal and the ia. One of the key Guideline changes
was an increased emphasis on the quantication of impacts, in particular administrative
burdens on business. e dra ia included little quantitative analysis and a new ia was
necessary. To support dg sanco in developing the quantitative information required by the
new ia Guidelines, the dg hired an external consultant to assist in the development of the
quantitative assessment and the nal ia.
One interviewee provided a dierent version of why the second ia was developed, stating
that:
“while dg sanco’s representatives felt that the main reason [for the further work
on the ia and proposal] was the adoption of the revised ia Guidelines in June
2005, other contributors felt that there were also concerns about the quality of
the original dra ia that had little to do with the revised Guidelines.”20
17Commission of the European Communities, Roadmap on Directive on the authorization of Plant protection
products, 2005.
18Commission of the European Committees, Commission Legislative and Work Programme 2006, com(2005)
531 nal.
19dg sanco Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
20e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
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e type of changes made to the ia and the controversy between those who supported business
interests and those who wanted greater consideration of environmental protection, support
a dierent version of why a second ia was developed. With an emphasis on establishing an
understanding of the administrative burdens on business, the new ia Guidelines adopted an
approach to ia which mirrored the approach used in the uk.is approach was viewed by
some in dg sanco as a means by which business concerns would receive greater consideration.
e second ia version may therefore have been due to an eort to build a stronger case for the
business perspective, rather than merely seeking to stay abreast of changes to the ia Guidance.
If the publication of the 2006 clwp was the Commission’s rst announcement to introduce
the proposal to revise Directive 91/414/eec this would have been too late to provide trans-
parency and coordinate key actors.is was conrmed by an interviewee from dg sanco,
who felt that the roadmap did not provide clarity.e publication of the roadmap coincided
with the hiring of an external contractor and, at best, provided actors with an overview of
the very last stages of the ia. In doing so, the Commission drew a line under the previously
completed ia and considered this the formal start of this ia—November 2005.
As illustrated by the other case studies, the late publication of the roadmap would not have
adversely impacted the ability of actors to participate in the process. dg sancowas open about
its plans to revisit the original Directive, holding various consultation events and receiving a
mandate from the European Parliament and Council to develop a proposal.is roadmap
therefore did not play a role in the coordination of actors. dg sanco developed an initial ia
in 2003, which needed to be reworked. Evidence indicates this was because of pressure to
examine the proposal’s economic impact in greater detail. In light of the two diering positions,
this suggests that the ia process was used by those who supported business considerations to
support their position. In particular, the new requirement to consider business impacts, which
resulted in a second ia supports this idea of control. Finally, although dg sanco published
the roadmap, technically marking the ia’s start, signicant amount of work was undertaken
before that date.
e decade long work to assess the safety of ppps provides some support to the idea of
enhanced rationalisation, albeit outside the context of the ia itself. However, as the roadmap
played a role in informing colleagues across the Commission (supporting, to extent enhanced
coordination). Furthermore, as a result of methodological changes to the ia Guidelines, dg
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sanco had to up-date the ia, providing some support to the notion of enhanced control over
the policy-making process, as will be explored in greater detail in the following section.
3 Stage II — Development of the Impact Assessment
is section provides an overview of the extent to which the three theoretical considerations
apply to this ia by exploring the extent to which key actors participated in the ia, the process
of quality assurance, and compliance of the nal ia report with the ia blueprint. In particular,
this section will explore the challenges of using ia as a means to incorporate information from
studies into the policy-making process (enhanced rationalisation and coordination) against
the backdrop of polarised policy preferences (i.e. attempts at control between business interest
and environmental / public health interests).
Although, this ia started in 2006 it is important to review the work undertaken before
that date as it formed an important part of the ia. As indicated in the background section,
dg sanco started to think about the improvements to Directive 91/414/eec since 2001. A
Commission progress report21 from 2001 to the European Parliament and Council on the
implementation Directive 91/414/eec highlighted the need for a number of amendments.
Many suggested amendments were a result of experiences, views and opinions gained from
Member States, consumers, public health and business groups over the course of the 1990s.
Feedback was collected through on-going interaction of key actors during the process of
evaluating and classifying existing plant protection products.e review process brought to
light a number of issues which were assessed as and when they arose. Because these changes
were minor, a detailed ia was not necessary.is was illustrated in the following passage of
the nal ia which explained changes required:
“either to bring the text in coherence with other eu policies or because the working
experience that has been gained so far showed that some measures contained
in Directive 91/414/eec were not sucient to full the objectives dened and
therefore, those provisions were adjusted in the proposal in order to optimise
them”.22
21Commission of the European Communities, Evaluation of the active substances of plant protection products,
(doc. com (2001) 444).
22ibid.
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Issues included setting agreed deadlines for actors to approve active substances to increase the
eciency of the system, setting rules for advertisement, improving the denition and roles of
inspections, setting rules for establishing guidance documents.
According to the Commission’s progress report in 2001, there was:
“a wide consensus on the need for reform. Both the Council and the European
Parliament favoured the development of more eective mechanisms and proce-
dures, to strengthen the criteria for acceptance of substances and products and to
ensure that they would be used more safely”.23
Industry in particular welcomed more eective evaluation and authorisation procedures, en-
vironmental non-governmental organisations (ngos) and consumer organisations supported
the need for increased transparency and strengthened criteria for the acceptance of active
substances. is resulted in a brainstorm meeting with Member States in February 2002.
During discussions, it was apparent that a number issues would require a more formal and
regular mechanism for feedback.e Commission launched a series of events to discuss the
working and future of Directive 91/414/eec. In July 2002 the European Commission hosted
its rst of several ‘stakeholder meetings’, inviting an exhaustive list of stakeholders”.24 Member
States, Accession Countries, the European Parliament and ngos were all invited to participate
in the draing of background papers on each of the topics identied.e report that came
out of this workshop formed the basis for further discussions during events held in January
2003 and 2005.
Workshops held between 2003 and 2005 provided a forum for the Commission to discuss
and develop an initial dra proposal and an ia with Member State input. In order to validate
the policy direction and data contained in the dra proposal and ia, the Commission held an
external consultation exercise with interested actors in April of 2005. Also, further written
evidence was collected via an “Interactive Policy Making (ipm) online consultation”25 which
was held between March and May 2005, with another consultation event held in January 2006.
e objectives of the consultation events were:
23Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market, com(2006) 388 nal.
24Commission of the European Committees, Commission Legislative and Work Programme 2006, com(2005)
531 nal.
25ibid.
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“(i) to report back to stakeholders on the orientations of the Commission in
handling all of the topics discussed at Corfu, (ii) to exchange views on a possible
compromise approach to data protection and on centralisation of the system
for authorisation of plant protection products and (iii) inform stakeholders on
planned next steps in the process”.26
In the summer of 2005 dg sanco saw a need to improve and build on the rst ia. According to
one interviewee the “report was not considered good enough to publish”27as it lacked sucient
analysis of business interests. Along with the new ia Guidelines which called for increased
understanding on the burden to business, dg sanco was compelled to develop a new ia.
To support the draing of the second ia, dg sanco recruited a consultant. His task was to
write the nal ia report over the later part of 2005 and early part of 2006, with a focus on a
quantitative assessment of future economic impacts. To oversee the consultants’ work, dg
sanco set up an Inter-Service Steering Group to meet regularly and review the consultant’s
work. Final touches to both the proposal and ia were made in April and March 2006 with the
proposal entering Inter-Service Consultation.e report was agreed in July and transmitted
to the European Parliament and Council in July 2006.
In summary, by the time dg sanco started work on this ia, it had consulted extensively with
a wide group of actors, providing interested parties with a play-by-play update of the policy
thinking.is indicated controversial context in which the proposal was developed with a
number of strong and vocal interests, including industry organisations and ngos on opposing
sides of the debate. e on-going consultation exercises assisted in ensuring the proposal
reected the interests of key actors, but in doing so also acted as a mechanism to coordinate
actors and build consensus. An initial dra proposal with a rst version ia provided a platform
for discussion, but with calls for increased economic analysis, the Commission had to dra a
second ia.
Table 25 provides an overview of the various activities and milestones dg sanco worked
on in preparation for the nal proposal.
26ibid.
27Civic Consulting — External Contractor, Interview, Phone 2006.
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Table 25: Activities and milestones for the IA
Date Activity
Progress Report
2001
dg sanco progress report on Directive 91/414/eec outlining need for
changes
July 2002 1st consultation event
January 2003 2nd consultation event
Summer 2003 dg sanco works on proposal and impact assessment
Summer 2004 dg sanco dras rst impact assessment report
January 2005 3rd consultation event and rst dra impact assessment circulated
March/May 2005 dg sanco launches on-line consultation
November 2005 dg sanco establishes Inter-Service Steering Group
November 2005 dg sanco hires external consultant to complete impact assessment
January 2006 4th consultation event
January 2006 Questionnaire sent to key actors for detailed information
March 2006 ia and proposal submitted for Inter-Service Consultation
July 2006 Proposal and ia accepted
The Impact Assessment Process
e ia process of the second, revised, ia was closely linked to the rst one. For instance, the
“internal Steering Group”28 set up in October 2004 to help dg sanco guide the policy team’s
work on the rst ia report also served as the Steering Group for the second ia. Furthermore,
dg sanco also presented the rst ia at a consultation event in 2005 and circulated to other
Commission services for consideration. Comments from the consultation event and Commis-
sion services were incorporated into the second ia.e main dierence in process between
the rst and second ia was that when by “June of 2005 it was clear that they [dg sanco]
needed an updated ia,”29 in part, because the up-dated ia Guidance called for more detailed
analysis of business impacts, dg sanco hired an external consultant.e consultant’s task was
to help strengthen the economic analysis. However, according to the dg sanco desk ocer
the “ppp ia was highly political and the data was used in a political not in a scientic way”30
and so the consultant’s work may also have been a move to mitigate against actors who were
concerned the proposal was going to negatively impact business.
28dg sanco Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
29ibid.
30ibid.
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In October 2005 Civic Consulting was hired with the expectation that the contractor could
use most of the work from the rst ia and therefore that the work would be completed quickly.
According to dg sanco the contractor had “ve weeks to clean up the internal report, but soon
[the contractor] realised this wasn’t possible”.31 Much of the pervious analysis and evidence
was not sucient and more time was required. However, the contractor stated that “those
who were willing to help [with the data] did not have data and those who had the data, did
not want to help”.32e original ve-week timeline was therefore extended to accommodate
further data collection and consultations, creating time pressure as the political timetable
required the proposal to be put forward in 2006.33
e dierence in content between the rst and the second ia was the level of quantication.
As explained by the consultant, most of the data used initially was of qualitative nature and
based on the various consultations. But as the new ia Guidelines expected a greater emphasis
on quantitative information, the challenge was to improve on the dg sanco’s work. e
external consultant stated “that very little data on the pppmarket was available”34 and so the
gap was “bridged by including qualitative evidence and the quantitative data collected from
the industry and Member State”35 in particular to calculate the administrative burdens. An
interviewee from dg entr explained that there was a real need for them to “push industry
to provide data”36 in particular because industry complained repeatedly about the cost of
the authorisation process. Despite this it proved dicult to obtain relevant data and so “the
impact boxes in the ia report were not always well supported by the accompanying text, as
they were oen based on impressions rather than facts”.37 Nevertheless, the new ia provided a
much clearer overview of business costs. However, one interviewee suggested “the change in
the data base was so thin that it should not have been approved”38 which did not diminish the
analytical work which resulted in an “ia which was helpful in ghting for”39 certain policy
options.
31ibid.
32ibid.
33ibid.
34e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
35ibid.
36dg entr Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
37ibid.
38dg sanco Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
39ibid.
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However, tight deadlines meant that, according to dg sanco ocials, “the second ia had
no inuence on the proposal”.40 Rather, the ia helped strengthen the argument and ultimately
the preferred option outlined in the nal proposal.is was supported by members of the
Inter-Service Steering Group (issg) which included “the Secretariat General, dgs ecfin, entr,
comp, agri, markt, empl, env, trade, and budg”.41 According to the external contractor,
the issg was challenging because the “dierent dgs were in conicting positions, with dg
sanco & dg env on one side and dg entr & dg comp on the other.”42 However, dg sanco
provided a dierent perspective, stating that the group was “pretty positive as there seemed
to be agreement”,43 but did admit that there was opposition to the proposal during the nal
Inter-Service Consultation processes.e opposition was, according to dg sanco, due to
the fact that “the voices and key people in the hierarchy were not represented in the issg”44,
which meant the issg did not have the mandate to make decisions. dg entr provided a more
positive recollection of events, stating that the meetings were “very constructive resulting
in improvements [to the ia] from the initial dra.”45 dg entr supportive stance provides
evidence that the second iawas designed to take business concerns more seriously. Other issg
members were less positive, with one interviewee stating that it was of limited value mostly
because “dg sanco had already been in close contact and knew the points and concerns”46 of
other dgs. In the end, “there was a feeling among participants that the exercise served the
primary purpose of justifying with more data the choices that had already been made”.47
In the end, the ia work was a result of a “lot of interaction between Commission ocials in
the operational unit and external contractors”.48 e operational unit provided the consultant
with all the available data and reports, which provided the basis for draing the nal ia. dg
entr supported the work conducted by the external consultant, explaining that, despite strong
involvement from Member State authorities “industry had not always felt that their views
were reected”49 and the consultant did a good job to remain “impartial and not accepting
40ibid.
41Civic Consulting — External Contractor, Interview, Phone 2006.
42e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
43dg sanco ia Support Unit, Interview, Brussels 2006.
44ibid.
45dg enr Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
46dg sanco Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
47e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
48dg sanco ia Support Unit, Interview, Brussels 2006.
49dg entr Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
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everything as a given,”50 giving industry a stronger voice. Although other “interviewees agreed
that the external work had added signicant value to the ia”51, dg sanco felt the report proved
that “they [dg sanco] had been right all along”52 and that the consultant was a “waste of time
from a technical standpoint”53 but useful from a political one. From dg entr’s perspective,
the second ia was important as originally there were “problems with the conclusions because
of an overemphasis of environmental benets”.54
In summary, dg sanco followed the analytical requirements outlined in the ia blueprint,
but was pushed to comply with the new requirement of assessing business burdens because of
dg entr.is supports the idea of dg entr using the ia process as a means to ‘stack the deck’
in favour of economic considerations. From dg sanco’s perspective, the independence and
neutrality of the external contractor provided the support they needed, but also vindicated
their original proposal and in doing so supporting the theoretical considerations of enhanced
rationalisation to underpin dg sanco’s policy preference.
Participation and Consultation
ree large consultation events were held between 2002 and 2005. However, according to the
contractor, the consultation process was not organised eciently because “stakeholder opin-
ions were not systematically analysed”.55is provides one explanation as to why, according to
dg entr, the industry’s position was not well represented. However, the contractor also stated
that, in his opinion, this did not diminish the value of the consultation events because both
industry and ngos were given the opportunity to challenge ndings and proposals.is was
particularly important because “very oen ngos don’t have capacity to actually support ias
compared to industry”.56 dg sanco explained that it was dicult to get ngos involved. Most in-
formation and consultation events were held with Member States and industry representatives
based in Brussels, which provided an aggregated view on the policy proposals.
50ibid.
51e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
52dg sanco Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
53ibid.
54dg entr Desk Ocer, Interview, Brussels 2006.
55Civic Consulting — External Contractor, Interview, Phone 2006.
56ibid.
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Views from those who were consulted were positive. For example, ecpa, the association
which represents the crop protection industry, stated that the consultation process was “both
open and transparent”.57is was supported by an ngo representative who stated that “overall
it was pretty transparent from the beginning”58 although they would have wanted to see the
nal results of their contributions before the proposal was adopted by the Commission.is
was also supported by ecpa. Both representatives agreed that the nal ia did not always provide
a clear assessment of the entire proposal, in particular the need for and the impact of the so
called “hazard based approach.”59 is was a particular concern of the ngo representative
who felt this was a weakness in the analysis which allowed industry to have the ‘hazard based
approach’ provision dropped at negotiation stage due to a lack of evidence.is issue would
indeed become an issue during the nal stages of negations, as will be illustrated later.
Actors were aware of the Commission’s work from the events held as part of the rst ia;
they also had opportunities to provide views and opinions.e redraing of the ia supported
dg entr’s and therefore industries’ ability to inuence the ia process. ngo held concerns that
the ia did not provide a strong story to counteract the ppp industry’s lobby, supporting the
idea that the ia was used by dg sanco as a means for enhanced coordination, but by other
dgs as a means for enhanced control.
Quality Assurance
In this case, the quality of the ia was monitored primarily by dg sanco’s ia support unit.e
unit provided advice on a continuous basis but there was no “strict criteria for quality”.60 An
interviewee from the Secretariat General reported that their role was to be “the Guardian of the
Guidelines and to provide examples for possible solutions”61 but was less able to provide value
from a policy standpoint. Another interviewee suggested “that the success of the ia depended
to some extent on the mix of skills of those involved, which ideally should comprise both
experts on the relevant policies, and people with strong expertise in methods”.62 In particular,
57ecpa (European Crop Protection Association), Interview, Brussels 2006.
58ibid.
59Pesticides Action Network (pan) Europe, Interview, Brussels 2006.
60dg sanco ia Support Unit, Interview, Brussels 2006.
61Secretariat General, Interview, Brussels 2006.
62e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
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the ability to “take a step back from the political process”63 was deemed important. In the
case of this ia and that function was fullled primarily by the ocial(s) from dg sanco’s ia
support unit.”64
e proposal and the ia were submitted for Inter-Service Consultation in March 2006,
but it was not until July when the Commission reached an agreement and transmitted the
proposal and the ia to the European Parliament and Council. e three months between
initial Inter-Service Consultation and agreement indicates internal disagreement. However,
there were no ocial reports on what held up the clearance process. An examination of the
Secretariat-General’s formal opinion provides a clue. It “makes one minor reference to the ia,
criticising that the ‘status quo’ option had not been adequately analysed (since the workload
regarding the examination of authorisation requests on active substances was apparently
expected to be drastically reduced in 2008).”65 is further supports the notion that there
were concerns about the proposal’s impact on industry which were backed by dg entr (i.e.
dg entr used the process to ensure the ia took greater account of the potential impact on
industry or as a means for ‘stacking the deck’).
The Impact Assessment Document
A review of the ia report shows that dg sanco followed the ia blueprint. In particular, the ia
report includes an overview of all of the key analytical steps. Although it does not provide an
executive summary, it does give an overview of the context in which the ia was developed
and the problems to be tackled. It also outlines the objectives and several policy options.e
ia report does not provide evidence or an insight into the concerns around the quantication
of administrative burdens to business, nor that this was the second ia (as was outlined in the
previous section).
Table 26 shows that the nal ia report complied with most of the categories outlined in the
ia blueprint/Guidelines.
63ibid.
64ibid.
65e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
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Table 26: Compliance of IA report with IA Guidelines
Report outline according to the iaGuidelines
Section Status
Executive Summary Done
Context/Background Done
Problem Done
Objectives Done
Policy Options Done
Impact Assessment Done
(economic, social and environmental)
Assessment of impacts outside the eu Not done
Quantication of impacts Done
Comparison of Options Done
Presentation of preferred options Done
Framework for future assessment Done
e second ia stage showed that dg sanco invested signicant eort into consulting key
actors. Unusually, compared with the other case studies examined in this research, dg sanco
hired an external contractor to redra their initial ia.is was, in part, to improve the data
and analysis, but more importantly, to ensure the analysis reected dg entr’s and therefore
business concerns. Bringing in a contractor provided the backing dg sanco required to put
forward their proposal. It also provided support in mitigating against industry and dg entr’s
concerns that economic or business impacts were not given enough consideration. Although
this provides strong evidence for the argument that the ia process was used to enhance the
rationalisation of the policy processes, equally, it supports the idea that data was used to
promote specic policy preferences and so enhanced control. dg sanco invested a lot of
time and resources in coordinating actors, building on Steering and Working Groups, which
were established several years back.e Inter-Service Steering Group provided a means for
engaging with actors within the Commission, but due to the composition of the group, dg
sanco found it of limited value. Much of the work was based on a decade-long exercise of
working with Member States. Nevertheless, stage ii provided a means for continuing this
coordination. However, it is easy to overplay the importance of the ia. Work to develop
this proposal was well underway and the ia was not a core element of this process. e
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detailed consultation and assessment requirements were part of dg sanco’s modus operandi
in addressing Plant Protection Products more broadly.
4 Stage III — Inter-Institutional Bargaining
is section describes the context in which the ia was negotiated, showing that the division
between those actors concerned about environmental and public health issues (e.g. during
the second ia stage dg sanco and ngos) and those supportive of industry (e.g. during
the second ia stage dg entr and industry representatives) continued to play a signicant
role. In particular, this section shows that although evidence from the ia was used during
the negotiation stage and additional evidence was supplied by Member States, this was not
primarily about improving the quality of the proposal or enhanced rationalisation of the policy
making process. Rather, industry in particular, used further studies as a tool for supporting
and furthering their policy preference, supported by a number of Member States.
e Committee of the Regions provided the rst reaction. In February of 2007 the Com-
mittee welcomed the Commission’s proposal but raised a number of concerns including the
call for more quantitative objectives to reduce pesticide use.e ocial literature does not
provide a clear indication of the extent to which the ia was considered during Committee
discussions, but ocially, the Committee did not believe the proposal went far enough to
prevent the contamination of surface waters. Representing a dierent perspective, in April
2007 the Economic and Social Committee draed a report which included a call for the
proposal to place a greater emphasis on economic considerations.is was unusual because
the Economic and Social Committee was not the lead Committee, but it set the context for
the conict between the two positions. Following these two opinions, the Committee on the
Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (envi), holding formal responsibility for the
proposal, started its deliberation. During the rst Parliamentary reading in September 2007,
almost 250 amendments were made and accepted. Changes included a recommendation to
extend the legal basis, changes to the approval procedure and a rejection of the Commission’s
proposal to pursue a ‘zone-based’ approach (i.e. to divide the eu into a few large zones),
opting instead to maintain national control over product approval processes. To support the
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European Parliament, a study was commissioned to undertake a more detailed examination
of the eects on public health.
e Commission took the opportunity to review the proposed amendments and made a
number of changes, accepting several of the Parliamentary amendments. On March 2008 the
Commission transmitted an amended version to the Institutions and the Council adopted a
common position in September 2008.e Hungarian, Irish, Romanian and uk delegations
abstained, citing concerns about the approval procedures in particular.
Although the Council did not undertake a formal ia, in May 2008 the uk did, countering
the study the European Parliament commissioned. Using the uk’s expertise in quantitative
assessment of impacts on business, the ia examined “283 substances to see which would
be aected by the cut-o criteria for health and environmental hazards proposed by the
Commission as well as by the more stringent cut-o criteria proposed by the European
Parliament”.66 However, according to the European Parliament, the “uk assessment did not
consider possible benets in terms of human health or environment, but rather focused on the
possible impact on agricultural productivity if certain chemicals were no longer available for
pesticide use.”67e uk ia was viewed as a means to support industry interests. In response,
the European Parliament commissioned a “study to assess the health benets of strict ‘cut-o
criteria’ on human health in relation to the proposal for a Regulation concerning the placing
of plant protection products on the market (com (2006) 388)”.68e purpose of the report
was to:
“provide a scientic review of evidence concerning human health eects of plant
protection products . . . [and] support the proposal of the European Parliament
that in order to ensure added protection of human health, substances considered
to cause a risk of developmental neurotoxic or immunotoxic eects in humans
should be added to the list of classications that would result in non-approval of
active substances, unless negligible exposure can be demonstrated”.69
66e European Parliament,e benets of strict cut-o criteria on human health in relation to the proposal for a
Regulation concerning plant protection products, (ip/a/envi/st/2008–18).
67ibid.
68ibid.
69ibid.
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e lines were drawn and over the coming threemonths the European Parliament and Council
worked on reaching a compromise.is was achieved in December 2008. In the end, both
the European Parliament and Council backed the measure, but “farmers’ groups and pesticide
producers argued that the proposed bans were based on assumptions rather than science”.70
In fact, unusually, the ia was raised on numerous occasions by various actors outside of
the Commission. For example, the European Crop Protection Association (ecpa), which
represents pesticide manufacturers
“strongly rejected the hazard-based cut-o criteria for the safety assessment of
substances, as it believed it was based purely on political perception, calling on
the Commission to conduct a European assessment of the impact of the proposed
cut-os . . . before the new regulation is adopted in order to allow legislators to
make fully informed decisions”.71
An Italian research institute Nomisma published a study on behalf of Syngenta and Bayer Crop
Science, which “argued that overly-stringent eu rules on pesticides would reduce European
agricultural self-suciency and trigger food price increases and job losses in the agri-food
sector”.72e Royal Agriculture Society of England went even so far as to accusing dg sanco
of not providing a comprehensive and appropriate assessment of the potential impact of the
hazard based ‘regulatory cut-o criteria’ and calling on the eu ombudsman to investigate the
matter.
In January 2009 the European Parliament voted to “restrict the use of toxic pesticides,
despite strong opposition from the uk, Spain and Hungary and calls for better evaluation
of the legislation’s impact upon agricultural production and food prices”.73 Shortly aer, the
proposal was ratied by the Council, despite opposition from the uk, Ireland, Spain and
Hungary.
70EurActiv, Pesticides: Striking the right balance?, http://www.euractiv.com/en/sustainability/pesticides-striking-
right-balance/article-175831 (October 2008).
71ibid.
72ibid.
73EurActiv, Parliament seals pesticides deal amid opposition, http://www.euractiv.com/en/climate-environment/
parliament-seals-pesticides-deal-amid-opposition/article-178470 (January 2009).
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The Impact Assessment in Parliament
e European Parliament’s lead committee was the Committee of Environment, Public Health
and Food Safety. According to the assistants of one of the Committee members the “impact
assessment was very useful for transparency reasons” but there was a view that this ia was
very much about “justifying their [the Commission’s] proposal” in an attempt to “manage the
dierent [political] interests”.74 Despite this ia providing a clear overview of the Commission’s
thinking, the Committee member also reported that, based on his experience, “ias are not
oen read in Committee, only when there are controversial cases can an ia be instrumental”.75
is was just such a case.
Unlike the other case studies considered in this research, arguments around the merits of
the proposal referred to ndings in the ia. Evidence suggests that the ia was read by Members
of the European Parliament (meps). One British Conservative mep “argued that the new
legislation would reduce yields of a number of foods, including carrots, cereals, potatoes,
onions and parsnips, whilst pushing up prices for consumers.”76 Although this statement
probably referred to the study completed by the uk government, the European Parliament
commissioned its own study to argue the impact of the proposal on public health.
Ultimately the discussion was based on policy preferences, in particular how to weigh the
impacts on business against the benets for the environment and public health. In the nal
Parliamentary debate, a number of meps made reference to ia, quoting the fact which best
proved their point, such as the expected improvement to groundwater vs. the detrimental
secondary aects to crop production and the farming community. It should be noted that
the Parliamentary study did not cover any of the 250 amendments; it focused on the main
critique posed by the business lobby instead, a clear indication of enhanced rationalisation in
support of ‘stacking the deck’.
74European Parliament mep Assistant, Interview, December 2006.
75ibid.
76EurActiv, Parliament seals pesticides deal amid opposition, op. cit.
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The Impact Assessment in Council
e Council’s Agriculture and Fisheries Working Group held responsibility for this proposal.
One Working Group member reported that “the Presidency had asked the Commission
whether there should be a specic discussion on the ia, but was reportedly told that this was
not necessary, and that the ia should be discussed together with the proposal”.77is shows
that there was a strong focus on the proposal with the ia playing very much a secondary role.
e interviewee further reported, similar to the ndings from other case studies that “ias are
only rarely referred to in the discussions in the Working Group”.78 Overall, the interviewee
suggested “ias were useful as background and for transparency reasons, but that there was
generally no need to discuss them at the political level”.79
Although the ia did not play a big role in discussion, the Council did note that the Com-
mission’s ia did not include all relevant analysis. In particular, analysis for one of the key
Commission options was missing. In particular, according to the Council interviewee, the
ia did not “address the cut-o criterion which was important for some Member States”.80
As reported by the media, one of these Member States included the uk. Described briey
in the previous section, in 2008 the uk’s Pesticide Safety Directorate undertook a study into
the ‘cut-o criteria for health and environmental hazards proposed by the Commission and
European Parliament.e study suggested the proposal was going to place an undue burden
on industry and although the Council did not formally endorse the report, it resulted in a
formal Commission response.
Just before the Parliament’s Environmental Committee voted on the proposal, Commis-
sioner Vassiliou made a public statement reassuringMembers of the European Parliament and
Member State representatives that the proposed replacement of Directive 91/414/eec would
not have a serious impact on agriculture.e Commission went so far as to explain that the
“ia conducted by the uk’s Pesticide Safety Directorate was based on a worst case scenario and
unrealistic gures”.81Although the uk worked hard to achieve its policy preference, in doing so
77e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
78ibid.
79European Council Finland Attaché, Interview, Brussels 2006.
80ibid.
81Royal Agricultural Society of England, Letter to eu ombudsman, 2008.
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using the process as a means for enhanced control, in the end, the uk did not have sucient
votes to block the proposal and chose to abstain instead.
Perceptions of the Impact Assessment Report
Interviews with actors outside of the European Commission conrm the issues highlighted in
media reports. Although interviewees:
“agreed that the overall depth and scope of the analysis in the ia were sucient
. . . [there were concerns] that the two specic aspects had been analysed dispro-
portionately: the impacts on human health and the environment of a reduced
use of pesticides were not analysed systematically, and one important action area
(the “cut-o criteria”) was not examined at all”.82
According to the industry interviewee:
“cut-o criteria had been included in the dra proposal of 2005, but had become
much stricter in the nal (2006) proposal, without having been addressed in the
ia.e interviewee representing an environmental ngo noted that they were very
much in favour of the strict criteria, but felt that they should have been assessed in
the ia, since there was a risk that the lack of evidence on their likely impacts could
play in the industry’s favour and result in a relaxation of these criteria during the
legislative process.”83
ese statements reect the divisions among key actors, but are at odds with the idea that dg
entr pushed for greater analysis of economic impacts.
is raises the question as to why dg sanco did not examine the impacts of the cut-o
criteria, an issue which was important to industry. One interviewee suggested this was
“because it would have been [technically/inherently] dicult to compare the
health and environmental benets (which are dicult to quantify) with the costs
to the industry (which are much easier to quantify), as this comparison might
have produced unfavourable results”.84
82e Evaluation Partnership, Evaluation of the European Commission’s ia system, op. cit.
83ibid.
84ibid.
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is suggests the analysis of certain options would have provided results which did not reect
Commission priorities. For example, the available methodology and analysis of the cut-
o criteria may have disproportionally favoured industry at the expense of environmental
and public health concerns. is was supported by Working Group members who stated
that from “the environmental viewpoint, health and environmental impacts were poorly
assessed in comparison with the economic costs”.85 Not surprisingly, this was in direct contrast
to the industry, which felt that “that while the analysis as such was balanced, some of the
interpretations and conclusions drawn from the available evidence were not balanced, and
did not take economic concerns suciently into account.”86
e nal stage of this ia showed that, along with further studies supplied by the European
Parliament and the uk, it played a key role during nal negotiations. In particular, the evidence
suggests that the ia’s role was to provide further facts and gures for each of the opposing policy
preferences.e European Parliament undertook its own study in response to strong industry
interests, which in turn provided their own studies supported by Member States, such as the
uk. Although debates in both the European Parliament and Council referred to evidence in
the ia, these references were in support of specic arguments.is section therefore provides
support to the idea that this ia was used as a means for enhanced rationalisation of the
policy process and clearly to enhance control or ‘stack the deck’ in favour of specic policy
preferences.
5 Conclusion
e Regulation designed to replace Council Directive 94/414/eec was developed taking into
account the experiences built up over the course of the original Council Directive and a
10-year exercise to reclassify Plant Protection Products. Similar to the third Postal Services
Directive, this proposal was mandated by the European Parliament and Council. is ia
must therefore be viewed within its wider context.e Commission knew well in advance
of starting the ia that it would need to make sweeping changes. In preparation, dg sanco
undertook a detailed evaluation programme of plant protection products.roughout this
85ibid.
86ibid.
258
JohannesM.Wolff Case Study 5: Plant Protection Products
time there were polarised policy preferences around the extent to which the industry should
be regulated. Although there was agreement that environmental protection and public health
considerations needed to be balanced against economic interests, there was disagreement on
the level of balance.e ia process played an important role in this disagreement.
A look at this ia through the three theoretical considerations shows that the ia was used,
to a varying degree, to enhance coordination, rationalisation and control throughout the ia
policy stages. Although the rst ia stage ocially started in 2005 with the publication of the
roadmap, this was aer an initial ia had been draed.e roadmap and its publication in
the clwp was therefore mostly a box-ticking exercise.e process had started earlier when
the intention to develop a new legislative instrument to manage plant protection products in
Europe was announced in 2001.e notion of developing a new legislative vehicle was backed
by both the European Parliament and Council. Although the inception of this ppp policy was
outside the context of the ia process, one dg entr interviewee suggested the roadmap was
helpful in understanding dg sanco’s intentions.is supports the idea that roadmaps provide
a means for enhanced coordination. However, as dg entr represented industry concerns, dg
entr’s interest was less about coordination and more about checking up on dg sanco (i.e.
enhanced control).
e second ia stage must also be viewed within a wider context. dg sanco originally
draed an ia in 2004, but a new one was needed in 2005. Although the ocial story was that
the new ia needed to take into account new requirements laid out in an up-dated version of the
ia Guidelines, interviewees provided a more nuanced explanation.e consultant suggested
the re-dra was due to a lack of quantication of the potential impact on industry. Others
suggested that dg entr tried to use the changes to the ia to achieve changes in the proposal,
in eect representing industry’s policy preference. e hiring of an external consultant to
work side by side with dg sanco suggested little additional information was available; rather
dg sanco was looking to use the analysis derived from the ia process to reach an agreed
position within the Commission, particularly with dg entr. Although the issg provided
some coordination function, the composition of the group, in terms of seniority, meant that
it did not provide dg sanco with an agreed position before the Inter-Service Consultation.
With evidence to support all three theoretical considerations, the case study tells a story of an
attempt to use enhanced coordination and rationalisation to achieve an agreed policy position,
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but that the ia process was used by dg entr to ‘stack the deck’.e theoretical consideration
of enhanced control therefore plays a prominent role.
Unusually, as compared to the other case studies, this ia also played a role during the nal
ia policy stage. Although the European Parliament and Council made a number of changes
to the original proposal without undertaking detailed ias, the European Parliament, the uk
and a number of trade associations provided further studies to support their preferred policy
option.e case study did not yield evidence to support the idea that the ia provided a means
to enhance the coordination of policy interests. Instead, the commissioning of various studies
provides some support for the consideration of enhanced rationalisation, but because the
information played a key role in supporting diering policy positions (more stringent ppp
regulation versus a more industry friendly approach), the notion of enhanced control is much
more central.
In summary, in contrast to the two preceding case studies, this ia played a prominent
role in enhancing the rationalisation, control and coordination of the policy-making process.
However, the ia’s role should not be overstated. External consultations and studies were part
of the original mandate and this ia built on an established process. Finally, although dg sanco
sought to use the ia as a means for enhanced rationalisation and coordination, like the rst
two case studies on Pre-Packed Products and theematic Strategy on Air Pollution, this ia
primarily played a strategic role in the political discussions between dg sanco and dg entr
(i.e. supporters of consumer and environmental considerations versus business and economic
interests).
Table 27 following gure provides a summary of the variation in the ia ambitions of
enhanced rationalisation, control and coordination in the context of the ppp proposal.
Table 27: IA as a tool for rationalisation, control or coordination
Policy Stage /eoretical Consideration Stage i Stage ii Stage iii
Enhanced Rationalisation No Yes Some
Enhanced Coordination Some Yes No
Enhanced Control Yes Yes Yes
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It was noted earlier that one of the key criticism regarding ias has pointed to their ambitions.
is thesis has examined ia as a set of procedural rules designed to advance several motives
or ambitions, including enhanced rationalisation, control and coordination. Acknowledging
that the pursuit of three ambitions (or logics) means ia risks “becoming all things to all men”,1
this thesis posed the question: are ia ambitions complementary, does one dominate others, or
are they contradictory?e purpose of this research was to go beyond much of the literature’s
methodological focus on whether the ia report achieves (or fails to satisfy) the individual
ambitions of enhanced control,2 rationalisation,3 or coordination.4 In examining ve ia cases
with a three-staged approach, this research explored the extent to which the three ambitions
complement or contradict each other. In doing so, this thesis contributes to a broad debate
between those who believe that the logic of enhanced control prevails the policy-making
process rendering other ia ambitions subservient to ‘political considerations,’5 and those who
favour the logic of enhanced rationalisation, arguing for ever-improved ia processes and tools
to overcome ‘irrationality’ and ‘information asymmetry’.
In applying a dynamic three-staged approach to trace the ia process, this research argues
that the multiplicity of ia ambitions is not merely a consequence of jurisdictional variation,6
but a result of changes in the contributions and ambitions of actors. In particular, this thesis
nds that while the ia ambition of enhanced control — specically ‘stacking of the deck’ —
1A. Meuwese, Impact Assessment in eu Lawmaking, op. cit.
2See: E. Posner, “Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benet Analysis”,op. cit.or G. Rowe, “Tools for control of
political and administrative agents: ia and Governance in the eu”, op. cit.
3See: N. Lee and C. Kirkpatrick, “Integrated impact assessment”, op. cit. or C. Cecot, R. Hahn, and A. Renda,
“A Statistical Analysis of the Quality of the Impact Assessment in the European Union”, op. cit.
4For example: oecd, Indicators of Regulatory Management System, op. cit. or A. Meuwese, Impact Assessment in
eu Lawmaking, op. cit.
5H. Heclo and A. Wildavsky,e private government of public money, op. cit.
6C. Radaelli, “Diusion without convergence: how political context shapes the adoption of regulatory impact
assessment”, op. cit.
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plays a dominant role when policy preferences are polarised, this only partly validates the views
of ia sceptics. Indeed, this thesis argues for a hierarchical complementarity of ia ambitions,
whereby each ambition plays a distinct role under the umbrella of enhanced control. is
is because of actors’ changing ambitions over the course of a dynamic three-staged process,
whereby each theoretical ambition exhibits dierent characteristics and plays a dierent role
at each ia stage.is nding calls for a more considered view of ia, accepting its limitations
but also acknowledging its opportunities for enhancing public policy.
e above ndings are based on the application of a three-staged approach, which — in
conjunction with a set of proxies identied in Chapterree — was used to trace the three
ambitions of enhanced rationalisation, control and coordination in the empirical evidence.
While the evidence in Chapter Four — a large ‘n’ analysis — provided a number of distinct
ndings by tracing analytical and procedural steps, it also shows the limitations of using the
ia report as the unit of analysis and called for a more nuanced approach. In examining the
changing ambitions of actors over the course of a dynamic ia process, the case studies relied
on the triangulation of empirical evidence— such as interviews, surveys and ia reports — and
proxies to trace each ambition.rough doing this, the case studies showed that the enhanced
coordination is more prominent during the early stages of the ia process — inception of
an ia—whereas enhanced rationalisation is most prominent during the second ia stage —
development of an ia— and enhanced control or ‘stacking the deck’ by multiple principals
more dominant during the second and nal ia policy stages.
e case studies also show that ias do not enhance procedural controls as expected by the
ia blueprint , nor that ias achieve the ideals of each ambition — such as the unbiased analysis
of policy problems as called for by the ideal logic of rationalisation or mutually benecial
policy proposals as called for by the logic of coordination. Rather than achieving ideals, the
case studies show that each ambition enhance their respective logic along a spectrum or range.
Finally, while this thesis nds ia to be a means for ‘stacking the deck’ — a nding already
identied in regard to the tension between actors in support of economic liberalisation and
actors in support environmental or social protection7 — it also identies distinct roles for
the logics of enhanced rationalisation and coordination. In doing so, this study departs from
7J. Hertin, K. Jacob, and A. Volkery, “Policy Appraisal”, op. cit.
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the existing literature, which recognizes the idea of ‘justication’, but without exploring the
interplay of other ambitions or logics.8
e rest of this chapter is divided into three parts. It starts with a summary of the empirical
chapters, contrasting the theoretical ambitions by ia stage and illustrating how each ambition
varies and changes over the course of the ia process. is provides the key nding of this
research, showing that the potential contradictions between the ia logics are resolved through
variations in ia ambitions.is nding is picked up in part two which provides details on
the methodological and theoretical contributions of this thesis.e third and nal section
concludes this thesis and considers opportunities for future research.
1 Variation and Hierarchy of Impact Assessment Ambitions
is thesis examined ia as a process to assess future policy consequences, dividing it into
three stages and assigning the three theoretical ambitions a continuous role throughout the
policy-making process. As the following pages show, assessing ia as part of a dynamic policy-
making process reveals a number of variations in ia ambitions. Chapter Two —eoretical
Considerations — highlighted the potential for the theoretical ambitions to be in conict
with each other. For instance, compromises reached through enhanced coordination may
not be compatible with the evidence collected under the banner of enhanced rationalisation
or the policy preferences of the decision-maker under the ambition of ‘stacking the deck’.
However, Chapter Two also outlined the potential of the three theoretical ambitions to act in
a complementary manner.is complementarity is based on the dynamic changes of actors
and their interests or policy preferences over the course of the policy-making process. Indeed,
changes in actors and their interests provide an opportunity for the theoretical ambitions to
play dierent roles, complementing each other, albeit in a hierarchical manner.
By building on the idea of an “evolving approach to the policy-making process”9 and in
conjunction with the three-staged approach, complementary hierarchy describes the changes
in policy preferences and the interplay of ia ambitions. In particular, the complementarity
of ia ambitions is based on the idea that they are ‘ranges’— rather than absolutes — and
8C. Dunlop, M. Maggetti, C. Radaelli, D. Russels, “e many uses of regulatory impact assessment: A meta-
analysis of eu and uk case studies”, op. cit.
9H. D. Lasswell,e Decision Process: Seven Categories of Functional Analysis, op. cit.
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the recognition that each ambition plays a dierent role at each ia stage. For example, while
procedural controls promote analytical and procedural rules to enhance rationalisation and
coordination, the logic of ‘stacking the deck’ plays an ever more important role as nal policy
decisions draw near. Indeed, the tension between economic liberalisation and environmental
protection as well as social protection plays an important role in the dominance of enhanced
control or ‘stacking the deck’. While this nding risks validating the critique that ia ambitions
will always be tempered because enhanced control will “put community [or cultural / social
values] above policy”10, the following pages illustrate that this would ignore a nuanced and
important narrative around ia ambitions. Indeed, while the large ‘n’ analysis in Chapter Four
provided an insight into the three ia ambitions, it is the individual case studies that provide
the detailed evidence underpinning the ndings of this thesis.
e following pages summarise the empirical evidence in regard to the variation of ia
ambitions and present the ndings of this research.e following section therefore examines
each theoretical ambition, identifying variations by ia policy stage, changes in the charac-
teristic as well as the role of policy preferences (i.e. between economic liberalisation and
environmental or social protection). Suggesting that the variation in ambitions are due to the
degree to which policy preferences are divergent and the changing role of actors at each of the
ia stages, the following section is divided into four sub sections; the empirical evidence for
enhanced rationalisation, control and coordination respectively. Each provides an overview of
the results from the ve case studies and the large ‘n’ analysis, drawing a distinction between
the two types of empirical evidence, before outlining a conclusion to set the stage for part two.
Variations of Enhanced Rationalisation
ia as a means for enhanced rationalisation is the introduction of a process to structure the
analysis of information, where judgements, conicts and shortcomings are declared. e
idea is to ensure policymakers do not undertake grossly incompetent analysis, by seeking to
encourage policymakers tomove toward a systematic synoptic approach to analysis, supported
by improved analytical, methodological and policy processes. In the words of policymakers,
ia is a means to enhance rationalisation to “improve the quality of policy proposals.”11is
10H. Heclo and A. Wildavsky,e private government of public money, op. cit..
11Commission of the European Communities, Impact Assessment Guidelines, op. cit.
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includes the application of new analytical methodologies, such as the use of quantitative
information to assess economic impacts12 and support the policy preference of economic
competitiveness.e European Union’s ia goes beyond merely improving processes — for
example by encouraging the publication of a roadmap during the rst ia stage or calling
upon the European Parliament and Council to conduct their own ia on amendments — by
seeking to enhance analytical depth. It is designed to introduce analytical and methodological
breadth through the requirement to use both quantitative and qualitative information to
assess policy proposals from three policy perspectives (or preferences); economic, social and
environmental.13 As the following section illustrates, the empirical evidence illustrates changes
in the ambition of enhanced rationalisation across the ia stages.
e ia system’s blueprint is specic about the idea of a broad, more scientic, and structured
approach to the policy-making process, stating that during the inception stage, policymakers
should assess the need for policy action; during the second stage they should undertake a
balanced assessment of economic, social and environmental consequences;14 and during the
nal stage should ne-tune the proposal to support decision-makers in choosing the ‘optimal’
policy option.15 Although the theoretical expectation is that ia enhances rationalisation across
the policy-making process, the large ‘n’ analysis shows that enhanced rationalisation plays
a distinct role during the rst two ia stages, while the ve case studies show that enhanced
rationalisation plays a primary role during the second ia stage. Case study evidence also
shows that enhanced rationalisation is a tool for actors both in and outside the Commission
to use the ia process as a means for enhanced control or ‘stacking the deck’ and therefore
in support of specic policy preferences. ia as a means for enhanced control is examined in
greater detail in the second part of this section — variations of enhanced control.
e examination of 155 ia reports, roadmaps and clwps in Chapterree illustrated the
limitation of ia reports, but also of the ambition of enhanced rationalisation. e rst ia
stage — inception of the ia— showed that compared to the total number of policy proposals,
only a minority were accompanied by a roadmap. is suggested a limited application of
12C. Cecot, R. Hahn, and A. Renda, “A Statistical Analysis of the Quality of the Impact Assessment in the
European Union”, op. cit.
13C. Radaelli and F De Francesco, Regulatory quality in Europe: Concepts, measures, and policy process, op. cit.
14Commission of the European Communities, Impact Assessment Guidelines, op. cit.
15European Parliament, Council and Commission, Inter-Institutional Agreement on Impact Assessment: General
Principles, op. cit.
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enhanced rationalisation across all Commission policies, but was qualied by survey ndings
that showed policymakers believed ‘signicant or important proposals’ were accompanied
by ias. Evidence for the second ia stage — development of the ia — provided stronger
support for the ambition of enhanced rationalisation as many of the ia reports gave an
overview of the economic, social and environmental analysis, with some indication that ia
reports had a strong focus on economic assessments (i.e. supporting the policy preference
of economic liberalisation) in particular. Nevertheless, the ia reports reected the analytical
steps representative of enhanced rationalisation as outlined in the ia Guidelines. However,
without further qualitative information or a more detailed analysis of individual cases, it
was unclear the extent to which the information in the ia report contributed to enhanced
rationalisation.e evidence for the third ia stage — the inter-institutional bargaining — was
limited, but showed that the European Parliament made modest eorts to use the ia process
(no evidence of the Council using ia).is therefore provided little support for the ambition
of enhanced rationalisation at this nal stage.
e individual case studies provided more detailed insight into the fourth chapter’s ndings.
dg entr’s proposal to de-regulate Pre-Packed Sizes’ rst ia stage was dominated by the slim
programme, a longstanding initiative to remove regulations at the European level, which
was also a policy preference supported by a small number of Member States. slim, with the
backing of the European Parliament, Council and Member States, announced the intention to
introduce the Pre-Packed Sizes proposal and set the agenda many years before work on the
proposal started. Policymakers incorporated and built on the information collected during
the slim programme, using the ia template to assess impacts. e nal ia report gave a
short but comprehensive overview of the data / information and therefore procedural and
analytical steps undertaken, but much of this was due to slim rather than the ia process.e
limits of enhanced rationalisation were apparent during the nal ia stage when the European
Parliament raised concerns about the evidence in the ia.e European Parliament sought
additional information on consumer protection and impacts on small and medium sized
enterprises (smes), with no evidence that the Council used the ia. By conducting its own
ia, the European Parliament developed its own ia to support its policy preference of not de-
regulating the market, supporting ideas of ‘stacking the deck’, rather than the ideal ambition
of enhanced rationalisation. Enhanced rationalisation was therefore not a strong feature of
this ia.
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e second case study provided stronger evidence for the theoretical ambition of enhanced
rationalisation, particularly in support of the policy preference of increased environmental
protection. dg env’s proposal for the Airematic Strategy set out a framework to improve
air quality in Europe.e Strategy was accompanied by a roadmap and published in the clwp.
However, the Strategy was preceded by an extensive programme (cafe). cafe, designed to
provide evidence to develop Europe’s environmental strategy for clean air, was established
in 2001. By 2005, signicant research and consultations had been conducted, acting as a
preliminary ia. e roadmap therefore did not play a signicant role. As for the second
ia stage, enhanced rationalisation played a much more important role. dg env undertook
extensive data collection exercises and worked with numerous actors. Although this work
nished abruptly— according to external actors suggesting a limit to enhanced rationalisation
— considerable eorts were put into identifying relevant data and building dg env’s case.
During the nal ia stage the Council tried to use the ia to inform debates on the adverse
economic eects, although this was ultimately overshadowed by political considerations.
Regardless, this ia was considered by many actors to be a good example of ‘quality impact
assessment’ or enhanced rationalisation.
dg markt’s proposal for the third Directive on the liberalisation of Postal Services was also
accompanied by a roadmap, supporting the notion that the rst ia stage played an important
role. But, like the two preceding case studies, the proposal was discussed over a long period
and preceded by two Directives.e Commission, European Parliament and Council had
announced their intention many years before the roadmap was published, which included
the requirement of a number of studies and regular updates to the European Parliament
and Council. is preparatory work was therefore of more importance than the roadmap.
Nevertheless, the studies provide support to the idea of enhanced rationalisation during the
early stages, albeit outside the context of the ia process. Enhanced rationalisation played
a stronger role during the second ia stage. dg markt invested considerable eort into
identifying relevant data and building its case for market liberalisation. Finally, although the
ia was read by the European Parliament and Council during the third ia stage, no additional
ias were conducted on amendments and the original ia was mainly used to support two
opposing policy preferences during Parliamentary and Council debates (i.e. enhanced control
for the liberalisation of the postal services market vs. social protectionism of public sector
jobs).
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dg jls’s proposal to establish a nancial mechanism to manage migration ows provided
only limited support for the ambition of enhanced rationalisation, as this proposal was in
support of Spanish interests and the Commission’s institutional ambitions (i.e. develop its
competency under the third pillar).e rst ia stage was preceded by a political commitment
to support the protection of eu borders going back a number of years. Although a roadmap
was published, there was no tangible evidence that it contributed to the development of the
proposal.e reason was a tight time-frame in which the proposal needed to be completed
(three months to meet budgetary timelines).e second ia stage revealed that an external
consultant was hired to support the collection of additional data and determining the legal
basis of the proposal in relation to existing programmes. e data collection focused on
understanding and reecting Member States’ preferences rather improving the analytical
basis of the proposal.e nal ia report showed that dg jls assessed economic, social and
environmental implications, but interviews with actors suggested the ia played a minor (box-
ticking) role.e nal ia stage illustrated that the ia was not used in any substantial manner,
with the European Parliament and Council not conducting an ia for amendments.
e nal case study provided similar ndings as the ones above. dg sanco’s proposal for
the regulation of plant protection products revealed little evidence of ia playing a role to
enhance rationalisation during the early stages of the ia process.e dg already had a strong
mandate to develop the proposal and spent over a decade collecting data. is formed a
de-facto preliminary ia and although a roadmap was published, it did not play any signicant
role other than ‘ticking the box’. Enhanced rationalisation was a stronger element for the
second ia stage, despite disagreements between dg sanco and dg entr regarding the level
of data required (a proxy for dierences in policy preference). Changes to the ia Guidelines
compelled dg sanco to re-assess its impacts on the economy, providing support to the idea
that enhanced rationalisation was important, but also to the notion that control was a factor
(i.e. as economic considerations were promoted by dg entr). Although a consultant was
hired to address the data requirements, little additional information was available andmuch of
the new analysis was based on the work conducted over the previous decade. Despite evidence
that the ia process played a role during the nal ia stage — both the uk and the European
Parliament undertook additional studies — this was a means to generate data in support of
enhanced control.
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e empirical evidence showed that enhanced rationalisation played a variable role in
the ia process. For instance, the large ‘n’ analysis in Chapter Four indicated that enhanced
rationalisationwas evident during the rst and second ia stage.is, on the one hand, supports
the notion that ia contributes to enhanced rationalisation during stage one and two, but on
the other hand, also supports the notion that it is not at play during the nal ia stage.e case
studies shed further light by showing that the rst ia stage play a minor role in the context
of the wider policy initiative, but that the second ia stage was oen marked by signicant
eorts to collect information and conduct extensive analysis. While this nding supports the
theoretical ambition of enhanced rationalisation, it is not a move toward a detached synoptic
approach to analysis, but rather an incrementally improved analysis in support of a clearly
established policy proposal and its objectives.is is particularly apparent during the nal
phases of the second ia stage and all of the third ia stage. Although half of the case studies
provided evidence of enhanced rationalisation during the third ia stage, this was always
infused by elements of control, in particular ‘stacking the deck’ (to be explored in the next
section). Table 28 provides a brief summary of this section.
Table 28: Evidence for enhanced rationalisation at each IA policy stage
Policy Stage / Rationalisation Stage i Stage ii Stage iii
Chapter 4 — Sample ias Yes Yes Some
Chapter 5 — Packed Sizes No Yes Yes
Chapter 6 — Air Strategy No Yes Yes
Chapter 7 — Postal Services No Yes No
Chapter 8 —Migration No Some Some
Chapter 9 — Plant Protection No Yes Some
Summary No Yes Some-Yes
Variations of Enhanced Control
e theoretical ambition of enhanced control, in particular procedural control where ia
is intended to overcome the information asymmetry between the decision-maker and the
policy expert,16 is strongly reected in the ia blueprint. Accordingly, the procedural and
16G. Miller, “e Political Evolution of the Principal Agenteory”, op. cit.
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analytical steps of the ia system are intended to provide decision-makers with a means for
monitoring and ‘policing’ the policy process. In particular, the ia Guidelines refer to ‘quality
assurance’ provisions during the second ia stage to give decision-makers an opportunity to
hold policymakers to account. Procedural control also plays a dominant role during the inter-
institutional bargaining stage, by giving the European Parliament and Council the opportunity
to hold the Commission to account based on the evidence in the ia. However, the theoretical
ambition of enhanced control also refers to the idea of ‘stacking the deck’.e expectation
under ‘stacking the deck’ — which is not explicit in the ia blueprint — is that, particularly
during the second ia stage, both policy and decision-makers inuence the policy process to
support specic policy preferences (such as economic liberalisation or environmental and
social protection). In particular, by encouraging the involvement of specic actors (such as
industry) or application of certain methodologies (such as the assessment of business impacts)
both policy and decision-makers ensure certain outcomes while also following the procedural
and analytical steps. At the Commission level this refers to the use of ias by individual dgs
to inuence each other, whereas at the intra-institutional level it is the European Parliament,
Council and Commission using the ia process to promote their policy preferences.
As this section illustrates, the empirical evidence— in particular the case studies— illustrate
the theoretical ambition of enhanced control — predominantly ‘stacking of the deck’ rather
than procedural control — throughout all three policy stages, with a strong emphasis at the
end of the second ia stage and, to a lesser extent, the nal ia stage. While the large ‘n’ analysis
in Chapter Four supported the idea of procedural control it provided an initial insight into
‘stacking the deck’.e case studies provide further detail, showing that control or ‘stacking
the deck’ manifests itself along policy preferences, such as the preference to support business
interests versus the interest of defending environmental or social interests. Furthermore, the
case studies also showed that the extent of ‘stacking the deck’ was aggravated by the degree
of preference polarisation, rather than institutional boundaries, such as the preferences of
the European Parliament and holding the Commission to account. However, while the case
studies found evidence of ‘stacking the deck’ this did not completely negate the ambitions of
enhanced rationalisation or coordination.
Although an aggregate examination of roadmaps and clwps in the third chapter did not
yield an insight into the decision-making or clearance process within the Commission, it
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indicated elements of ‘stacking the deck’. While all dgs participated in the newly established
ia system— showing that decision-makers successfully introduced the new ia system— the
low number of ias at best supported the ambition of enhanced control in a small number
of cases.e second ia stage showed that many of the procedural and analytical steps were
followed, but the quantitative information was inconclusive in providing support to the
ambition of procedural control to monitor or ‘police’ the system.is inconclusive result was
mainly because of the lack of empirical evidence regarding the Commission quality assurance
processes. However, the evidence did to a limited degree support the ‘stacking of the deck’ by
showing a dominance of economic assessments in favour of economic preferences, a nding
requiring further exploration in the case studies. e nal ia stage provided no tangible
evidence that ias were used to hold the Commission to account.
e individual case studies provided a more detailed insight; in particular dg entr’s pro-
posal to de-regulate pre-packed sizes illustrated the ia’s supporting role in a wider policy
preference for economic liberalisation. e rst ia stage was dominated by the slim pro-
gramme with the roadmap playing no part.e Parliament and Council used slim set a course
for action, setting out parameters within which the Commission would operate.e second
ia stage made signicant use of the slim programme, to the extent that information was used
to support the ia report and to illustrate dg entr’s commitment to the new ia system. As a
deregulatory programme, slim provided the evidence for the ia to justify the simplication
of the proposal. With a focus on economic impacts, the ia was used to ‘stack the deck’ and
support the wider slim initiative. During the third ia stage, the European Parliament accused
the Commission of purposely focusing on economic impacts and preferences.e analysis
contained in the ia became a tool to — in particular by the uk and Council — ensure their
policy preference of economic liberalisation was taken into account by promoting business
considerations.e European Parliament also used ia to justify or ‘stack the deck’ by under-
taking its own ia to support its own policy preferences (protecting consumers), looking for
information to satisfy exempting additional sectors from the liberalisation of the pre-packed
legislation.
As with dg entr’s Pre-Packed Products proposal, dg env’sematic Air Strategy was set
in context of a multi-year plan and the evidence in the ia was used to promote dierent policy
preferences. In light of the cafe programme, the rst ia stage played a minor role. Although
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procedural rules were followed through the publication of a roadmap, it played a minor role
in informing actors because the debate had been previously framed. In contrast, the second
ia stage was dominated by political concerns and moves to control the outcome of the ia and
proposal. As reported by the media, dg env and dg entr were on opposing sides, with dg
env supporting an ambitious strategy and dg entr supporting one designed to limit any
negative impact on economic growth. During Inter Service Consultation, debates focused on
the level of ambition (the cap for air quality). Both sides discussed the details of the air quality
levels, looking to balance the cost to business and the cost to the environment. During the
nal ia stage, the ia was used to showcase the Commission’s proposal as the best compromise.
Although both the European Parliament and Council agreed on the detail and thoroughness
of the scientic evidence collected, the debate around ambition levels continued. dg env tried
to use the evidence-base or enhanced rationalisation to support its policy preference (a lower
cap for air quality). e ia, or more accurately key information in it, was used during the
inter-institutional bargaining stage to defend opposing policy preferences (low vs. high cap
for air quality). No additional ia was conducted for amendments, rather discussions focused
on business costs and environmental costs based on the evidence contained in the ia.
Long standing policy-making preferences were also a key element in the case study for dg
markt’s proposal to liberalise European Postal Services.e case study provided an example
for procedural control and ‘stacking the deck’ on the part of actors within the European
Commission, such as dg sanco and dg markt, as well as the European Parliament and
Council.e proposal for the third Directive on Postal Services and therefore the rst ia stage
was overshadowed by the preceding Directives, with the roadmap not playing any signicant
control function. However, the second ia stage was dominated by activities to inuence or
control the outcome of the ia results and proposal. For instance, the contractor who worked
on the ia stated that dg markt and various Member States used the data collection as a battle
ground to present key data in support of their own preferences (i.e. Commission was fullling
its mandate to liberalise themarket, while someMember States sought to protect their national
postal markets). Even the Inter-Service Steering Group, a forum designed for coordination,
was used to ensure dg markt’s preferences were perpetuated across the Commission and
reected in the nal ia. During Inter-Service Consultation, conict between dg sanco and
dg markt became apparent, with both dgs arguing on the basis of the data or lack thereof in
the ia.e procedural brake or control imposed by the Inter-Service Consultation processes
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slowed down agreement on the nal proposal. It provided a forum for actors who were in
support of speedy and complete market liberalisation and those more cautious actors keen
to use the ia process to identify key information to support their own policy preference (of
job protection). is tension continued during one nal stage where the ia supported the
Commission’s policy preference for overall market liberalisation in contrast to the preference
on the part of a number of Member States who sought to protect their domestic postal services
industry. Although, the ia failed to ‘stack the deck’ in favour of the European Commission’s
proposal, the information contained in the ia— such as employment gures — was used by
the European Parliament and Council to promote their own policy preferences.
dg jls’s proposal to establish funds to manage migration ows showed little support for
the ambition of enhanced control. Overshadowed by a political commitment to develop the
proposal in a short amount of time, the roadmap played no role. Some actors suggested that
dg jls saw the proposal as a means to expand their remit in this policy area (Justice and Home
Aairs) and in doing so was willing to adhere to requests fromMember States, in particular
Spain. Evidence from the second ia stage showed that dg jls followed the steps necessary to
receive nal clearance and fullled what the Member States wanted.e ia itself played less of
a control role; rather it justied the policy intention.e third ia stage illustrated that the ia
provided the European Parliament and Council with an understanding of the Commission’s
proposal, but was not used by the European Parliament or the Council.
Like the other case studies, dg sanco’s ia on plant protection products was also set within
the context of a decade long initiative. Over a 10 year period, assessment processes were put
in place to ensure the proper management of plant protection products and to balance the
policy preferences of protecting public health and the environment against economic interests.
e rst ia stage was accompanied by a roadmap, but it played a minor role. Control over
policy preferences played a key role ahead of the roadmap. dg markt completed an initial
ia which was rejected. A change in methodology required dg sanco to develop a new ia,
giving economic considerations greater consideration.e requirement to revise the ia was
an opportunity for dg entr to ‘stack the deck’ in favour of economic considerations. e
second ia stage was subsequently dominated by the need for dg sanco to illustrate the ia
captured economic impacts. dg sanco hired a consultant to identify and show economic
benets, providing dg sanco evidence to support its policy preference, in particular showing
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that the economy would not be negatively impacted by the proposal.e inter-institutional
bargaining stage was dominated by various ia reports to support dierent preferences.e
uk and industry supported a more liberal approach and the European Parliament, along
with dg sanco, a more protective position with a greater emphasis on public health and
environmental protection. Several studies were commissioned in the competition over the
nal policy proposal. In the end the uk abstained from voting, but had used the ia processes
to inuence the debate.
e empirical evidence showed that enhanced control — in particular ‘stacking the deck’ —
played a signicant role, particularly during the second and third ia stages. With one exception,
the case study ias were all overshadowed by mandates set by the European Parliament and
Council, as well as previously commissioned work. ia therefore played no role during the rst
ia stage and the long standing policy-making process permeated throughout the second and
third ia stages. In particular, the case studies showed that enhanced control played a key role
during the second ia stage, but not — as required by the ia blueprint — through the use of
quality assurance processes. Rather enhanced control was exercised through the ‘stacking the
deck’ in favour of certain policy preferences (in a number of cases economic considerations
were given greater consideration as they were part of the wider policy context), particularly if
policy preferences were based on long-standing polarised positions.e theme of ‘stacking
the deck’ to enhance policy preferences was also reected during the nal ia stage. Here, over
half of the case studies provided evidence of enhanced control to advance economic, social
or environmental preferences; rather than as a means for institutional dominance. Table 29
provides a brief summary of this section.
Table 29: Evidence for enhanced control at each IA policy stage
Policy Stage / Control Stage i Stage ii Stage iii
Chapter 4 — Sample ias No Yes Some
Chapter 5 — Packed Sizes No Yes Yes
Chapter 6 — Air Strategy No Yes Yes
Chapter 7 — Postal Services No Yes Some
Chapter 8 —Migration No Yes No
Chapter 9 — Plant Protection Yes Yes Yes
Summary No Yes Some–Yes
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Variations of Enhanced Coordination
Enhanced coordination is the ambition of using the ia process to move away from negative
coordination17 — a process of limiting the interference of other policymakers — by breaking
down silos and establishing an environment where decision and policymakers work inclusively.
is idea is reected in the European Union’s ia blueprint with specic reference during the
rst and second ia stages. For example, during the inception stage the publication of roadmaps
is intended to provide a means to signal the lead dg’s willingness to collaborate with actors in
and outside the Commission. At the policy development stage, the ia process provides internal
actors with a forum to collaborate — the issg— and external actors a means to contribute
— through consultations.e ambition of enhanced coordination is less prescriptive at the
inter-institutional negotiation stage, with the expectation that the ia report will provide a
means to debate policies and reach agreement on proposals.
e following pages will illustrate that the ambition of enhancing coordination through ia
was evident in all six empirical chapters. However, while the large ‘n’ analysis in Chapter Four
indicated that enhanced coordination had a signicant role during the rst and second ia
stages, ndings from surveys and the case studies did not fully reect the ideal represented
by positive coordination. Rather, enhanced coordination predominantly played a role in
inuencing actors to canvass support for certain policy preferences or ‘stacking the deck’.
is was evident for the second ia stage, particularly when policy preferences were divergent.
Chapterree provided an aggregate overview of ias and showed that while all dgs were part
of the ia system, the number of ias and roadmaps were low. Although this nding indicated a
limited role for ia to act as a coordination mechanism, the large ‘n’ evidence showed that more
roadmaps were completed than ia reports. However, this did not show the extent (if any) to
which roadmaps supported the ambition of coordination at an early ia stage. Evidence for the
second ia stage showed that a signicant number of ias were accompanied by Inter-Service
Steering Groups and consultation exercises, backing the case for enhanced coordination at
the second ia stage. Evidence for the third ia stage were not sucient to show whether ia was
a means to enhance coordination between institutions.
As identied in the two previous sections, wider policy-making preferences played an
important role, and this was also true for the ambition of enhanced coordination. dg entr’s
17F. Scharpf and M. Mohr, “Ecient Self-Coordination”, op. cit.
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proposal to de-regulate pre-packed sizes was dominated by slim with the roadmap playing
a minor role. e second ia stage showed that dg entr used an existing Steering Group
established under slim as a means to coordinate policymakers, illustrating the dominance
of the slim programme over the second ia stage. Nevertheless, the ia took advantage of the
consultation exercise and coordination mechanisms set up through slim, providing some
support to the idea that ia played a coordination role. However, there was no evidence to
suggest the ia played a coordination role at the nal ia stage.
dg env’sematic Air Strategy proposal providedmore evidence of enhanced coordination,
but mostly for the nal ia stage. Although a roadmap was published, key actors already knew
about the Commission’s intention due to cafe, a programme designed to ensure the Com-
mission worked closely with Member States. Nevertheless, the case study provided evidence
that actors inside the Council and Commission found the roadmap useful to understand
dg env’s intentions and contribute to the ia process. During the second ia stage dg env
established an issg and held numerous consultation events. However, key actors did not think
the second ia stage gave them an opportunity to inuence the ia report and proposal. Again,
an explanation for this nding was the dierent policy preferences inside the Commission, in
particular between those who wanted higher environmental protection and those who wanted
to ensure economic competitiveness.is supported the idea of enhanced control playing a
dominant role.e nal stage showed no evidence that the European Parliament and Council
used the ia process.
dg markt’s European Postal Services ia demonstrated some support for the ambition of en-
hanced coordination, particularly during the second ia policy stage.e rst ia stage showed
no evidence of enhanced coordination outside the Commission— due to commitments under
the second Postal Services Directive — with some evidence that policymakers in other dgs
used the roadmap to understand the policy proposal ahead of engaging through the issg.e
second ia stage was considerably more useful as a tool for enhanced coordination. With an
issg and extensive consultation exercises with external actors, dg markt used the ia process
to work with key actors. However, although actors (both inside and outside the Commission)
were supportive of the coordination activities, they complained that their contributions were
not incorporated into the nal ia or proposal.is nding was not surprising in the context
of the pressures to balance the policy preference of liberalising the postal services market and
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the objective of a number of Member States to protect their national markets. During the nal
ia stage both the European Parliament and the Council did not make use of the ia and so
there was no indication that the ia played a substantive role in enhancing coordination.
e fourth case study, funds to manage migration ows, also provided little evidence of
enhanced coordination. Overshadowed by political commitments — the Hague programme
— and the need to nalise budget proposals, the proposal had to be developed within a tight
time-frame. As a consequence, the publication of a roadmap was not useful to actors as
they were well aware of the Commission’s intentions. While one Commission policymaker
explained that the roadmap helped his planning, much of the coordination was arranged
well in advance of the roadmap. e second ia stage did not see dg jls set up an issg;
rather meetings between Head of Units were held to ensure the policy was not blocked (by
veto players in the Commission). Workshops and consultations were held with Member
States to align preferences, making it dicult to disaggregate whether dg jls used the ia to
enhance coordination or inuence / control the agenda. During the nal ia stage the European
Parliament and Council did not use the ia.
dg sanco’s plant protection products proposal showed limited support for the ambition
of enhanced coordination during the rst two ia stages and none for the nal stage. As with
the other case studies, the rst ia stage was set against the backdrop of over ten years of
work. Its intention to develop the proposal was well understood by Member States, industry
and the European Parliament. Nevertheless, dg sanco completed and published a roadmap,
with ocials from dg entr reporting they found it useful to plan their future engagement.
During the second ia stage, dg sanco convened an issg, but did not nd the group helpful
as, in their opinion ‘the wrong people’ participated which resulted in substantial discussions
during the Inter-Service Consultation. Coordination therefore played no role during the
inter-institutional stage.
e empirical evidence showed that enhanced coordination played a minor role in the use
and application of ia. Nevertheless, the large ‘n’ analysis showed that the procedural steps
for enhance coordination were oen followed, but the survey results showed that enhanced
coordination played a minor role. In particular, the case studies showed that the rst ia
stage was overshadowed by clear mandates and previously commissioned work, contributing
signicantly to ensuring relevant actors were aware of the Commission’s policy work.is
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Table 30: Evidence for enhanced coordination at each IA policy stage
Policy Stage / Coordination Stage i Stage ii Stage iii
Chapter 4 — Sample ias Yes Yes No
Chapter 5 — Packed Sizes No Some No
Chapter 6 — Air Strategy Some Yes Some
Chapter 7 — Postal Services Some Yes No
Chapter 8 —Migration Some Some No
Chapter 9 — Plant Protection Some Yes No
Summary Some Some-Yes No–Some
resulted in a limited role, if any, for the roadmap. However, the case studies showed that
enhanced coordination played a more signicant role during the second ia stage, particularly
during the early parts of the second ia stage when issg and consultation exercises were
held. e ambition of enhanced coordination was less of a driver when the Commission
nalised its proposal and when polarised policy preferences were at play. Evidence showed
that contributions from actors outside lead dgs were ignored during parts of the second ia
stage, in doing so providing evidence for negative coordination and supporting the idea of ia
as a means for enhanced control or ‘stacking the deck’. Little to no evidence was available to
show that ias served as a means for enhanced coordination during the third and nal ia stage.
Table 30 provides a brief summary of this section.
Impact Assessment Ambitions: The Variation
e preceding section summarised this research’s empirical evidence, presenting ia as a set of
rules to enhance rationalisation, control and coordination. It highlighted the limitation of
large ‘n’ analysis and illustrated the usefulness of the empirical evidence derived from the ve
case studies. Indeed, the case studies provided the basis to assert that because ia is part of a
broader dynamic policy-making process, its ambitions change — or vary — over the course
of the policy-making process. While this argument is explored in greater depth in part two of
this chapter, the following briey retraces the empirical results and develops the argument
that while the logic of enhanced control is dominant, the ambitions or logics of enhanced
rationalisation and coordination play distinct roles, resulting in hierarchical complementary
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of ia ambitions. In this research, hierarchical complementary refers to the situation whereby
the variations in ambitions and variation across ia stages result in the theoretical ambitions of
enhanced rationalisation, control and coordination complementing each, albeit under the
umbrella of enhanced control (or ‘stacking the deck’).
Variation of Impact Assessment Ambitions
e large ‘n’ analysis — presented in Chapter Four — broadly reected the variation in ia
ambitions outlined in the ia blueprint. In particular, it showed that — as required by the ia
blueprint — ia promotes the use of procedural and analytical steps to support the ambitions
of enhanced rationalisation and coordination. However, at the same time, the large ‘n’ analysis
also indicated at the motivations of actors and therefore dierences with the ia blueprint —
such as an emphasis on economic impacts.e case studies provided further insight into this
dierence between blueprint and empirical evidence. For example, while many of the case
studies showed that enhanced coordination, in particular positive coordination, played a role
during the early ia stage — reecting an important element in the ia blueprint — viewed
against the backdrop of existing mandates, this claim seemed overinated. Indeed, the case
studies showed that the rst ia stage played a small role, not just for the ambition of enhanced
coordination. Dierence between the ambitions as laid out in the ia blueprint and empirical
evidence increased during the second and third ia stages. For instance, during the second ia
stage enhanced coordination became increasingly intertwined with enhanced rationalisation
as ocials canvased actors to ensure the coordination of expertise but also to stop veto votes.
As will be explored in the following section, enhanced coordination — and to a similar degree
enhanced rationalisation — varied from the ideal of promoting positive coordination during
the rst ia stage to merely contributing to limiting negative coordination during the second
ia stage.
Another marked variation from the ia blueprint was the role of enhanced control. With four
out of the ve cases studies showing that ideas of economic liberalisation were pitched against
social or environmental protection, enhanced control — in particular ‘stacking the deck’ —
played an ever important role. While the role of ‘stacking the deck’ supports the sceptics’
argument that governments “put community [or cultural / social values] above policy,”18 the
18H. Heclo and A. Wildavsky,e private government of public money, op. cit.
279
JohannesM.Wolff Conclusion
case studies urge a more nuanced examination. Indeed, at rst glance, the dominance of
‘stacking the deck’ seems to merely reect the ndings presented in the existing literature. For
instance, the nding that ex-ante tools do not contribute to raising fundamental questions
when policy solutions are already mandated19 or that ia ambitions vary to such a degree that
they are elusive20 or the long-standing challenge that while process changes can enhanced
the implementation of decisions, they “cannot in themselves achieve dramatic change.”21
However, this would ignore the variation of enhanced control identied in the empirical
evidence, in particular that enhanced procedural control does promote coordination and
rationalisation. It would ignore the nding that ‘stacking of the deck’ only becomes prominent
as the policy-making process evolves, allowing for enhanced coordination and rationalisation
to play a role during the early ia stages.
Complementarity Hierarchy of Impact Assessment Ambitions
Indeed, as part two of this chapter will illustrate in greater detail, while the empirical evidence
re-enforces the challenge of identifying the genesis of policy proposals and therefore the
applicability of the three ia ambitions — at least at the early ia stage — this is in contrast to
the second and third ia stages. It also does not take into account the interaction of ambitions
over the course of the policy-making process. For example, if the three ia stages were further
segmented — by dividing the rst ia stage into the preparation of the roadmap and the
publication of the roadmap or the second ia stage into the analytical and procedural steps to
develop the policy proposal and a stage to nalise and agree the ia— a more gradual change
in ambitions would become evident. Nevertheless, within the connes of the three-staged
approach, the case studies illustrated that the three ia ambitions played distinct, albeit varying
roles. For instance, a number of actors within the Commission explained that they found the
roadmap informative and helpful in preparing for future collaboration. Also, coordination
mechanisms , such as Workshops with expertise or the Inter-Institutional Steering Groups
held during the second ia stage, provided actors with a means to enhance coordination.
However, over time coordination mechanisms became a means for enhanced rationalisation
(i.e. through the collection of data), but also a means to focus on specic policy preferences
19R. Baldwin, “Is better regulation smarter regulation?”, op. cit.
20As stipulated by: C. Radaelli, “Better Regulation and the Lisbon Agenda”, op. cit.
21P. Joyce, “e Reiterative Nature of Budget Reform: Is there Anything New in Federal Budgeting?”, op. cit.
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of lead dgs. In fact, the policy preferences of principals became increasingly evident as the
second ia stage draws to an end.
is variation of ambitions showed that it was a function of dierent ia stages and changes
in the motives of actors, therefore allowing for the complementarity of ambitions. Indeed, the
variation in theoretical ambitions and changes across the ia stages illustrated a hierarchical
complementarity of ia ambitions. Complementary in so far that mechanisms for enhanced
coordination support the ambition for enhanced rationalisation, with the mechanisms of
enhanced rationalisation in turn supporting or complementing the ambition enhanced control,
and enhanced control — in particular ‘stacking the deck’ — becoming increasingly prominent
as the ia stages progress. Hierarchical in so far that, although enhanced control takes on
an increasingly prominent role as the ia process unfolds, both enhanced rationalisation
and coordination have an opportunity to play specic roles during the earlier ia stages.
Furthermore, while ‘stacking the deck’ plays a dominant and therefore it top of the hierarchy, it
varies by the extent to which the policy preferences of decision-makers are polarised.erefore,
the more polarised policy preferences are, the more enhancements in analytical rigour and
coordination become instruments to control, ‘stack’ or justify the outcome of the proposal.
2 In Defence of the Optimists and in Support of the Sceptics
ia is an amalgamation of tools and processes promoted to advance solutions to three specic
policy problems. In doing so, ia represents the most recent incarnation of methods and tools
designed to overcome the challenges of how to choose the ‘best’ policy-option; how to steer
public administrations; and how to coordinate policies across institutional sub-units. e
departure from previous analytical methods and processes lies in the amalgamating of various
public policy solutions into one process, the ia. As indicated throughout this thesis, this
research argues against the sceptical claim that the application of procedural tools — such as
ia— is context specic and, because “community [or cultural / social values] are placed above
policy”22 their ambitions are rendered elusive23 or even subservient to ‘political considerations’.
22H. Heclo and A. Wildavsky,e private government of public money, op. cit.
23As stipulated by: C. Radaelli, “Better Regulation and the Lisbon Agenda”, op. cit. or more recently ia ambitions
have been stipulated to be a function of the condition behind the use of ia as outlined in: C. Dunlop, M.Maggetti,
C. Radaelli, D. Russels, “e many uses of regulatory impact assessment: A meta-analysis of eu and uk case
studies”, op. cit.
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Equally, this thesis also argues against those supportive of ever-improved analytical methods
and processes, which could be further improved through the insulation of analysis from
political preferences.24 Indeed, this thesis argues for the hierarchical complementarity of
ia ambitions. In doing so, this thesis recognises the role of each ambition in the policy-
making process, tempering the ambitions of enhanced rationalisation and coordination,
and acknowledging the dominance of enhanced control. In doing so, this thesis calls for
a recognition of the multiplicity of ia ambitions and therefore the limitations as well as
opportunities of processes and analytical tools more widely and ia specically.
While decision and policymakers will continue to place “community [or cultural / social
values] above policy,” ia plays a role in contributing to how administrations express “not only
what is, but also what ought to be”.25 Although this establishes a tension between the logics
of enhanced rationalisation and enhanced control — in particular ‘stacking the deck’ — the
variation of ambitions provides a resolution to this tension. As outlined in the rst chapter,
the eu developed several methods and processes to assess policy over the course of 30 years.
ese processes and methods have continuously ‘developed’ and were ultimately incorporated
into the eu ia system in 2003. An assessment of whether ‘meta-instruments’ such as ia have
improved over time was not the focus of this thesis; instead it examined ia as a marked change
from the past due to the amalgamation of the tools, processes, and ambitions.erefore, this
thesis focused on the current mix of ambitions — and their interaction — to advance the
understanding of ia and the debate between ia proponents and sceptics.
Indeed, by segmenting the ia process into a set of procedural and analytical steps, this
thesis shows the applicability and compatibility of three ia ambitions. In particular, while
the research acknowledges the dominance of enhanced control — in particular ‘stacking the
deck’— it argues that the ambitions are complementary when examined across dierent stages
of the policy-making process. In doing so, this thesis dismisses the unilateral rejection of ia
ambitions based on the sceptics’ concern that principal’s will inevitably place “community
[or cultural / social values] above policy.”26 Instead, this thesis contributes to the existing ia
literature by identifying two solutions to the tension between ia ambitions: rst it applies a
methodological approach to trace dynamic changes of ambitions over the course of the policy-
24As do: N. Lee and C. Kirkpatrick, “Integrated impact assessment”, op. cit.
25H. Heclo and A. Wildavsky,e private government of public money, op. cit..
26ibid.
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making process; and second, it identies variations in ia ambitions. In doing so, this thesis
stipulates that ia advances all three theoretical ambitions, albeit in a hierarchical manner and
not as intended by the ia blueprint. In particular, the empirical evidence showed that while
each ambition played a distinct role, this reected changes in policy preferences and resulted
in, ultimately, the ambition of enhanced control playing a dominant role, complemented
by enhanced rationalisation and enhanced coordination. is nding contributes to the
wider ‘meta-instrument’ literature by advancing the understanding of the limitations and
opportunities of ia through an examination of how diering ambitions interact.
e rest of this section takes each contribution in turn, starting with the policy process-
informed approach, before examining the applicability and interplay of the three theoretical
ambitions.
Theoretical Ambitions and the Three-Staged Approach
e contribution of the three-staged policy process-informed approach used in this thesis lies
in the idea of an “evolving approach to the policy-making process.”27is approach provides
a structure for dividing the ia process into three distinct stages and to trace the interaction
changes of ia ambitions.e application of this staged approach has two advantages; rst,
it provides a means to explore the dense policy environment in which ia is developed; and
second, it provides a method to acknowledge and explore changes in policy preferences and
dynamics throughout the policy-making process.28 e importance of examining ia as a
process — rather than as a report or an analytical tool as much of the ia literature does29 —
was highlighted in Chapterree. As such, Chapterree illustrated that the ia blueprint
acknowledges variations in the ambitions across the policy-making process with Chapter
Four’s large ‘n’ analysis illustrating this variation in the empirical evidence. However, while the
analysis of the ia blueprint and ia reports generated statistical information to trace ambitions
— such as compliance with procedures set out in the ia blueprint — it failed to provide an
insight into the policy context and did not provide a detailed insight into variations in the
theoretical ambitions. e diculty was the use of ia reports as the unit of analysis. As a
27H. D. Lasswell,e Decision Process: Seven Categories of Functional Analysis, op. cit.
28B. Hogwood and G. B. Peters, Policy Dynamics, op. cit.
29As do: N. Lee and C. Kirkpatrick, “Integrated impact assessment”, op. cit.
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static document, the ia report did not provide much indication about what lay behind the
ocial story; rather it only presented a snapshot of agreed policy positions. In applying a
simplied, three-staged policy approach, this thesis went beyond the ia report, identifying
changes in policy environment and policy dynamics.
e three-staged approach therefore acknowledges that the ia ambitions vary over the
course of the policy-making process and that context matters when developing an ia.30
However, context plays a role in so far that existing policy initiatives inuence the information
or evidence used during the ia process, not the changes in ambitions.e case studies showed
that policy context was not the sole driver in the varying uses of ia. Indeed, the staged approach
provided a means to disentangle the dierent ambitions by policy-making stage, showing the
interplay of more than one theoretical ambition over the course of the policy-making process.
In applying the staged approach, this thesis did not assume a world with one decision-maker
and a static linear decision-making process. Such an approach — as discussed in Chapter
ree — would have resulted in the theoretical ambitions of enhanced rationalisation, control
and coordination contradicting each other.31 Rather, the staged approach allowed the analysis
to go beyond the idea of ia as a means to achieve one theoretical ambition, as advanced by
much of the literature on enhanced control32, rationalisation33, or coordination.34 Instead, the
staged approach revealed dierent dynamics in policy preferences and therefore the prevalence
of ia ambitions across the policy-making process.
Another signicance of going beyond the ia report was that — as argued in Chapterree
— it provided a means for identifying signicant dierences in ambitions between the ia
blueprint and the empirical evidence. For example, the case studies revealed noteworthy
dierences, such as the failure of ia at the rst ia stage, but also the value of ia during the
30As stipulated by: C. Radaelli, “Better Regulation and the Lisbon Agenda”, op. cit.
31As outlined in the rst section of this Chapter, the enhanced rationalisation ambition to change existing
policy-making paradigms through a problem-solving model includes an attempt to isolate policy from political
preferences.is isolated problem-solving model is at odds with an ideal version of enhanced control, where the
synoptic analyses promoted by enhanced rationalisation which may not reect the principal’s policy preference.
ere are also tensions with the ideal of enhanced coordination. By seeking to overcome conicts between
dierent organisational interests, enhanced coordination seeks jointly considered choices or compromise which
may not reect the ideals of a synoptic analysis or the policy preferences of the principal.
32For example: E. Posner, “Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benet Analysis”, op. cit. or G. Rowe, “Tools for
control of political and administrative agents: ia and Governance in the eu”, op. cit.
33For example: N. Lee and C. Kirkpatrick, “Integrated impact assessment”, op. cit. or C. Cecot, R. Hahn, and A.
Renda, “A Statistical Analysis of the Quality of the Impact Assessment in the European Union”, op. cit.
34For example: oecd, Indicators of Regulatory Management System, 2009 or C. Radaelli, “Diusion without
convergence: how political context shapes the adoption of regulatory impact assessment”, op. cit.
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second and third ia stages. All ve case studies illustrated the challenge of identifying the
beginning or genesis of the policy-making process, let alone the start of an ia. Indeed, although
the European Commission has the right of initiative, a plethora of interests shaped the start
of European proposals.erefore, while the ambitions of enhanced rationalisation, control
and coordination call for the development of and use of the initial ia (i.e. roadmaps), all case
studies revealed that the relevant proposals were monitored and mandated by the principal
regardless of the roadmap. While this illustrates the notion that policy-making is not a linear35
progression of ideas — supporting the sceptic’s perspective that ia ambitions are overinated
because the rst ia stage played a minor role — it does not render ia or the ia stages useless.
Rather, because the case studies provided evidence that the rst ia stage — through the use of
roadmaps — played a role, the rst ia stage continues to be instrumental in the ia process,
not only because it marks a starting point. However, at the same time, the empirical evidence
also urges proponents of ia36 to accept the limited (if any) role of ia at the early policy stage.
In regard to dierences at the second and third ia stages, the case studies revealed additional
opportunities and challenges for all three ia ambitions to inuence the policy-making process.
For example, while the empirical evidence reected the challenges sceptics highlight in relation
to the staged approach — such as the lack of a unitary decision-maker and that objectives
change over the course of the policy-making process — these ndings lie at the heart of this
thesis. Indeed, as the following section will illustrate, the variation of actors — including
decision-makers — and ambitions complement each other. However, the variation does not
reect the ia blueprint; instead the case studies provide amore nuanced picture of the variation
in ia ambitions across the policy-making process. For instance — as indicated in Chapter
ree — the ia blueprint stresses a dominant role for enhanced rationalisation throughout the
policy-making process with the role of enhanced coordination decreasing over time, and the
role of enhanced procedural control increasing as the three ia stages progress. However, the
case studies reveal a decreasing role for enhanced rationalisation and in particular procedural
control during the second ia stage, with ‘stacking the deck’ taking on an ever more prominent
role.
Figure 24 provides a visual representation of the blueprint’s references to the theoretical
ambitions by ia policy stages, before the next section explores the variation in ambition but
35P. Sabatier,eories of the policy process, op. cit.
36C. Radaelli and F. De Francesco, Regulatory quality in Europe: Concepts, measures, and policy process, op. cit.
285
JohannesM.Wolff Conclusion
also between ia blueprint and empirical evidence.e lines across the ‘x’ axis illustrate the
changing role each ambition plays across each of the three ia policy-making stages, against
the ‘y’ axis which shows the emphasis placed on each ambition.e ‘y’ axis is divided into
three markers; ‘no reference’ in the ia guidelines, an ‘implicit reference’ — for instance at the
third ia stage coordination across the three institutions is implied but not explicitly outlined
— and an ‘explicit reference’ to the ia ambition in the ia guidelines. If an explicit reference was
made — as identied in Chapterree — the ambition received a value of 1, if it was ‘implicit’
it received a value of .5, if there was no reference it was given a value of 0. Based on this, the
following gure uses ‘explicit reference’ as a proxy for emphasis and to illustrate the variation
in each ambition across the ia stages as outlined in the ia blueprint.
Figure 24: Enhanced rationalisation, control and coordination: the IA blueprint
No 
Reference 
Implicit  
Reference 
Explicit  
Reference 
Stage I  Stage II  Stage III 
Enhanced control  Enhanced ra7onalisa7on  Enhanced coordina7on 
Indeed, as indicated above — and as will be explored in the next section — while the
empirical evidence supports the variation of ia ambitions identied in the ia blueprint, the
variation is greater than outlined in the ia guidelines.
Variation of Theoretical Ambitions within a Hierarchy
As indicated, the empirical evidence does not entirely match the ia blueprint described in
the preceding section. However, it is this mismatch and the exploration of variation in ia
ambition which is the thesis’ second contribution to the literature. Indeed, this variation
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addressed the challenge of ia sceptics and ia proponents representing dierent theoretical or
logical absolutes — ia sceptics represent enhanced control and ia proponents the logics of
enhanced rationalisation and coordination — and assumption that the logics remain constant
over the course of the policy-making process. erefore, in addition to arguing that the
three theoretical ambitions vary at each ia policy stages, this research argues that there is a
hierarchal relationship between them.e extent of this hierarchical relationship becomes
more or less apparent the further the policy-making process evolves but also depends on the
extent to which policy preferences are polarised.is is explored in the following section by
tracing the variation of ambitions at each ia stage before discussing the tension between the
ambitions and the debate among proponents and sceptics of ia.
Contrasting the variation identied in the ia blueprint with the empirical evidence shows
that, although enhanced rationalisation applies across the policy-making process, the emphasis
is mainly on the second ia stage. is nding reects other research which shows that ex-
ante assessment oen focuses on policy solutions, rather than raising fundamental questions
about the underlying need for action.37 Additionally, as identied in the previous section, the
challenge of identifying policy genesis lies in policy decisions oen beingmade well in advance
of any systematic analysis.38 However, despite the limitations of ia’s role during the rst ia
stage — such as failing to systematically question the overall policy direction — it creates
a structure for information to be collected and analysed by policy experts (policymakers),
while also providing specic entry points for dierent actors to engage in and shape the policy
process (e.g. decision-makers).
e application of the theoretical ambitions of ia is much more evident during the second
part of the ia process. For example, policymakers take advantage of enhanced coordination
mechanisms— such as issgs— to identify and collect data to achievemore than just enhanced
coordination. In each case study, the enhanced coordination processes were integral to
achieving the ambition of enhanced rationalisation or data collection to improve the policy
analysis.e case studies also showed a strong role for enhanced control during the second
ia stage. However, unlike much of the ia research which focuses on the extent to which ia
can limit coalitional dri or on how improved ‘police-patrol’ control mechanisms can enforce
37R. Baldwin, “Is better regulation smarter regulation?”, op. cit.
38W.West, “Inside the Black Box:e Development of Proposed Rules and the Limits of Procedural controls”,
op. cit.
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the ideals of enhanced rationalisation,39 the case studies showed that ia contribute to policy
justication or ‘stacking of the deck’.is reected, in part, some of the sceptic’s literature40
on how the ia process supports the lead dg’s policy preference or conversely assists other
dgs (in particular dg entr) in inuencing their own policy preferences, reecting ideas of
‘stacking the deck’.
In regard to the theoretical ambitions during the nal ia stage, unsurprisingly, the empirical
evidence reected a less detailed ia blueprint for this stage. It showed a much diminished role
for all three ia ambitions. In particular, both enhanced rationalisation and control played a
role during the nal stage, albeit less than prescribed by the ia blueprint. Table 31 provides
a summary of each ia ambition using the summary tables in part two of this chapter. If
the empirical evidence found evidence to support an ia ambition, it was coded as a 1; if the
evidence did not exist it was coded as 0; and if there was some evidence but not triangulated
with other sources it was coded as 0.5.
39C. Radaelli, “Regulating Rule-Making via Impact Assessment”, op. cit.
40For example: J. Hertin, K. Jacob, and A. Volkery, “Policy Appraisal”, op. cit. or R. Parke, Is Government
Regulation Irrational? A reply to Morrall and Hahn, op. cit. or J. Meyer and B. Rowan, “Institutional Organisations:
Formal Structures and Myth and Ceremony”. op. cit.
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Table 31: Summary of ambitions at each IA stage
Enhanced Rationalisation Stage i Stage ii Stage iii
Chapter 4 — Sample ias 1 1 0.5
Chapter 5 — Packed Sizes 0 1 1
Chapter 6 — Air Strategy 0 1 1
Chapter 7 — Postal Services 0 1 0
Chapter 8 —Migration 1 0.5 0.5
Chapter 9 — Plant Protection 0 1 0.5
Summary 2 5.5 3.5
Enhanced Control Stage i Stage ii Stage iii
Chapter 4 — Sample ias 0 1 0.5
Chapter 5 — Packed Sizes 0 1 1
Chapter 6 — Air Strategy 0 1 1
Chapter 7 — Postal Services 0 1 0.5
Chapter 8 —Migration 0 1 0
Chapter 9 — Plant Protection 1 1 1
Summary 1 6 4
Enhanced Coordination Stage i Stage ii Stage iii
Chapter 4 — Sample ias 1 1 0
Chapter 5 — Packed Sizes 0 0.5 0
Chapter 6 — Air Strategy 0.5 1 0.5
Chapter 7 — Postal Services 0.5 1 0
Chapter 8 —Migration 0.5 0.5 0
Chapter 9 — Plant Protection 0.5 1 0
Summary 3 5 0.5
Figure 25 provides a visual summary which shows that enhanced rationalisation, control
and coordination peak during the second ia stage. As with Figure 24, the lines across the ‘x’
axis illustrate the uid role each ambition plays across the policy-making stages, against the
emphasis placed on each ambition.e ‘y’ axis is divided into three markers; ‘no evidence’ in
the six empirical chapters, ‘implicit evidence’ — for example roadmaps were considered by a
very small number of actors during the rst ia— and ‘explicit evidence’ of the ia ambition.
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Figure 25: Enhanced rationalisation, control and coordination: the empirical evidence
No  
Evidence 
Explicit  
Evidence 
Implicit  
Evidence 
Stage I  Stage II  Stage III 
Enhanced control  Enhanced ra6onalisa6on  Enhanced coordina6on 
e variance of each ia ambition across the policy-making process and the variation in
emphasis and nature (of ambition) provides the key to how the ambitions interact. It also
shows that the ia blueprint’s assumption that enhanced rationalisation dominates each of the
three ia stage is overinated. To ease the comparison between the ia blueprint and empirical
evidence, Figure 24 is illustrated again below as Figure 26.
Figure 26: Enhanced rationalisation, control and coordination: the IA blueprint
No 
Reference 
Implicit  
Reference 
Explicit  
Reference 
Stage I  Stage II  Stage III 
Enhanced control  Enhanced ra7onalisa7on  Enhanced coordina7on 
Taking each ambition in turn, enhanced rationalisation is about two extremes: the analysis
within established paradigms or bureaucratic-rationality and a systematic (scientic) synoptic
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approach to policy analysis.e optimists see ia as a means to overcome the limits of this
‘techno-bureaucratic rationality’41 by introducing methodological breadth42which leads to
‘better decisions’.43 Although the empirical evidence shows that ia does promote some addi-
tional analysis, particularly during the early phases of the second ia stage, it diminishes as the
second ia stage progresses. As the second ia stage draws to a close, enhanced rationalisation is
increasingly designed to support specic policy preferences — as illustrated by the enhanced
rationalisation line in Figure 26 moving below the enhanced control line — particularly if
the preferences are polarised.is does not automatically support the sceptics’ views who
conclude that iamerely becomes a means for justifying policy.44e case studies show that
policymakers start with the intention of collecting relevant data. While this may not be as
extensive as Figure 25 illustrates, it is more dominant than enhanced control. Furthermore,
although the case studies show that the analysis becomes polarised between the policy prefer-
ences represented by two groups, those supportive of business or economic interests and those
of social or environmental considerations, this polarisation encourages additional analysis.
e ambition of enhanced control is both about limiting policy dri and ensuring policy
proposals reect the principal’s policy preference or ‘stacking the deck’. To this end, ia provides
enhanced control through classic procedural tools, but in a world with multiple principals, ia
also becomes a means for actors to use the ia processes to ‘stack the deck’ against each other.
While the optimists or ia proponents argue that improved ‘police-patrol’ control mechanisms
can ensure the ideals of enhanced rationalisation45 or that processes can be ‘stacked’ to reect
macro level objectives such as the Lisbon Agenda,46 the empirical evidence only provides
limited support for this. Rather, as the principal within the executive (the dg) becomes the
agent later in the policy-making process — inter-institutional bargaining — enhanced control
is pronounced through the ‘stacking of the deck’ to justify policy proposals. is explains
the ‘enhanced control’ line inclining in Figure 26, albeit much of the increase from ia stage II
onward should be interpreted as enhanced control to ‘stack the deck’ rather than procedural
41T. O. McGarity, Reinventing Rationality:e Role of Regulatory Analysis in the Federal Bureaucracy, op. cit.
42C. Radaelli and F De Francesco, Regulatory quality in Europe: Concepts, measures, and policy process, op. cit.
43J. F. Morrall, Controlling Regulatory Costs:e Use of Regulatory Budgeting, Unclassied oecd document, Public
management Occasional Papers, Regulatory Management and Reform Series No. 2, 1992.
44M. Nilsson, A. Jordan, J. Turnpenny, J. Hertin, B. Nykvist and D. Russel, “e use and non-use of policy
appraisal tools in public policy making: an analysis of three European countries and the European Union”, op. cit.
45C. Radaelli, “Regulating Rule-Making via Impact Assessment”, op. cit. and C. Radaelli & A. Meuwese, “Hard
Questions, Hard Solutions: Proceduralisation through Impact Assessment in the eu”, op. cit.
46C. Radaelli, “Better Regulation and the Lisbon Agenda”, op. cit.
291
JohannesM.Wolff Conclusion
control. Little evidence supports the idea of ia as a control mechanism as outlined by the ia
blueprint, or in the classic sense, where the principal holds the agent to account.47 However,
it would be wrong to conclude, as some sceptics do, that the ia process has a bias toward
‘stacking the deck’ in favour of economic impacts (through the examination of administrative
burdens).48e picture is more complicated, ‘stacking the deck’ occurs on behalf of dierent
groups representing the policy preferences of those with economic, social and environmental
interest.
In regard to the ambition of enhanced coordination which is about moving beyond negative
coordination, the evidence illustrated the limitations of this ambition’s aspirations, showing
that decision and policymakers oen use coordination to simply limit the interference from
other units. Optimists argue that tools, such as ia or evaluation, can “improve the trans-
parency and coherence of policy designs.”49 While the empirical chapters do provide some
support for this idea, it was mainly to obtain additional data (linked to both the ambitions
of enhanced rationalisation and control) with limited attempts to maximise welfare benets.
is reected a trade-o between coordination that enables policymakers to create value and
the cost of coordination to create added-value.50 In many of the cases studies, actors used
the ia coordination processes to either limit the interference of other interests, such as dgs,
or conversely as a means to interfere with or inuence those policymakers developing the
proposal. However, rather than claiming this is merely evidence of negative coordination,
the empirical chapters provide some indication that the range of actors involved in the ia
case studies did include those beyond existing networks, illustrated by the dominance of the
enhanced coordination line in Figure 26 during stage I but balanced by it falling below the
enhanced rationalisation and control line during stage II and III.
As the preceding pages illustrated, the variation in theoretical ambitions across the ia stages
reect their hierarchical complementarity. As Figure 26 illustrates, enhanced coordination
plays a dominant role during the rst ia stage, albeit thismust not be overemphasised due to the
limited inuence of this stage. As the policy-making process evolves, enhanced coordination
47An ambition propositioned by G. Rowe, “Tools for control of political and administrative agents: ia and
Governance in the eu”, op. cit.
48J. Hertin, K. Jacob, and A. Volkery, “Policy Appraisal”, op. cit.
49N. Stame, “e European Project, Federalism and Evaluation”, op. cit.
50F. Scharpf, “Games Real Actors Could Play: Positive and Negative Coordination in Embedded Negotiations”,
op. cit.
292
JohannesM.Wolff Conclusion
supports enhanced rationalisation, with enhanced rationalisation in turn complementing
and then supporting enhanced control. In particular, enhanced control — or ‘stacking the
deck’ — takes on an increasingly prominent role as the ia process unfolds, but both enhanced
rationalisation and coordination maintain a role. e dominance of ‘stacking the deck’ is
explained by its dominance during the case studies which revealed signicant polarisation
between policy preferences. While these ndings are based on the application of proxies
developed in Chapterree, the identication of a direct link with the empirical evidence was
not always straightforward. Inevitably, this required careful analyses of interview responses and
the assessment of policy background. While this ‘contextualisation’ risks being subjective, it
nevertheless reects broad themes represented by the views and opinions of actors interviewed
for the case studies, and are based on discussions held more about the ia system and its
ambitions.
Variations and Wider Implications of this Research
e case studies showed that, as a procedural tool with three ambitions, ia has contributed to
the implementation of processes to enhance the use of analytical tools as well as mechanisms
to encourage coordination both within and outside the Commission. But, as illustrated in
other areas where ‘meta-instruments’ have been used— for example in budget reforms— they
have “not in themselves achieved dramatic change.”51 Indeed, with three logical ambitions
and evidence of only small changes, ia risks being everything — or conversely nothing — to
everyone. Proponents of ia as a means for enhanced rationalisation seek to ever improve
the analytical methods, no matter how modest the change may be, claiming that if only
implemented ‘properly’, ia can yield much ‘better’ policy solutions.52 Sceptics on the other
hand will argue that advances to enhanced rationalisation will always be tempered because
the ambition of enhanced control will “put community [or cultural / social values] above
policy”53 or synoptic analysis.
e tension between proponents and sceptics of ia raises a further question. In the con-
text of the broad concept of public policy — which includes “anything that government
51P. Joyce, “e Reiterative Nature of Budget Reform: Is there Anything New in Federal Budgeting?”, op. cit.
52For example: N. Lee and C. Kirkpatrick, “Integrated impact assessment”, op. cit. or C. Cecot, R. Hahn, and A.
Renda, “A Statistical Analysis of the Quality of the Impact Assessment in the European Union”, op. cit.
53H. Heclo and A. Wildavsky,e private government of public money, op. cit.
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chooses to do or not to do”54 — can ‘meta-instruments’ change the policy process? is
thesis has shown that ia has advanced changes which support the ambitions of enhanced
rationalisation and coordination. But do these advances risk ia simply being labelled another
‘meta-instrument’ which will become side-lined as ‘political considerations’ take precedence?
While the contradictions between the three ia ambitions are avoided through trade-os across
the policy-making process, the tensions between advances in enhanced rationalisation and
control are more dicult to reconcile. In the context of an individual ia process, the tension
between enhanced rationalisation — whereby technical assessments are conducted at the
expense of less or even unquantiable values55 — and enhanced control — which in essence
seeks to represent these unquantiable values — is solved by the hierarchy of ambitions. How-
ever, this tension is amplied in the wider context of ‘meta-instruments’, particularly as the
“incessant drive towards synoptic legibility [by] installing systems of comprehensive reporting
and surveillance over numerous social spheres”56 increases. Indeed, the ia Guidance and eu
ia system have changed since the start of this research.ese changes are promoted as further
‘improvements’ to the rationalisation of the ia system through an increase in the centralisation
of regulatory functions,57 illustrated by the introduction of new control mechanism (i.e. the
new control function of the ia Board inside the Commission).
While this thesis has not focused exclusively on the above tension, the application of the
three-staged approach and the tracing of the ia process shed light on how this may develop.
By examining the theoretical ambitions as scales between two extremes — not absolutes —
and acknowledging their changing role across the policy-making process, this thesis showed
the need for a more nuanced approach toward ia and public policy more generally. While this
nding does not provide a conclusive claim that ia is ‘evolving’ or ‘developing’, the empirical
evidence does show that all three ambitions are reected in the ia policy process and resolves
the tension through the idea of ‘hierarchy’. However, as decision and policymakers continue
to change or up-date ia processes and tools, the tension between the dierent ambitions is
going to increase. Indeed, picking up on the rst chapter’s overview of the 30 year evolution
of the eu’s ia system, the three ambitions — but in particular ia as a means for enhanced
54T. Dye, Understanding Public Policy, 7th Edition, op. cit.
55C. Hood, “Emerging Issues in Public Administrations”, op. cit.
56M. Moran,e British Regulatory State: High Modernism and Hyper-Innovation, op. cit.
57oecd, Indicators of Regulatory Management System, op. cit.
294
JohannesM.Wolff Conclusion
rationalisation and control — are showing elements of simple, disjointed as well as strategic
changes.58
In the context of enhanced rationalisation, the case studies showed that policymakers
have increased the application of analytical methods and tools. Indeed, the evolution of the
ia system over the past 30 years is reminiscent of the idea of ‘simple rationality’,59 with an
incremental development of analytical tools to assess environmental and business impacts.
e picture in regard to enhanced control is more mixed. For example, the case studies
provided evidence to support the notion that procedural rules were ‘strategically’ promoted
to support each of the ideological preferences of business and environmental supporters.
However, the evidence also shows that the ambition of enhanced control illustrates little or
perhaps ‘disjointed ‘change, particularly as ia has failed to be used as a means for enhanced
institutional or procedural control. While brief, this evidence provides a start to undertake
a more thorough examination of the interplay and tension between ambitions over a much
longer time-frame. What it shows is that the ambitions of enhanced rationalisation and
enhanced control, in particular ‘stacking the deck’, are not new, raising the question of whether
the culmination of ambitions into one process can contribute to advancing dierent ambitions.
In the case of the eu’s ia system, this seems to be the case, albeit under the dominance of
‘stacking of the deck’ on the part of multiple decision-makers.
For policymakers seeking to advance any of the three theoretical ambitions, this thesis
showed the limitation of seeking to ever-improve analytical tools and acknowledges the
challenges of informational learning, particularly in the context of the substantive ends they
seek to achieve.60 As indicated in Chapter One, the parallels with the management of public
spending are compelling, but improvements to spending procedures have also faced challenges,
with the result that decision-makers have not necessarily made the right decisions despite strict
spending controls. Nevertheless, incremental reforms in government spending programmes
have resulted in assisting decision-makers — and the public — not only knowing what is, but
“also what ought to be”.61 ia faces similar challenges, with specic policy preferences playing
an important role, but this does not diminish the need for ia to assist in identifying the ‘right’
or at least ‘better’ policy option and coordinating across institutions. In the end, the three
58Note: borrowing the terms from C. Lindblom, “Still muddling through not there yet”, op. cit.
59C. Lindblom, “Still muddling through not there yet”, op. cit.
60T. O. McGarity, Reinventing Rationality:e Role of Regulatory Analysis Ine Federal Bureaucracy, op. cit.
61H. Heclo and A. Wildavsky,e private government of public money, op. cit.
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ambitions will, to some extent, be overshadowed by the need for decision-makers to justify or
‘stack the deck’ because “society is unwilling to accept erstwhile political considerations as an
acceptable rationale for administrative decision-making”.62 However, this should not detract
from decision and policymakers seeking to enhance policy-making or to grant each ambition
the space to enhance the policy-making process.
3 Conclusion and Future Research
Research into ia processes and ex-ante tools more generally, should recognise that while
decision-makers “put community [or cultural / social values] above policy,”63 reforms to
processes and methods can improve how decision and policymakers express “not only what
is, but also what ought to be”.64is has practical as well as theoretical implications. Practical
in regard to understanding the roles of actors in the ia process and therefore how decision
and policymakers should use ia; theoretical in regard to the usefulness of the three-staged
approach to explore the interplay of or tensions between ambitions; and a combination of
both theoretical and practical implications when thinking about the future of ia and attempts
to enhance the clarity of ambitions.
First, decision and policymakers should recognise the challenges and opportunities of
‘meta-instruments’ such as ia. For example, recent changes to the eu ia process have focused
on the ambition of enhanced rationalisation with little regard to the challenges of multiple
decision-makers and a discontinuous decision-making process. While decision-makers have
recognised the opportunities of ia as a ‘meta-instrument’ to regulate the regulators,65 they
have shown little understanding of the challenges of ia as a means for policy learning in a
polarised policy environment. As this research has shown, in a world with many principals
or decision-makers, such as Directorates General, the European Parliament, Council and
Member States, the use of information (and therefore ia reports) is not merely about enhanced
rationalisation but is also a key element of enhanced control to support or justify dierent
62T. O. McGarity, Reinventing Rationality:e Role of Regulatory Analysis Ine Federal Bureaucracy, op. cit.
63H. Heclo and A. Wildavsky,e private government of public money, op. cit..
64ibid.
65C. Radaelli, “Better Regulation and the Lisbon Agenda”, op. cit.
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policy preferences (i.e. in the context of this thesis the division was between economic
liberalisation vs. environmental or social protection).66
erefore, interest formation67 beyond the classic ia actors — the Commission, European
Parliament and Council — and the way in which they provide information needs to be better
understood by both decision and policymakers. While the tension between the policy prefer-
ences of economic, social and environmental protection have been recognised and deemed ‘a
fact of life’, by practitioners, there is little appreciation for how the ia process engages actors
such as consultants, large and small trade associations, as well as Member State representatives.
ese actors play a role which goes beyond merely information providers as prescribed in the
ia blueprint.eir role needs to be understood in the context of shaping and inuencing policy
preferences, beyond how they may, for example, support dg entr’s quest for better economic
assessments, or dg env’s use of environmental impact assessments.68 Untangling the role of
information provider and policy preference contributor will have practical implications for
understanding the purpose of the ia process and its future development. In particular, it raises
the question for practitioners as to whether the challenges to ia can be addressed through
ever improved rationalisation. As this research suggests, the challenges and opportunities of
all ambitions are important.
Second, and building on the above, this research has illustrated the usefulness of a staged
approach to explore the interplay of dierent theoretical ambitions. While this ideal-type
approach contrasts with the reality of a discontinuous and dynamic policy process, the seg-
mentation of the ia process provides a means to move beyond a formal analysis of institutions
and ia reports.e three-staged approach establishes a basis for comparing and contrasting
distinct analytical, procedural and political interactions across policies and institutions.is
not only provides a means to contrast blueprints with empirical evidence, but it also provides a
means to assess whether the risk of ia being ‘all things to all people’ results in overall failure or,
as illustrated in this research, whether the answer is more nuanced.e advantage lies in the
66Although this is not unique to the eu, see: e Economist, Overregulated America,
http://www.economist.com/node/21547789 (February 2012) or Financial Times, Cameron’s blue-sky thinker takes
a year o, http://www..com/cms/s/0/29b326aa-649c-11e1-9aa1-00144feabdc0.html\#axzz1o3declHq (March
2012) or B. Morgan, “Regulating the Regulators: Meta-regulation as a strategy for reinventing government in
Australia”, Public Management: an international journal of research and theory, Vol. 1, 1999.
67M. Olson, “e Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and theeory of Groups”, Harvard University
Press, 1965.
68is builds on similar observations in regard to the role of actors outside the institutions identied by: A.
Meuwese, Impact Assessment in eu Lawmaking, Kluwer Law International, op. cit.
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opportunity to move beyond a focus on single ambitions69, represented by dierent theoretical
logics, to advance the debate between ia sceptics and ia proponents. Without exploring the
tensions between ambitions, the hierarchical emphasis of enhanced rationalisation, control,
and coordination identied in this research will hold true and have practical implications. For
instance, while recent changes to institutional controls within the Commission (for example
through the introduction of the ia Board) are promoted as enhanced control to advance
rationalisation, they broadly ignore the challenges of ‘stacking the deck’.e literature should
further test the ia ambitions identied in this thesis — including the proxies — and investigate
whether the culmination of and changes to procedural mechanisms to enhance several ambi-
tions is exhibiting simple, strategic or disjointed changes.is would provide an opportunity
to explore more recent ia data and to advance practical recommendations, but to also add to
the debate between ia proponents and ia sceptics.
Indeed, the consequences of tools and process that incorporate dierent ambitions provide
an avenue for further research and an opportunity to further a long-standing debate.is is of
particular interest if the amalgamation of ambitions in ia processes is heightening the tension
underlying the debate between ia proponents70 and ia sceptics.71 For instance, as the ambition
to advance the problem-solving model yields ‘better’ policy solutions through ever-improved
methods and process, it is conceivable that this will inevitably clash with the notion that
decision-makers will (as rent-seekers) always put community values above policy solutions.
Against this backdrop, ia can play an important role in the management of information and
raises the question about how the methods and process to manage information will in future
result in new structures for public policy (or even politics). is question is increasingly
pressing as public administrations get to grips with new information tools, such as Web 2.0,
and begin to harness networks to coordinate and structure citizen participation to make
‘better’ decisions.72
Finally, drawing on the above and having parallels with budgeting processes, the use of ia
must rest on the goal of contributing towards a clear view on what is and what ought to be,
69As recognised in: H. Rothstein and J. Downer “Renewing DERA: Exploring the emergence of Risk-Based
policy-making in UK central Government”, Public Administration, 2012
70For example: N. Lee and C. Kirkpatrick, “Integrated impact assessment”, op. cit.
71Such as: H. Heclo and A. Wildavsky,e private government of public money, op. cit.
72B. Simmons Noveck,Wiki Government: How Technology Can Make Government Better, Democracy Stronger,
and Citizens More Powerful, Brookings Institution Press, 2009.
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without ignoring the lessons from other solutions to public policy problems. Proponents of ia
must hear the warning from sceptics who point to the lessons from years of budgetary reform
(for example it has not resulted in the curbing of extensive public decits).erefore, while
ia has a role as a ‘meta-instrument’ to measure or direct specic outcomes, this is subject to
political considerations and preferences. How this works in the context of explicitly dened
political objectives which steer away from broad statements identied in this research may
either become a variation of existing questions or reinforces the need for a more nuanced
approach. If ia is asked to go beyond merely seeking to improve the “quality of policy
proposals,”73 there is an opportunity for ia to play a more prominent role. For instance, the
United Kingdom’s Coalition Government recently introduced a new One-in, One-out rule,
whereby each new net regulatory cost imposed on business must be compensated through
the removal of an equal amount.74 To underpin this rule, the Coalition Government has
stated that ia will provide the analytical basis to reduce regulatory burdens.erefore, ia is
the means whereby the costs and benets the Coalition Government wishes to remove are
identied (enhanced rationalisation) to reduce the regulatory burden (enhanced control).
Under the above system, ia has a formal role in developing ‘better’ (as dened by the
Coalition Government) proposals and enhancing control (holding policymakers to account).
In such a system, the decisions about ‘better’ proposals depart from the ideals of enhanced
rationalisation because ‘better’ is not necessarily a result of ‘synoptic analysis’ which yield a
balanced or scientically pure result; rather it refers to the outcome the principal or decision-
maker sets out (in this case reduced burden on business). While explicit overall goals or
ambitions may provide a means to overcome the tension between them, as this research shows,
without understanding and acknowledging the interaction between enhanced rationalisation
and control, decision and policymakers are at risk of developing systems with ever more
sophisticated analytical rigour dominated by the ambition of ex-post policy justication rather
than ‘stacking the deck’ toward political priorities.
As a consequence, sceptics will repeat their assertion that tools like ia or Cost-Benet
Analysis have been tried before and failed.75 However, while the ability of ia to achieve
dierent ambitions should not be overemphasised, ia is more than a methodological tool, it
73Commission of the European Communities, Impact Assessment Guidelines, op. cit.
74See: Department for Business Innovation and Skills, One-in, One-out rule,
http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/bre/better-regulation-framework/one-in-one-out (February 2012).
75H. Heclo and A. Wildavsky,e private government of public money, op. cit.
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is a process that has had remarkable longevity and continues to grow in popularity across
oecd, the eu and beyond.is suggests that while it will be dicult to dene ia in a uniform
manner, it is the culmination of ambitions which is likely to give ia continued longevity.
erefore, while iamay not full all of the ambitions heralded by its supporters, this thesis
has shown that ia has also not failed.e tension between supporters and sceptics of ia is
likely to prevail due to the hierarchical cohabitation of ambitions outlined in this study. ia
sceptics will inevitably continue to be dissatised with, in their view, the overinated success
of ia to enhance rationalisation, while ia proponents will be frustrated by the dominance
of ia as a means for justication or ‘stacking the deck’. Practitioners are likely to carry on
with advancing methods and tools to enhance rationalisation. However, heeding the sceptic’s
warning, a perfect system is unlikely to emerge.
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List of Abbreviations
Abbreviation Term
aps Annual Policy Strategy
best Business Environmental Simplication Task Force
beuc European Consumer Organisation
cafe Clean Air for Europe programme
cba Cost Benet Analysis
clwp Commission Legislative and Work Programme
dg Directorate General
dg admin Directorate General for Human Resources and Security
dg agri Directorate General for Agriculture and Rural Development
dg budg Directorate General for Budget
dg comp Directorate General for Competition
dg dev Directorate General for Development
dg eac Directorate General for Education and Culture
dg ecfin Directorate General for Economic and Financial Aairs
dg elarg Directorate General for Enlargement
dg empl Directorate General for Employment, Social Aairs and Inclusion
dg entr Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry
dg env Directorate General for Environment
dg fish Directorate General for Maritime Aairs and Fisheries
dg infso Directorate General for Information Society and Media
dg jls Directorate-General for Justice and Home Aairs
dg markt Directorate General for Internal Market and Services
dg regio Directorate General for Regional Policy
dg relex Directorate General for External Relations
dg sanco Directorate General for Health and Consumers
dg taxud Directorate General for Taxation and Customs Union
dg trade Directorate General for Trade
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Abbreviation Term
dg tren Directorate General for Transport Policy
eap Environmental Action Plan
ec European Commission
ecpa European Crop Protection Association
eea European Environmental Agency
eia Environmental Impact Assessment
envi Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety
erf European Refugee Fund
eu European Union
ia Impact Assessment
iisa International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
imco Internal Market and Consumer Protection
iom International Organisation for Migration
ipm Inter-active Policy Making
isc Inter-Service Consultation
issg Inter-Service Steering Group
jrc Joint Research Centre
mep Member of the European Parliament
ms Member State
ngo Non-Governmental Organisation
nqppp Non-Quantities Pre-Packed Packages
oecd Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
ppp Plant Protection Products
pwc PricewaterhouseCoopers
qa Quality Assurance
rains Regional Air Pollution Information and Simulation Model
sem Sound and Eective Management
sg / SecGen Secretariat General
slim Simplication of the Legislation on the Internal Market
smart Specic, Measurable, Accepted, Realistic, and Time Dependant
sme Small and Medium Enterprises
tep e Evaluation Partnership
ToR Terms of Reference
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Abbreviation Term
uk United Kingdom
unece United Nations Economic Committee on Europe
unhcr United Nations High Commission for Refugees
unice Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe
uk United Kingdom
us United States
who World Health Organisation
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